ADM Anderson arrived at the Pentagon and proceeded at once
to Flag plot to investigate reports that the Bucharest had
slipped through the first contingent of intercepting ships.
ADM Ricketts in the office.
0758 VCNO departed
0831 VCNO and ADM Griffin arrived
0832 CNO arrived
0855 CDR Walker arrived and discussed the possibility of an early
interception of a non-block ship. He said none were presently
under surveillance and plot didn’t know exactly where the
destroyers were. He thought that the admiral wanted some
information on this situation right away so he was prepared
to give what he had, but IP was coming up with a better
answer. CAPT Kidd told him that a Greek ship (Sirius) had
requested permission of the Coast Guard to call at Cuba and
suggested that IP investigate this possibility.
0901 CDR Walker phoned that the Sirius was 200 miles west of the
line.
0903 CAPT Kidd ordered that word be passed immediately to the
White House, SecDef and SecNav regarding intercept of the
Bucharest.
0911 CAPT Thomas and a Time-Life reporter visited CNO
0925 ADM Smedberg departed after checking on the arrival of the
USNS Upshur at Norfolk with dependents from Cuba. CNO asked
him to meet them and he was going.
0927 CNO departed for JCS conference room.
0935 ADM Griffin entered hurriedly and said to VCNO "We've got to
get word to Dennison right away" and left saying he was going
to phone him.
0935 ADM McCain discussed plans with CAPT Kidd concerning Mr.
Sylvester having coffee with CNO and being briefed in flag
plot. CAPT Kidd said flag plot okay, but not IP and that
it would have to be played by ear as far as the coffee was
concerned.
0937 CAPT Kidd ordered that COMZELT 251146Z be passed immediately
to White House, SecDef and Joint War Room.
0940 ADM Griffin arrived and said he had talked with ADM Dennison
and told him to get a ship headed for the Sirius "so we can
cover ourselves on this deal." (Or words to that effect) He
also said that the Bucharest had exchanged calls with our
ship.
ADM Pirie arrived and asked if anyone had any positive word that we were going to activate the Lexington. We must also activate an air group, he said, which we can do. He then went into CNO's office, in company with ADM Griffin.

CAPT Bayne discussed with CAPT Kidd what SECNAV wanted in the way of message traffic and briefings in flag plot. CAPT Kidd said that we'll do anything we can to help and suggested that the Secretary not get all the traffic because of the volume, but start with the CNO situation reports as a base because they were basically concerned with Navy in-house matters. He said that perhaps the Secretary would be interested in SIIRPS down to fleet level and only sightings and incident reports below that level. He suggested that it would be difficult to keep up-to-the minute plot of the situation and that this could be best handled by the Secretary through visits to flag plot. CAPT Bayne agreed with these thoughts generally and said that he would now proceed to get the information he thought the Secretary wanted. CAPT Bayne was of the impression he had to get CAPT Kidd's okay to have the traffic routed to the Secretary, but CAPT Bayne said this was not so and that he merely wanted to know exactly what the Secretary wanted so that he could advise short of routing everything.

ADM Pirie departed with CNO's parting comment: "The plan will be ready." CNO left for JCS conference room.

CDR Stroud arrived and said he had, at SecDef's request, given Mr. McNamara the ETD at the barrier of the Groznyy, which was 227000 EDT and replied to another request concerning whether it had changed course. It had not. Mr. McNamara left for the White House with the information, he said.

CAPT Kidd called CAPT Pratt and told him to put SECNAV on the distribution for JCS, CNO and CINLANT messages.

CAPT Kidd ordered that voice communication message between Hickory Stick to Ivanhoe (CINLANTFLT) DTE 231402Z be passed immediately to the White House, JCS, and SECDEF.

CAPT Kidd called CNO and passed the above message to him, to the effect: From Gearing to CNO - Bucharest most cooperative. Ships exchanged good mornign signals and dipped colors." The message further reported position of ships relative to each other.

CAPT Kidd called CNO and passed the following: The Gearing has the Bucharest on her port beam and she is receiving ECM and underwater transmissions from starboard. The screen has altered and the ESSEX group is closing from the south.

ADM Lowrence and CDR Stroud arrived and ADM Lowrence took ship's intelligence brief into ADM Ricketts.
CDR Stroud departed for JCS with the above data.

VCNO requested and received COMZPCH 251402Z and 251413Z

CAPT Kidd passed to ADM Anderson the following message:
Gearing evaluates ECM and underwater transmissions previously reported as Newport News and accompanying destroyers.

VADM

Nielsen reported message to Beakley was acknowledged

ADM Pirie arrived and departed after brief talk with CAPT Kidd.

VCNO left

Call for CAPT Kidd from Gilmore

CAPT Kidd passed to CNO following: We have a Lebanese freighter (Zarwul) at North end of patrol line with machinery, trucks, sulphur, paper rolls and spare parts. The destroyer Pierce is with her now. ADM Ricketts has notified the Secretary and unless otherwise directed, we will stop her and search. (NOTE: The name of this ship actually MARUCLA)

CAPT Kidd remarked that Argentina, Chile and Venezuela have offered ships and assistance.

Call to CAPT Kidd from ADM Denfield. The captain's responses were: "The efforts is heavy to keep under surveillance everything moving." "I told ADM Anderson and ADM Ricketts what I said to you and they said it was appropriate and ADM Anderson told me to tell you not to worry; that protection is a function of ours, too." "Let's make sure they are well identified and fly their biggest flag. Make it easy to identify them so we can devote our time to those requiring careful scrutiny." "If it is a matter of necessity, certainly--go ahead." "Anything they can do to help make prompt and early identification will make the job easier." "Also, have them file before leaving a concise report of how they are going."

Call from CAPT Garrett and CAPT Kidd directed that he try to bring up the Pierce on single side-band and try to talk to her.

NOTE: CNO was in and out of the office all morning, leaving the office to ADM Griffin while out.

Message passed to CNO at JCS: We have been ordered to stop the Zarwul and search her--she's at the northern end of the picket line and we're trying to get the Pierce up on single side-band.

Sent urgent intelligence information by messenger to CNO at JCS conference room.

Pierce not up yet on single side-band
CAPT Sheppard arrived

Mr. Hitchcock (CIA) returned call

CAPT Sheppard passed Zarubri boarding order to White House situation room

ADM Wright and CAPT Riera arrived asking for ADM Ricketts and departed when told he was not here but in his office.

CAPT Kidd called CAPT Riera and told him VCMO wants to be sure that we don't heckle the Pierce or let anyone know we have them on the radio if we ever get them.

ADM Griffin showed the ground rules under which the Zarubri will be boarded.

An officer arrived and informed CAPT Kidd that CAPT Riera wanted him to inform ADM Ricketts and ADM Anderson that "we are going to proceed with the action they were interested in in about 5 minutes." CAPT Kidd took it in.

Call from Mr. Hitchcock

Call Hitchcock with information not to board the Bucharest.

BACKGROUND: Canadian Prime Minister Diefenbaker had scheduled a radio speech to his people and one of the central points was what we were going to do regarding the Bucharest and he wanted to put it so that it was favorable to U.S. interests. He requested through CIA our plans in this regard and needed the information right away because he was going on the air shortly. CAPT Kidd checked with ADM Griffin who said that our current instructions were not to board.

CNO arrived and CAPT Kidd briefed him regarding Canadian Prime Minister's speech and the word given to Hitchcock.

CAPT Kidd dictated for ALUSNA OTTAWA: Please deliver to ADM Rayner. Your message hand delivered today by COMMO O'Brien. Greatly appreciate it. Warmest regards.

CNO arrived. (NOTE: CNO, VCMO and the CNO's frequently left and arrived via the opposite door, so it is not always possible to be sure who or when arriving and departing.)

CNO and ADM Griffin departed for lunch.

CNO returned.

VCNO departed.

CAPT Kidd remarked that, for the record, the Russian ships turned around at 032800A.

CAPT Thomas arrived and told CAPT Kidd that he had just...
come from flag plot and said that the Pierce was heard on
single side-band stating that she was following an East
German ship and not the Zaruni.

1434 ADM Duncan phoned

1454 ADM Lawrence's aide phoned. (NOTE: Many of the phone calls
received involved one-sided conversations which did not
reveal any significant information to me.)

1456 CAPT Riera arrived and said that another ship was being
assigned to the Lebanese ship; that intercept was expected
about 1800 and that the Joseph Kennedy may be assigned to
tag it. He said that there was no ship named "Zaruni."
NOTE: At this point it became fairly obvious that there
was a mix-up in names. This ship was later identified as
"Marucla" and there is sufficient similarity in the character-
istics of most of the letters in each so as to indicate an
error in reading the name.

1555 CAPT Kidd passed to CNO: '10 up; 10 down; feet dry.'

1644 CNO arrived from JCS and immediately went into a long meeting
with VCN0, and DCNO's. NOTE: It was later indicated that
this meeting concerned a proposal of a "sanitized box" around
Cuba. There were many phone calls late in the afternoon and
in the evening to CAPT Kidd during which the term "box" and
"dimensions" were used. When CNO left, he asked CAPT Kidd
to put the following in the record as his thoughts on the
matter:

"On condition that ships carrying Soviet Bloc arms to Cuba
will not proceed west of 60° West. Then no U.S. ships of
our quarantine forces will proceed east of 60° W. This
restriction will not apply to vessels of the Soviet Bloc
not carrying articles on the prohibited list to Cuba or
proceeding elsewhere; neither will it apply to other U.S.
Navy vessels not involved in the quarantine. Duration not
to exceed 48 hours. 60° W longitude between 30° N.

1652 Marucla reported at 27°07N, 69-15 W.

1753 CAPT Riera and CDR Walker arrived and said reports
that the Marucla
had turned around were incorrect and that it was another ship.
CAPT Riera said that there was no one aboard and CDR Walker
said no chance of intercepting it tonight.

1802 Call from CDR Walker regarding Marucla

1855 LCDR Hipley reported a sub contact as follows: Partol air-
craft reports visual sighting of Russian Foxtrot submarine
surfaced at 26-49N 67-26W heading 060/10. Aircraft maintaining
contact. Time 252121Z.

1910 ADM Griffin departed
1911 CAPT Thomas arrived and said he was going to keep a record of what is going on in flag plot and make a daily report to Mr. Sylvester. He cited unclassified messages which came in voice in-the-clear which he felt could have been released. CAPT Kidd cautioned him about the fact that verifaxed copies sometimes do not show the classification. CAPT Thomas said not to worry, he would be sure that everything was okay before he did anything.

1926 CAPT Dusek made a report of the intercept situation and said the Gearing and MacDonald had broken off pursuit of the Bucharest and returned to the line. Pierce had broken off for the Volker Freundschaft. Kennedy was searching for Marucla and previous orders to Randolph to delay search were cancelled, and the word was that the Marucla should be stopped and searched when found, day or night.

1932 LCIR Ripley reported that the surfaced sub-sighting was made by a PBM from Bermuda and that if and he believed it is a new sub and not C-18.

1935 CNO departed for SECDEF’s office.

2020 LCIR Ripley reported that the Randolph group would refuel tonight and that plot didn’t know where the Kennedy was; also, the MacDonald and Gearing’s positions were not positively known. He was going to get a firm plot on all ships.

2025 CNO departed Pentagon.

2115 LCIR Ripley with flash message that an S2F from the FSSTX had a positive contact on the Marucla at 26-52N 72-21W. In communication with the Pierce which is on route to join Kennedy for Marucla boarding mission. He stated that I.P. thinks C-19 is C-18. NOTE: it was later determined that these were different subs.

2130 Pierce reported in vicinity of Marucla.

2142 Word was received that Mr. McKenna and Mr. Gilpatrick would attend a flag plot briefing in about 10-20 minutes. Adm Griffin and ADM Sharp notified.

2200 SECDEF and ADM Griffin left flag plot.

2245 Pierce alongside Marucla. The two ships have exchanged lights. The Marucla identified cargo as previously reported and the Pierce informed her that she would put a boarding party aboard at first light.

NOTE: Reasons why Bucharest was allowed to pass was political. Since Russians backed off, it was decided not to push matters by searching a Bloc ship first. This was the reason for the push to find and board the Marucla and early efforts to seek out a "friendly" contact.