Interview with Alexei Adzhubei & Rada Khrushcheva

[Did the two countries drift into the crisis without really meaning to ?]
A: I didn't quite understand...

[clarification]

A: As far as the months before the Caribbean crisis are concerned, of course, a sort of confrontation can be seen. Well, I would put it this way: potentially, probably since the 1920s, within the Russian people, and the Soviet people, and in our history as a whole, except maybe for a short period of hatred for the Americans on the part of Stalin (he was very suspicious of the Americans during his later years), there was in fact a mutual sympathy of America and Russia... I think I told you that when Khrushchev was in America in 1959, he met so enthusiastically with the American engineers he had worked with on the construction of the metro and Dneprogess... He knew this... And I have to say that Stalin once said an amazing thing: we need to combine Americans' business-like nature with the scope of the Russian revolution. You understand, America and Russia had this mutual emotional and business inclination. This trend was stronger or weaker at different times...but as far as 1961 is concerned, before the crisis, it was a cooler period for a number of reasons. When I think about it...I would like to tell you something: of course, there were two sides of Khrushchev as a politician of that time... Well, actually, he had a very straightforward personality... And when they say that Khrushchev had an evil nature, or a good nature, for example, as Ernst Neizvestnyi depicted him in the monument that was put on Khrushchev's grave, he was wrong. Khrushchev was a very straightforward person. But still, there were two sides of his personality. The first one was a person brought up by Stalin, a true Stalinist...who dethroned Stalin, and on the other hand he was a kind of simple pragmatic. His life was such that he was a person who saw the life of the people up close. He was from a peasant family, he took the classic path of a simple man who managed to come to power. And he acted depending on which side was stronger. I am sure that by that period, he was disillusioned, because in 1959...Rada should remember this...Khrushchev was delighted by his trip to America in 1959 by President Eisenhower's invitation. This was his finest hour,
the best time of his life. He never had such a good time after that. Although he visited 38 countries...He tried to be restrained, and it seemed like nothing surprised him in America, but of course he was stunned by everything. He became fascinated with Garst, and he followed his advice with corn, because he himself knew this crop, but he didn't know that it could be used as fodder if it didn't ripen. He became friends with Cyrus Eaton, a big businessman, and many other people. And of course, he was fascinated by America. He visited factories, plants and so on. And when he returned from America, it was the first time in our history when, on the way from the airport to the place where he was supposed to speak, hundreds of thousands of people came out on the streets to greet him of their own free will, not on orders, like when they were made to wave their little flags. And he saw that among the people there was, I would even say, a hunger for friendship with the Americans...you understand...and he made a marvelous speech. We had written a speech on the plane and tried kind of to prepare him for it. But then he didn't use our notes, he didn't even go home to change clothes, he went straight to the meeting. And he finished his speech with a beautiful phrase, about how we didn't know what was going to happen...but suddenly he remembered Pushkin: "Let the darkness go away and the Sun reign." And suddenly-1960... May, the flight of the U-2....I'll tell you this: when Khrushchev returned from America, he felt some pressure from some of his Party comrades in the sense that they thought he put too much value in friendship with the Americans. And he felt this in his bones, because the tradition of confrontation, the struggle between Communism and Imperialism, was being violated. He was breaking these stereotypes. And he took that into account. And suddenly-the flight of the U-2... After this flight in May, he was supposed to go to France for a meeting with President Eisenhower. And, of course, the second Khrushchev reappeared in him...the second. What, Khrushchev didn't know that the U-2s were flying over our country? Of course, he knew. They were flying even before that...but we couldn't reach them. We made special airplanes, tried to reach them... but no, there flew unpunished. And this, of course, injured Khrushchev’s pride. But, being a politician, he remained silent. And suddenly, we shot the U-2 down. And the part of the party apparatus that didn't really want these close relations with the imperialists pressured Khrushchev a great deal. "You see, Nikita Sergeevich, you were kissing them, you gave them Lunniks as presents, but now you can see how they really are...."And, of course, this second personality reappeared in him. This played an important role, in a psychological sense, of course. The more so, that in Europe tension was growing-Berlin, the Berlin Wall, the meeting with Kennedy that, it is generally thought, didn't result in anything. They were very cautious. That's not true. Few people know about it-Pierre Salinger, by the way, knows this very well. He is a wonderful person and a great journalist, I can say that he is my friend. And Rada also thinks very highly of him, we visited him many times at his home in America. And he can confirm this. Maybe, from a political point of view, the Vienna meeting did not have much of an effect. But, although this meeting didn't bring them closer as politicians, it didn't push them apart as people either. The hot line between the Kremlin and the White House was established. And on March 12, 1962, during a live television discussion, Khrushchev and Kennedy were supposed to meet. The time had already been set-March 12, 1962. But many circumstances -Berlin and so on- prevented this from happening. And from Kennedy's position, too. Because, when Kennedy came to power, he criticized Eisenhower very strongly for not arming enough, because we were ahead of the Americans in heavy missiles. And Kennedy was concerned about this. But still, especially after the meeting between Kennedy and Khrushchev in Vienna, I went to do an interview with President Kennedy, which was the first interview with an American president in the history of our relations. So, you see, everything developed in a very complicated way, but
still, the force of the circumstances that pushed the two countries apart were winning. I would put it this way. And another element was at play here. Khrushchev had a constant feeling that we should become a superpower, just like America. And we had a chance to do it. We had heavy missiles, we sent the first spaceship to the moon, and that's why Khrushchev wanted to take advantage of this opportunity. That's important in high politics, I mean to take advantage of an opportunity. And events began to develop very quickly. But there was a lot of time before the Caribbean crisis. At that time, the Berlin crisis was still very acute. I have to say, that my wife and I just recently learned that Khrushchev himself—and there are documents that can prove it—was against putting the wall in Berlin. A document, a letter from Ulbricht to Khrushchev was shown, that said they wanted to put up such a wall, and there was a note from Khrushchev that he didn't think it was the right thing to do because it would make the situation worse. And when it was done, and Kennedy came and made his famous speech in West Berlin, and then, in January of 1962, Rada and I were in South America, we suddenly received an invitation to come to Washington. By the way, we went through Dallas where Kennedy was killed the next year. And in January 1962, in a very frank discussion, Kennedy sent a message to Khrushchev that America would be forced to fight for Berlin. And he even used such a phrase: "Please, tell Nikita Sergeevich -Khrushchev- that in America, presidents also come under great pressure, and I won't be able to restrain the forces that will demand a fight for Berlin." This is what was happening before Cuba.

So, of course, I think, a certain recession in the country's development, the first beginnings of stagnation, played some role, and Khrushchev, of course, felt it. I would say that if the first five years of Khrushchev's era was a path upwards, when we even wanted to reach the level of America in the production of meat, milk, butter. But then slogans like "If you are not sure, don't even try" appeared. And, as always, this is a classic political story, when there is trouble within the country, the danger should be transferred outside. Maybe, this factor played some role, including the pressure from the military. And, finally, Cuba itself, I remember very well that when Castro, at the famous meeting in Havana, said that, before, he only heard the music of revolution, he only heard Marxism (he didn't consider himself a Communist, his brother Raul was a Communist. I knew him very well, by the way. He was a young leader, and I was the editor of Komsomolskaya Pravda before Izvestiia, and I met with him often.) And suddenly he declared that he is a Communist. I remember Khrushchev's reaction. He was, how shall I put it, taken aback, because he understood that this would create great pressure. And again, there were two personalities in Khrushchev. On the one hand, he understood that this would be a burden, and it would be very hard, that this would take money, expenses and so on...and on the other hand, he was a participant of the Civil War. He remembered when the whole world was saying, "Hands off the Soviet Russia." And, of course, he was a true communist, and he thought he couldn't leave a small communist country alone against the American imperialists. He had all that on his mind. And that's when our Cuban adventure began, the first adventure. I don't think that Americans today know—everything is forgotten very quickly—that Cuba initially wasn't particular enthusiastic about relations with our country, it even started to get closer to China, like Albania. I think that it was a smart move on the part of the Cuban leadership, including Castro, who tried to play one against the other in order to choose the best. And then Cuba finally chose the Soviet Union as its partner. And then the problems that Khrushchev knew would come, started. Then our troops were sent there...and Rada and I remember this very well because I went to Cuba with her and, of course, met with Castro. Say, we were on the plane; at the rear end of the plane there is a small compartment for passengers. And in front, there is a curtain, and no one
is allowed beyond the curtain. But when you pull back the curtain, you can see two hundred people there in identical shirts, with the same kind of haircuts. Also "passengers." By that time, by the time of the crisis, I think there were more than 40,000 Soviet troops there. And then the missile crisis. Everything started in a strange way. In June 1962, Raul Castro came to Moscow together with a military delegation. This event was almost unnoticed because he came rather often and we always knew that he would ask for weapons. In the newspapers...I was surprised by only one thing. Suddenly, there appeared a small article that the Soviet Union doesn't need to deploy its ballistic missiles anywhere, and so on. And moreover, the Soviet Union wasn't going to deploy them on Cuba. Although I knew for sure that all of this was going on right there on Cuba. I don't know why they needed this strange story. In my opinion, it only encouraged the Americans to fly over Cuba and look for these missiles. If the Russians say we will not deploy missiles, you have to make sure they don't. And I have to say, that when you, Americans, talk about this, you forget everything except how the other side acted; you forget about your own actions. When foreigners came to see Khrushchev-he loved to meet with American journalists, and I brought Reston and Lippman and many others to see him-at his dacha, in the south, he always gave his guests a seat so that they would face the sea. It was on the terrace. And when the dinner was coming to an end-I have to say that he was a very hospitable man, he was just an ordinary person-he would play tricks on his guest. He would start, for example, like this: "Mr. Lippman, you don't see anything on the horizon, do you?" "No, I don't see anything..." He would tell his guard, "Bring the binoculars." The guard would bring the binoculars, he would give them to the guest and say, "Please, look." But the guest would again say, "I don't see anything." And Khrushchev would say, "Well, it's strange, Mr. Lippman. I can see American missiles in Turkey. You say that Cuba threatens you from a distance of 90 miles. But you threaten us from Turkey, from a distance of 150 miles. That's not much for a missile." You understand, this also disturbed him. When he was among close friends and allies, Nikita Sergeevich would say, "You have to know where your partner has a blister. You know, a blister, a sore spot on your finger. And when it's time, you have to press on it...to show that I am here, don't mess with me." So, of course, this desire to be equal with others was present in Khrushchev's present in everybody, including Kennedy. When Kennedy learned that they were behind us in missiles, what did he do? He called some engineers and said...they said, well, we think the Russians have, say, 30 missiles, so let's make a hundred." And he said, "Why only a hundred? We have to make a thousand." And they made a thousand missiles, and then we pulled ourselves into this terrible arms-race that, by the way, made bankrupted us. And it bankrupted America, too.

A: And then, events started to develop very quickly. After this strange telegram saying that we didn't have to deploy missiles anywhere. It was a strange act, but it was like, you know, when an avalanche starts, when the trains starts moving forward, it's very difficult to stop it. And Khrushchev was already pulled into the game. I only want to say, and I am more than sure-and my wife and our children can prove it-that Khrushchev would never have started a nuclear war, never. Even possessing nuclear missiles. He was a strong-willed person, and he wouldn't allow anyone to do that. But it was, of course, a very risky game, very risky. I don't think that the Americans would have attacked Cuba, because if you read all the American books on Kennedy's behavior-and Kennedy acted brilliantly during this campaign-I have to tell you, and Rada and I have talked about this very often that the hysterics in America was hundreds of times greater than in our country. This was a kind of advantage of being in country where no one knows anything, and no one writes anything. They make decisions somewhere at the top, and that's it.
Well, I knew something, and we published some things in our newspaper, of course, condemning the American imperialists, but not too much. There wasn't as much hysteria as in America. If you read, say Bob Kennedy, "Thirteen Days," I was just astonished that such complex and grandiose mechanisms were engaged in America-military, political, intelligence, engineering. Huge power was concentrated to stop the Soviet Union. This, of course, only egged Khrushchev on. Of course, you can't compare the work of politicians with a card game, but you know, when one thing leads to another, a catastrophe could happen. In this sense, I can agree with those who say that there could have--been a nuclear catastrophe. Without Khrushchev. And maybe without Kennedy. But both of them proved to be very strong people. And that's why, when the Caribbean crisis is remembered now, they talk about a crisis, about a catastrophe, and I am sometimes asked who won--America or Russia, Khrushchev or Kennedy. Well, of course, Khrushchev won, OK, we won. We brought missile there and back, but we defended Cuba. Kennedy, on the other hand, said, "Of course, we won. We made these Russians to get the hell out of there" and so on. But I am convinced that it was a time of great compromise, the first compromise between two opposing countries. And they both won. Kennedy restrained the military after all. They encouraged him to bomb the missiles. But what would it have meant, to bomb the missile installations? Who knows, maybe the Americans would have provoked a nuclear explosion. It’s very hard to say. So it was a time of great compromise and you have to keep that in mind, too. And sometimes some people said in our country, especially on the October 27 and 28 – at the peak of the crisis--that we had to take the children out of Moscow. No, I don’t think so. I think that Khrushchev would have taken his grandchildren out of Moscow, and his daughter, and maybe even would have sent his son-in-law somewhere. No, I don’t think so. In those days, we…it was funny...American journalists always said that the lights were always on in the Kremlin. Our journalists wrote from Washington, that the lights were always on in the White House. And we told this story to Khrushchev. “Comrade Khrushchev, Americans see the lights in the windows of your office.” He said, “Yes, it’s not good. They understand that we’re nervous. Let’s move to Ogarevo (this famous Novo-Ogarevo)”…And the light were turned off.

[Some talk]

A: Yes, well, like everything else in the world, even such tragic and traumatic days had some funny moments. We, Russian journalists, read in American newspapers that the American journalists were writing that the situation in Moscow was very nervous, because the lights were on in the Kremlin day and night. There were the windows at the top, where Khrushchev's office was. And we told Khrushchev about it. He said, "Yes, that's not good. It means that they know we're nervous. Let's move the Novo-Ogarevo" where later the Union collapsed. And we moved there. I don't know what the American journalists were writing-that the Russians stopped being nervous, maybe they turned the lights off in the White House, too, I don't know. So, these were small things, but, of course, we were on the very edge. And I also want to say, and I am absolutely convinced, that Khrushchev would have retreated even at the expense of his own prestige. If there was a choice: nuclear war or his complete defeat-political or otherwise-there is no doubt that he would have chosen to be defeated. He was in the war...he knew what it was like, you understand. He lost his son in the war. No, it was impossible. He knew what nuclear war would mean...You see, back then not many people knew about it. They knew Hiroshima, Nagasaki, the nuclear mushroom. But people like Kennedy and Khrushchev saw thousands of meters of film with nuclear tests. Until 1963, when we signed an agreement that banned nuclear tests on the surface, underwater and in the air. And I saw these films, and I can't describe it. Because Hiroshima and Nagasaki were just pale shadows of the kinds of weapons that America
and the Soviet Union had by that time. It's important to know this. And I once again want to say that there was no hatred within Khrushchev, no anti-American feelings. Not only because he visited America, he understood the American mentality, their pragmatism and their business-like nature. But I have to return to 1955, when the notorious Suez crisis broke out, Khrushchev was not a simple figure. In 1955, he decided to sell weapons to Egypt. This caused a panic in our country, because Nassar was considered anti-communist, he put communists in prison, and he was considered, as they said, a half-fascist dictator, and suddenly Khrushchev sold him weapons. And, by the war, when the war started, I was in Port-Said, and I got acquainted with Nassar, and later Rada and I visited Egypt many times, and became friends with a wonderful journalist, Mohammed Heikal, who recently invited us to visit him again. He was the editor of "AI Ahram" newspaper. And when the English, the French and the Israelis continued to fight the first day, the Americans stopped fighting, Eisenhower distanced himself from this campaign, and Khrushchev immediately played on this idea, and proposed to deploy a joint Russian-American force to the Middle East. You see, I think he understood that the Americans would never agree to this, but it stopped the war. That's why the idea that peaceful coexistence is a necessity and that nuclear war is not inevitable...and after all, these two factors were stressed by Khrushchev at the 20th Congress in 1956. So, basically, I think that this crisis, this fateful adventure Cuba, it taught Khrushchev many things. And I think the Americans, too, because they kept their word, they didn't touch Cuba. Cuba is about to collapse by itself at any moment now, because everything that is taking place there is a complete repetition of what has happened in our country. You don't have to shake an apple tree, an apple will fall by itself. There is such a law, the more so that everything has disintegrated.. But this is for Cubans to decide. So, this was the mosaic of the events of those years. A very multifaceted one, just as Khrushchev's reign was very multifaceted. Giozzeppe Bofre, an Italian journalist, said something wonderful about him. He is now the director of the International Research Institute in Italy. He said that...he knew Khrushchev well, he was Unita's correspondent in Moscow, and he even was there during Brezhnev period. He expressed it very well, saying that with Khrushchev, periods of total absence of political culture alternated with ingenious revelations of the most precise psychological analysis And I think that during the Cuban crisis, the presses psychological analysis that this man was capable of, won. And he was opposed by Kennedy, who was a brilliant politician. I knew Kennedy very well, and I respected him very much. I have to say that it was the rarest thing. When Kennedy was assassinated, Khrushchev was literally crushed, that's how hard it was for him. He very much hoped to continue his union with Kennedy. And, by the way, the Americans say that if Kennedy hadn't been assassinated, Khrushchev wouldn't have been re moved from his post. And, indeed, there are some connections. Because there were some similarities in the way Kennedy tried to build a new America, and the way Khrushchev was trying to reform this country. But Khrushchev was alone.. And he made a lot of mistakes, including the fact that no democratic movement was created. He just didn't understand it at that time, and there was no demand for this in society either. Only a thin layer of intelligentsia... And the so called thaw created an illusion that democratic forces could win. But even now, they can't win. After 30 years. So, what do we want from Khrushchev and his time? And from me, from people like me? It's a difficult path to democratic reforms. But I have to say that what your country, Britain and France went through was no less difficult. And when you accuse us of all kinds of deadly sins and everything else, you shouldn't forget that you, too, had McCarthy and so on. And we don't have to make accusations at each other, the more so now . But what happened, happened.. [Rada, tell me what do you remember of how your father reacted to that trip]
R: You know, for me, personally, it was kind of a big step, because my father was a rather restrained and harsh man when he was with his family. And he never combined his work with his family matters. But then it happened that at that time I was visiting with my older sister, who lived in Kiev. And my father came there for a few days on some business. And suddenly he tells me, like he often did, somewhere at a dinner table at the dacha, very unexpectedly...he said. "Of course, I knew that this trip was going to happen, and I decided to take you with me ..." It was absolutely unexpected for me, it was a kind of unexpected revelation. And, of course, I was very interested and I wanted very much to go, but I dared not ask him to take me, to tell him that I would like to go, this wasn't even a possibility. And only later I found out and understood that of course, it wasn't just because he wanted to please me. He took not only me, but also my sisters and my brother went with him. And this was a kind of a well-considered step on his part. I especially understood it when were turned from America, when I could analyze everything a little: who was there and what we saw there. Because, when we stepped out of the plane in the States and were on this 20-minute or half-hour trip to Washington, I still remember. It was an absolutely astonishing sight. Crowds of people were standing on the sides of the road, they waved their flags, but they were silent...Dead silence. We, the delegation, and Khrushchev were for Americans just like some aliens from the Moon. This is how I understood the feelings of these people.

A: What are they here for? Who are they?
R: Not only why, but they were interested to know who we were. And father obviously understood it and he wanted -and many people advised him to do it, for example, Mikoyan, who was an expert in such things, he had been to America many times before that -to show that we were ordinary people, and he was a man with a wife, a daughter, a son, and all of them are normal, ordinary people.
A: And all of them, by the way, spoke English.
R: Yes, and we managed to accomplish this to some extent. You know, this wall that was between us, the Russians, and the Americans at that time. Unfortunately, I understood later in life that this wall can collapse very quickly but can then be put up again very quickly. And it happened just that way. But at that time, in 1959, it collapsed at some point. Where was it? In San Francisco or Los Angeles?
A: In Los Angeles.
R: Yes, in Los Angeles. Right after the scandal, about which I can tell you later in detail, this silent, emotionless crowd suddenly burst out with such human feelings that today it's hard to imagine. We felt that the people didn't want confrontation, they wanted us to understand each other, in a human sense. I was impressed by that very much then. And, of course, it was very interesting for me, it was the same kind of discovery for me as for an American to see a Soviet premier. And there were some moments...it was my first visit to America—after that I was there several times, but that time was my first. Everything was very interesting... Well, say, the minute we stepped out of the plane. They gave us an agenda and we weren't accustomed to this. The very same evening, Eisenhower gave a reception in the White House after such a difficult flight. And I remember, when a very big handsome man approached me, I think it was a marine from the presidential guard, and I had to take him by the arm to be brought into the room, it took me some time to understand what was happening.
A: Before that, there was another story. Even before Rada's trip. By the way, in 1964 at a plenary meeting, when Khrushchev was removed from his power, he was criticized for this trip and the fact that he took his family with him. They screamed, "Look at him, he dragged the
whole family to America." But before that there was another funny incident. Before the trip, Khrushchev knew that he would go, a very well-known American-Canadian photographer Karsh. He was very well-known. And he said that he wanted to take pictures of the government and of the Russian elite. Americans had never seen anything of the sort. And when Khrushchev was told that this American photographer had come and wanted to take pictures and so on, he, being a Communist who was against any kind of publicity, said, "No, the hell with him." But Mikoyan told him, "Nikita, you'd better do it. They have never seen you. They think that you have a tail." So, Karsh came, and Nikita Sergeevich was a kind person, and a polite person, you know, peasant up-bringing is very civil. And I think, that this photographer made Khrushchev put a warm mink coat in the middle of summer. It's a famous portrait by Karsh, he made several portraits – John the 23rd, Hemingway, and Khrushchev in this mink coat – supposedly it was minus 40. It was 30 degrees Celsius above zero outside. And then the “Life” magazine came out, it was completely dedicated to Russian people, and he understood that he had to prepare for it.

R: And during the trip, it was very interesting. Of course, at home, I saw journalists all the time, they often came to our house on Sundays. So, of course, I saw my father during such conversations, but there it was thousand times more intense. A crowd of journalists from all over the world was traveling with him. And it was interesting for him, and he enjoyed talking with them. And the more intense the talk was, the more interesting it was for him. Say, we were traveling on a tourist train on some two-hour trip, and he'd be sitting in his seat, and all the journalists would be literally hanging from above and asking their questions. Well, I have to say that I was lucky, I think I didn't hear any unfriendly, bitter conversations or questions with some unfriendly implications. As a rule, although there were very direct questions, in general they were very business-like and friendly conversations. And this was very interesting. That's why I remember very well, when we visited with Garst, and when these crowds of journalists ran across these fields, and they walked and discussed the corn. So, it was for him..I think that for him it was a kind of confirmation of what America was like..

TAPE 2, SIDE 1
A: And our country is getting worse all the time.
R: It's like a particular period has ended.
A: It didn't work out.
R: Something new should begin. You would think that this new thing would be a step forward. But unfortunately it turned out to be slide backwards.
A: Like we're just standing in one spot. Although I'd say that if you read the reminiscences of people who were close to the leaders, well, Stalin's circle are constantly writing about what a wonderful person, Bruk, for example, how he gave rides to old ladies. There was a marvelous Soviet writer, Ginzburg, and he had a wonderful book of essays, "Meeting on the other side," and he began to seek out people who had been close to Hitler. Stenographers, mechanics, cooks, chauffeurs, and they all said, "He was wonderful, intelligent, kind." So you have to take it with a grain of salt. But at the same time I wasn't just Khrushchev's son-in-law. I worked at that time and was the editor of a major newspaper. And I was shocked by some things, and I was ashamed of it, of some of Khrushchev's decision. But for me undoubtedly one thing sticks out: in those ten years, the first hints arose that something had to be changed, understand, that the system was skidding to a halt. There's one very important detail that no one pays attention to, but it's worth it to tell Americans about it: In 1963, when things were truly bad here, with a bad harvest in that year, price increases for bread, and meat just that much-in comparison with today’s price
increases, it was just a few kopecks, but still... At that time, a letter came from a very famous market economist, Yevsei Grigorievich Lieberman. Quite a long letter addressed to Khrushchev. Well, it took a lot of courage to write that kind of letter, because Khrushchev was just merciless in this area. Once, Rada, who is basically a biologist by training, had a huge fight with her father about genetics. He criticized Rada, saying that she'd fallen under the influence of the geneticists, because he really supported Lysenko. So there were fights sometimes. To write that kind of letter and send it to Khrushchev...he was surrounded by a tight orthodox group, Suslov, Ponamaryov, Fedoseev, Ilyichov, who were for the planned economy, for the system and so forth. And still he sent this letter. We were terribly afraid there'd be an explosion. He could be furious, especially in his last year, when he was already old and showing some signs of sclerosis already, a kind of unrestrained anger, so we expected an explosion. And suddenly we receive...I received a directive and Pravda printed this letter. And entire column. That was really the first sign that Khrushchev had begun to think about the market, about market relations, that the planned economy wasn't working. Somehow we forget about this. And most importantly, when Khrushchev went to Pitsurida in October 1964, he knew about the plot. I didn't know, Rada didn't know. I didn't spend my time in the Central Committee. But he knew. Sergei told him. He told him what he had heard from one of the KGB men. And he left together with Mikoyan, who also knew about it. It's just impossible to imagine...that...he and Mikoyan didn't discuss this, the plot against him. Mikoyan was very close...the closest person to Khrushchev in the last years. So that would be just absurd. And of course Khrushchev was...

R: And then he had a great deal of experience in this area....
A: Experienced.
R: ...in the past, in days of Stalin...
A: How much trouble would it have been for Khrushchev.... Those plotters, as we call them, in the palace coup, they were quite scared themselves. Suslov was scared, Brezhnev, all of them. Khrushchev could have called for a television camera, to Pitsunda, make an appeal to the country, saying that such and such is going on, they're challenging me, and that would have been the end of it. Why didn't Khrushchev do that? I've asked myself that same question over and over. Why didn't he want to fight? Him, who in 1957 pushed aside the pro-Stalinists, Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich. In 1954, he wasn't afraid to arrest and execute Beria. In 1956 he revealed everything that was connected with Stalin, and things about himself, too. He got up and just didn't want to fight. He understood that it was already too late. He gave up power himself, while they thought they had torn power out of Khrushchev's hands. No, he just didn't want to fight. And we can see in this, too, by the way, that Khrushchev behaved honestly here, because he understood that he couldn't offer anything. And now, when Gorbachev, about whom I am not indifferent, more and more interferes in political affairs and gives advice on how to do things, I feel terrible, because.... why didn't he do it all himself? . But Khrushchev just didn't want this criticism. I have to tell you that the whole time he was in retirement, it was practically house arrest, absolutely. And he took this very hard, but not once did he say anything about any, about any political, shall we say, situations. Just once. He didn't hold back...even in front of family. Not that he gave any interviews or anything. Thank God that Gorbachev has the right to speak and so forth. They wouldn't have permitted Khrushchev to do anything. They didn't even allow him to write his memoirs. He asked them, "Give me a typist, a stenographer, I'll write it and give it to you." No, they hated him, of course, not even personally, but because he had stirred up that hornet's nest, you understand, that clan, that system, he wanted to destroy it. He wanted to, of course, although he himself grew up there. So, just once, he was shocked when our forces went
into Czechoslovakia in 1968. And now it turns out that those Hungarian events...the latest publications, the documents...speak to the fact that he got involved in Hungary only with great unease and inner doubts. But all these people like Khrushchev, Kennedy, Gorbachev, Eisenhower...it only seems like they're powerful. They're all powerful as long as they stay within the bounds of their...
R: Authority.
A: ...authority.
R: Yes.
A: Kennedy began to overstep the bounds...and was killed. He began to overstep the bounds. You remember his famous speech at American University in 1963: "I want to build a new America." He was a brilliant president. Khrushchev, who began to break up the party system, divide the party, began to stick his nose here and there...and was removed. So Kennedy, Khrushchev...and De Gaul... Well, here I have to say, too, by the way: De Gaul and Khrushchev --two different people. One was an aristocrat. But...but...De Gaul lost the referendum. [I'm afraid that if we start talking about De Gaul and Khrushchev, we'll never get back to the crisis]
R: Yes, yes...
A: No, I'm talking about how political figures fall from power. [Yes, yes, but we're going to be here all night. I could listen to him all night.]
A: Fine, your question....
While we are at the end of the story and not the beginning, you mentioned how upset he was when Kennedy died. I'd like to ask Rada to tell me what you remember about your father when Kennedy died.
R: I can't really remember the very moment now. I remember how I heard about it and I was completely shocked by it. When I heard about, I was visiting Trayanovsky, and he got a call and they told him and...at that time Alyosha wasn't in Moscow, he was on a business trip. He was on a business trip.
A: Yes, I was in Scotland [??] but later Trayanovsky told me that when they reported to Khrushchev's office, Khrushchev didn't say a word, and he told me-either Trayanovsky or Shuysky-that for the first time, he saw a tear in Khrushchev's eye, and he cried. I remember that very well. And...that wasn't just because it ruined his plans....
R: Of course, he thought that it was a loss not just for America...
A: ...because he was a young man, understand, so brilliant...
R: ...yes, yes...
A: ...because contacts had been made. He really thought that he could really come to an agreement with Kennedy and we could return to...calm.
R: Yes, find some common...coincidence of interests, that they had found...a certain tone of discussion. And was ruined in one moment. He thought it was A: Radochka, you don't remember, it wasn't all just official, there was a telegram of condolence. He sent a telephone message personally to Jacqueline Kennedy. And Mikoyan went, the closest person to Khrushchev. And in that way he made clear how he felt about this tragic event. [And when your father was in retirement, on pension, whatever you want to call it, did he ever talk about the Caribbean crisis, about the lessons he had learned, about regrets?]
R: Well, of course, for him it was one of the, shall we say, events of his life that he talked about a lot. You understand, at that time he was already old, and he was very hurt by, I would say more
than anything, such betrayal on the part of people that he'd been with for many years, people that he'd promoted. That hurt him. So, of course, it took a long time for him to gain some perspective on it. But then, when he could already talk about this and that, laugh even, he didn't have enough contact with people, so he even loved to get out, go for a walk, meet with just common people that lived nearby or were there on vacation and somehow talk with the m about something, and people asked him all kinds of questions, and he already had some stories worked out that he would tell, just, I say again, like an old person. And his stories about the Caribbean were just the same experiences that we know today in much greater detail. He didn't tell us any special details that he didn't tell anybody else. No, at that time, he never permitted himself to do that. As I told that I, just like Alyosha, are finding out a lot from the documents being published. For us it's as much a discovery as for us as for everybody else. We could guess, just knowing him as a person, that he probably would have done this, or thought this about that, but how it was in reality, he, being on his pension, never gave away any surprises.

A: He continued to be the same person. No commentaries. No details, only some things that weren't secrets.

R: Well, for instance, he said that he liked Kennedy, that he was such a talented, young, very promising, that Jacqueline was beautiful. Just those kinds of general conversations, that of course it was a confrontation, but nevertheless the USSR also had a right to have its bases, all the same, the whole circle of question that we heard five or six years before, when he still the premier. That is, he didn't go outside the bounds of those conversations.

A Of course he talked about, he said that what I would call a compromise-maybe he didn't use that word-but he breathed a sigh of relief, and that the rest of his life was happy that war didn't break out..

R: ...that it worked out that way....

A: ....that it worked out that .... And he even used nearly the same words as Kennedy, that was very difficult to untie the knot, very difficult. And he said the same thing about the Hungarian events. Those Hungarian events ended-and I heard this myself many times-he said to Kadar, "Let's begin withdrawing our forces." He wanted the forces to leave. Understand? It was the same with Cuba, understand. It all ended and he breathed a sigh of relief. But when he was retired-and by the way, that's a very interesting question. When you talk with Soviet people-former Soviet people well, citizens of our country-especially those who were close, or pretended to be close, to leaders, to politicians, and so forth, be very careful. Because sometimes they'll tell you some details or some stories and they're lying. The system was very closed. Just ask my wife what I told her about what was happening at the newspaper Izvestiia. I never did. We just didn't do that. We just didn't do that, because there was a certain political formation within the newspaper system in this country. For example, I'd get orders about what to put where. What to print. Whom to come out against.

R: Maybe it was different in different families. As far as my father is concerned, in that sense he was a very restrained person. And my mother, too. I don't know. Maybe he told mother something....

A: ...Not likely....you understand...

R: ...but never us. Even when he had retired. Even when he had retired. My mother passed on a long time ago, and now I really regret that I didn't ask her so many questions. But she never...after all, she lived a whole lifetime beside him, and probably she knew more than we did. But that's their personalities were and that's what the situation was like.

[How did Khrushchev respond when the Americans discovered the missiles?]
A. He was worried and he was furious. He was furious with our military men, who hadn't hidden everything like they should have. He was quite furious with the military men. He thought that if a few days passed and the Americans didn't see the missiles, it'd be a base and that would be all. Guantanamo on one side, and whatever they wanted to name our base. But he understood that there'd be a scandal. He understood this, by the way, because it wouldn't have been the first scandal. You know there was a book published in America, "Kennedy and Khrushchev 1961-1963, The Crisis Years." But the crisis had begun already in 1961, in Berlin, on Freidrichstrasse where Russian and American tanks stood head-to-head. Well, that was just nonsense, but that nonsense could have ended badly, too, because Kennedy warned Khrushchev that he would fight for Berlin. And I remember the 22nd Party Congress. Konyev, the same one who'd been in Hungary, called Khrushchev down from the podium at the Congress, which Khrushchev didn't like. He said, "What the meaning of this." And Konyev said, "Nikita Sergeevich, American tanks have put their guns into firing position and have started their motors. They're going to break through." There was a long pause, and then Khrushchev said, "Withdraw our tanks." Konyev just flushed. So Khrushchev was capable of retreating. I remember Konyev said, "They'll attack!" Khrushchev said, "No. Reason will win out." And that was, if you will, a small rehearsal for...

R: ...for Cuba...
A: ...a small rehearsal. In general, I'd say that when I read that book, I saw that this young American author had written a terrible amount of rubbish about myself and Rada, but he didn't know anything.

R: But still it's research. It's interesting.
A: And I'd put it this way-this comparison just came to me-yes, these were years of crisis, and a crisis is when a person gets sick and then gets well again. That's how I'd classify the relationship between Kennedy and Khrushchev, even after the Caribbean crisis. This crisis occurred when we were certain that we were already healthy, you understand, just like with a person who's very sick. And doctors sometimes even say, "Don't worry about the fever. Let it go as high as it has to, and then it'll come down to normal on its own." Well, "normal" didn't work out because those political figures left the arena. And I don't want to offend you, but here we said that lukewarm presidents have come to power in America. Lukewarm. I don't want to offend them, so I won't name them. And here we had leaders who were considerably worse than lukewarm after Khrushchev. Not because he was perfect, or good. But still he was a personality, understand... So....

[Rada, what were your impressions during the week of the crisis?]  
R: Yes, yes. You know, there's little I can say, because the thing is that I was living entirely separately with my family. And so, say, evening, morning, at breakfast, I didn't meet my father. I mainly saw him on weekends, on Sunday. And it all took just a week, the whole thing, just a week, so I wasn't able to observe him during those days, unfortunately. I simply didn’t see him.
A: And I didn't tell her anything....
R: Yes, the only thing, the only thing...well, basically, I was leading my normal life. To work in the morning, home in the evening. The only thing...of course I read the paper, of course I listened to the radio...but maybe because I wasn't...well...interested in politics, shall we say. I had, you know, other interests in life. But it seemed to me that there wasn't anything tragic in the whole thing. Well, it was serious, very serious. But I tried to believe-and still try to believe-that reason will win out. So I didn't really feel the whole seriousness. Now of course I understand that it was naive, but that's what the situation was. And the only time I saw my father in those days-and I think I already told you-was at the most serious moment, he decided to show, as it then seemed,
that everything was fine and he was calm, his guard called and said, "Get ready, I'll send a car for you and we'll go to the Bolshoi Theater." In the evening...

A: Yes, "Boris Godunov"....

R: I don't remember what was on. But I went, with pleasure, as always, father loved to go, to the Bolshoi and to the theater in general. So I got dressed and went to the Bolshoi. Then later it seemed that it was a sort of demonstration.

A: Yes, a demonstration. That was the 27th. And when it was all over, we all took our children and went to the circus. Remember?

R: Yes.

A: Then we went to the circus. To relax.

R: The children were at the dacha.

A: For a break from thinking. Just to listen. To be with the clowns.

R: Well, not just clowns, but human beauty.

A: Yes, beauty. He loved the circus very much.

R: So, unfortunately, I can't say very much. Except that there wasn't any feeling of...tragedy in the family. Not at all. My mother didn't say anything to me. And really, she could have said, "Take the children and go to Kiev." Well, let's suppose, she could have said something.

A: But at Izvestiia, from the 26th to the 27th, things were very tense, very tense. Every two hours I myself had to go to the Central Committee and read the documents and telegrams. There was this one very famous man, Melor Sturua -I think he's in America now-he was very close to me, very smart. We couldn't send a courier to the Kremlin, only a senior staff member could run over to take the latest telegram. Well, Pierre Salinger wrote, and very clearly, that if the correspondence between Khrushchev and Kennedy hadn't been so personal-you know, these letters that are going to be published -well, they had a great influence on Kennedy as far as showing Khrushchev's sincerity. After all, the final communique that we were accepting the Americans' terms was sent over the radio. And as far as I remember, it was an open letter. And he was in such a hurry that he didn't tell Castro anything. Not because he thought that Castro would be against it. No, but because he understood that there wasn't a second to spare. And we were even afraid that someone would kill that communique, there'd be some revocations and the letter wouldn't go out. He was very worried. And when Melor ran over the last time to find out what we should do when we were ready to put out the paper for the 27, he saw that the door to the office was open, there was a map, with flags for our ships, including our sub marines that had already surrounded America, just as the Americans had probably surrounded us, which is what things had come to...a very serious situation. The door was already open. Khrushchev sat by the map with Malinovsky and it seemed that they were discussing something very seriously and they didn't notice that someone had come to hand over some documents. I myself didn't get home that night. Rada just doesn't remember. We sat in the newspaper around the clock, particularly since we had two editions, in the evening and in the morning. Of course, we were worried. To be frank, to be completely honest, no one at the newspaper believed that Khrushchev would begin a nuclear war. No one. Well, we understood that even though we'd be ruined, that we'd be destroyed as a great power, that people would laugh at us, still Khrushchev would give way. So, you could maybe say that it was a bit of adventurism that pushed humanity to the edge of war. But you could say the same thing now when Arab terrorist circle around nuclear power stations all over the place, in Sweden, in France. This incident should have taught people. Teach them, including the leaders.

R: Yes, it would be nice to believe that that's true, that some serious lesson was learned.
A: As I said, the Americans want to analyze that period, but they don't want to here. No one is asking anything or making films. There might be some small press conferences, scientific conferences, but when Rada and I find out who's speaking there, who's saying what, it's just funny, understand.

[When you were at the Central Committee, could you tell what Khrushchev’s mood was?]

A: Nikita Sergeevich?

[yes]

A: Well, I have to say that he was outwardly very confident, although I sensed that he was very worried. But I was, and many others—not because I want to exaggerate my own popularity; I don't need that—but I saw the kinds of troublemakers that surrounded Khrushchev. Just as Kennedy was surrounded by hawks, well, there were hawks here, too. They stood around, they egged him on. So Kennedy held back his hawks, and Khrushchev held his back. And that's the most frightening. The influence of those people. Understand.

R: Who would come out on top...

A: Who would come out on top, the militarists or people of a more liberal bent who...

R: ...had some sense....

A: ...had more sense. Understand. After all, almost no one supported Kennedy. Even Bobby wrote that he didn't always agree with his brother. And Khrushchev was also alone.

R: Well of course he was very tense. He couldn't even sleep nights. Then, of course, he understood it all, all the responsibility that...rested upon him.

A: As strange as it is, it's important to note that Malinovsky, as strange as it was, was a restraining influence, a restraining influence. He was a very intelligent minister. He had gone through two wars.

R: He was the minister of defense.

A: And Khrushchev listened to him. First of all, he was a very erudite person.

R: Even intellectual....

A: Even intellectual. He knew French quite well. It's not well known that after the event in Spain, where he commanded some artillery there, Malinovsky did. I forgot...

R: During the Spanish Civil War....
A: Ah, during the Spanish Civil War. He even wrote his dissertation when he came back from there: "Artillery Duels on Two Fronts." And when Malinovsky's friends saw that dissertation, they said, "What, have you gone crazy. If you publish that dissertation, Stalin will arrest you immediately." So he was a rather thoughtful person. And moreover, I believe that Matinovsky supported Khrushchev, that he said, "Nikita Sergeevich, we have to withdraw. We have to retreat." Sometimes I had the impression that Malinovsky was always by Khrushchev's side, whether walking by the sea, or when Khrushchev took Malinovsky to Paris with him, and so forth. And that was true. But Malinovsky wasn't a hawk. No. He knew the cost of war. And Khrushchev always relied on Mikoyan and Malinovsky. And all the others, first of all, were insignificant people, to tell the truth, although maybe more significant than the people who are there today, who are all young pups. Back then, as politicians they were orthodox, but firm. So Khrushchev was always alone back then, to tell the truth. For all his inexplicable, confused, complicated, unrealistic doctrine, he was alone, understand, alone.

R: You know, that's very interesting for me. Pierre Salinger in fact told me, and I heard it from him for the first time, a year ago, that at the time Khrushchev and Kennedy corresponded with each other on an unofficial level, and Pierre put it to me this way, these are unique documents in human and diplomatic history. There's nothing analogous to them. They're so sincere and human, without a hint of any kind of diplomatic form. These are documents for humanity. And they had an enormous effect on Kennedy, these unofficial letters going back and forth. It's very interesting. I think that in these very letters you'd find the feelings you're looking for that unfortunately I can't tell you about.

A: While I do know because: these were letters that were sent off very quickly at night after he had dictated the m, with just a few people checking the m over, and in the years since not one of us ever said that we knew about these letters. And there were some amazing phrases there that we didn't correct, some mistakes in grammar or choice of words; they weren't written grammatically. "Mr. President," I remember. "Is it really possible that we can't put our heads together and come up with a reasonable solution?" You can't say that in Russian. You can say, "Can't we think about this together?" But he said, "No, no. Leave 'put our heads together.'" Well, such small things. And Kennedy evidently sensed that Khrushchev himself wanted to get out this hole. Khrushchev didn't lose personally, as a political figure. Well, in front of the hawks, yes, of course. For them he was a non-person. When he decided to compromise with Kennedy, he signed his own sentence and his opponents decided to have nothing to do with him. Well, maybe Kennedy signed his own death sentence, I don't know. It's the terrible fate of reformers, whether they're in the church, or communism, or capitalism, for all reformers. It's a terrible fate.

Remember I said something about De Gaul. Well, this has a direct connection to this. He was a reformer, too. Or John the 23rd. There were three people then who want to change things: John, the Pope; Kennedy; and Khrushchev. And all of them were brought down. And so I'm grateful to you for this conversation about that time, which was also my time. With all our mistakes and miscalculations. And repentance, too. Without any repentance for everything that passed, there won't be any renaissance here. No. And again we'll face catastrophe, I don't know, nuclear or starvation, whatever.

[Rada, you said that you hoped there were lessons from the crisis. Do you think your father drew any lessons from the crisis?]
R: Yes, undoubtedly, I think so. Of course. That was probably one of...well, not probably, but definitely, the most tragic, shall we say political of his time as leader...of the time when he was in power. Undoubtedly. But, you know, along with what Alyosha already said several times, when that same Mao Tsedong said, "Well, so what, nuclear war will kill 10 million or 30 million. No big deal." Father, well, not only never said anything of the kind, there was never the sense that he was ready to pay any price to spread the doctrines that he believed in absolutely, sincerely and without reservation.

A: He just wanted to give people a little apartment, feed people, give them free lunches and that was enough.

R: No, well, that of course was the main thing for him. That was the most important thing, but not war, not war. Not seizing Europe, spreading socialism. Anyway, that's the feeling that I had from the time that I knew him, what he spoke about, what he dreamed about.

A: So he might have had a certain role in certain organizations, when today certain things are perceived as great discoveries, well, Heavens, it's just laughable. OK, so there existed an International Fund for Assisting Communists. Just like I suspect the Christian Democrats give support. Honest or dishonest, that's another question. At the expense of the state, out of the Party's funds, that's all correct. But...that was then and there; they were people of that time, understand, and even now when we want to completely cross out everything that happened under Stalin, I also say, yes, yes, it was a terrible time. But I told you already that I could name hundreds of brilliant people from that time: Shostakovich, Ulanova, Tvardovsky. God! And Solzhenitsyn and Korolyov and Yangele. Yefremov, Tovstonogov, Lyubimov. They're all from that time. Aksyonov, Maksimov.

END OF TAPE 2, SIDE 1
TAPE 2, SIDE 2

[Rada, why did you father have those feelings about war, where did those feelings come from?]

R: Well, you understand, again, I can only think about how I perceived my father's attitude toward war. Of course, first of all, he already wasn't very young at that time, not very young at all. He already had his entire life behind him, and a difficult life at that, and at that time he had already been through two wars, the Civil War that we had here. He didn't fight in World War One; as a miner he was excused from service in Tsarist Russia. And he went through the whole war, what we call the Great Patriotic War, that is, the war against fascism, literally from the first day...he joined up and went off to the front...to the very last day of the war. [And of course he was very lucky in this war. Over all those several years, he didn't get even one scrape, although several times his transport was hit, and the driver was wounded, and so forth and so on. But he was at Stalingrad. Can you imagine what that was like from the first to the last day. He went through that whole retreat. Well, in short, he saw all the horrors of war, he didn't just hear about them in Moscow, but saw them with his own eyes. And he sat through the whole battle of Stalingrad in a foxhole at the command center. I think that really did have a serious effect on him. Well, and you asked whether he talked about the Caribbean Crisis when he was retired.
Well, I don't remember that he talked much about the Caribbean crisis, but he did talk about the war. And the same way, he had several stories. About Stalingrad. About the Battle of Kursk. About all the most terrible of those battles. And he remembered how he went about all those fields around Stalingrad with Zhukov. And in all his stories you'd always find the same, I'd say, motif, or hint...after all, Zhukov was of course a very talented person, but as a person he was very harsh. Everybody knew that and said that. But in spite of all that, father liked Zhukov and they were friends for many years, even during the war. But he never liked Zhukov’s harshness toward people, that is, he himself had a different attitude toward people. He felt sorry for people. He felt sorry for them, without a doubt. And he thought that maybe the socialist ideal was utopian, to make people happy in every way, but he believed in it, and he served the ideal, he served it. So in this case, I think that he knew very well what war was like. And I say again, he didn't make that kind of calculation, as far as I could see, that, well, let Europe perish, but socialism will at least be victorious. He didn't except that idea.

A: He'd be just horrified as he told a certain story about Zhukov, although he valued him very much, that when they were at Stalingrad, at the end, when it was over, they were giving up Stalingrad, they understood that it was over, when Mannstein was moving toward the surrounded forces, and the wounded were moving back from the front, well, no one can imagine what it was like on the burning step, these little people bending under their rifles, and this soldier is staggering by, covered with blood, and Zhukov suddenly jumps out of his car, grabs him by his collar, shakes him and says, "Retreating?!" And Nikita Sergeevich says, "Stop it, Marshal. What are you doing?" And the soldier says, "No, I'm not retreating. The ones who are back there are just lying there, they're not moving. But I'm going to take up a new firing position." That's how the soldier answered, and that just stunned Khrushchev. So he had seen the horror of war, and he didn't really want a war with America. And he understood that we would lose, of course. He understood that America was stronger, without a doubt. But on the other hand, I say again, he had within him the ambition of a person equaled America if only in the fact that began to call us a superpower. There were two superpowers. And Soviet Russia became a superpower under Khrushchev, not under Stalin. A superpower. And now we aren't any power at all.

R: Why not? We're a small power.

A: No...

[Last question. You have a picture of the helicopter going from Sheremetyevo to the Kremlin. When I first met you, you told me that story. Please....]

A: Yes, yes Nikita Sergeevich never praised anything when he was in America. He was very restrained, although when we were alone he 'd say, "Look at what the Americans are doing! Look at how they've organized everything." But only to a very narrow circle so as not to show everybody in public that his mouth was hanging open in surprise. Although he was very surprised. And so, he and Eisenhower flew to Camp David by helicopter. And that was very convenient, because you didn't have to deal with traffic, traffic jams, guards and all. He didn't like it when you had to stop traffic and so on. And he rode several times with Eisenhower in the helicopter, just hip hop and they were there at Camp David, and he made his aides, including
yours truly, when we were coming from abroad, fly to the Kremlin by helicopter, and he also liked to fly... But he had his own helicopter so that we all wouldn't die at once. And we had our own. I have a photograph with Troyanovskiy and me coming out of the helicopter near that famous Kremlin bell tower...what's it called...Uspensky Cathedral. But then the military men said he shouldn't go by helicopter, and he asked why not. Ours aren't very reliable, our helicopters. And that killed his love for his American experience. He stopped flying on helicopters. But, you know, along with that, Nikita Sergeevich met our auto makers there in America, engineers, designers, and they told him...he was a rather stingy man, I have to say...and they told him, "Nikita Sergeevich, what automobiles they have here in America. Unbelievable! We don't have anything! Well, if only so we could see how they're built, and so forth. He said, "Buy some, buy some!" So they decided to buy some, you know, an Oldsmobile, Ford and the like, the average ones. And then the director of the automobile factory comes up to him and says, "It's not as simple as that." "What do you mean?" he said. "You have to order a car and wait three months." He was quite surprised, because it seemed to us like you could just walk up and buy one. Well, it wasn't quite like that, at least then. And even when we had two children, I wanted to buy that kind of bunkbed in America, and I went to the store and they said, "Mr. Adzhubei, we'll send it to you from the factory in two months." And so forth. And so then he said, "Well, buy one from...you know, that kind of rental company." He really wanted to get a hold of a car so our people could look at it, because he knew that our cars weren't as good. Well, you know, he got a great deal from his American experience, and from everywhere. He first saw those underground pedestrian crossings in Moscow when he was in Vienna, and right away he started digging underground crossings. You see, he was a...practical person. Maybe even high politics were...well, not to much for him... but I think that he didn't need it...He suffered too much from it. But when it was something practical, he just came alive. That's how we remember him.

[Thank you!]