Key to Exemptions
1. Executive Order 13526 section 3.3 (b)(1)
2. Executive Order 13526 section 3.3 (b)(6)
3. Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C., section 403g)
4. 5 U.S.C. section 522 (b)(3), the Freedom of Information Act
5. 5 U.S.C. section 522 (b)(6)
6. 5 U.S.C. section 522 (b)(7)(C)
7. 5 U.S.C. section 522 (b)(7)(E)
30 October 1987

THE JONATHAN JAY POLLARD ESPIONAGE CASE:
A DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

Study Director:

WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND
METHODS INVOLVED

TOP SECRET
Preface

This study, undertaken by the Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis Committee (DDAC) at the direction of the Director of Central Intelligence, is one of two assessments of damage undertaken as a result of Jonathan Pollard's espionage on behalf of Israel during 1984-85, which are being issued almost simultaneously. The other is an assessment prepared for the Department of Defense by the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Naval Investigative Service, Naval Security and Investigative Command, where Pollard was employed during his espionage career. The principal drafters consulted closely during preparation of the two studies. Although they differ somewhat in detail and emphasis, there is mutual agreement concerning their findings.

The Study Director gratefully acknowledges the valuable assistance of contributors from throughout the Intelligence Community to the project.
The Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case:
A Damage Assessment

Executive Summary

1. Jonathan Pollard's short but intensive espionage career on behalf of Israel lasted from June 1984 until his arrest on 21 November 1985. He pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit espionage on 5 June 1986 and was sentenced to life imprisonment on 4 March 1987. Following his guilty plea, which arose from a plea bargain, Pollard cooperated with US Government investigators, including officials of the Intelligence Community. Extensive post-plea debriefings of Pollard, aided by a review of document-receipt records, yielded an extensive account of Pollard's espionage objectives, activities, and compromised documents. A series of polygraph interviews tended to confirm that his cooperation with US authorities was bona fide.

Personal History and Espionage Career

2. Although Pollard was regarded by his former college professors and colleagues in naval intelligence as a capable—if eccentric—scholar and intelligence analyst, his personal and employment history is replete with incidents of irresponsible behavior that point to significant emotional instability. For
example, although Pollard earned a 3.5 grade point average as a Stanford undergraduate from 1972-76, former student acquaintances told investigators that he bragged about his role as a Mossad agent and, on one occasion, waved a pistol in the air and screamed that everyone was out to get him. Pollard's fantasies regarding involvement with clandestine US and Israeli intelligence operations continued during his employment with US naval intelligence from 1979 to 1985.

3. Another factor in Pollard's background was his persistent and growing determination to assist Israel, either by emigrating to that country or by other means, which eventually meant espionage. In his first Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing following his arrest and guilty plea, Pollard claimed that he had begun dreaming about future emigration to Israel at age 12 when that country won a dramatic victory in the six-day war of June 1967. According to Pollard, another influence was his attendance in the summer of 1971 at a three-month science camp in Israel, which featured strong encouragement to emigrate. During the pre-espionage period of Pollard's employment with naval intelligence, he claimed he developed a strong perception of anti-Israeli attitudes among his colleagues and of inadequate US intelligence support for Israel.

4. Despite his emotional and behavioral difficulties, Pollard managed to gain the respect of most of his superiors, as evidenced by his achievement of promotions from GS-07 to GS-12 over a six-year period. Pollard's success rested upon an academic background that included graduate study at the Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy, Tufts University, upon his considerable skills as an analyst, and upon deficiencies in administrative procedures and record-keeping—since rectified—that allowed Pollard to change jobs without adverse aspects of his past performance coming to the attention of his new supervisors.*

5. According to Pollard's polygraph-enhanced, post-arrest debriefing statements, he eagerly seized an opportunity to volunteer his services to Israeli intelligence in late June 1984. At that time, Pollard met his initial Israeli handler, Col. Aviem Sella—a noted fighter pilot on study leave in the United States—through a pro-Israeli activist, who was an old friend of the Pollard family. Pollard passed classified material to Sella concerning military developments in several Arab countries during at least three meetings, June-August 1984.  

6. Pollard received initial, formal instruction from the Israelis during three days of operational planning and tasking sessions in Paris in November 1984. Here, Pollard met Rafael Eitan, advisor on counterterrorism to Prime Minister Shamir and the senior Israeli in charge of the case, as well as Joseph Yagur, Counselor for Scientific Affairs at the Israeli Consulate in New York, who immediately replaced Sella as Pollard's direct handler. Pollard's initial monthly salary of $1,500 was agreed upon in

Pollard in 1978 had been rejected for a CIA Graduate Fellowship owing to his admission, and recent use of marijuana.
Paris, as was the main objective of the operation as outlined by Yagur—to provide Israel with the best available US intelligence on Israel's Arab adversaries and the military support they receive from the Soviet Union. Eitan emphasized that Pollard should resign from naval intelligence rather than undergo a polygraph examination; we assume that Pollard at some point told the Israelis that his application for a graduate fellowship had been rejected by CIA.

7. After returning from Paris, Pollard shifted his espionage into high gear. Beginning in late January 1985, he made large biweekly deliveries of classified material, on every other Friday, to the apartment of Irit Erb, a secretary at the Israeli Embassy in Washington. Pollard recalled that his first and possibly largest delivery occurred on 23 January and consisted of five suitcases—full of classified material, and that he maintained the biweekly schedule—interrupted only by a second operational trip abroad—until his arrest in November 1985. Pollard also met Yagur at Erb's apartment on the last Saturday of each month to discuss additional taskings and the value of the intelligence he delivered. Pollard recalled that Yagur on at least two occasions indicated that selected items of his intelligence were known and appreciated by "the highest levels of the Israeli Government." Pollard's monthly salary was raised to $2,500 in February 1985 in appreciation for his productivity; and he made a second operational trip to meet his Israeli handlers in Tel Aviv in July-August 1985.

8. By the fall of 1985, Pollard's Navy supervisor had become suspicious of his activities because Pollard seemed to be handling
large amounts of classified material concerning the Middle East and unrelated to Pollard's legitimate duties, which concerned North America and the Eastern Caribbean. An investigation ensued that led to Pollard being questioned by FBI and NIS officials beginning on 18 November and arrested on 21 November after an unsuccessful effort to gain asylum at the Israeli Embassy.

9. During post-arrest debriefings, Pollard said that if his espionage had remained undetected, he would have been inclined to seek a job with the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research because he would not have been required to undergo a polygraph and major intelligence products were readily available there. He also indicated he could have assumed a less risky role as an agent of influence at State.

Israeli Espionage Motives and Classified Materials Received

10. Given Israel's challenging security problems over the past 40 years, Israeli intelligence officials have put into vigorous practice their belief that In the aftermath of Israel's pyrrhic military victory in Lebanon in 1982, representatives of the Israeli Government, defense forces expressed concern about a potential erosion owing to Israeli economic difficulties and a robust, Soviet-sponsored Syrian military-
11. According to Pollard, the Israelis submitted the following collection requirements, in descending order of priority, to Pollard:

--Arab (and Pakistani) nuclear intelligence;
--Arab exotic weaponry, including chemical and biological weapons;
--Soviet aircraft;
--Soviet air defenses;
--Soviet air-to-air missiles and air-to-surface missiles;
and
--Arab order-of-battle, deployments, readiness,

Eitan provided additional tasking for material reporting "dirt" on Israeli political figures, any information that would identify Israeli officials who were providing information to the United States,

12. We believe that Pollard responded effectively to the general Israeli taskings, but that he himself exerted the strongest influence on what was compromised by virtue of his own access, interests, and collection initiatives. US investigators, with
Pollard's assistance, identified the following categories and approximate numbers of compromised published documents, plus an estimated 1,500 current intelligence summary messages:

- Special compartmented information (SCI)
- Top Secret, non-codeword
- Secret, non-codeword
- Confidential
- Unclassified and unknown classification

Israeli Intelligence Gains
14. In our view, Pollard's stolen material...  

Losses and vulnerabilities: Damage to US Security

15. The unauthorized disclosure to the Israelis of such a large and varied body of classified material poses risks of several kinds to US intelligence sources and methods, analytical capabilities and intelligence exchanges, and foreign-policy interests, including the possibility of extended compromise of some of Pollard's material to third countries.

--Sources and Methods. Analysis of the information received from Pollard would be a routine counterintelligence function performed by the Israeli intelligence and security services. We believe the
--Foreign Policy Interests. Pollard's role in providing Israel with intelligence that assisted its planning for the 1985 raid on PLO headquarters near Tunis.

--Extended Compromise of Pollard's material to third countries.
16. Pollard's espionage has put at risk important US intelligence and foreign-policy interests.

17. Still, without discounting this potential for serious, long-term damage from Pollard's espionage,
Lessons Learned

18. The DCI's Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis Committee has commissioned a separate paper, to be published in the spring of 1988, on the counterintelligence and security lessons learned from the Pollard and four other recent espionage cases--those of Larry Wu-tai Chin, Pelton, Walker/Whitworth, and Howard. Among the most important lessons unique to the Pollard case is that vigilance must be maintained.

19. Lessons from previous damage assessments and security studies that were reinforced by our findings in the Pollard case include (Tab III, pp.5-9):
   --Utility of the polygraph as a deterrent to espionage;
- Need for thorough personnel background investigations
- Need to complete background investigations before granting access to sensitive intelligence;
- Need for management awareness of employee behavior and for completeness and availability of employees' personnel records; and
- Need to devote additional resources to computer security.

**Key to Exemptions**

1. Executive Order 13526 section 3.3 (b)(1)
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# The Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case: A Damage Assessment

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I. Introduction

1. In March 1986, the National Security Council Staff asked the Director of Central Intelligence to commission comprehensive damage assessments of espionage cases that have occurred since 1980 (NSC/ICS 40102, dated 19 March 1986). Among the cases to be addressed was that of Jonathan Jay Pollard, an employee of the Navy Field Operational Intelligence Office (NFOIO) and other components of naval intelligence from September 1979 until November 1985. The DCI directed that this effort be undertaken by the Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis Committee (DDAC). This study results from the collection of all available information on the Pollard case, and represents an assessment of the overall damage to national interests and to the Intelligence Community.

2. Jonathan Pollard's short but intensive espionage career on behalf of Israel lasted from June 1984 until his arrest on 21 November 1985. He pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit espionage on 5 June 1986 and was sentenced to life imprisonment on 4 March 1987. Following his guilty plea, which arose from a plea bargain, Pollard cooperated with US Government investigators, including officials of the Intelligence Community, who were examining the extent of his damage to the national security of the United States. Extensive post-plea debriefings of Pollard, aided by and review of
document-receipt records, yielded an extensive account of Pollard's espionage objectives, activities, and compromised documents. A series of polygraph interviews conducted to monitor the veracity of Pollard's debriefing statements tended to confirm that his cooperation with US authorities was bona fide.
II. Background: Personal History and Espionage Career

4. Jonathan Jay Pollard's intensive, 17-month espionage campaign on behalf of Israel resulted in the loss of more than [1] US classified documents and messages. Pollard concentrated on providing Israel with US intelligence on the military forces and equipment of Arab and Islamic states and on Soviet military forces, equipment, and technology.

Judging from Pollard's post-arrest statements and writings, he has tried to justify or rationalize his espionage as an effort to help a beleaguered Israel so that it would "win the next war" against the Arabs. The Intelligence Community believes the Israelis readily would accomplish that objective without Pollard's stolen intelligence:

2 In addition to the extensive post-arrest debriefings he gave to investigators from the FBI, and Naval Investigative Service, Pollard granted a detailed, on-the-record interview to journalist Wolf Blitzer, and submitted two Memoranda In Aid of Sentencing, totaling 107 pages, to presiding Chief Judge Aubrey E. Robinson, Jr., of the US District Court.
A. Personal History

5. Jonathan Jay Pollard's childhood and adolescence were marked by material sufficiency, strong intellectual stimulation within a closely knit family, and some bruising experiences as a member of the Jewish-American minority growing up in Middle America. Born as the youngest of three children to Morris and Mildred Klein Pollard on 7 August 1954, Jonathan Pollard spent his early childhood in Galveston, Texas, and his adolescence in South Bend, Indiana, where his father is a prominent virologist at the University of Notre Dame. The family has been strongly pro-American and also active in support of the State of Israel. Jonathan Pollard indicated that he felt ethnically isolated in South Bend and was uncomfortable in an environment he perceived to be strongly anti-Semitic.

4 In a Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing, Pollard wrote that "the first flag I could recognize in my early youth was that of Israel and for years our family took quiet pride in my late uncle's decision to provide the fledgling Israeli Army in 1948 with military boots and medical supplies "liberated" from the American Hospital in Paris, which he commanded at the time." Pollard also states in the memorandum, "my parents never ceased in their efforts to portray this land [USA]... as a Godsend for Jews...."

5 In the same memorandum, Pollard related that "the first indication I had that life would be an agonizing struggle between competing values rather than one of coherent academic absolutes occurred when my family moved to Indiana, where I suddenly found myself confronting a community in which racism and bigotry were acceptable social practices....I was never able to establish friendships in my neighborhoods and was compelled to spend most of my time around the city's Hebrew Day School, where I felt at least physically safe and emotionally protected."
5. Pollard indicated that he already had begun fantasizing about future emigration to Israel when that state won a dramatic victory in the six-day war of June 1967. This event evidently made a lasting impression upon him; from then on he increasingly considered emigration to or other means to assist Israel. Another influence was Pollard's attendance in the summer of 1971 at a three-month science camp in Israel, sponsored by the Weizman Institute, which featured patriotic field trips and strong encouragement for young Jewish-Americans to emigrate to Israel. (S 3)

7. Pollard's attendance at Stanford University from 1972-76 was marked both by significant academic achievement and signs of emotional instability. On the one hand, he graduated with a B.A. in political science, emphasizing national-security studies, with a grade point average of 3.5. On the other hand, after Pollard's arrest, former Stanford acquaintances alleged that he was involved in several bizarre incidents. They, for example, claim that he told them he worked for the Israeli intelligence service, Mossad, and was being groomed to work for it within the United States Government. On another occasion, Pollard waved a pistol in the air and screamed that everyone was out to get him. (S 3)

8. Throughout his time at Stanford, Pollard apparently retained a fixation on emigrating to Israel or providing other direct assistance to Tel Aviv. He claims to have volunteered to work on a kibbutz during the Yom Kippur War in 1973 as part of a program to permit Israeli men to be transferred from the
kibbutzim to the war fronts. 6 Pollard indicates he decided at that time that the intelligence field would provide him with a skill once he had emigrated.

9. Pollard followed a circuitous path from Stanford to the US Intelligence Community. He attended Notre Dame Law School from September to November 1976 and Indiana University from January to May 1977. He then was enrolled in the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, from September 1977 until August 1979. While at Fletcher in early 1978, Pollard applied unsuccessfully for CIA's Graduate Fellow program. Although his academic credentials were impressive7 and most of the references interviewed for his background investigation commented favorably upon his character and qualifications, Pollard admitted extensive and recent use of marijuana thereby disqualifying himself for CIA employment. In the spring of 1979, while still at Fletcher, Pollard successfully applied for employment with the Department of the Navy.

Although Pollard did not receive the Master's degree, he began work as an Intelligence Research Specialist assigned to the Naval Ocean

6 Pollard claims in his first Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing that his volunteer group spent five frustrating days waiting for an El Al flight in Los Angeles before being told the need for them had passed with Sharon's crossing of the Suez Canal. (S)

7 classified him as a "temperamental genius" and a gifted person who worked at his own pace and would only respond to people he felt were of equal intelligence. (S)
Surveillance Information Center (NOSIC) of the Navy Field Operational Intelligence Office in September 1979.

B. Navy Employment and Descent Toward Espionage

10. Pollard's job performance and personal behavior varied markedly in the course of working for several components of naval intelligence from 1979-85. Most of his performance evaluations were very positive and he was promoted from GS-7 to GS-12 during the period. Still, especially in retrospect, Pollard showed additional evidence of emotional instability and an obsession with helping Israel.

The following factors that have come to light about his employment with the Navy indicate that Pollard was unsuited for access to sensitive national security information:

---False claims concerning professional qualifications.

Pollard falsely stated on his naval employment application that he had a "provisional" M.A. degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Moreover, in February 1980 during an interview with Task Force 168, the intelligence element charged with HUMINT collection, Pollard falsely claimed to have an M.A. degree, to be proficient in Afrikaans, and to have applied for a commission in the naval

---

8 After Pollard's arrest, observed that Pollard's sometimes strange behavior--including, inter alia, the telling of bizarre stories about his adventures as a CIA agent in Syria and being captured and tortured by Syrian authorities--had taken on new importance after his discovery and arrest, but noted further that the most important thing known about Pollard before his arrest was that he was an intelligent, energetic, and often productive analyst whose faults could be overlooked in light of his obvious value to the components to which he was assigned.
reserve. Pollard made another, more farfetched statement to his immediate supervisor in NOSIC: he said he had key South African contacts who could provide him with valuable information, and that he had known South African citizens for many years because his father had been the CIA Station Chief in South Africa.\(^9\)

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BOX

Pollard's Assignments and Security-Clearance Actions

With Naval Intelligence, 1979-85

**September 1979**
Research analyst, Naval Ocean Surveillance Information Center, Suitland, Maryland (merchant shipping analyst and watch officer).

**November 1979**
Interim Top Secret clearance granted.

**February 1980**
Volunteer to Task Force 168 (TF-168), the naval intelligence element responsible for HUMINT collection; Pollard was assigned to collect information from a South African defense attache.

**April 1980**
Pollard temporarily reassigned to position in Naval Intelligence Support Center (NISC)-34 that did not require access to SCI material,

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\(^9\) Pollard admitted in July 1980 that he had lied about his South African contacts in order to impress others and enhance his professional status. (\(\varepsilon\) \(3\))
owing to reservations concerning his emotional stability.

May 1980
Assigned as Middle Eastern warship analyst, Free World Branch, NISC-33; SCI access reinstated.

August 1980
Association with TF-168 terminated owing to evidence of gross unreliability and recommendation by clinical psychologist that Pollard be assigned to non-sensitive duties. Top Secret clearance and SCI access suspended; Pollard reassigned as research ship analyst, NISC-34, pending fitness for duty evaluation by one of four cleared psychiatrists identified to Pollard by Commanding Officer, NISC.

April 1981
Psychiatrist diagnosed Pollard as having a but also deemed him "thoroughly capable of handling the duties of his job and not a security risk." The psychiatrist recommended further treatment, but Pollard did not seek or receive any.

January 1982
Reinstatement of Pollard's Top Secret clearance and SCI access ordered by Commander, Naval Intelligence Command (NIC).

February 1982
Pollard returned from NISC-34 to assignment as Middle East warship analyst in NISC-33.
June 1984
Began temporary duty with Anti-Terrorist Alert Center (ATAC), Naval Investigative Service (NIS); worked rotating shift as watchstander.

October 1984
Permanently assigned to ATAC, NIS, as analyst responsible for assessing terrorist activities, narcotics traffic, and instability in North America and Eastern Caribbean. Remained in this assignment until arrest.

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--Adverse record with Task Force-168. Pollard repeatedly violated his instructions--for example, by attending meetings against orders and disclosing classified information without authorization--during his assignment to collect intelligence on Soviet naval activities in the South Atlantic from a South African defense attache. Pollard's superiors quickly developed misgivings concerning his erratic behavior and then learned he had lied about his qualifications and disclosed classified information to the South African attache without authorization.10, 11 As a

10 Although we are not certain of the extent of Pollard's unauthorized disclosures during the TF-168 assignment.

11 The TF-168 collection operation was converted to counterintelligence case "Operation Swan Song," under the auspices of
result of his unacceptable behavior, Pollard was examined by 
a clinical psychologist, who described Pollard as grandiose 
and manipulative. The psychologist felt that the risk of 
unintentional compromise of information, but not espionage, 
by Pollard was high. He recommended therapy and assignment 
to nonsensitive duties. (S 3)

--Lifestyle Problems. Pollard experienced intermittent 
financial difficulties and behavioral problems, and the 
post-arrest investigation turned up allegations of drug 
abuse. Pollard's rent check was returned owing to 
insufficient funds in March 1983, and he was late paying 
rent due in December 1983, and March and April 1984. In May 
1984, he borrowed money from a co-worker and over the next 
few months bounced several checks attempting to repay it. 
In July 1984, a letter of indebtedness from the Navy Federal 
Credit Union reported that Pollard was delinquent in 
repaying a $4,175.00 loan. Meanwhile, Pollard and his 
fiancée Anne Henderson allegedly used marijuana and cocaine 
ocasionally at parties in the Washington area from 1982-84. 
In late 1983, an anonymous telephone caller informed a NISC 
official that Pollard had been observed in an altercation in 
a bar in Georgetown and had identified himself as an 
intelligence analyst during the incident. (S 3)

11. In post-arrest debriefings, Pollard claimed that 
what he perceived to be anti-Israeli attitudes among his 
NIS, in July 1980, for the purpose of clarifying Pollard's 
activities. Operation Swan Song was terminated in early August 
following Pollard's admissions, noted above, and a determination 
that further investigation would be unproductive. (S 3)
colleagues in naval intelligence contributed to his decision to commit espionage for Israel. For example, Pollard claimed that the US delegation to a US-Israeli scientific and technological intelligence-exchange conference, which he attended in 1982, failed to follow established disclosure guidance by withholding information releasable to Israel.  

Pollard also claimed he overheard comments from US delegates that he viewed as either anti-Israeli or anti-Semitic.  

Pollard claimed that another key contributing factor was his concern and frustration over the inadequate US reaction following the bombing of the US Marine headquarters in Beirut in October 1983. Pollard rationalized that if the US Government were unwilling to take effective countermeasures to protect its own interests in Lebanon, then it might be unwilling or unable to provide Israel with adequate assistance in the event of critical need. Pollard stated he "walked out of the memorial service [for the marines] committed to doing something that would guarantee Israel's security even though it might involve a degree of potential risk and personal sacrifice."  

Lifestyle problems notwithstanding, Pollard on the job had rebounded from his failure with Task Force 168; he received outstanding performance-appraisal reports covering the period February 1982 through January 1984. His supervisor  

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12 In his Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing, Pollard claimed that "the principal instruction I received from my supervisor was that we should only be prepared to give the Israelis enough to get them paranoid but not enough, say, to let them figure out a countermeasure to a newly identified Soviet weapon system."
commented that Pollard was an outstanding analyst who made many valuable contributions to intelligence production. He received his final promotion, to GS-12, in September 1983. (§ 3]

14. In contrast, Pollard exhibited significant performance problems during February-August 1984—the period immediately preceding and just after initiation of his espionage in June of that year. He had to be counseled several times about completing his work on time; and he had several heated arguments with his supervisors, questioned their professional competence, and expressed discontent with them to his co-workers. Pollard often was late for work, and fellow employees observed that he often worked late and alone. Despite these problems, Pollard's supervisor indicated that Pollard's analytical ability and his retention of facts enabled him to make up for other shortcomings and earn a "highly satisfactory" performance rating. (§ 3]

15. Pollard stated that in the fall of 1983 he made a final decision to assist Israel through espionage, and he soon sought means to initiate the activity. He thought initially that he would need an associate to act as an intermediary with the Israelis. Accordingly, Pollard—accompanied by Anne Henderson—in the spring of 1984 approached a friend who worked with a proposal for an

13 Pollard claimed in a post-arrest debriefing that he had come very close to volunteering to commit espionage while holding a conversation in Hebrew with the Israeli Naval Attache during a US-Israeli intelligence exchange in 1983. Although it is not clear exactly when Pollard first began to consider espionage, we believe it was at least as early as 1980-81. (§ 3]
ill-defined effort to aid Israel. Being aware of the nature of Pollard's employment, he was proposing the delivery of classified material and firmly rejected the suggestion.  

C. Contact, Assessment, and Recruitment, 1984

16. The contact, assessment, and recruitment phase of the Pollard operation appears to have lasted from June to November 1984. During this time, Pollard met with Israeli intelligence officials on at least four occasions in the Washington area and on three successive days during an operational trip to Paris. He also established a pattern of providing more and better intelligence than his handlers expected.

17. According to Pollard, his initial contact with Israeli intelligence for the purpose of espionage was arranged by an old friend of Pollard. Was aware of

14 When making the proposal Pollard and Henderson stressed that he could earn money through this enterprise to upgrade substantially his current lifestyle, which they ridiculed.

15 Pollard could have come to the attention of Israeli intelligence as early as 1971, when he attended the Weizman Science Camp in Israel. In any case, we believe Pollard's dissatisfaction with the Navy's intelligence-disclosure policy and his eagerness to help Israel probably became known to Israeli intelligence operatives as a result of Pollard's dialogue with dating from 1981.
Pollard's access to classified information and, according to Pollard, would have known intuitively that Pollard would welcome an opportunity to provide classified material to the Israeli Government. In late June 1984, shortly after Pollard was detailed to the Naval Investigative Service's newly-created Anti-Terrorist Alert Center (ATAC), Pollard received a phone call from [6] who wanted Pollard to meet a high-ranking Israeli Air Force officer. [6] stated this officer had been involved in the "raid on the reactor," which Pollard understood to be the October 1981 Israeli air raid on the Osirak nuclear facility in Iraq. Pollard claims he immediately viewed this proposal as an opportunity for him to volunteer his services to Israel. A few days later, Pollard was telephoned at his residence by "Avi," who introduced himself as a friend of [6] and arranged to meet with Pollard in Washington. [6] 18. Pollard said his initial meeting with Col. Aviem Sella[17] occurred a week to 10 days after Sella's initial phone call. They met at a bar in the Washington Hilton Hotel, and Pollard immediately informed Sella of his desire to provide US
intelligence information to Israel. Speaking in Hebrew, Pollard described his job at the ATAC and his extensive access to classified material both in the center and elsewhere in the US Intelligence Community. While Sella seemed skeptical that security could be as lax as Pollard described, he identified the general targets of his collection efforts—the Soviet Union and Arab States. Sella emphasized that Israel would not request information on US military capabilities, then told Pollard that he wanted to see an example of the material he could provide. Sella suggested that Pollard obtain classified documents on Saudi Arabia and Soviet air-defense systems, as well as photographs of the bomb-damaged Iraqi nuclear facility. (S 3)

19. Sella established a secure procedure for setting up future clandestine meetings. He directed that Pollard obtain a listing of several pay telephones within a few blocks of his residence, also located near the Hilton Hotel. Once this was accomplished, Sella assigned a Hebrew letter to each number and explained that he would call Pollard at his residence, mention a Hebrew letter, and thereby direct Pollard to a particular pay telephone to await an operational telephone call. (S 3)

20. Using this procedure, Sella contacted Pollard within a few days to arrange a second meeting for the purpose of viewing and evaluating the information requested at the first. After again making contact at the Hilton, Sella drove Pollard to a secluded outdoor location near Dumbarton Oaks. Pollard had brought a briefcase full of classified documents for Sella's review, including a three-volume, study of Saudi Arabian
military forces, a study of Saudi ground forces' logistics, and satellite imagery of the bomb-damaged Iraqi nuclear facility. Sella commented that the material was much better than what was currently available in Israel and would be of great assistance to his country.

21. A third meeting with Sella was scheduled for the purpose of copying all material collected to date. In the week or so between the second and third meetings, Pollard assembled information from the National Security Agency, including daily Middle East and North African Summaries and a study on Egyptian air defenses. He also screened and obtained numerous US defense attache reports from embassies in various Arab countries.

22. The meeting began at a Holiday Inn in Bethesda, Maryland, and proceeded by car via a circuitous route to a residence on Deborah Street in Potomac, Maryland. Subsequent investigation identified the Deborah Street residence as the house of Ilan Ravid, Attache for Scientific Affairs of the Israeli Embassy in Washington. Pollard saw a man in the house.
whom he identified during subsequent investigation as similar in appearance to Ravid.

23. During the third meeting, Sella informed Pollard that he would have to travel to Europe--Paris was agreed upon--to meet the Israeli intelligence official in charge of the operation. Pollard was told to make his own travel arrangements and charge the expense to a credit card, as he would be reimbursed after arriving in Paris. Anne Henderson, to whom Pollard had become engaged in July 1984, was to accompany Pollard, but the Israelis did not want her to know the true purpose of the trip. To assist Pollard in explaining how he could afford such a "vacation," Pollard and Sella created a fictitious "Uncle Joe Fisher" who was paying for the trip as an engagement present. Sella also told Pollard to arrange for him to meet Henderson socially so that she could see a familiar face in Paris; Pollard, Henderson, Sella, and his wife met subsequently for dinner at the Four Ways Restaurant in Washington, D.C. Finally, Sella told Pollard to bring his latest Navy leave-and-earnings statement to Paris for examination by Israeli Intelligence officers, so that they might use it as a basis for establishing payment for his espionage.

24. Meetings between Pollard and his Israeli handlers on 8, 9, and 10 November in Paris essentially completed Pollard's

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18 Pollard was instructed to tell Henderson that Sella was an old school chum who would coincidentally be in Paris with his wife at the same time. Although Sella also had instructed Pollard to conceal his espionage activity from Henderson, Pollard informed her immediately after his initial contact with Sella.
assessment and recruitment and prepared him to undertake the most productive period of his espionage career. Several important developments occurred during the meetings:

--Pollard met Rafael (Rafi) Eitan, a senior career official in Israeli intelligence, former adviser on counterterrorism to the Israeli Prime Minister, and the person in charge of the operation.

--Direct handling of Pollard in the United States was transferred from Sella to Joseph (Yossi) Yagur, Counselor for Scientific Affairs, Israeli Consulate New York; Eitan and Yagur warned Pollard against further operational contact with Sella.

--Yagur and Eitan provided initial, detailed taskings on the intelligence Pollard was to obtain. Yagur emphasized that Pollard should seek military and scientific intelligence on Arab States, Pakistan, and the Soviet Union in its role as military patron of the Arabs. Eitan requested the only specific document mentioned at the Paris meetings, the "RASIN Manual," which he could only describe as a document concerning signals intelligence. Eitan also requested information on PLO Force 17, material reporting "dirt" on Israeli political figures, any information that would identify Israeli officials who were providing information to the United States, and any information on US intelligence operations targeted against Israel.
Eitan emphasized that Pollard should resign from his Navy position if required to undergo a polygraph examination. (We assume Pollard told the Israelis that he had been rejected by CIA.

Pollard's compensation was set at $1,500 per month (roughly equivalent to his Navy salary after deductions). The Israelis--using "Uncle Joe Fisher" as cover--also purchased a diamond/sapphire ring for Ms. Henderson. Pollard was instructed to avoid ostentatious use of his new-found wealth and to stay away from investments or expenditures that later could be documented, such as purchases of securities.

The next operational meeting was scheduled to occur in the Washington area in late January 1985.

In addition to conveying operational instructions and taskings, Eitan used the Paris meetings to test and strengthen Pollard's motivation. Eitan presented a formal, highly alarmist briefing to Pollard on the Middle East situation, which described how Israel could be quickly overrun by a Syrian attack. He emphasized that Israel faced a "technological Pearl Harbor" and badly needed access to the material Pollard could provide. In his debriefings, Pollard commented that the presentation was calculated to strengthen his commitment to the espionage operation, and it was accompanied by a "ceremony" wherein he was "sworn in" as an Israeli citizen.
26. According to Pollard, security and cover matters were addressed only perfunctorily. Pollard was assured that US authorities would be unlikely to take any action against him if he were detected, and any action that was initiated could be contained by Israel. The "Uncle Joe Fisher" cover story, originally created to explain the financing of the Paris trip to Henderson, was extended to cover the purchase of the diamond-sapphire ring as a gift for her. Eitan commented that he could "backstop" the "Joe Fisher" identity in New York; Pollard then composed a letter from "Fisher" to Pollard referring to the gift and indicating that "Fisher" was sorry to have missed seeing Pollard and Henderson in Paris. (3)

D. Espionage in High Gear, January-November 1985

27. Upon his return from Paris, Pollard initiated intensive espionage activity in response to the Israeli taskings. By the time of his scheduled meeting in late January 1985,\(^{19}\) he had accumulated a large volume of documents. During the afternoon and evening of 22 January, Pollard went to his work space in ATAC to collect the material he had accumulated. He estimated that four to five hours were required to move the material to his automobile in five suitcases. Owing to his repeated trips in and out of the building, Pollard informed the

\(^{19}\) During the post-arrest interviews, Pollard recalled an additional meeting at the Deborah Street residence in Potomac sometime between his return to the United States and the January 1985 meeting--probably in December 1984. Pollard recalled that the purpose of that meeting was to pick up the ring for Henderson and the "Uncle Joe Fisher" letter. Yagur also told Pollard that this meeting and all future meetings would be in an apartment on Van Ness Street, N.W. in Washington, D. C., Pollard received a key to the apartment at that time. (3)
security guard that he was removing the material to another building for an ongoing project.\textsuperscript{20} He took this material to his residence, retained it overnight, and delivered it to Yagur at the Van Ness Street apartment on 23 January, the date government records indicate Pollard was on sick leave. (\textsuperscript{3}3\textsuperscript{3})

28. Pollard was met by Yagur and a woman later identified as Irit Erb, who lived in the apartment. Erb was a secretary in the Israeli Embassy in Washington, D.C. Yagur expressed amazement at the volume of Pollard’s material. The accountable documents that Pollard needed to return to a government repository were removed to another room for copying, then returned to Pollard. (\textsuperscript{3}3\textsuperscript{3})

29. At this meeting, Pollard and Yagur established a schedule for future meetings and deliveries of classified material. Pollard would deliver material to Erb’s apartment every other Friday. In addition, Pollard would come to Erb’s apartment on the last Saturday of each month for tasking discussions with Yagur, which usually lasted several hours. Erb would notify Pollard when to return to pick up documents after they had been copied—usually the following Saturday or Sunday. This schedule was kept until the Israelis obtained a second apartment in Erb’s building several months later. The use of the second apartment, which contained only copying equipment,

\textsuperscript{20} To avoid the inconvenience of readmitting Pollard to the building after each trip to his vehicle, the guard allowed Pollard to prop the door open so that he could enter and leave freely. (\textsuperscript{3}3\textsuperscript{3})
occasionally allowed the material to be photographed or duplicated while Pollard waited. (§ 3)

30. The biweekly drop schedule and monthly face-to-face meetings with Yagur at Erb's apartment continued up to the time of Pollard's initial questioning by NIS and FBI personnel in November 1985. He made his last drop on Friday, 15 November. The only interruption in the routine occurred during Pollard's second and last operational trip overseas in July and August 1985. During this trip, Pollard met with Eitan and Yagur in Tel Aviv and married Anne Henderson in Venice, Italy. (§ 3)

31. The Israelis warmly praised Pollard's productivity during his first operational meeting in Tel Aviv. Pollard and Yagur met with Eitan in a secure area of the Beilinson Hospital in Tel Aviv, where Eitan was recuperating from eye surgery. Eitan reviewed a computerized listing that Pollard believed contained all the material provided to date. Eitan complimented him on the material, stating that it had been crucial to the security of Israel and had far exceeded expectations. (§ 3)

21 Pollard advised NIS, FBI, investigators that his monthly salary was raised from $1,500 to $2,500 per month shortly after his large delivery of stolen documents on 23 January 1985. According to Pollard, the raise was based upon the Israelis' appreciation of both the quantity and quality of the material he was providing. (§ 3)

22 Pollard noticed that one significant item was missing from the list: the photograph of the bomb-damaged Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq that Sella had requested during his initial meeting with Pollard. Pollard told investigators that he believes Sella kept this photograph for his personal memorabilia. (§ 3)
32. A second meeting in the afternoon covered security and future operational plans and compensation. Eitan repeated the reassurances he had offered in November 1984, to the effect that Pollard should not worry.

Pollard claimed to investigators that he again expressed concern about what would happen to his wife and himself if his espionage was detected. Eitan again assured him that no drastic action would be taken by the United States. He also repeated his pledge that Israel would take care of Pollard; and informed Pollard that in addition to his salary, Israel was setting up a Swiss bank account for him, into which Israel would deposit $30,000 per year.23 Pollard was to continue his espionage for Israel for 10 years, after which Pollard and his immediate family would emigrate to Israel. He could then use the projected $300,000 to establish himself in his new homeland. The Swiss account would be in the name of "Danny Cohen," which would be Pollard's Israeli identity. Eitan commented further that Israeli passports would be prepared for the Pollards. (3)

33. Pollard claimed that he was deeply troubled by Eitan's plans. This was the first time he had heard of an

23 Although Yagur subsequently set up a Swiss bank account in the name of Danny Cohen, from which funds could only be withdrawn with Yagur's countersignature, Pollard's arrest occurred before any money was deposited in the account.
anticipated 10-year timeframe for the espionage operation. According to Pollard, he was becoming increasingly concerned about being detected and wanted to terminate his espionage activity in the near future; however, he had not yet informed the Israelis of this intention. (3)

34. Pollard claimed that he unburdened himself during a final, confrontational meeting with Eitan, which lasted only 15 to 20 minutes. Pollard told Eitan of his concern about detection and his belief that a 10-year commitment was unreasonable. Eitan, who appeared very angry, once again told Pollard that he had nothing to worry about insofar as security was concerned, and the Swiss bank account in any case should allay any concerns. Additionally, Eitan directed Yaqur to give Pollard "a couple of thousand more" for the expense of his trip. Yaqur subsequently gave Pollard approximately $12,000 for expenses, which Pollard assumed included the extra $2,000 mentioned by Eitan. (3)

E. Detection and Apprehension

35. Upon returning to Washington in late August following his marriage and honeymoon in Europe, Pollard resumed his espionage activities amid heightened security awareness. The revelation in May 1985 of the Walker/Whitworth espionage conspiracy had led to a general government-wide increase in security consciousness, particularly within naval intelligence.24

24 We speculate that the publicity concerning Walker/Whitworth contributed to Pollard's increased concern--almost alarm--over the possibility of detection as expressed to Eitan during the
36. By the fall of 1985, the ATAC officer-in-charge (OIC) had become suspicious of Pollard's activities because he seemed to be handling large amounts of classified material concerning the Middle East that was unrelated to his legitimate area of concern, North America and the Caribbean. The OIC began to monitor more closely Pollard's activities. On 25 October 1985, one of Pollard's co-workers notified the OIC that he had seen Pollard apparently removing classified material from the center without authorization. The OIC verified that Pollard had removed the material and informed the Counterintelligence Directorate of the Naval Investigative Service. NIS opened an investigation of Pollard and notified the FBI. Pollard was observed removing additional classified material during the NIS/FBI investigation. (3)

37. On 18 November 1985, FBI and NIS agents confronted and questioned Pollard for the first time as he left the ATAC building in Suitland, Maryland. They found classified material in Pollard's possession for which he had no authorization to remove from the building. Pollard at first claimed to be delivering the material to another US intelligence organization. Once this story broke down, he alleged that the information was destined for a journalist contact, Kurt Lohbeck, who was interested in helping the Afghan Mujahidin.25 Early in July 1985 meetings in Tel Aviv. 1

25 Pollard and Lohbeck had met on a number of occasions to discuss Middle Eastern, Soviet-Afghan, and arms-transfer issues. Lohbeck was a pro-Mujahidin lobbyist, who maintained contacts
the three-day period of questioning by NIS and FBI investigators, Pollard alerted Yagur by telephone and volunteered false information to investigators thereby giving Yagur, Erb, and Sella time to flee the country. Pollard was placed under 24-hour FBI/NIS surveillance on 19 November with the two-fold objectives of identifying his real contacts and preventing his escape from the United States. Pollard and his wife were arrested by the FBI on the morning of 21 November after a security officer at the Israeli Embassy refused to allow them entry into the building. Probably, Yagur, Sella, and Erb already had left the United States. (§ 3)

F. Debriefings, Legal Disposition, and Publicity

38. The 15-month period between the Pollards' arrest on 21 November 1985 and sentencing on 4 March 1987 was marked by the Pollards' guilty pleas, extensive polygraph-supported debriefings of Jonathan Pollard by NIS, FBI, and CIA officers, repeated sentencing delays, and violations of the plea-bargain arrangements by both Jonathan and Anne Henderson-Pollard. After defense counsel realized that the government had developed enough evidence to indict the Pollards and probably to convict them, Jonathan Pollard pleaded guilty on 5 June 1986 to conspiracy to commit espionage. His wife pleaded guilty at the same hearing to conspiracy to receive embezzled government property and to being an accessory after the fact to possession of national-security

with Afghan guerrilla leaders as well as US and Pakistani government officials. As far as can be determined from investigation, Lohbeck had no role in Pollard's espionage. (§ 3)
Accompanying the guilty pleas was a plea bargain which stipulated, in effect, that in return for the Pollards' full cooperation with government authorities, the prosecution would not request the maximum sentences of life imprisonment for Jonathan Pollard or 10 years for Anne Henderson-Pollard.

Jonathan Pollard cooperated with government authorities to the extent of responding in apparent good faith to debriefers' questions—including those of the study director of this assessment—regarding his own operating objectives and methods and those of his Israeli handlers.

In addition to being witting of her husband's espionage activities, Anne Henderson-Pollard assisted him at the time of his initial interrogation on 18 and 19 November by removing and attempting to conceal classified material that Jonathan Pollard had stored in their apartment. Ms. Henderson-Pollard, however, apparently did not steal documents, assist her husband in delivering them to the Israelis, or otherwise actively participate in the espionage conspiracy.
41. During his debriefings, Pollard discussed what he might have done for Israel in the future if his espionage had remained undetected. He commented repeatedly that he had intended soon to resign his position with Naval Intelligence. He said that he would have been inclined to seek a job with the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. He believed that once he was at INR, he could have assumed a less risky role as an agent of influence within State while also being in a position to steal key intelligence documents when necessary. It is unclear whether Pollard discussed this idea with the Israelis.

42. While his cooperation in debriefings was most helpful to government investigators, Pollard's willingness to grant an interview to journalist Wolf Blitzer for The Jerusalem Post without obtaining advance approval of the resulting text from the Justice Department violated the terms of his plea bargain. In the Blitzer interview, which was held on 20 November 1986 at Petersburg Federal Penitentiary, Pollard provided

27 It should be assumed, of course, that given Pollard's record of exaggerating the importance of his qualifications and activities, his claims regarding his assistance to the Israelis probably are somewhat distorted.
extensive information on his motives and objectives in conducting espionage for Israel. He also provided Blitzer a general account, with some important examples\(^{28}\), of intelligence he passed to the Israelis and emphasized that the Israeli Government must have been aware of and have approved of his activities. The interview, first published in excerpted segments in The Jerusalem Post over several months, was replayed in The New York Times and The Washington Post. Anne Henderson-Pollard followed up with her own commentary on the case in an unauthorized interview on "60 Minutes" on 1 March 1987, just three days before the Pollards were sentenced. (\(^{3}\))

43. This publicity, which the Pollards apparently hoped would mobilize sympathy and support from the Israeli Government as well as from within the American Jewish community, backfired on both them and on the Israelis. Following a series of delays in sentencing from 10 September 1986 until 4 March 1987, Judge Aubrey Robinson pronounced sentences of life imprisonment for Jonathan Pollard and two concurrent five-year terms for Anne Henderson-Pollard. Although his perception of the severity of the espionage offense probably was the chief factor in Judge Robinson's sentencing decision, he likely also took into account the Pollards' plea-bargain violations. (\(^{3}\))

\(^{28}\) The examples included intelligence on PLO headquarters in Tunis, Iraqi and Syrian chemical warfare production facilities, Soviet arms shipments to Syria and other Arab states, Pakistan's nuclear program, and the US Intelligence Community's assessment of a new Soviet fighter.
44. Additionally, the publicity not only failed to engender widespread sympathy for the Pollards within the United States, it resulted in severe criticism and political pressure on the Israeli Government by American Jewish leaders to conduct an investigation to determine which, if any, senior Israeli Government officials had approved or knew of the Pollard operation. Israeli discomfiture had been heightened by the US indictment in February 1987 of Pollard-recruiter Col. Aviem Sella and then by the sharp US reaction to Sella's appointment as Commander of Israel's Tel Nof airbase. Although the official Israeli Government investigation announced on 11 March and completed in late May was legally toothless and did not yield findings of complicity on the part of Israeli cabinet officials in the affair, adverse publicity and political pressure forced Sella's resignation from the Tel Nof post. 

45. Nonetheless, Israeli media commentaries and public opinion polls also suggest that many Israeli citizens regard Pollard as an Israeli patriot and believe that their government should have assisted him once he was caught. Moreover, Sella retains his status as an Israeli national hero and his colonelcy in the Israeli Air Force.

III. Inventory Profile--Classified Material Sought and Stolen

A. Israeli Intelligence Motives, Priorities, and Requests

46. Israel's intelligence services aggressively seek information concerning threats to the security of the State and,
together with Israeli military and political leaders, search with equal diligence for means to counter such threats.
49. Consistent with Israeli intelligence objectives and Pollard's access, Pollard's handlers included intelligence and military and technical specialists. Rafael Eitan, Pollard's chief handler and longtime intelligence and security expert, was a personal advisor on terrorism to Prime Minister Shamir and was recognized by Sella, Yagur, and Pollard as the senior Israeli in charge of the case. Joseph Yagur, Counselor for Scientific Affairs in the Science Liaison Office (Lekem) at the Israeli Consulate in New York, accepted general guidance from Eitan but
demonstrated considerable initiative and independence in tasking matters as Pollard's primary, direct handler. Col. Aviem Sella, Pollard's recruiter, initial handler, and career fighter pilot, was at New York University at the time of the Pollard affair. We speculate that Sella was chosen to make the initial approach to Pollard because of his reputation as a leading Israeli war hero.  

50. Pollard claimed that he assumed initially that Mossad, Israel's external intelligence service, was responsible for his case.
Sherut Bitahon Kelali (Counterespionage and Internal Security Service, or Shin Bet), and Agof Modi'in (Military Intelligence-MI),

In addition to running operations against the Arabs, the Israeli services have high interest in collecting political, economic, and scientific intelligence about the Soviet bloc, the United States, and the United Nations, whose policy decisions could have repercussions on Israel. Tel Aviv's program for accelerating its technological, scientific, and military development has included attempts to penetrate classified defense
51. We believe most of the tasking levied on Pollard by his handlers was intended to advance Israel's objectives. Two of Pollard's three handlers, Col. Aviem Sella and Joseph Yagur, emphasized that Pollard should obtain military and technical intelligence on the Soviet Union, Arab states, and Pakistan. The Israelis wanted to be informed of technological advances in Arab military inventories; for example, they wanted Pollard to provide them with information on Soviet reactive-armor technology and on
advanced Soviet SAM systems so they could prepare for their appearance in Arab inventories. At the first formal tasking meeting in Paris in November 1984, Yagur used one tasking list each 1 (8 3)

52. At the Paris meeting, Yagur told Pollard that he should obtain the following categories of information, in descending order of priority:

--Arab (and Pakistani) nuclear intelligence
--Arab exotic weaponry, including chemical and biological weapons
--Soviet air defenses
--Soviet aircraft, air-to-air missiles, and air-to-surface missiles
--Arab order-of-battle, deployments, readiness, services.

1 1 Political

and economic intelligence was deemed less valuable than military and technical material. Yagur expressed interest in intelligence regarding all Middle Eastern countries, which he defined as ranging from Morocco to Pakistan and from Lebanon to the Yemens. 1 Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, and Pakistan. Pollard also was to provide indications-and-warning support for the Israelis by contacting them via an emergency telephone number and using a code word, later designated as "20 percent," if he learned that war in the Middle East was imminent. (8 3)
53. Eitan supplemented Yagur's briefing with requests for information that appear to stem from his background as a career intelligence and security specialist. He asked for information on the PLO's Force 17, CIA psychological studies or other intelligence containing "dirt" on senior Israeli officials; information identifying the "rats" in Israel, by which Eitan apparently meant Israelis who provided information to the United States; In his polygraph-corroborated debriefings, Pollard claimed that Yagur, standing behind Eitan, violently shook his head "no" to these requests and later, away from Eitan's presence, told Pollard that procuring such information would be grounds for immediate termination of the operation. 

54. As the espionage operation accelerated following the Paris meeting, Yagur extended and refined the Israeli requirements at meetings held monthly with Pollard. During a discussion which accompanied Pollard's first large delivery of classified material on 23 January 1985, Yagur repeated a request that Eitan had made in Paris for the "RASIN" (Radio Signal Notation) manual. Yagur showed Pollard the first chapter of the manual, which identified it as an NSA document. Yagur told Pollard that Israel had gained access to the communications of the Soviet military assistance group in Damascus and needed the
RASIN manual to determine if it were technically feasible to decrypt the signals. (S 3)

55. Many Israeli taskings involved Syria. Examples included requests for information on "CERES," which Yagur thought was a Syrian research and development facility; data on Syrian remotely piloted vehicles; information on the Romona ELINT system in Syria, the numbers and locations of all Soviet advisors in Syria; information on the national-level command, control, and communications center in Damascus; the identities of Syrian units with attached Soviet advisors; and all training programs for Syrian personnel in the USSR. Yagur also requested medical intelligence on the health of Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad. (S 3)

56. Pollard also received specific requests for intelligence on Egypt and on the Egyptian connection with an Argentinian missile program. Yagur asked for a specific, Egyptian study on the Israeli Air Force and a Westinghouse Corporation study on Egyptian air defenses, neither of which Pollard was able to obtain. Yagur also made a high-priority request for information on the Argentine-Egyptian Condor missile program. DIA documents on the Condor, which Pollard obtained and provided, filled an important gap in Israeli strategic intelligence, according to Yagur. Pollard claimed he later saw an Israeli intelligence report based on his information. (S 3)

(S 3)
57. In June or July 1985, Yaqur asked Pollard for all available information on PLO headquarters outside Tunis and on Libyan and Tunisian air defenses. Following the Israeli air attack on the headquarters on 1 October 1985--according to Pollard--Yaqur said a contingency plan had been developed and executed based upon Pollard's information. Pollard claimed that Yaqur passed thanks from "the highest levels of the Israeli Government" for his intelligence support for the raid.

58. In the absence of an Israeli request, Pollard initiated the delivery of three daily intelligence summaries, prepared by the National Security Agency and by Naval Intelligence and issued by the originators in message format, which the Israelis found useful and asked to receive routinely. These were the Middle East and North Africa Summary (MENAS), the Mediterranean Littoral Intelligence Summary (MELOS), and the Indian Ocean Littoral Intelligence Summary (I.O. Littoral Intsum.) Pollard claims to have provided copies of each summary from mid-July 1984 until a few days before his arrest on 21 November 1985, which would yield a total of roughly 1,500 messages. As an example of their importance to the Israelis, Pollard recalled that Yaqur once chided him for missing one day out of a month's collection of MELOS messages. Pollard claims the Israelis used the MENAS to identify new units in Arab orders-of-battle.

59. Pollard recalled that on two occasions--dates not remembered--he delivered information on an emergency basis, for
warning purposes. In one instance he alerted Yagur that the Soviet T-72M main battle tank had entered the Syrian inventory. On the other occasion he provided information on an impending terrorist truck bomb attack. According to Pollard, the CIA had warned Israel of an impending terrorist attack that would occur during the coming week, but had offered no supporting details. Pollard said he found information explaining that the terrorists planned to use a truck with stolen French diplomatic plates. As a result of his information, Pollard said, the Israelis were able to foil the attack.

"dirt" on Israeli officials, which Eitan had requested at the Paris meeting.

--The State Department's position on Taba, a small disputed area on the Egyptian-Israeli border.
"Granite" and "Have" programs, which involve US exploitation of foreign materiel.

Pollard said he provided at his own initiative a DIA study that concluded Syria had a less-than-even chance of retaking the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights in a surprise attack. This contrasted sharply with which, according to Pollard, concluded that Syria could recapture the Golan Heights and reach Haifa in 72 hours.
Yagur questioned Pollard about the Middle East Arms Transfer (MEAT) Working Group, a State Department-chaired interagency committee that coordinates military-hardware sales to that region, and asked if Pollard could join it;

B. What the Israelis Did Not Ask For

63. According to Pollard, the Israelis did not request or receive from Pollard intelligence concerning some of the most sensitive US national-security resources. The Israelis never expressed interest in US military activities, plans, capabilities, or equipment. Likewise, they did not ask for intelligence on US communications per se (although the RASIN manual
communications-security deficiencies, or cryptologic systems or keying material.

Pollard was not tasked to describe the pro- or anti-Israeli biases of individual intelligence analysts, nor was he asked to slant his own analyses for Israel's benefit. The Israelis expressed no serious interest in other US espionage cases, although Yagur did ask about damage from the Morison and Walker/Whitworth disclosures during casual conversation.

C. Overview of Compromised Material

64. Although Pollard's Israeli handlers aggressively requested intelligence on a number of specific topics and asked for some particular documents by name, Pollard himself apparently exerted the strongest influence on what was compromised by virtue of his own access, interests, and collection initiatives. Judging from the Israeli-volunteered raise in Pollard's monthly salary from $1,500 to $2,500 in early 1985, the quantity and quality of Pollard's deliveries considerably surpassed the Israelis' initial expectations. After the Paris meeting in November 1984, Pollard appears to have operated to a great extent independently of major coaching by his handlers. According to
Pollard, who may well have been exaggerating his degree of independence and self-control within the operation, his sessions with Yagur focused more on the substantive content and usefulness of his recent deliveries than on instructions for additional collection. (§ 3)

65. In terms of the sheer quantity of identified intelligence stolen over a limited period, 17 months—with the vast majority being passed from January-November 1985—Pollard's operation has few parallels among known US espionage cases. Government investigators, who were assisted by Pollard in reconstructing the inventory of compromised material, identified the following categories and approximate numbers of compromised, published documents: 29

Special Compartmented Information (SCI) (Top Secret and Secret)
Top Secret, non-codeword
Secret, non-codeword
Confidential
Unclassified and unknown Classification

In addition, Pollard stole an estimated 1,500 current-intelligence summary messages.
66. Most of the documents address—at least tangentially—issues of major concern to Israeli security.

Many of the documents focus on Iran, Iraq, and the Iran-Iraq War, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and on military developments in Israel itself.
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<td>3. Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C., section 403g)</td>
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<td>4. 5 U.S.C. section 522 (b)(3), the Freedom of Information Act</td>
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4. **Current Intelligence, Foreign Intelligence Services, Counterintelligence, SIGINT Operations and Multidisciplinary Items**

78. These important categories of compromised material contain messages and documents of widely varying subject, format, purpose, and complexity.
IV. Implications of Compromises--What Israel Gained from Pollard's Espionage

79. While the loss of such a large volume of highly classified material clearly is serious per se, our conclusions concerning specific damage center on an analysis of Israeli gains, and on the harm and risk of these compromises to US interests.
82. Pollard's stolen material, from the Israeli perspective, provided significant benefits.
Pollard's deliveries concerning PLO headquarters near Tunis, Tunisian and Libyan air defenses, and Pakistan's plutonium reprocessing facility near Islamabad.
Pollard told investigators that Joseph Yagur informed him that the RASIN manual permitted Israel to begin the process of attempting to monitor a communications link between the Soviet General Staff in Moscow and the Soviet military assistance group in Damascus, Syria.
V. Losses and Vulnerabilities: Damage to US National Security

A. Intelligence Sources and Methods
TOP SECRET

1

TOP SECRET

63
D. US Relations with Pro-Western Arab States

99. Apart from supporting Israeli actions or positions that could harm US relations with friendly Arab states, Pollard's activities have caused some Arab countries to raise unwelcome questions or make critical observations about US evenhandedness in its Mideast policies.
The findings of the Israeli investigations, announced in late May, pressure led to the resignation of Pollard-handler Col. Aviem Sella from his prestigious position as commander of Israel's Tel Nof airbase.
The investigators, however, did criticize some current and former cabinet ministers—including the Prime and Defense Ministers and a former Chief of Staff of the Israeli Defense Forces—for failing to discover and put an end to the espionage operation. Even so, some Israeli press articles and Israeli public opinion polls indicated support for Pollard, anger at the Israeli Government for failing to help him once he was caught, and a perception that the United States had failed to provide adequate intelligence and military assistance to Israel.
VI. Conclusions

A. The Bottom Line
B. Damage Limitation
The Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case: A Damage Assessment

Selected Bibliography

1. 


Key to Exemptions
1. Executive Order 13526 section 3.3 (b)(1)
2. Executive Order 13526 section 3.3 (b)(6)
3. Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C., section 403g)
4. 5 U.S.C. section 522 (b)(3), the Freedom of Information Act
5. 5 U.S.C. section 522 (b)(6)
6. 5 U.S.C. section 522 (b)(7)(C)
7. 5 U.S.C. section 522 (b)(7)(E)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7 August 1954</td>
<td>Born in Galveston, Texas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Family moved to South Bend, Indiana; father employed as virologist at Notre Dame University. Pollard complained in pre-sentencing affidavit that the community generally was unfriendly to Jews.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1967</td>
<td>Pollard indicated in pre-sentencing affidavit that Israel's dramatic victory in the six-day war made a profound and lasting impression upon him.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer 1971</td>
<td>Pollard attended Weizman Institute Science Camp in Israel, which extolled Zionism and encouraged emigration to Israel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-1976</td>
<td>Attended Stanford University; graduated with BA in Political Science. GPA 3.5. Displayed first known signs of emotional instability.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
September 1977-August 1979

Attended Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. No degree received owing to failure to submit required term papers for eight courses, but Pollard falsely claimed achievement of "provisional" M.A. degree; early evidence of tendency to exaggerate personal and professional qualifications.

May 1978

Pollard's application for CIA Graduate Fellowship denied owing to extensive and recent use of marijuana.

April 1979

Applied for employment with Department of the Navy;

Mid-September 1979

Began work as GS-07/1 for Naval Ocean Surveillance Information Center (NOSIC), a component of the Navy Field Operational Intelligence Office (NFOIO), Suitland, Maryland; background investigation requested for Top Secret clearance.

29 November 1979

Interim Top Secret clearance granted based upon favorable results of NAC but prior to completion of background investigation.
December 1979
Indoctrinated into several SCI accesses eight days before successful completion of background investigation; Pollard began standing watches in NOSIC's Current Operations Center while working as merchant-shipping analyst for Naval Surface Forces desk.

February 1980
Detailed part-time to Task Force-168 (TF-168), the naval-intelligence element responsible for HUMINT collection efforts. Made several false statements to TF-168 supervisor about alleged personal and family connections with South Africa, the intelligence target of Pollard's association with TF-168.

March 1980
Applied for analytical position with the Surface Ship Systems Division of the Naval Intelligence Support Center (NISC-33).

April 1980
Removed from access to SCI clearances, based upon Director of Naval Intelligence reservations concerning Pollard's stability, as a result of bizarre behavior during the TF-168 assignment.

May 1980
Regained SCI access when assigned to NISC-33 position applied for in March; NISC not
immediately informed of Pollard's unfavorable record with TF-168. Assigned as Middle Eastern Warship Analyst in Free World Branch.

June 1980

Director of Naval Intelligence requested that Naval Investigative Service (NIS) help to clarify Pollard's TF-168 activities; NIS initiated counterintelligence "Operation Swan Song" to investigate Pollard's relationship with a South African attache.

July 1980

Pollard admitted during pre-polygraph interview, conducted pursuant to "Operation Swan Song," that he had lied concerning his alleged personal and professional connections with South Africa in order to impress others and enhance his professional status. He further admitted that he had attended a clandestine meeting with the South African Defense Attache in September 1979.
Pollard was referred to and examined by an Air Force clinical psychologist, who described him as grandiose, manipulative, and at times uncertain of what was real, exaggerated, imagined, or false; recommended therapy and assignment to nonsensitive duties.

August 1980
"Operation Swan Song" terminated; Pollard's Top Secret and SCI clearances suspended; Pollard reassigned from NISC-33 to NISC-34 position as research ship analyst with access to Secret, non-compartmented information, pending Pollard's receipt of a satisfactory fitness-for-duty evaluation from one of four cleared psychiatrists identified to Pollard by the Commanding Officer, NISC.

September 1980
Performing duties proficiently in NISC-34; successfully completed one-year probationary period; received within-grade increase to GS-7/2.

November 1980
Pollard sent memorandum to Commanding Officer, NISC, advising him that he had seen a psychiatrist of his choice and requesting that NISC contact the psychiatrist for a report on Pollard's "emotional fitness."
December 1980
Pollard promoted to GS-9/1.

January 1981
Commanding Officer, NISC, ordered Pollard to consult one of the four cleared psychiatrists referred to Pollard in August 1980.

February 1981
Pollard submitted grievance letter against Commanding Officer, NISC, denying he originally had been ordered to consult a cleared psychiatrist and intimating that he was a victim of persecution by NISC.

March 1981
Pollard examined by a cleared psychiatrist. He diagnosed Pollard as having a borderline-personality disorder with a good prognosis for improvement if he sought further psychiatric treatment. The clinical judgment deemed Pollard "thoroughly capable of handling the duties of his job and not a security risk," but also advised that Pollard be closely supervised in his work because he had a tendency to become expansive under stress. Pollard did not receive further psychiatric counseling.

July-August 1981
Pollard's request for reinstatement of SCI access was endorsed by Commanding Officer, NISC, based upon cleared psychiatrist's findings; Navy Senior
SIGINT Officer (SSO) recommended against granting Pollard such access because of his history of problems.

November 1981

NISC request for a status report regarding the reinstatement of Pollard's Top Secret and SCI access again resulted in rejection by Navy SSO and Commander Naval Intelligence Command.

December 1981

Pollard promoted to GS-11/1.

January 1982

Received "highly satisfactory" overall rating on annual basic performance appraisal; Commander, Naval Intelligence Command, ordered reinstatement of Pollard's SCI clearances. Director of Naval Intelligence ordered that Pollard be monitored closely on a continuing basis and that quarterly reports be provided on his progress and stability. Pollard worked with SCI access and with an interim Top Secret clearance from 19 January 1982 until 3 January 1985, when he was granted a permanent Top Secret clearance.

February 1982

Pollard returned to work as Middle East Warship Analyst at NISC-33; CO NISC provided very complimentary quarterly reports on Pollard to Commander, Naval Intelligence Command, in May,
July, and October 1982; quarterly reports ended thereafter.

Pollard's performance was rated "outstanding" in the first two of three annual performance appraisal reports. The third report, covering 1 February - 24 August 1984, which included the time of Pollard's initial espionage activities, rated his overall performance as "highly satisfactory," but cited some significant problems. The problems included failure to meet some assignment deadlines, disagreement with assigned work priorities (Pollard wanted to concentrate on research related to the Middle East to the exclusion of littoral Africa), and lateness for work. Following Pollard's arrest, his supervisor indicated that Pollard's superior analytical ability and command of facts enabled him to dazzle his supervisors and consumers of information and make up for shortcomings in performance.

Post-arrest investigation showed that Pollard and Anne Henderson occasionally used marijuana and cocaine at parties in the Washington area. Pollard showed increasing signs of financial difficulty or irresponsibility, indicated
initially by occasional failure to pay rent on time and later by failure to repay credit union loan.

October 1983
US Marine Barracks in Beirut bombed. In post-arrest debriefings, Pollard identified this incident and subsequent US inaction as major factors precipitating his decision to commit espionage for Israel.

Late Fall 1983
Anonymous telephone call informed Commanding Officer, NISC, that Pollard had been observed in an altercation in a bar in Georgetown and had identified himself as an intelligence analyst during the incident. Pollard received counseling from NISC-30 department head.

Spring 1984
Pollard and Anne Henderson approached a friend of Pollard's who worked in an unsuccessful attempt to recruit him to aid in Pollard's thus far ill-defined objective to commit espionage for Israel.

May-June 1984
Anti-terrorist Alert Center (ATAC) established within NIS; Pollard selected for temporary detail to ATAC in light of staffing needs and Pollard's areas of stated interest and expertise (Middle

I-9

SECRET 3
East, terrorism). Pollard's personnel file as provided to NIS for inspection was incomplete, omitting information concerning Pollard's grievance against Commanding Officer NISC in February 1981 and omitting his involvement with TF-168 and its consequences.

20 June 1984

Pollard began temporary detail to ATAC, working a rotating shift as a watchstander.

Late June 1984

Pollard received phone call from an old family friend and active member of the "Israel Lobby" with whom Pollard had conducted a dialogue on Israel since 1981. Wanted Pollard to meet a high-ranking Israeli Air Force officer who had been involved in the "raid on the reactor," which Pollard understood to be the 1981 Israeli air raid on the Osirak nuclear facility in Iraq. Pollard claims he immediately viewed this proposal as an opportunity for him to volunteer his services to Israel.

A few days after call, Pollard received a phone call at his residence from "Avi" (Col. Aviem Sella) who introduced himself as a friend of and arranged for initial meeting with Pollard at the Washington Hilton Hotel.
Early July 1984

Pollard made initial disclosure of classified material to Sella at second meeting that began at Washington Hilton and continued at a secluded outdoor location near Dumbarton Oaks. Material included a three-volume study of the Saudi Arabian military, a ground logistics study of Saudi Arabia, and satellite imagery of the bomb-damaged Iraqi nuclear facility.

Sella emphasized that scientific and technical intelligence, particularly Top Secret documents, would be of greatest value and commented that US intelligence information on terrorism was not very important to Israel.

Navy Federal Credit Union letter concerning Pollard's non-repayment of two loans forwarded to NISC. Pollard owed approximately $4,000 and was three months in arrears on payments. There is no record of any action taken by NISC. Neither NIS nor the Navy SSO were informed of the delinquent repayments. Pollard claims that his NISC-33 supervisor spoke to him about the matter, but that it was a "non-issue" because he had the money to repay his debts but had simply neglected to do so.
July 1984

Pollard's third meeting with Sella occurred approximately one week after the second. They made contact at a Holiday Inn in Chevy Chase and proceeded in Sella's car via a circuitous route to a residence on Deborah Street in Potomac, Maryland (subsequently identified during investigation as the residence of Ilan Ravid, Attache for Scientific Affairs of the Israeli Embassy in Washington).

At the meeting, Pollard provided, for the Israelis to copy, the same material he had shown Sella at the second meeting, plus additional classified material including the daily Middle East and North Africa Summary and some additional NSA-originated documents such as a study on Egyptian air defenses. He also passed a number of US defense attache reports from embassies in various Arab countries.

Pollard's debriefings indicate that he delivered no additional classified documents to the Israelis until December 1984.

Pollard and Anne Henderson became engaged.
16 August 1984

Pollard submitted Personal Qualifications Statement and application for an Intelligence Research Specialist position with NIS. This statement omitted employment information prior to October 1981, which resulted in a failure to consider derogatory information concerning Pollard's detail to TF-168 in 1980.

14 October 1984

Pollard left NISC and became a full-time employee of NIS, remained in the ATAC, and retained his SCI access. Clearances were certified from NISC, again without an extensive file check. Pollard's past investigation by NIS was not in the open files, and no NIS personnel familiar with "Operation Swan Song" were aware of Pollard's employment with NIS. NISC did not notify NIS of any of Pollard's past problems.

In his new, permanent position in ATAC, Pollard left the Watch Office and became a Foreign Counterintelligence Analyst with responsibility for analyzing information and producing assessments pertaining to terrorist activities, narcotics traffic, and factors affecting the stability of North America and the Eastern Caribbean.
Pollard also was responsible for conducting liaison with other elements of the Intelligence Community. For that purpose he was issued a courier card (on 22 October 1984), which permitted him to carry classified material out of any DOD building without being questioned.

October 1984-November 1985

The ATAC Officer-in-Charge told investigators that Pollard did not do well in the analyst position (in contrast to his excellent performance as a watchstander) because his interest in Middle Eastern affairs and, retrospectively, because his espionage activities for the Israelis took precedence over his assigned duties. Nonetheless, Pollard's performance was rated as satisfactory and he was judged to have great potential. Pollard's coworkers noted that he kept unusual hours (permitted by the flextime policy then in force). He often came to work late, spent long periods away from his ATAC spaces, and frequently worked on weekends.

November 1984

Pollard and Anne Henderson traveled to Europe. He met Rafael Eitan, the senior Israeli official in charge of the case; Aviem Sella, Pollard's first handler; and Joseph Yagur, Counselor for Scientific Affairs, Israeli Consulate New York and
Sella's replacement as handler, in Paris where formal tasking priorities and operational procedures were established. Pollard received his initial payment from the Israelis of $10,000-$11,000 in cash, and his salary was set at $1,500 per month. Anne Henderson selected a diamond-sapphire ring from a jewelry store, which the Israelis purchased for her. Eitan conducted a "ceremony" during which Pollard was "sworn in" as an Israeli citizen. Yagur replaced Sella as Pollard's direct handler. Eitan downplayed security concerns and pledged that, in any case, Israel would "take care of" Pollard if he were caught. Eitan instructed Pollard to resign if called upon to submit to a polygraph.

December 1984

Pollard made his first delivery of classified material since July by bringing stolen documents to the Israeli residence on Deborah Street in Potomac.

3 January 1985

Pollard's final Top Secret and SCI clearances were certified by NIS Headquarters and Pollard signed an NIS Security Agreement. Information regarding his prior limitation of access, to the Secret level from 1980-82, was not brought to the attention of NIS.
23 January 1985  Pollard made his first large delivery of about five suitcases full of classified material. From then until his arrest the following November, he made large biweekly deliveries (every other Friday) to the same apartment on Van Ness Street in Washington, D.C. where Erit Erb, a secretary in Israel's Embassy, resided. Erb would advise Pollard when to return to pick up the documents after they had been copied. The Israelis eventually obtained a second apartment in Erb's building which they furnished only with copying equipment, which occasionally permitted the material to be copied while Pollard waited.

Pollard's schedule also called for a face-to-face meeting with Yagur at Erb's apartment on the last Saturday of each month for the purpose of obtaining additional tasking and feedback. The schedule of drops and meetings was followed consistently except during Pollard's trip to Israel and Europe the following summer.

February 1985  Pollard's monthly salary raised to $2,500.

July-August 1985  Pollard and Anne Henderson traveled to Israel, where Pollard met Eitan and Yagur. Eitan reviewed
a computerized listing that Pollard believed contained all but one document provided to date. (Pollard said he believed Sella kept one photograph of damage to Iraq’s nuclear reactor for his personal memorabilia.) Eitan complimented him on the material, stating that it had been crucial to the security of Israel and had far exceeded their expectations.

Over a three-day period, two additional, operational meetings occurred concerning future operational plans and security concerns. At the first meeting, Eitan again assured Pollard that Israel would take care of him and that no drastic action would be taken by the United States, based upon experience with similar situations in the past. Eitan also told Pollard that Israel was setting up a Swiss bank account for him, into which $30,000 per year over 10 years would be deposited in return for Pollard’s continued services. At the end of 10 years, Pollard and his immediate family would emigrate to Israel, where he could use the money to establish himself. The account would be in the name of "Danny Cohen," which also would be Pollard’s Israeli identity.
Pollard initiated a second, confrontational meeting with Eitan wherein Pollard informed Eitan of his concerns about detection and his belief that a 10-year commitment was unreasonable. Eitan angrily told Pollard that he had nothing to worry about insofar as security was concerned, and that the Swiss bank account should allay whatever concerns he did have. Eitan directed Yagur to give Pollard "a couple of thousand more" for the expense of his trip.

Pollard received $12,000 for the trip, which included the Pollards' marriage and honeymoon in Europe following the meetings in Israel.

9 August 1985

Pollard and Anne Henderson were married in Venice, Italy.

Early Fall 1985

Pollard, surprisingly, once again sought to be assigned or detailed to TF-168 despite his previous problems with that component. He arrived late and disheveled for an applicant interview and offered a preposterous explanation, to the effect that the Irish Republican Army had kidnapped his wife and he had spent the weekend getting her released.
Pollard was rejected for the TF-168 job.

Fall 1985

Security awareness and vigilance had increased within naval intelligence as a result of revelations about the Walker-Whitworth espionage case. Officer-in-charge (OIC), ATAC, had begun focusing on and became suspicious of Pollard's activities because Pollard seemed to be handling large amounts of classified material concerning the Middle East and unrelated to Pollard's legitimate area of responsibility (North America and the eastern Caribbean). The OIC began low-key monitoring of Pollard's activities.

25 October 1985

A coworker notified the OIC that he had seen Pollard apparently removing classified material from the ATAC without authorization.

The OIC verified that Pollard had removed the material and informed the Counterintelligence Directorate of NIS. NIS opened an investigation and subsequently notified the FBI. Pollard was observed removing more classified material during the joint FBI/NIS investigation.
18 November 1985 FBI and NIS agents confronted and questioned Pollard as he left the building housing the ATAC. The agents found classified material in Pollard's briefcase, which he had no authorization to remove from the building.

Pollard at first claimed he was delivering material to another US intelligence organization and later claimed the information was destined for a contact, journalist Kurt Lohbeck, who was an active supporter of Afghan freedom fighters. He retracted the Lohbeck story only after his arrest.

21 November 1985 Pollard and his wife were arrested outside the Israeli Embassy following the Embassy's refusal to accept them for asylum.

5 June 1986 Under terms of a plea bargain, Pollard pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit espionage and his wife to conspiracy to receive embezzled government property and to being an accessory after the fact to possession of national-security documents.

4 March 1987 Following successive delays to the original sentencing date of 10 September 1986, Pollard was
sentenced to life imprisonment and his wife to two concurrent five-year prison terms.

Key to Exemptions

1. Executive Order 13526 section 3.3 (b)(1)
2. Executive Order 13526 section 3.3 (b)(6)
3. Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C., section 403g)
4. 5 U.S.C. section 522 (b)(3), the Freedom of Information Act
5. 5 U.S.C. section 522 (b)(6)
6. 5 U.S.C. section 522 (b)(7)(C)
7. 5 U.S.C. section 522 (b)(7)(E)
Annotated Examples of Compromised Documents

1. Military Intelligence.
2. Political Intelligence
4. Current Intelligence, Foreign Intelligence Services, Counterintelligence, SIGINT Operations and Multidisciplinary Items

--NSA Radio Signal Notation (RASIN)
--Middle East and North Africa Summary (MENAS),
A number of counterintelligence and security issues raised by the Jonathan Jay Pollard case have been discussed previously, as in the Report of Task Group Six of the Integrated Damage Assessment, in the 1985 publication, "Keeping the Nation's Secrets: A Report to the Secretary of Defense by the Commission to Review DoD Security Policies and Practices" (the Stilwell Commission), in National Security Decision Directives (NSDDs) 196 and 197 of 1 November 1985, and in Congressional committee reports on counterintelligence. Some aspects of the Pollard case also are relevant to other espionage damage assessments recently completed or under preparation by DDAC, specifically, the Larry Wu-tai Chin, Ronald Pelton, and Walker/Whitworth cases, as well as the Edward Howard case.

All five cases have significance for counterintelligence and security issues that have become all too familiar in the last few years: the efficacy of polygraph and repolygraph tests; physical security of classified facilities from inside theft by trusted personnel; computer security; violations of the "need-to-know" principle; the relationship among personality, lifestyle (including management of personal finances) and espionage; the vulnerability posed by "ties of affection" to other countries;
and the need for more management awareness of security issues. It is our view that these issues merit discussion in a broader context.

There are, however, some unique aspects to the Pollard affair that raise specific concerns not discussed in other recent damage assessments or counterintelligence studies.
Israel's absence from the Attorney General's list of "criteria countries"—meaning that the US counterintelligence posture against Israel is not especially high—points to a need for remedial action. Israel's special relationship with the United States appears to preclude that country's placement on the "criteria country" list.
Security, Counterintelligence, and Pollard

Several security and counterintelligence considerations came to light during the government's investigation of the Pollard case that deserve highlighting, mostly as old lessons reinforced:

---Usefulness of the polygraph as a deterrent to espionage. As noted p.20, Pollard's chief Israeli handler, Rafael Eitan, instructed him to resign from naval intelligence rather than
submit to a polygraph interview. (We assume Pollard told the Israelis that he had been rejected by CIA.

Moreover, Pollard himself stated that had his espionage remained undetected, he would have been inclined to seek a job with the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research because he could have gained necessary access there without having to undergo a polygraph.

--Need for thorough personnel background investigations

4 and 7
Completion of background investigation before granting access to sensitive intelligence.

There was no legitimate requirement for Pollard to have been granted an interim Top Secret clearance or access to SCI based upon a waiver of DCID 1/14 before completion of his background investigation.

Management awareness of employee behavior and completeness and availability of personnel records. Pollard's adverse performance record with TF-168 and other manifestations of irresponsibility during his employment with naval intelligence should have been highlighted in his personnel file and been readily available to naval intelligence components (as well as any other intelligence agencies) considering him for reassignment or interagency transfer. Pollard's frequent removal of large numbers of documents from his workspace should have aroused the suspicion of his supervisor and colleagues much sooner despite complicating factors such
as flextime (permission for employees to work odd hours) and Pollard's possession of a "courier card" that afforded him unrestricted permission to transport classified material among DoD facilities. A related factor was that most of the documents Pollard stole were unrelated to his job as a terrorism analyst for North America and the Caribbean. Pollard's acquisition of such documents, therefore, constituted a gross violation of the need-to-know principle.
Key to Exemptions

1. Executive Order 13526 section 3.3 (b)(1)
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6. 5 U.S.C. section 522 (b)(7)(C)
7. 5 U.S.C. section 522 (b)(7)(E)
Terms of Reference

The Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case
Intelligence Damage Assessment

PURPOSE:

1. This study, undertaken on behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence, will identify and review the full range of US classified information and materials compromised to the Israelis between June 1984 and November 1985 by Jonathan Jay Pollard (aka Danny Cohen), in order to determine the damage to US intelligence sources, methods, and capabilities. Objectives of the study include:
-- Evaluation of the damage to US intelligence capabilities and regional interests.

-- Review of security considerations arising from the Pollard case, such as the possibility that Pollard may have encouraged or facilitated other Israeli attempts to penetrate US intelligence agencies.

BACKGROUND:

2. Pollard, using his access to Top Secret, sensitive compartmented information, and other classified documents while employed in the antiterrorist Alert Center of the Naval Investigative Service, passed a large volume of classified information to Israel's Directorate of Military Intelligence from June 1984 until his arrest in November 1985. Extensive post-arrest debriefings of Pollard—corroborated by polygraph interviews—indicate that he provided the Israelis with more than 800 documents. Most of the compromised materials comprise intelligence on Soviet weaponry and C³ systems and on the military forces, programs, capabilities,

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Additiona11y, Pollard's case officers told him that his intelligence provided critical support for the planning of Israel's air attack against PLO headquarters near Tunis on 1 October 1985.

IV-2

SECRET
4. A major difference between the Pollard espionage case and others exposed within the past several years—e.g., Walker-Whitworth, Boyce-Lee, Kampiles, Pelton, Prime, and Chin—
Contributors to the Pollard Damage Assessment

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