(2) The GOG military junta had to act without delay in order to take advantage of the popular euphoria which attended the coup. For the first time, the people were expressing genuine sympathy for the army. Political parties were vying to embrace the army. However, this popularity was fleeting. On Saturday night (27 MAR 82),

Unusually large crowds of people out having a good time, unaired and unpredicted, in public places. This had not been seen in a long time. The army intended to act with two sets of rules, one to protect and respect the rights of the average citizen who lived in secure areas (mostly the cities) and had nothing to do with the coup. The second set of rules would be applied to the areas where the junta was prevalent. These areas (“war zones”) the rules of unconventional warfare apply (NFI). Guerrillas would be destroyed by fire and their infrastructure eradicated by social welfare programs. The army did not need more helicopters and military aid. Behind attacking military units, it needed tractors and bulldozers, followed by hundreds of prefabricated houses. These were the tactics needed to destroy insurgencies.

HELP US WITH TRACTORS AND PREFABRICATED HOUSES AND DEVELOPMENT RESOURCES SHOULD BE ADMINISTERED IN GUATEMALA DIRECTLY BY THE U.S. TO KEEP THE LOCAL CROoks AWAY.

(3) There was no longer a place for “sorcerers”.

Proof that Bucardo stole 30 million dollars or more, as it is alleged, that what “Washington” should lend the GOG was an expert team of project appraisers who could survey major projects, such as the new San Jose port development project, and provide the GOG an accurate estimate of what the projects should actually cost.

The new minister of education (Merida) and the new presidential private secretary (Brutichcas Rendon de Sosa) had study reputations as corrupt individuals. However, Merida was known as an able administrator, and the new junta was going to make a vice minister of education of his job would be to keep an eye on the minister of education and keep him honest. Regarding presidential private secretary Rendon de Sosa, she had already been confronted and made aware that dishonesty on her part would not be tolerated. She had been wounded (figuratively) and angered. She then announced that she would work without any pay whatsoever.

She had been had, and she certainly knew where many skeletons were buried, regarding the assignment of Col. Hector Israel (Antonvarian) to service, as chief of the presidential staff, this was only a temporary assignment. Antonvarian would not be kept on permanently.

Sequently, because his experience and knowledge were needed, he was asked to remain as presidential chief of staff until the new junta could be its feet on the ground.

BT
TO DIA WASH DC
INFO DIA WASH DC//DB-3E/DB-3E2/05-1/JSI-4B//
SECCSTATE WASHDC
HQ USAF WASH DC//XIXN//
MACOS INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//11N//
CMO WASH DC//OP-005//
COMUSFORCARIB KEY WEST FL
USINCRED MACDILL AFB FL//RCJ2//
USAG7ONIIMP FT CLAYTON PN//IAPP-PN//
CISRSTIFBE (PAN) FT CLAYTON PN//AFZU-05//
USDAO MEXICO CITY MA
USDAO TEGUCIGALPA HD
USDAO PANAMA CITY PN
USDAO SAN SALVADOR ES

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

10. (U) PROJ NO: NA
11. (U) COLL MGMT CODES: AB
13. (U) SPEC INST: DIRECT
14. (U) APP BY:
15. (U) REQ EVAL: NO; REL TO: NONE
16.17.: NO

BT

F 071025Z APR 82

AS THE SELECTION OF BG MALDONADO AND COL GORDILLO TO THE JUNTA, BG RIOS HAD PERSONALLY SELECTED THESE TWO, BG MALDONADO MOST CERTAINLY HAD FOREKNOWLEDGE OF THE COUP (NFI). THE MLN POLITICAL PARTY AND ITS LEADERS, MARIO (SANDOVAL) ALARCON AND LEONEL (SISINEGA) OTERO, PLAYED ANY ROLE IN THE COUP. THEY WERE A BUNCH OF "APROVECHADOS" (KOPPORTUNISTI) AND THEY WERE ALL "AFUERA" (OUT). "WE" HAVE NO OBLIGATION TO ANY OF THEM.

ACTION DC-4(*) DIA(*)
INFO RIDS(*) J3:NMCC(*) J5(*) RQJTF-LD(*) ORG-JPE(*)
SECOF(*) SEGDEF(*) USDF(*) ASD:PAGE(*) DI-1(*)
JISI-4B(*) AT(*) AT-1(*) AIG(*) DIX(*) DE(*) DB-1G(*)
DB-3E(*) DB-3E2(*) DB-4A(*) DB-5D(*) DB-1E(*)

+USW DC
+USC CC WASHINGTON DC
+DIUS DA GEORGE G MEADE MD

SECTIONAL(1)

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 1
EXCISED COPY FOLLOWS
(2) The Gog Military Junta had to act without delay in order to take advantage of the popular euphoria which attended the coup. For the first time, the people were expressing genuine sympathy for the Army. Political parties were vying to embrace the Army. However, this popularity was fleeting. On Saturday night (23 Mar 82), Gog drove around Guatemala City just to observe the people coming and going. He was extremely gratified to see the unusually large crowds of people out having a good time, unarmored and unafraid. In public places, thus, he said, had not been seen in a long time. The Army intended to act with two sets of rules, one to protect and respect the rights of the average citizen who lived in secure areas (mostly the cities) and had nothing to do with subversion. The second set of rules would be applied to the areas where subversion was prevalent. In these areas ("war zones") the rules of unconventional warfare would apply (NVI). Guerrillas would be destroyed by fire and their infrastructure eradicated by social welfare programs. The Army did not need more helicopters and military aid. Behind attacking military units, it needed tractors and bulldozers, followed by hundreds of prefabricated houses. These were the tactics needed to destroy insurgency. This was the message Gog wanted to see one central Gog agency established to coordinate all economic assistance and development projects.

(3) There was no longer a place for "Bucaros." 

In this way, "We" could call Raúl (Garcia) Granados (a shady financier and relative/confidant of Ex-Gog President Lucas) and request his extradition form the U.S. to face charges of massive fraud. Gog acknowledged that the new Minister of Education (Merida) and the new Presidential Private Secretary (Ruth Fuentes) in the Presidential Office had shady reputations as well. However, Merida was known as an able administrator, and the Gog Junta was going to name a Vice Minister of Education (FNI) who was incorruptible. His job would be to keep an eye on the Minister of Education and keep him honest. Regarding Presidential Private Secretary Rendon de Sosa, she had already been confronted and made aware that dishonesty on her part would not be tolerated. She had been wounded (figuratively) and angered. She then announced that she would work without any pay whatsoever. What better Secretary could one have? She had been had, and she certainly knew where many skeletons were buried. Regarding the assignment of Col. Hector Ismael Montalvan to the Presidential Staff, this was only a temporary assignment. Montalvan would not be kept on permanently. He had offered to step down, but the Gog did not accept his offer. Because Montalvan, a very bright officer, was the most experienced individual in the Presidency, he had all the answers and institutional memory. Consequently, because his experience and knowledge were needed, he was asked to remain as Presidential Chief of Staff until the new junta could get its feet on the ground.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

RTICZYN RUESOTA2564 1022330
ROUTINE
R 071028Z APR 82

TO DIA WASH DC

INFO DIA WASH DC//DE-3E/DE-3E//OS-1J51-4B//
SECSTATE WASHDC//DA WASH DC//DMAY-155/F11//
HQ USAF WASH DC//JSGX//
USCINCQO QUARRY HTS PN//SC32//
MACDOS INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB II//INK//
NCW WASH DC//DP-009//
CINCANT NORFOLK VA
COSUSFORCARB A KEY WEST FL
USCINCQO MACDILL AFB FL//RC32//
CDR7096P FT CLAYTON PN//165P-08//
CDR1931NFBG DE FT CLAYTON PN//A02U-05//

BT

SECTION 02 OF 02

OPINIONS REGARDING THE NAMING OF NEW GOG OFFICIALS CARRY WEIGHT. RIOS THINKS HIGHLY OF RIOS. HE REFERRED TO HIM AS A FINE MAN OF GREAT INTELLECT AND WIDE GRASP. RIOS WILL NOT TOLERATE A LACK OF HONESTY AND INTEGRITY. DISMISSED COMPLAINTS THAT RIOS WAS ANANKING MANY FAMILY MEMBERS TO IMPORTANT GOG POSITIONS. FELT THAT THIS PRACTICE WAS ACCEPTABLE BECAUSE THE PEOPLE NAMED WERE HONEST AND COMPETENT. BESIDES, HE SAID, IN CRITICAL TIMES WHO SHOULD ONE TURN TO IF NOT TO ONE'S FAMILY MEMBERS?

HAD ALREADY RECEIVED SEVERAL DEATH THREATS (MFI). EMPHATICALLY DENIED THE POSSIBILITY THAT HIS FAMILY MEMBERS COULD BE HELD HOSTAGE IN THE OFFICIAL RESIDENCE TO GUARANTEE HIS SUPPORT OF THE GOG JUNTA. IN FACT, HAD BEEN CHARGED WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY OF RIOS' PERSONAL SECURITY, BECAUSE RIOS TRUSTED HIM COMPLETELY. HAD TURNED DOWN THE POSITION OF SG ON THE PRESIDENTIAL STAFF BECAUSE IT ENTAILED HANDLING CONSIDERABLE SUMS OF MONEY, AND DID NOT WANT TO MAKE HIMSELF VULNERABLE TO ANY CHARGES REGARDING THE ADMINISTRATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS. AS FOR THE SELECTION OF GOG MUNDO AND COL. GORDILLO TO THE JUNTA, SAID THAT GOG RIOS HAD PERSONALLY SELECTED THESE TWO AND, DEFERRING TO RIOS' DESIRES, ACCEPTED THIS SELECTION. GOG MUNDO MOST CERTAINLY HAD FOREKNOWLEDGE OF THE COUP (MFI). HOWEVER, ADAMANTLY DENIED THAT THE MNL POLITICAL PARTY AND ITS LEADERS, MARIO (SANDOVAL), ALARCON AND LEONEL (SISNIEGA) OTERO, PLAYED ANY ROLE IN THE COUP. HE SAID THEY WERE A BUNCH OF "APROVECHADOS" KOPPONUTS AND THEY WERE ALL "AFUERA" (OUT). "WE HAVE NO OBLIGATION TO ANY OF THEM."

ACTION DC-4(*) DIA(*)
INFO NIDS(*) 33-MNCC(*) JS(*) BDJT-10(*) OPE-266(*)
SECDEF(*) USDF(*) ASD-PAGE(*) DI-1(*)
MNCC(*) RST-28(*) ROM-281(*) OS-1(*) SNS(*)
JSI-4B(*) AT(*) AT(*) AIS(*) DIO(*) DIO(*) DE(*) DB-16(*)
DB-3E(*) DB-3E(*) DB-4A(*) DB-5D(*) DB-1E(*)
DI-1(*)
CIA WASHINGTON DC
+DC CC WASHINGTON DC
+DTRNSA FT GEORGE M MEADE MO

SECTIONAL(I)

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MCN=82103/02072 TOR=82103/1428Z TAD=82103/1659Z CDSN=M11548

PAGE 1 OF 1
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SECT 02 OF 02