О постоянно действующем задании по выявлению подготовки НАТО к ракетно-ядерному нападению на СССР

В связи с возрастанием важности решения задачи своевременного выявления подготовки противника к ракетно-ядерному нападению (РЯН) на СССР Вам направляется постоянно действующее задание (ПДЗ) и ориентировка по этой проблеме.

Цель ПДЗ - обеспечить систематическую работу резидентуры по вскрытию планов подготовки главного противника к РЯН и организации постоянного слежения за признаками принятия им решения о применении ядерного оружия против СССР и осуществления непосредственно подготовки к ракетно-ядерному удару. Выполнение ПДЗ является лишь одним, хотя в крайне важным, аспектом деятельности резидентуры по военно-стратегической проблематике. Работа в этом направлении должна вестись наряду с решением других, ранее поставленных задач по добыче военно-стратегической информации.

По мере поступления сведений по проблеме РЯН Центр предполагает вносить в данное ПДЗ соответствующие дополнения и уточнения.

Информацию, добытую резидентурой в соответствии с заданиями разделов I и П (ближайшие и перспективные задачи), направлять в Центр с индексом "И-БИ", который предусматривает рассылку телеграфной информации по разъезке: руководство служб, подразделения, информационная служба и обязательную передачу почтовой информации в информационную службу. Для уточнения линии, работником которой добыта информация, можно указывать после индекса "И-БИ" дополнительный индекс (ПР, КР, Х и т.д.).

ПДЗ (приложение № I) должно быть проработано всем оперативным составом резидентуры. Конкретные предложения и соображения резидентуры, направленные на максимально эффективное выполнение ПДЗ, доложить в Центр до 31 марта 1983 года.

Хранить ПДЗ в резидентуре постоянно в особой папке резидента.

Приложение: 1) в 374/ПР/52, на 4 листах, сов.секретно, ШН. 102
2) в 6282/ПР/52, на 9 листах, сов.секретно, ШН. 103
Permanent operational assignment
to uncover NATO preparations for
a nuclear missile attack on the USSR

In view of the growing urgency of the task of discovering promptly any
preparations by the adversary for a nuclear missile attack (RYAN) on the USSR,
we are sending you a permanently operative assignment (POA) and a briefing
on this question.

The objective of the assignment is to see that the Residency works systemati-
cally to uncover any plans in preparation by the main adversary [USA] for
RYAN and to organise a continual watch to be kept for indications of a decision
being taken to use nuclear weapons against the USSR or immediate prepara-
tions being made for a nuclear missile attack. Carrying out this assignment is
only one aspect, albeit an extremely important one, of the Residency's activity
in connection with matters of military strategy. Work in this sector must be
carried on side by side with the other tasks previously set for obtaining informa-
tion on military strategy.

As information is obtained on the question of RYAN, the Centre proposes
to supplement and clarify the permanent assignment accordingly.

Information obtained by the Residency relating to the assignments in sec-
tions I and II (immediate and future tasks), is to be sent to the Centre indexed
'I-VN', which will provide for distribution of telegraphic information as marked
to: heads of service, subsections, information service; and see that information
by bag is transmitted without fail to the information service. In order to specify
the line of the official by whom the information was obtained, additional letters
(PR, KR, X and so on) may be shown after the letters 'I-VN'.

The permanent operational assignment (POA) (Attachment No 1) must be
studied by all operational staff of the residency. Specific suggestions and ideas
evolved by the Residency with a view to carrying out this assignment as effici-
ently as possible, should reach Centre by 31 March 1983.

At the Residency, the POA must always be kept in the Resident's special
file.

Attachments: 1) No 374/PR/52, 4 pages, Top Secret, PN 102
              2) No 6282/PR/52, 9 pages, Top Secret, PN 103
Permanent Operational Assignment
to discover NATO Preparations for
a Nuclear Attack on the USSR

Section 1 – Immediate tasks of Residencies for Collecting
Information and Organising their Work

1. Collect data about places where Government officials and members of their
families are evacuated. Identify possible routes and methods of evacuation. Make suggestions about ways of organising a watch to be kept on preparation and actual evacuation. Time limit: 3rd quarter [by 30 September 1983]

2. Identify the location of specially equipped Civil Defence shelters or premises which could if necessary be used as shelters (underground garages and depots, basements, tunnels) and arrange for a periodical check on their state of preparedness to accommodate the population at a particular time. Time limit: 3rd quarter [by 30 September 1983]

   Report to Centre immediately if shelters are being taken out of storage or a start is being made on preparing certain premises for accommodation of the population.

3. One important sign that preparations are beginning for RYAN could be increased purchases of blood from donors and the prices paid for it and extension of the network of reception centres, since the treatment of burns (the most widespread injury in a nuclear explosion) requires blood transfusions in very considerable quantity. In this context, discover the location of several blood-donor reception centres, and find out how they operate and the price of the blood donated, and record any changes. Time limit: 2nd quarter [by 30 June 1983]

   If there is an unexpectedly sharp increase in the number of stationary and mobile blood donor centres and in the prices paid, report at once to the Centre.

4. Put forward proposals for organising a watch on individual civil defence installations. Time limit: 2nd quarter [by 30 June 1983]

5. Identify several places which are most frequently visited outside working hours by employees of institutions and installations connected with taking and implementing decisions regarding RYAN, including military personnel. Put
forward your views about the possibility of regular observation of the places selected. Time limit: 2nd quarter [by 30 June 1983]

6. Keep under regular observation the most important government institutions, headquarters and other installations involved in preparation for RYAN. Send a list of immediate targets of observation to the Centre. Ascertain the ‘normal level of activity’ of these targets in and out of working hours, i.e. the outward signs of their daily activity in a normal situation (differences in the number of cars collected there in the daytime and the evening, and in the number of lighted windows in and out of working hours, and activity round these targets on non-working days). Find out, on the basis of the ‘normal level’ ascertained, any changes in the indicators during special conferences, when there is a crisis situation (cars collected there out of hours, an increase in the number of lighted windows at night in comparison with the ‘normal level’, or increased activity on non-working days).

7. Set a regular watch for any significant changes in the police administration system and the activity of the special [i.e. security and intelligence] services in regard to Soviet citizens and institutions, which may be associated with preparation for RYAN.

On points 6 and 7 inform Centre of the existence or absence of any changes of this kind regularly – once every two weeks.

Section II – Principal Prospective Directions for the Residency to Pursue its Work of Collecting the Information Needed to Discover the Adversary’s Preparations for RYAN

1. Detailed description of the nature of measures being carried out in your country of residence by NATO headquarters and agencies, American representations and military installations located there at a time of immediate preparation by the USA and NATO for RYAN.

2. Analysis of the possibility of co-opting existing agents to work on uncovering preparation for RYAN and of using all available resources for this purpose.

3. Identifying and studying with a view to subsequent cooption for collaboration, a cadre of people associated with preparing and implementing the decision about RYAN, and also a group of people, including service and technical personnel, who might be informed of the fact that this or that measure is being taken in preparation for RYAN, even if they do not know its objective or purport (the official chauffeurs of individuals involved in the decision about RYAN, those working in the operating services of installations connected with processing and implementing the decision about RYAN, and communications staff involved in the operation and interaction of these installations).

4. Studying the possibilities of organising systematic observation of persons
associated with taking the decision about RYAN and those who might be informed of the preparation of such a decision.

5. Uncovering the lines of communication used for preparing for RYAN, their terminal points, switchboards and system of operating in normal conditions and in an emergency situation, technical characteristics and the possibility of interception.

6. Assessment of opportunities for keeping watch for changes in the pattern of operation of government institutions which are involved in taking political decisions regarding RYAN, and are responsible for the country's military preparedness and for contacts with NATO allies.

7. Collecting data about plans for preparing the special [intelligence and security] services for a particular time and for possible action at that time. Studying facilities for organising a systematic watch to be kept for changes in the operating routine of the central establishments of the special services.

8. Identifying the places where the country's leading military and political figures, and state institutions, including personnel from the central apparatus of the special services, are to be evacuated.

9. Identifying possible routes and methods of evacuating military and political leaders and state institutions. Studying the possibilities of discovering promptly when evacuation is in progress.

10. Gathering data about the location of control centres and headquarters of civil defence forces, shelters, depots and training posts of the civil defence system. Assessment of the possibilities of discovering immediate preparation of the civil defence system for war.

11. Defining the possibility of finding out with present resources what measures are being taken to bring military installations, which are accessible to our observation into a state of heightened operational preparedness. Collecting information about the main residential and recreational centres of the services, hospitals and other installations closely connected with military bases and headquarters.

12. Assessing the degree of likelihood that the heads of national churches and of international church organisations, and the leadership and institutions of the Vatican abroad would be aware of preparation for a nuclear attack and clarifying possibilities of obtaining information about RYAN from these circles.

13. Bearing in mind the very considerable knowledge possessed by the heads of international and the larger national banks, examine the possibility of obtaining information about RYAN from such circles.

The Residency must organise its work in a planned manner on the questions which have been enumerated. Please keep the Centre regularly informed as information is obtained.

No. 374/PR/52
The Problem of Discovering Preparation for a Nuclear Missile Attack on the USSR

In view of the way in which the main adversary (the USA, NATO, the PRC) has stepped up the tempo and scale of military preparations, the need to deal with the central assignment of the KGB’s foreign intelligence service at the present stage – not to overlook the immediate threat of a nuclear attack (RYAN) on the Soviet Union – has acquired an especial degree of urgency.

This task lies at the core of military strategy. It was emphasised in the instructions from the heads of the chief Directorate that in contemporary conditions ‘the need to discover specific plans and actions by our adversary connected with his preparation for a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR and other socialist countries is now of particularly grave importance. In this context, the primary task is to obtain reliable documentary and other advance information about all aspects and details of military, political and strategic activity of the main adversary, revealing his secret preparations for war.’

The instruction defines in practice the main ways of dealing with our chief task, i.e. the need to uncover the adversary’s plans and the measures he is taking in preparation for a nuclear missile attack, above all by exploiting and expanding agent access to the adversary’s installations where secret information about military strategy is concentrated.

Information about strategic and operational plans to use nuclear weapons in war with the Soviet Union is of most serious and urgent significance for discovering the adversary’s plans promptly for RYAN. This would include, for instance, such documents as the ‘Single Integrated Operational Plan – SIOP’ of the USA for waging a nuclear war, the ‘General Defence Plans’ of the NATO strategic and subordinate joint commands, NATO’s ‘Nuclear Support Plans – Supplan’ and a number of NATO ‘Contingency Operations Plans – COP’, which anticipate deploying and utilising various types of armed forces and arms of service in operations zones in periods of tension or crises and at various stages of war, including nuclear components of these forces.

The intelligence value of the adversary’s plans lies in the fact that it enables us to get clear, well in advance, the picture of his possible military operations against the USSR and other countries of the socialist community and his preparations for a nuclear missile strike.

An important element of the adversary’s preparation for RYAN is specific action to bring the armed forces and the civilian sector from a peacetime on to a wartime footing, which is seen in implementation of measures which were planned in advance and subsequently ratified. At the stage when the measures are implemented, the most important section of which comes into effect after the adversary has taken the political decision in principle to go to war, he begins to step up his activity in both military and civilian sectors. Notwithstanding the fact that in order to make sure of a sudden attack the adversary counts on maintaining secrecy about his preparatory measures, the scale of activity involved in bringing military and civilian sectors from a peacetime on to a wartime footing entails the appearance of a whole series of revealing signs regarding the nature of the adversary’s procedure.

Therefore one of the chief directions for the activity of the KGB’s foreign service is to organise detection and assessment of signs of preparation for RYAN in all possible areas, i.e. political, economic and military sectors, civil defence and the activity of the special services.

Our military neighbours [the GRU] are actively engaged in similar work in relation to the activity of the adversary’s armed forces. However, the fact that the adversary maintains a considerable part of his strategic forces in a state of operational readiness, capable of proceeding to execute military assignments in the shortest possible time (for instance, all American land-based inter-
continental missiles, 70% of their naval nuclear facilities and 30% of the strategic air force are on duty, and in NATO, about 20% of nuclear missile facilities are detailed as duty forces) makes it essential to discover signs of preparation for RYAN at a very early stage, before the order is given to the troops to use nuclear weapons.

Uncovering the process of preparation by the adversary to take the decision for a nuclear attack and the subsequent measures to prepare the country for a nuclear war would enable us to increase the so-called period of anticipation essential for the Soviet Union to take retaliatory measures. Otherwise, reprisal time would be extremely limited. For instance, noting the launching of strategic missiles from the continental part of the USA and taking into account the time required for determining the direction of their flight in fact leaves roughly 20 minutes reaction time. This period will be considerably curtailed after deployment of the 'Pershing-2' missile in the FRG, for which the flying time to reach long-range targets in the Soviet Union is calculated at 4–6 minutes.

It is thus fully evident that the problem of uncovering the threat of RYAN must be dealt with without delay.

Immediate preparation for a nuclear attack begins at the moment when the other side’s political leadership reaches the conclusion that it is expedient to use military force as the international situation becomes progressively more acute, and takes a preliminary decision to launch an attack on the Soviet Union.

Analysis of NATO's ideas on military strategy and the organisational procedures adopted in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, point to the fact that so-called nuclear consultations in NATO are probably one of the stages of immediate preparation by the adversary for RYAN.

To ascertain in good time the moment when nuclear consultations begin inside NATO is a most important problem for the information-gathering apparatus of Soviet intelligence, together with discovering the specific plans for RYAN of the individual powers constituting the main adversary and, in the first place, the USA.

Nuclear consultations begin after the NATO agencies (the Planning Council/Committee) have received notification from a nuclear power belonging to the grouping, of the intention to use nuclear weapons, or a request from a non-nuclear country in NATO or one of the main commands of the bloc (Supreme Command of NATO forces in Europe, Supreme Command of NATO Forces in the Atlantic or the NATO Command in the Channel) for the use of nuclear weapons. The aim of these consultations is to convey to the nuclear powers concerned, the views of the other members of the bloc on the questions of launching a nuclear attack, so that it should take them into account before taking its own final decision. NATO attaches great importance to beginning nuclear consultations at the earliest possible stage of a political crisis in East/West relations which is threatening to develop into armed conflict.

The forum for consultations, including nuclear ones, would be a meeting of the NATO Council/Defence Planning Committee, at the level of permanent
representatives of the member-countries of the bloc at its headquarters in Evère (a suburb of Brussels), with the rank of ambassador. Joint meetings may also be called of the Council/Defence Planning Committee and the Military Committee of NATO, attended by military representatives of the member countries of the bloc.

The alert system serves to ensure military preparedness and provide for the transition of NATO armed forces and the civilian sector from a peacetime to a wartime footing, embracing a series of measures in military and civilian areas which must be implemented according to the degree of world tension and threat of the outbreak of war.

NATO's alert system consists of three mutually dependent and complementary components:

- a state of 'military alert' (preparatory measures of a military nature)
- a battle alarm system (an emergency 'system of military measures to forestall and break up a possible attack')
- an official alarm system (for putting on a war footing not only the armed forces, but also the NATO countries as a whole).

The state of 'military alert' includes preparatory and preliminary measures of a military nature which may be implemented over a considerable period of time. It is designed to simplify the transition to a higher degree of preparedness and need not entail aggravation of international tension, since the corresponding measures must be carried out in maximum secrecy. A state of 'military alert' and the corresponding measures which form part of it are not in themselves indications of preparation for RYAN, but are largely a reaction to the beginning of complications in the international situation and are countermanded when there is an improvement in this situation. At the same time it is essential to discover what measures have been taken under the 'military alert', in order not to miss the moment of transition to a higher degree of readiness constituting a threat of RYAN.

The battle alarm system is a series of purely military measures implemented within an extremely short time in order to withdraw NATO armed forces from being under attack and maintain their fighting efficiency for action to carry out a surprise or retaliatory attack. This system comes into operation when owing to increasingly complicated circumstances, measures cannot be implemented as part of the official alert system, and the 'enemy attack has already begun or may begin in the immediate future'. It determines the order in which specific measures come into operation after receiving the warning signal of a 'possible attack'.

The battle alarm system envisages two states of readiness for action: an 'Orange' alert and a 'Scarlet' alert.

'State Orange' is declared when 'an attack may be expected' in the immediate future (within 36 hours), and 'State Scarlet' when military action has already
began or is expected to do so within minutes. When this alarm system has
been introduced, the Supreme Command and the national authorities must
undertake a series of operations under the official alert system, particularly if
there is time to implement civil defence measures.

In view of the fact that the measures involved in ‘State Orange’ have to be
carried out with the utmost secrecy (under the guise of manoeuvres, training
etc) in the shortest possible time, without disclosing the content of operational
plans, it is highly probable that the battle alarm system may be used to prepare
a surprise RYAN in peacetime.

Following on from this it appears that the discovery that steps are being
taken under a military alarm system, and there is a corresponding state of
readiness for action in NATO armed forces, may in combination with a number
of other factors point to the conclusion that RYAN is in preparation.

The official alert system embraces a series of civil and military measures aimed
at switching the armed forces and the NATO member-countries as a whole
from a peacetime to a war footing, and affects all potential fields of preparation
for a nuclear attack – military, political, economic, civil defence, special service
activity. The official system consists of three states:

Simple alert which is introduced in the initial stage of deterioration in the
international situation but there is no ‘immediate threat of attack’ in the
very near future. The steps taken under a simple alert are aimed at ensuring
that the NATO armed forces are ready for action, in order that, if necessary,
measures can be speeded up under a heightened alert and preparation
completed to engage without delay in military operations. At this stage,
immediate preparation begins to switch the civilian sector to a war footing.
Discovery of this stage represents an extremely serious development from
the point of view of early warning of immediate preparation for RYAN. The
measures taken at this stage are kept secret but their scale and gravity enable
signs of their implementation to be detected. Maximum attention must be
devoted to ascertaining in good time that a state of simple alert has been
introduced.

A heightened alert is declared in order to ensure that the NATO armed forces
are in a state of maximum readiness and fully deployed in accordance with
operational plans. At this stage, there is a large-scale operation to put the
country on a war footing, and such measures can no longer be concealed. They
will clearly indicate preparation for military operations. If the heightened alert
is not called off, and is followed by proclamation of a general alert, then this will
indicate the commencement of military action. It is a matter of particularly
grave significance that a general alert may be declared without previously intro-
ducing the first and second stages of the official alert system in the period when
states ‘Orange’ and ‘Scarlet’ are in operation.

The NATO alert system thus envisages measures to put not only the armed
forces, but the country as a whole on a war footing. Opportune discovery of
signs indicating implementation of a series of such measures, especially in
conjunction with nuclear consultations, provides grounds for giving the Centre early warning of the possibility of RYAN.

The USA has its own system of military preparations for switching the American armed forces to a wartime footing. This system may be used by US armed forces deployed in NATO countries. It consists of five stages, any of which may be introduced according to the actual situation. It is also possible to switch the armed forces urgently to a heightened state of readiness, by-passing the intermediate ones.

Operational readiness No 5 is the normal state of the armed forces in peacetime conditions.

Operational readiness No 4 may be introduced if there is tension in certain parts of the world. Intelligence and counter-intelligence operations may be stepped up, with preparation for combating possible sabotage. All measures are carried out in secret, with no cancellation of leave for personnel.

Operational readiness No 3 is declared if tension in a particular part of the world may affect American interests and requires intervention by US armed forces. A specially detailed contingent of the armed forces is put into this state of readiness. Secret measures are carried out (in the guise of training and manoeuvres) to reinforce protection of installations and prepare military equipment and weapons for possible use, and intelligence and counter-intelligence is stepped up. Personnel are allowed leave or passes at the decision of the command.

This stage of readiness corresponds to that of 'military alert' in NATO's alert system.

Operational readiness No 2 is introduced when a threat of conflict develops which seriously affects the interests of the USA or its allies. The emerging situation is fraught with possibilities of military action. Operational deployment of selected contingents of armed forces begins. Arms and military equipment are put in a state of wartime readiness. Controls are instituted over the activity of the civilian authorities, shipping and airlines. Censorship is introduced, with safeguards for security of communications, and leave is cancelled.

This stage of readiness corresponds in general to that of simple alert in NATO's official system, including also a number of elements of a heightened alert.

Operational readiness No 1 is declared when there are obvious indications of preparation to begin military operations. It is considered that war is inevitable and may start at any moment. The armed forces are put into a state of complete preparedness for military action to execute operational plans. All activity of civilian agencies and undertakings is subordinated to military interests.

This stage of readiness corresponds in general to the 'Stage Orange' and a heightened alert in NATO's alarm system, with elements of the 'State Scarlet' and the general alert. It immediately precedes the proclamation of a state of military emergency (in the USA), or the 'State Scarlet' or a general alert (in NATO), signifying the start of military action.
Combat readiness is stepped up on instructions from the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff, and also on orders from the commanders-in-chief of the US armed forces in the zones (theatres of military operations) with the agreement of the Committee. The signals for introducing the corresponding degree of readiness are transmitted on the Committee’s instructions through the main and reserve command centres and control points of the armed forces.

When a state of heightened readiness is introduced in the US armed forces or the alert system comes into operation in NATO, this must be accompanied also by a series of measures in the civilian sector of the United States to ensure that the country is put on to a war footing and the number of victims of a retaliatory attack is kept down.

One of the important means of safeguarding the process of preparing the decision to use nuclear weapons and controlling their use is provided by the various systems of communications: communications networks of the nuclear powers and NATO’s combined systems of communication.

From a functional point of view the adversary’s existing communications systems can be divided into general and military systems. However, irrespective of the distinctions laid down for the channels allocated, their subordination, the degree of secrecy and the specified subscribers, both types of communications are used for nuclear consultations.

Intelligence work carried out against the main communications agencies could make it possible to discover the adversary’s overall plans for preparation for war. If information is obtained promptly about the activity of executive agencies at headquarters level in carrying out these plans, this may serve as an indication of enhanced readiness on the adversary’s part for military action.

Any instructions which are discovered about rules for using the communication networks and their method of operating are also of practical significance.

In an emergency situation and when military exercises are taking place, operation of lines of communication may be switched to the ‘minimise’ system in which the volume of ordinary telephone calls and telegraphic messages is sharply curtailed and channels of communication cleared for transmitting urgent messages.

The ‘minimise’ system may be introduced selectively, in certain countries, for example, if there is deterioration in their internal situation, or it may apply to US and NATO communications systems. If this system is instituted in countries which have nuclear weapons, especially if it is on a global scale, this may provide a serious warning signal that the adversary is preparing for RYAN. The fact that ‘minimise’ had been introduced could only be discovered by means of intercept facilities.

It is of the highest importance to keep a watch on the functioning of communications networks and systems since through them information is passed about the adversary’s intentions and, above all, about his plans to use nuclear weapons and practical implementation of these. In addition, changes in the method of
operating communications systems and the level of manning may in themselves indicate the start of preparation for RYAN.

Information must be obtained about the organisation, location and functioning mechanism of all forms of communications which are allocated by the adversary for controlling the process of preparing and waging a nuclear war.

No. 6282/PR/52