1. (U) REF requires USCINCEUR to forward After Action Report for JCS-directed exercises to JCS, Services, and other CINCs. Report includes matters of doctrine and tactics that warrant attention and evaluation, and problems encountered, with suggested recommendations.

2. (U) Exercise summaries:

A. (U) Reforger 83, Fifteenth Strategic deployment Exercise of that name successfully deployed 16,044 soldiers from CONUS to demonstrate US resolve and ability to defend Europe. Elements of III Corps Battle Staff, 1st Cav Div, 3rd ACR, 1st BN 75th Rangers, and other active/reserve combat support and combat service support units deployed on 130 flights from 23 CONUS APOs to 6 European APOs prepared for combat and participated in either 1st (NL) Corps FTX Atlantic Lion or V (US) Corps FTX Confident Enterprise. SS American Eagle, SS American Rapid, and USNS Cygnus transported 1139 wheeled vehicles, 50 tracked vehicles, 250 CONEXs, and 43 MIVANS from Beaumont, TX and Bayonne, NJ to ports of Rotterdam and Vlissingen NL and Antwerp BE. Personnel redeployed on 105 flights and equipment was returned on 2 ships.

B. (U) V (US) Corps FTX Confident Enterprise (19-29 Sep) and 1st (NL) Corps FTX Atlantic Lion (19-30 Sep) were two major Autumn Forge tactical exercises associated with Reforger 83.

C. (U) CRESTED CAP 83: Third exercise of this series to incorporate revised concept approved by JCS and MOD Bonn. Under this concept, CRESTED CAP squadrons deploying to Germany are no longer limited to designated dual-based tactical units but include
OTHER NATO COMMITTED SQUADRONS. CRESTED CAP 83 DEPLOYED ONE DUAL-BASED SQUADRON (24 F-4E'S) FROM 336 TACTICAL FIGHTER SQUADRON (TFS), SEYMOUR JOHNSON AFB, NC TO RAMSTEIN AB, GE. AND ONE NATO COMMITTED SQUADRON (24 F-15'S) FROM 7 TFS, HOLLOMAN AFB, NM TO LAHR, CFAB, GE. CRESTED CAP CONCEPT CONTINUES TO EMPHASIZE DEPLOYMENT OF DUAL-BASED UNITS WHILE ALSO PROVIDING EXERCISE TRAINING FOR OTHER UNITS PLANNED TO DEPLOY TO COLLOCATED OPERATING BASES (COB'S) IN GERMANY.

D. (U) AFSOUTH FTX DISPLAY DETERMINATION (DD) 83: APPROXIMATELY 800 PERSONNEL FROM 30TH MECH INF BOE OF NORTH CAROLINA NATIONAL GUARD (NG) STRATEGICALLY DEPLOYED FROM CONUS TO ITALY FOR PARTICIPATION IN DD 83. THIS MARKED FIRST TIME THAT NG UNIT DEPLOYED WITH ALL EQUIPMENT FROM CONUS FOR PARTICIPATION IN EUROPEAN EXERCISE. DD 83 WAS LARGEST STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT TO DATE. TOTAL WAS APPROXIMATELY 11,000 US PERSONNEL. FOR NG DEPLOYMENT, SOUTHERN EUROPEAN TASK FORCES (SETAF) ACTIVATED NORTHERN ITALY AREA SUPPORT GROUP (NIASG). EMPLOYMENT OF NIASG PROVIDED OPPORTUNITY TO EXERCISE IN MANNER CLOSELY ALIGNED TO WARTIME MISSION. EMPLOYMENT OF NIASG PROVIDED VALUABLE INSIGHT FOR DETAILED PLANNING AND EFFORT REQUIRED TO SUPPORT RECEPTION OF EXTERNAL UNITS DEPLOYING TO NATO'S SOUTHERN REGION.

E. (U) COLD FIRE 83: AFCENT SPONSORED LARGE SCALE COMBINED EXERCISE FOR GROUND AND AIR FORCES AFFORDED CENTRAL REGION GROUND AND AIR FORCES EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITIES TO EXERCISE JOINT/COMBINED AIR/LAND TACTICS AND PROCEDURES. OF PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE WAS INTEGRATION OF AIR OPERATIONS WITH NATO AND NATIONALLY SPONSORED FTX'S AND OTHER GROUND ACTIVITIES TO EXERCISE JOINT AIR/LAND TACTICS AND PROCEDURES WITH FULLEST PARTICIPATION OF GROUND AND AIR FORCES. FOR FIRST TIME, CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (CAS) WAS PROVIDED ONLY AT REQUEST OF GROUND COMMANDER IN SUPPORT OF LAND BATTLE.
3. (U) SIGNIFICANT EXERCISE ACTIVITIES:
   A. (C) EXERCISE OF USCEUR OPLAN 4102 (REINFORCEMENT OF AND
      SUPPORT FOR DEFENSE OF ACE IN GENERAL WAR) WAS PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF
      REFORGER 83 AND CRESTED CAP 83. OTHER IMPORTANT OBJECTIVES
      ACCOMPLISHED ARE AS FOLLOWS:
      (1) U.S. DEMONSTRATION OF US RESOLVE AND ABILITY TO HONOR
          NATO COMMITMENTS.
      
      PAGE 06 RUSNNOAD0041  CONFIDENTIAL
      (2) (U) DEPLOYMENT, RECEPTION, EQUIPPING, AND MOVEMENT OF
          CONUS FORCES TO EXERCISE REINFORCEMENT OF EUROPE.
      (3) (U) TO INCREASE USE OF HOST NATION SUPPORT.
      (4) (U) EXERCISE AND EVALUATION OF INTERFACE BETWEEN JDA
          AND DEPLOYMENT EXECUTION SYSTEMS.
      B. (U) COMPRESSION OF AIRFLOW: OF 16,044 PERSONNEL 71
          PERCENT ARRIVED BETWEEN 10 AND 13 SEP 83. COMPRESSED TIME FRAME
          WAS DESIGNED TO MORE CLOSELY APPROXIMATE WARTIME ARRIVALS AND TROOP
          CONCENTRATIONS IN POMCUS SITES AND MARSHALLING AREAS.
      C. (U) FIRST USE OF NORTHERN POMCUS SITES WAS EXECUTED FROM
          STORAGE FACILITIES AT MENCHENGLADBACH AND HERONGEN, GE.
      D. (U) SPECIAL FORCES UNITS OPERATING IN BELGIUM,
          NETHERLANDS, AND LUXEMBOURG LINES OF COMMUNICATION (LOC) PROVIDED
          HUMAN INTELLIGENCE THROUGH FORWARD OPERATING BASES TO HIGHER
          HEADQUARTERS. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO AIR FORCE
          UNITS TO EXERCISE JOINT INTELLIGENCE PROCEDURES.
      E. (U) RANGER COMPANY CONDUCTED OPERATIONS IN REAR COMBAT
          ZONE AGAINST POMCUS MARSHALLING AREAS TO EVALUATE LOCAL SECURITY
          PROCEDURES FOLLOWING POMCUS DRAW.
      F. (U) FIRST STAGING OF US FORCES WAS CONDUCTED IN NETHERLANDS
          
      PAGE 07 RUSNNOAD0041  CONFIDENTIAL
      G. (U) NIGHT AIRDROP OF 280 RANGERS FROM C-141'S WHICH FLEW
          NON-STOP FROM HUNTER ARMY AIRFIELD, GA. AGGRESSOR FORCE OPERATED
AGAINST US CORPS LOGISTICAL UNITS IN CORPS REAR AREA.

(2) DEPLOYMENT:

1. GOLD DEPLOYMENT AGENCY AGAIN USEC COMBINED DATA BASE FOR DEPLOYMENT EXECUTION; HOWEVER, THIS YEAR'S COMBINED DATA BASE WAS EXPANDED TO INCLUDE REFORGER, CRESTED CAP, AND DISPLAY DETERMINATION DEPLOYMENTS. ELEMENTS OF JCS CRISIS ACTION SYSTEM WERE USED TO PREPARE FORCES FOR DEPLOYMENT EXECUTION. WIN TELECONFERENCE SYSTEM WAS USED AS MANAGEMENT TOOL TO IDENTIFY AND RESOLVE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH DEPLOYMENT PLANNING.

2. DURING AUTUMN FORGE EXERCISES, MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND (MAC) PROVIDED AIRLIFT FOR FIVE USEUCOM SPONSORED OR COORDINATED EXERCISES SIMULTANEOUSLY: REFORGER, CRESTED CAP, COLD FIRE, DISPLAY DETERMINATION, AND OKSBOEL. FORCES WERE DEPLOYED USING SINGLE DEPLOYMENT AIRLIFT FLOW. THIS INTEGRATED FLOW PROVIDED MORE EFFICIENT, RESPONSIVE DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE. OVERALL AIRLIFT EFFORT INCLUDED SOME 19,000 TROOPS AND 1,500 TONS OF CARGO ON 172 MISSIONS. AUTUMN FORGE 83 WAS ONE OF BEST AIRLIFT EFFORTS TO DATE.
EIGHTY-NINE PERCENT OF ALL AILRIFT AND 91 PERCENT OF REFORGER
AILRIFT ARRIVED AT OFFLOAD LOCATIONS WITHIN TWO HOURS.

(3) U/C APPROXIMATELY 600

SOLDIERS AND AIRMEN PARTICIPATED IN STRATEGIC AEROMEDICAL
EVACUATION EXERCISE. THIS SIMULATED EVACUATION OF COMBAT CASUALTIES
FROM EUROPEAN THEATER TO MEDICAL TREATMENT FACILITIES IN NORTH
AMERICA.

(4) (U) PROBLEMS AND MATTERS OF DOCTRINE, EQUIPMENT, AND TACTICS:

(A) (U) TITLE: JOINT DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM (JDS).

(1) (C) PROBLEM: LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN JDS BY
TRANSPORTATION OPERATING AGENCIES AND FORCE TRACKERS IMPAIRED

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REALISTIC EVALUATION OF JDS.

(2) DISCUSSION: PLANNING GUIDANCE AGREED TO BY ALL
PARTICIPATING HQS AT JDA TRANSPORTATION CONFERENCE (MAY 83) REQUIRED
EXCEPTION REPORTING THROUGH JDS. NO POSITIVE REPORTING WOULD BE
CONDUCTED; HOWEVER, ORGANIZATIONS THAT PROVIDED FORCES INITIATED
TELECONFERENCE (TLCF) IN WHICH POSITIVE REPORTING WAS CONDUCTED.

ADDITIONALLY, IDENTICAL INFORMATION WAS PASSED THROUGH DIRECT
TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN CONUS ORGANIZATIONS AND ARRED CELL
AT 21ST SUPCOM IN KAINERSLAUTERN. JDS WAS NOT EXERCISED PROPERLY
AND AGREED UPON EXCEPTION REPORTING WAS EITHER NOT TIMELY OR NOT
DONE AT ALL. FULL 4102 DEPLOYMENT MANDATES ESTABLISHMENT OF
INTEGRATED AND
CREDIBLE SYSTEM WHICH IS RESPONSIVE TO CHANGES. TO DEVELOP COHESIVE
SYSTEM, PROBLEMS MUST BE IDENTIFIED AND CORRECTED BY EXERCISING JDS.

(3) (U) RECOMMENDATIONS:

(A) (U) JCS ESTABLISH WELL DEFINED REQUIREMENTS FOR
SERVICE INTEGRATION INTO JDS.

(B) (U) JCS ESTABLISH COMPLETION DATE FOR INTEGRATION

(C) (U) JCS ESTABLISH ATTAINABLE AND WELL DEFINED
CRITERIA FOR SYSTEM USE DURING EXERCISES.

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(4) (U) OFFICE OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY: JCS.
B. (U) TITLE: USCIENCEUR AND CINCUSAREUR OPLANS 4102 AND
CINCUSAREUR OPLAN 4360.
(1) (U) PROBLEM: PARTICIPATING CONUS UNITS WERE
FAMILIAR WITH USCIENCEUR AND CINCUSAREUR OPLANS 4102 AND
CINCUSAREUR OPLAN 4360.
(2) (U) DISCUSSION: USCIENCEUR AND CINCUSAREUR OPLAN 4102
AND CINCUSAREUR OPLAN 4360 ARE KEY EUROPEAN WARTIME PLANNING
DOCUMENTS UNDER WHICH CONUS FORCES ARE DEPLOYED, RECEIVED, EQUIPPED,
AND MOVED AS REINFORCING FORCES. REFORGER MOBILITY EXERCISES ARE
DESIGNED TO TEST AND REFINE THESE WARTIME PLANS. MAJOR SUBORDINATE
CONUS DEPLOYING COMMANDS REQUIRE KNOWLEDGE OF USAREUR LOGISTICAL
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. WITHOUT THIS, CONFUSION AND DELAYS ARE
EXPERIENCED DURING CRITICAL PERIODS OF RECEPTION, EQUIPPING, AND
MOVEMENT.
(3) (U) RECOMMENDATION: THAT EMPHASIS BE PLACED ON CONUS
UNITS HAVING GREATER FAMILIARITY AND KNOWLEDGE OF SUPPORTED CINC
PLANS.
(4) (U) OFFICE OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY: JCS, USREDCOM.
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. (U) TITLE: MOVEMENT STANDARDIZATION AGREEMENTS (STANAG)
PROCEDURES.
(1) (U) PROBLEM: USAREUR AND CONUS DEPLOYING UNITS NEED MORE
TRAINING IN PREPARATION OF STANAGS ASSOCIATED WITH RECEPTION AND
INWARD MOVEMENT.
(2) (U) DISCUSSION: USAREUR AND CONUS DEPLOYING UNITS ARE
REQUIRED TO SUBMIT MOVEMENT REQUESTS IN STANAG FORMAT. ALL MILITARY
UNITS ARE EXPECTED TO BE FAMILIAR WITH STANAG
176 (PROVIDES CUSTOMS REQUIREMENTS FOR MILITARY ROAD MOVEMENT
ACROSS INTERNATIONAL BORDERS) AND STANAG 2154 (PROVIDES REQUIREMENT
FOR VEHICLE MARKINGS IN CONVOYS). MANY UNITS WERE UNFAMILIAR WITH
CURRENT STANAG PROCEDURES, RESULTING IN NUMEROUS ERRORS,
CONFUSION, AND DELAYS. MOVEMENT PLANS, SOPS AND DETAILED TRAINING
IN STANAG PREPARATION AND PROCEDURES ARE NEEDED BY ALL UNITS.

(3) (U) RECOMMENDATION: THAT TRAINING PROGRAM BE INITIATED TO FAMILIARIZE CONUS ARMY UNITS WITH STANAG PROCEDURES.

(4) (U) OFFICE OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY: USREDCOM AND DA.

D. (U) TITLE: SELF-SUFFICIENCY OF DEPLOYING FORMATIONS.

(1) (U) PROBLEM: DIVERSION OF FORWARD STATIONED UNITS TO SUPPORT DEPLOYING FORCES DURING RECEPTION AND ONWARD MOVEMENT

SERIOUSLY DEGRADED SUPPORT PROGRAMMED FOR FORWARD STATIONED COMBAT FORCES.

(2) (U) DISCUSSION: US FORWARD STATIONED MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY WAS DIVERTED FROM PRINCIPAL MISSION, WHICH IS BACK-UP MAINTENANCE SUPPORT TO US FORWARD STATIONED FORMATIONS, TO PROVIDE COMMUNICATION ZONE SUPPORT. HOST NATION SUPPORT (HNS) WAS REQUESTED TO PRECLUDE USE OF FORWARD STATIONED MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY; HOWEVER, 1ST (NL) CORPS FTX ATLANTIC LION LIMITED HNS THAT COULD BE ACTIVATED IN NETHERLANDS WHICH PRECLUDED EXERCISE OF DESIRED LEVELS OF HNS. US ASSETS USED TO FILL THIS VOID WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE IN FULL OPLAN 4360 IMPLEMENTATION. CONUS UNIT EQUIPMENT MUST BE DEPLOYED FULLY MISSION CAPABLE. PERSONNEL ACCOMPANYING SEA-DEPLOYED EQUIPMENT MUST MAINTAIN OPERATIONAL STATUS ABOARD SHIP. DRIVERS AND ADVANCED PARTIES MUST BE CONFIGURED AND EQUIPPED TO SUPPORT POD CLEARANCE AND ONWARD MOVEMENT. THIS INCLUDES SECURITY, MAINTENANCE, RECOVERY AND EVACUATION, REFUELING, SUBSISTENCE, AND MEDICAL SUPPORT.

(3) (U) RECOMMENDATION: INSURE THAT DEPLOYING UNITS SELF-SUFFICIENCY PLANS, SOPS, AND TRAINING ARE ADEQUATE.

(4) (U) OFFICE OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY: DA AND USREDCOM.

E. (U) TITLE: DEPARTMENT OF ARMY STANDARD PORTS SYSTEM (DASPS).
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UEAAAC/CNO WASHINGTON DC
UEAHQA/HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC//XOO//
UEAHER/CAC WASHINGTON DC
UCBSAA/CINCLANT NORFOLK VA:
UCJAAM/USCINCRED MACDILL AFB FL//RCJ3/RCJ4//
UHQQHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
UEDEHA/USCINCQO QUARRY HEIGHTS PANAMA
HCUNAA/HQ MAC SCOTT AFB IL//DO//
UCUEKA/HQ SAC OFFUTT AFB NE//DO//
UCPPAA/USCINCENT MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ3/CCJ4//
UCJJAAA/JDA MACDILL AFB FL
UDFDDAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//AEAGC//
HDCNIN/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
HFRAAB/HQ USAF RAMSTEIN AB GE//DO//
HCGBURB/CDR FORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//AFOP//

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UKMTC/CDR MTMC WASHINGTON DC
UWRRSA/USMINR SHAPE BE
HFRAAB/7 AD RAMSTEIN AB GE//DO//
HFRAAB/322 ALD RAMSTEIN AB GE//DO//
INGREDIENTS USED IN SEASONING T-RATION MENU ITEMS.

(1) (U) OFFICE OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY: DA.

(2) (U) TITLE: LOGISTICS INTEROPERABILITY.

(3) (U) PROBLEM: REFINEMENT OF REPLACEMENT-IN-KIND (RIK) PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 96-323 IS NECESSARY TO IMPROVE RIK VALUE TO NATO SUSTAINMENT.

(4) (U) DISCUSSION: FIRST MAJOR IMPLEMENTATION OF REPLACEMENT-IN-KIND (RIK) WAS TESTED AND PROVED FUNCTIONAL. IN EXERCISE ATLANTIC LION, US BRIGADE RECEIVED ALL CLASS: I AND CLASS III (BULK) SUPPORT FROM NL SOURCES, WHILE NL BDE RECEIVED RIK SUPPORT FROM US. SIMILAR RIK ACTION WAS EXERCISED IN FTX CONFIDENT PAGE 03 RUSNODAO043 CONFIDENTIAL ENTERPRISE BETWEEN US AND GE ORGANIZATIONS.

(3) (U) RECOMMENDATION: IMPLEMENTING AGREEMENTS CONTINUE TO BE DEVELOPED AND REFINED. CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS WITH NATIONS WITH WHOM SUCH AGREEMENTS DO NOT CURRENTLY EXIST.

(4) (U) OFFICE OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY: USEUCOM.

H. (U) TITLE: NON-DEMAND SUPPORTED STOCKAGES OF CLASS IX AND CLASS VII (REPAIR PARTS AND ASSEMBLIES).

(1) (U) PROBLEM: TO ELIMINATE EXERCISE STOCKING (NON-DEMAND SUPPORTED) OF SUPPLIES IN THEATER (STOCK PILES) AND STANDARDIZE RESUPPLY PACKAGES FOR STRATEGIC RESUPPLY.

(2) (U) DISCUSSION: DEVELOPMENT OF "EXERCISE STOCK PILES" DEMONSTRATES LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN SUPPLY SYSTEM. CONUS LOGISTIC COMMUNITY MUST BE EXERCISED. AIR LINE OF COMMUNICATION (ALOC) AND EXTENDED ALOC OPERATIONS PROVIDE MOVEMENT MEDIUM FOR FLOW OF SUPPLIES AND SHOULD ALLOW LOGISTICIANS TO MANAGE THIS FLOW RATHER THAN STOCK PILES. NEED TO EMPHASIZE FLOW OF SUPPLIES RATHER THAN BUILD UP OF STOCKS.

(3) (U) RECOMMENDATION: THAT LISTEC CAPABILITIES BE REFINED AND IMPROVEMENT FACILITATE STRATEGIC RESUPPLY AND ELIMINATION OF STOCK PILES.
(1) OFFICE OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY: DA AND USEUCOM.
(2) TITLE: COMPRESSION OF DEPLOYMENT AND RECEPTION.
(3) PROBLEM: SPREADING DEPLOYMENT AND RECEPTION OVER PERIOD GREATER THAN 48 HRS FOR DIV EQUIVALENT DOES NOT ADEQUATELY TEST OR DEMONSTRATE FULL USABILITY TO RAPIDLY REINFORCE EUROPE.
(4) DISCUSSION: THIS YEAR'S DEPLOYMENT IN 4 DAYS OF LESS THAN 20 PERCENT OF FORCES PROMISED UNDER OLPAN 4102 DOES NOT ADEQUATELY EXERCISE US ABILITY TO REINFORCE. UNDER CURRENT PLANS AND AGREEMENTS, US MUST DEPLOY AND RECEIVE DIV EQUIVALENT EVERY 48 HOURS. THIS CAPABILITY SHOULD BE DEMONSTRATED UNDER CONTROLLED CIRCUMSTANCES, SUCH AS REFORGER, TO VALIDATE CONCEPT.
(5) RECOMMENDATION: THAT DEPLOYMENT COMMUNITY SUPPORT FURTHER COMPRESSION OF DEPLOYMENT AND RECEPTION.
(6) OFFICE OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY: USEUCOM, JREDCOM, MAC, AND JDA.
(7) TITLE: BELGIUM RAIL STRIKE.
(8) PROBLEM: LACK OF COLLECTION AND REPORTING OF INTELLIGENCE ON MATTERS DIRECTLY IMPACTING LOC OPERATIONS.
(9) DISCUSSION: ORGANIZATIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR COLLECTING AND REPORTING OF INTELLIGENCE WERE NOTIFIED OF POSSIBLE RAIL STRIKE. PROMPT ACTION NULLIFIED POSSIBLE DELAYING EFFECT ON REFORGER RECEPTION PROCESS. TIMELY EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION BETWEEN US AND HOST NATION PARTICIPANTS WAS NOTICEABLY ABSENT. EFFORTS TO OBTAIN TIMELY AND ACCURATE ASSESSMENT OF STRIKE AND ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT WERE HAMPERED BY HOST NATION PHONE COMMUNICATIONS FAILURES THROUGHTOUT PORT AREA. THIS RESULTED IN US DECISIONS BEING MADE IN SITUATION.
(10) RECOMMENDATIONS: US AND ALLIED NATIONS TAKE MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE DATA IMPACTING ON LOC OPERATIONS. THAT PROCEDURES DEVELOPED FOR DISSEMINATION OF THIS DATA TO ALL CONCERNED.
(11) OFFICE OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY: USEUCOM.
K. (U) TITLE: LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE PATROL (LRRP) REQUIREMENTS.

(1) LRRP PROBLEM: LACK OF US ORGANIC HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (HUMINT) SOURCES RESPONSIVE TO US CORPS.

(2) LRRP DISCUSSION: REQUIREMENTS FOR HUMINT ASSETS HAVE BEEN VALIDATED DURING REFORDER EXERCISES SINCE MID-1970'S. NATO LRRP PARTICIPATION IN FTX CONFIDENT ENTERPRISE WAS SIGNIFICANT.

PAGE 06 RUSNNOA0043 CONFIDENTIAL CONTRIBUTOR TO TOTAL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PROCESS. INFORMATION PROVIDED BY LRRP TEAMS WAS TIMELY AND RELIABLE.

(3) LRRP RECOMMENDATIONS: DA AUTHORIZE LRRPS AS ORGANIC HUMINT SOURCE AT CORPS LEVEL AND DEVELOP DOCTRINE FOR EMPLOYMENT.

L. (U) TITLE: COMMUNICATIONS AND MISSILE MAINTENANCE EQUIPMENT OF CONUS DEPLOYING UNITS.

(1) COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEM: UNITS ARRIVING IN THEATER WITHOUT REQUIRED COMMUNICATION AND MAINTENANCE SYSTEMS.

(2) DISCUSSION: UNITS DEPLOYING FROM CONUS MUST BRING ALL TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS AND MISSILE MAINTENANCE EQUIPMENT REQUISITES WHICH ARE NOT IN CONUS. DEPLOYMENT DURING REFORDER SHOULD BE DONE UNDER SAME CRITERIA AS DEPLOYMENT TO HOSTILE ZONES WHERE UNITS MUST PERFORM MISSIONS WITH ORGANIC ASSETS. WHEN MOST UNITS ARE TASKED TO PROVIDE ASSETS TO DEPLOYING UNITS FOR INTERNAL OPERATIONS, UNIT CAPABILITIES ARE DEGRADED. ALSO, UNREALISTIC PERCEPTIONS OF AVAILABLE SUPPORT ARE DEVELOPED.

(3) COMMUNICATIONS RECOMMENDATIONS:

(a) CONUS UNITS DEPLOY WITH CONUS SHORTFALLS AT C2 FOR EQUIPMENT READINESS CODE A ITEMS AND C1 FOR PACING ITEMS, AS REQUIRED TO ACCOMPLISH UNIT MISSIONS.
(A) (U) NON-POMCUS UNITS DEPLOY WITH ALL ASSETS REQUIRED BY TOE TO ACCOMPLISH ASSIGNED MISSIONS.

(4) OFFICE OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY: USREDCOM AND DA.

M. (U) TITLE: PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOP) EQUIPMENT.

(1) (U) PROBLEM: MAINTAINABILITY OF PSYOP PECULIAR EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.

(2) (U) DISCUSSION: REQUIREMENT TO SHIP PSYOP PECULIAR EQUIPMENT (I.E., PRESSES AND LOUDSPEAKERS), OVER-SEAS AND LAND, CAN RESULT IN CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE AND IMPEDE PERFORMANCE OF MISSION. ADDITIONALLY, ARMY SUPPLY SYSTEM DOES NOT PROVIDE TIMELY REPAIR SUPPORT OR SUPPLIES FOR PSYOP EQUIPMENT.

(3) (U) RECOMMENDATIONS: PSYOP PECULIAR EQUIPMENT AND ITS ASSOCIATED REPAIR PARTS AND SUPPLIES BE PRE-POSITIONED IN THEATER.

(4) (U) OFFICE OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY: DA.

N. (U) TITLE: ORGANICALLY DEPLOYED U.S. AIR FORCES.

(1) (U) PROBLEM: NON-USE OF JDS FOR REPORTING AND MONITORING ORGANICALLY DEPLOYING AIR FORCES.
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ULSWCA/COMSC WASHINGTON DC
UKGATC/CDR HTMC WASHINGTON DC
JUORRA/USMNR SHAPE BE
JFRAAB/7 AD RAMSTEIN AB GE//DO/
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(2) DISCUSSION: DURING CRESTED CAP DEPLOYMENTS, ORGANICALLY DEPLOYED U.S. AIR FORCES WERE NOT REPORTED OR MONITORED USING JDS. FORCES WERE IN JDS DATA BASE BUT NOT DIVIDED INTO SMALLER ELEMENTS (FRAG AND INSERT TECHNIQUE) TO SHOW HOW FORCES WERE ACTUALLY MOVING, E.G. SIX AIRCRAFT ELEMENTS.

(3) RECOMMENDATIONS: THAT ORGANIZATIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING ORGANICALLY DEPLOYED FORCES, USE JDS FRAG AND INSERT TECHNIQUE TO SHOW HOW FORCES ARE ACTUALLY MOVING.

(4) (U) OFFICE OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY: USREDCOM.

(1) (U) PROBLEM: DEVIATION AND DIVERSION REPORTING.

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(2) DISCUSSION: STRATEGIC AIRLIFT USUALLY MOVED ACCORDING TO AIRLIFT SCHEDULE. WHEN DEVIATIONS OR DIVERSIONS OCCUR, JDS IS SUPPOSED TO BE UPDATED TO REFLECT THESE CHANGES. THIS TYPE INFORMATION IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO ORGANIZATIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR RECEPTION OF FORCES AND ORGANIZATIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR TRACKING FORCES. DURING REFORGER DEPLOYMENT, SOME KNOWN DEVIATIONS AND DIVERSIONS WERE NOT UP-DATED IN DATA BASE. FOR SOME DEVIATIONS, UPDATE OCCURRED AFTER DELAYED CARRIERS ACTUALLY ARRIVED AT APPOD. IN ADDITION, DIVERSIONS ENTERED INTO JDS USED DEVIATION REPORT FORMAT INSTEAD OF DIVERSION FORMAT.

(3) RECOMMENDATIONS: DEVIATION/DIVERSIONS DATA BE ENTERED INTO JDS AS SOON AS KNOWN TO HELP MAKE EXCEPTION REPORTING SUCCESSFUL.

(4) (U) OFFICE OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY: MAC AND USREDCOM.

(1) (U) TITLE: JDS REPORTING PROCEDURES.

(2) (U) DISCUSSION: SHADOW REPORTING (SEPARATE, INDEPENDENT COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM OF TELEPHONE NETS AND WIN TELECONFERENCE) WAS USED EXTENSIVELY BY SUPPORTING COMMAND ARMY.
PAGE 04 RUSNNOAO044 CONFIDENTIAL COMPONENT DURING REFORGER TO MONITOR DEPLOYMENTS. AS A RESULT, JDS PRIMARY REPORTING NETWORK WAS NOT UPDATED BY SUPPORTING COMMAND OR TOA WITH CARRIER MANIFEST CHANGES. PROBLEM IS NOT THAT BACKUP REPORTING SYSTEM WAS USED, BUT THAT IT BECAME PRIMARY MEANS OF MONITORING DEPLOYMENTS. SHADOW REPORTING DURING EXERCISES IS FEASIBLE. AS EVIDENT BY ITS USE DURING REFORGER 83; HOWEVER, DURING LARGE SCALE REAL WORLD DEPLOYMENT, COMMUNICATION ASSETS USED FOR SHADOW REPORTING COULD BEST BE USED FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

(3) IU) RECOMMENDATION: THAT REPORTING PROCEDURES FOR JDS BE REVIEWED AND STRICTLY ENFORCED.

(4) (U) OFFICE OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY: JCS, DA, USAF, JSREDCOM, MAC, AND JDA.

Q. (U) TITLE: DD 83 DEPLOYMENT/RECEPTION.

(1) (IAW) PROBLEM: EXECUTING DEPLOYMENT/RECEPTION OPERATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH IAW EXISTING WAR PLANS.

(2) (IAW) DISCUSSION: DURING DD 83, DEPLOYMENT OPERATIONS WERE NOT EXECUTED IAW CURRENT WAR PLANS. RECEPTION ACTIVITIES WERE CONDUCTED AT MESTRE SEA PORTS (VENICE, IT). DEPLOYMENT INTO MESTRE SEA PORTS DID NOT PERMIT EXERCISING OF SEA PORTS WHICH ARE SCHEDULED TO BE USED DURING WARTIME. ALSO, CAPABILITIES OF 8TH AREA SUPPORT GROUP TO RECEIVE AND MOVE EXTERNAL REINFORCEMENT UNITS INTO NATO'S SOUTHERN REGION WERE NOT EXERCISED.

(3) IU) RECOMMENDATION: IN FUTURE DD EXERCISES IN ITALY, EARLY NEGOTIATION WITH ITALIAN AUTHORITIES SHOULD BE EFFECTED TO INSURE THAT SEA PORTS SCHEDULED FOR USE DURING WARTIME ARE MADE AVAILABLE.

(4) (U) OFFICE OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY: USEUCOM/AND JSAREUR.

R. (U) TITLE: RESTRICTIVE TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS IN AEGEAN DURING DD 83.

(1) (IAW) PROBLEM: WITHDRAWAL OF GREECE FROM EXERCISE DD 83 SEVERELY IMPACTED ON AIR OPERATIONS IN AEGEAN.
(2) DISCUSSION: THERE ARE MANY SOUND TACTICAL REASONS OR POSITIONING CV IN AEGEAN TO SUPPORT LAND BATTLE IN TURKISH HRACE WHILE MAINTAINING SEA CONTROL IN CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN; HOWEVER, REQUIREMENT TO AVOID ALL GREEK SOVEREIGN TERRITORY (WITHOUT DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE FOR OVERFLIGHTS) SEVERELY Restricts TACTICAL OPERATIONS.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: PURSUE BLANKET DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE FOR U.S. MILITARY AIRCRAFT TO FLY OVER GREEK TERRITORY AST OF LONGITUDE 24E DURING SPECIFIC EXERCISES.

4) OFFICE OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT.

S. TITLE: NATO AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING (NAEW) IN DD 83.

(2) DISCUSSION: NAEW OPERATIONS DURING DD 83 DEMONSTRATED CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE AIR SURVEILLANCE PICTURE EXTENDING FROM BLACK SEA SOUTH TO EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. NE3A, ACTING AS NET CONTROL STATION, PROVIDED LINK II CONNECTIVITY TO BOTH MESSAGE PROCESSING CENTER (MAP)/NATO AIR DEFENSE GROUND ENVIRONMENT (NAGDE) RADAR SYSTEM AND USN E2C AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING (AEW) AIRCRAFT. E2C PROVIDED SOUTHERN AREA OVERWATER TRACK DATA AND ACTED AS RELAY TO OPERATING TASK FORCE. NE3A DIRECTED JOINT COMBINED AIRCRAFT; DEMONSTRATING COMMAND AND CONTROL CAPABILITIES. USN F-14 FIGHTER AIRCRAFT, OPERATING UNDER CONTROL OF 6TH ALLIED TACTICAL AIR FORCE AND DIRECTLY UNDER CONTROL OF NE3A, IN SUPPORT OF SIMULATED RIENDLY FORCES, SUCCESSFULLY DEFENDED PAMUKOVA, TU AIRFIELD. INTERCEPT CONTROL INFORMATION WAS TRANSMITTED TO FIGHTER AIRCRAFT VIA LINK 4A AND TO MPC/NAGDE VIA LINK II FOR CONVERSION TO LINK I.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: INCLUDE NE3A IN ALL MAJOR NATO GROUND BASE SITES. EVOLUTION WAS SUCCESSFUL AND WAS A MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENT IN IMPROVING MULTI-SYSTEM INTEROPERABILITY.
EXERCISES AND EXPAND SCOPE OF NAEM'S CAPABILITY TO FURTHER ENHANCE NATA INTEROPERABILITY, PARTICULARLY IN AREA OF INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE.

(4) (U) OFFICE OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY: USEUCOM IN COORDINATION WITH AFCENT, AFSSOUTH, AND AFNORTH.

T. (C) TITLE: DECEPTION IMPLEMENTATION DURING DD 83.

(1) USE: PROBLEM: NONE.

(2) USE: DISCUSSION: OPERATIONAL DECEPTION WAS ROUTINELY USED THROUGHOUT EXERCISE BY NAVAL FORCES, SPECIFICALLY DIMMING OR EXTINGUISHING NAVIGATIONAL LIGHTS, WHICH IN ONE CASE RESULTED IN UNOBSERVED CLOSE ABOARD DESTRUCTION OF SIMULATED ENEMY VESSEL. IN ANOTHER SITUATION, SIMULATED ENEMY PATROL BOATS WERE FORCED TO RADIATE EMITTERS, THEREBY ALLOWING FRIENDLY FORCE TO DESTROY THREAT WITH GUNS PRIOR TO COMING UNDER ATTACK.

(3) USE: RECOMMENDATION: CONTINUE TO DEVELOP DECEPTIVE LIGHTING SCHEMES IN COORDINATION WITH EMISSION CONTROL PLANS TO ENSURE EFFECTIVE OPERATIONAL DECEPTION.

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(4) OFFICE OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY: USN.

U. (U) TITLE: GREEK WITHDRAWAL FROM DD 83.

(1) (U) PROBLEM: GREEK WITHDRAWAL FROM DD 83 FORCED EARLY REDEPLOYMENT OF TWO AIR FORCE UNITS.

(2) (U) DISCUSSION: OVER PAST THREE YEARS, GREEKS HAVE DISRUPTED OR CAUSED COMPLETE CANCELLATION OF SEVERAL NATO EXERCISES AT SIGNIFICANT COST OF MONEY AND EFFORT. IMPACT OF THESE WITHDRAWALS HAVE ADVERSELY AFFECTED UNIT TRAINING AND RESULTED IN UNNECESSARY EXPENDITURE OF EXERCISE FUNDS.

(3) (U) RECOMMENDATION: CAREFULLY EVALUATE FUTURE DEPLOYMENTS TO GREECE AND TURKEY FOR EXERCISES.

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(4) (U) OFFICE OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY: JCS, USEUCOM, AND US STATE DEPARTMENT.

V. (C) TITLE: BASING FOR MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT.

(1) (C) PROBLEM: BASING OPTIONS FOR MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT (MPA) IN EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN.

(2) (C) DISCUSSION: WITHDRAWAL OF GREEK FACILITIES FROM DD 83 UNDERSCORED NEED FOR CONTINUED REVIEW OF BASING OPTIONS IN EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AREA. IN ACTUAL TENSION SITUATION, DISABLING/DENIAL OF SOUDA BAY FACILITIES WOULD LIMIT ABILITY OF SIGONELLA BASED MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT TO PROSECUTE TARGETS/PROVIDE SUPPORT IN EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. CONTINUOUS PROSECUTION FROM SIGONELLA OF SINGLE TARGET ISLAND EAST OF CRETE WOULD REQUIRE APPROXIMATELY 75 PERCENT OF AVAILABLE EFFORT FROM ONE PATRON.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: CONTINUE INITIATIVE TO EXERCISE U.S. MPA BILATERALLY WITH TURKISH NAVAL FORCES WITH AIM TOWARD GREATER FAMILIARITY AND OPERATIONS FROM TURKISH BASES.

(4) (U) OFFICE OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT.

W. (U) TITLE: INVITATION OF DOD SPONSORED NEWS MEDIA.
1. (U) PROBLEM: SHORTFALL IN REGIONAL/NATIONAL NEWS MEDIA IN DOD SPONSORED MEDIA TOUR.

2. (U) DISCUSSION: AS IN PREVIOUS YEARS, OASD (PA) REQUESTED SERVICES NOMINATE MEDIA TO DEPLOY WITH AND COVER REFORGER/CRESTED CAP UNITS. OBJECTIVE IS TO INFORM U.S. PUBLIC OF CAPABILITY OF U.S. FORCES TO QUICKLY REINFORCE EUROPE IN A CRISIS. SUPPORTING USEUCOM OBJECTIVE WAS TO PUBLICIZE HOST NATION SUPPORT PROVIDED TO DEPLOYING FORCES. USEUCOM RECOMMENDED INVITATION OF REGIONAL/NATIONAL MEDIA TO BEST ACCOMPLISH THESE OBJECTIVES. THIRTY-FIVE NEWS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES ACCEPTED INVITATION TO REPORT ON EXERCISES. TWENTY-SEVEN MEDIA REPRESENTING 22 NEWS ORGANIZATIONS CAME TO EUROPE BUT ONLY 25 COVERED EXERCISES. ONLY TWELVE OF MEDIA COULD BE CONSIDERED REGIONAL OR NATIONAL NEWS MEDIA. ALMOST ONE-HALF OF NEWS MEDIA WERE FROM EASTERN PART OF UNITED STATES. WESTERN U.S. WAS REPRESENTED BY ONE INDIVIDUAL. A BETTER SYSTEM OF MEDIA SELECTION AND INVITATION SHOULD BE DESIGNED TO OBTAIN IMPROVED GEOGRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION WITH MORE REGIONAL/NATIONAL MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES.

3. (U) RECOMMENDATION: OASD (PA) DISCONTINUE SELECTION OF MEDIA FROM SERVICE NOMINATIONS AND, IN COORDINATION WITH SERVICE DEPARTMENTS, DEVELOP LIST OF GEOGRAPHICALLY-BALANCED REGIONAL/NATIONAL MEDIA. USEUCOM COULD ASSIST IN PROVIDING ADVANCE INFORMATION TO ATTRACT MEDIA. IMPLEMENTATION OF NEXT RECOMMENDATION WOULD ALSO ASSIST IN IMPROVING REPRESENTATION OF REGIONAL/NATIONAL MEDIA.

4. (U) OFFICE OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY: OASD (PA).

5. (U) TITLE: MEDIA AIRLIFT.

1. (U) PROBLEM: DOD REGULATION Restricts DOD-SPONSORED MEDIA TRAVEL ON EXERCISE AIRCRAFT AND EXERCISE AIRFLOW DICTATES THAT MEDIA STAY IN EUROPE FOR TWO WEEKS OR LONGER.

2. (U) DISCUSSION: CHAPTER 8, DOD 4515.13-R STATES THAT MEDIA TRAVEL ON DOD AIRCRAFT IS ONLY AUTHORIZED IF TRAVEL ITSELF IS PART OF COVERAGE. THIS THEN Restricts REFORGER MEDIA TRANSPORTATION TO EXERCISE AIRCRAFT ONLY AND TO EXERCISE AIRFLOW BOTH TO AND FROM
Europe. Many of problems mentioned in above para in obtaining regional/national media and better geographic representation are direct result of fact that media must remain in Europe for two weeks or more before they can return to CONUS on redeploying aircraft. Due to demands on their time, quality media representatives cannot afford lengthy stay away from their office. As noted in OASD (PA)

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Reforger 82 media tour after action report, visit of less than two weeks is preferred. Same comments were noted for Reforger/Crested CAP 83. All efforts were made to shorten tour period for Reforger/Crested CAP 83 consistent with airflow requirements; however, travel restrictions required two-week stay. USREDCOM and JDA' efforts in providing three appoints for media departure significantly aided embarkation of media from U.S. If DOD feels that PA benefits to be derived from better informing American public of capability of U.S. forces to reinforce Europe in crisis are important enough to warrant manhours and money currently expended, then exception to DOD 4515.13-R should be made.

(3) (U) RECOMMENDATION: OASD (PA) grant exception to CH 8, DOD 4515.13-R authorizing Reforger media to travel on any airlift service industrial fund (ASIF) aircraft in space-available, non-interference basis from Europe. Attempt should be made to encourage media to travel in group, as during Reforger 83. This worked exceptionally well from USEUCOM logistics/coordination standpoint.

(4) (U) OFFICE OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY: OASD (PA).

Y. (U) TITLE: TACTICAL DECEPTION.

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(1) (U) PROBLEM: RESTRICTIVE FTX PLAY.

(2) (U) DISCUSSION: SCOPE OF AUTUMN FORGE 83 FTX'S require that exercise play be tightly controlled. While requirement for strict adherence to master events list is recognized, there

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SHOULD ALSO BE OPPORTUNITY FOR COMMANDS TO EXPLOIT ADVANTAGES CREATED BY USE OF SOUND TACTICS, INCLUDING USE OF TACTICAL DECEPTION. RESTRICTIVE EXERCISE PLAY MAY REDUCE WILLINGNESS OF COMMANDERS AT ALL ECHELONS TO EXPEND RESOURCES IN SUPPORT OF EXERCISE OBJECTIVES SUCH AS TACTICAL DECEPTION, WHICH, EVEN IF SUCCESSFUL, WILL PROVIDE NO TACTICAL PAY-OFF.

(3) (U) RECOMMENDATION: COMMANDERS RESPONSIBLE FOR CONDUCTING FTX ASSOCIATED WITH REFORGER EXERCISES CONSIDER MAKING PORTION OF FTX FREE PLAY, THUS PERMITTING COMMANDERS TO EXPLOIT ADVANTAGES THEY CREATE FOR THEMSELVES. ALTERNATIVELY, EVALUATE EXERCISE OBJECTIVES FOR APPLICABILITY IN CONTROLLED EXERCISE ENVIRONMENT, ELIMINATING OR REDUCING THOSE NOT LIKELY TO PRODUCE MEANINGFUL TACTICAL PLAY.

(4) (U) OFFICE OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY: USEUCOM AND GT 
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