TARGETING DOCTRINE

CURRENT US STRATEGIC

"Doctrine" used here as statement of principles for employment of strategic nuclear resources.

(U) Based on President's initial guidance for strategic forces (PRM-10, Jul 77).

(U) Maintenance of "essential equivalence".

(U) No strategically inferior position.

(U) No US disarming first strike capability unless Soviets do so first.

(U) Maintenance of secure reserve force.

(U) Maintenance of forces and C³ capabilities to secure limited employment options.

(U) Maintenance of adequate attack warning and assessment.

(U) Aids in maximizing our weapon systems and reduce the probability of being overwhelmed by the systems' technology.

(U) Provides the framework for policies (ground rules for nuclear weapon employment) and objectives (specific qualitative and quantitative goals for targeting within capabilities plans).

(U) Influences acquisition and deployment policies.

(U) Current doctrine result of evolutionary changes in strategic realities.

(U) Achievement of a secure strategic retaliatory capability by Soviet Union in 1960s.
-- (U) Continuous uncertainty that the threat of large-scale nuclear retaliation provided the best deterrence.

-- (U) Erosion of US allies' confidence in strength and credibility of US nuclear deterrent.

--- (U) Decline in confidence of US counterforce attacks holding damage to the US to a low level.

--- (TS) Reductions in US defensive capabilities.

-- (U) Articulated via five major elements.

-- (U) Formal policy documents (NSDM 242, PD-18).

-- (U) Elaboration documents (NUWEP, JSCP).

-- (U) Declaratory statements (SECDEF Report to Congress).

-- (U) Capabilities plans (SIOP).

-- (U) Forces, related command, control, and intelligence which develop, support, and execute the plans.

(U) Fundamental Objective: "Flexible Nuclear Response".

(U) Deterrence of nuclear (and conventional) attacks and coercion by nuclear powers against US and allies.

---- (U) Concept:

----- (U) Discourages enemy from taking actions.

----- (U) Works on enemy intentions.

----- (U) Primarily a peacetime objective.

---- (U) For credibility, deterrence must be effective over wide range of possible contingencies.

----- (U) Rests on many options.

----- (U) Requires spectrum of capabilities.
Requires forces designed to promote nuclear stability and reduce Soviet incentive to use nuclear weapons.

Survivability: controlled and able to retaliate.

Flexibility: can provide options.

Communicated primarily through declaratory policy.

Control escalation should conflict occur.

Confine conflict to lowest level.

Display restraint by executing limited options.

Coerce conflict termination on acceptable terms.

One of few means for limiting damage to US.

US counterforce capability waning.

Lack of improved civil defense measures.

Requires "communication" of US determination and ability to resist aggression coupled with intent and capability to exercise restraint.

Maximize US power relative to the enemy if escalation cannot be controlled.
TOP SECRET

- (U) Chronology of current doctrine and policies.
  -- (TS) NSSM 169 (13 Feb 73), "US Nuclear Policy."
  -- (TS) Originally formed by Sec. Laird in 1970 to determine effectiveness of US nuclear deterrent.
  -- (TS) Recommended introduction of limited nuclear employment options to enhance deterrence and limit damage by controlling escalation.
  -- (TS) Findings were basis for NSDM 242.
  -- (TS) NSDM 242 (24 Jan 74), "Policy for Planning the Employment of Nuclear Weapons".
  -- (TS) Expansion of NSSM 169 concepts.
  -- (TS) Primary source of current doctrine.
  -- (TS) Introduced

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TOP SECRET
X --- (7S) Regional Nuclear Options (RNO) -
Small-scale attacks designed to counter
deployed attacking enemy forces and
their supporting resources to achieve
specific military objectives.

X --- (7S) Includes provision for Secure
Reserve Force.

--- (7S) NUWEB (4 Apr 74) Nuclear Weapons Employment
Policy.

--- (7S) Translates NSDM 242 by SECDEF into
policy guidance for employment of nuclear
weapons.

--- (7S) Elaborates on national policy.
-- JSCP Annex C - Provides specific JCS guidance for development of the SIOP - revised annually.


--- Present administration's statement of overall nuclear policy.

--- Broad enough to encompass range of possible employment policies.

--- Not a radical policy change.

--- Reaffirms deterrence, damage limitation and escalation control.

--- Documents strategic posture of essential equivalence.

--- Continues the three-part interrelated objectives.

--- Deter nuclear attack against US and enhance deterrence of nonnuclear aggression against NATO and Asian allies.

--- If deterrence fails, provide options for limited retaliatory responses to control escalation and flexibly respond to aggression.

--- If control of escalation fails, seek to limit damage to US and allies and inflict unacceptable levels of damage on Soviet Union so conflict terminates on most favorable possible terms to US and allies.

--- NSDM 242 and NUWEP continue as elaboration to carry out above objectives although PD 18 supersedes NSDM 242.
Directs review of US nuclear targeting policy (NTPR).

- NTPR. (Nuclear Targeting Policy Review)
- Evaluates current employment policies and identifies alternatives.
- Major findings.
  - Deterrence - target higher value systems.
  - Escalation control - develop a broader range of options with more political inputs.

Major issues.
- Flexibility - Recommends building block approach, restructure and increase number of SAOs (2 added to SIOP 5D and 4 proposed for addition to SIOP 5E).
- Endurance - Concentrate on C3I, Requirement for refinement of SRF and optional withholds.
- Counterforce - Give equal priority compared to recovery resources, attack reusable targets, modernize US forces.
- SRF - Size and composition change.
- Escalation control - More fully integrate political guidance and participation.
- US-NATO interface - Strengthen cooperation and integration of forces and plans.
LUA for Minuteman ICBM (implemented in SIOP 5D). ICBM only LUA against low collateral military and leadership subsets.

Target data - Expand base, particularly as regards leadership and warfighting target sets. Should become more responsive.

SIOP 5D (1 Oct 79).

Incorporates initial findings from PD-18 and NTFR.

Increase in SAOs (7).

Restructured SRF.

LUA.

Maintains three planning assumptions

AND

GWOD

GWD - Generated with damage, added to SIOP 5G, postulates fully generated forces which receive damage from Soviet first strike.