Soviet and Peoples Republic of China
Nuclear Weapons Employment
Policy and Strategy
and early 1953. By late 1954, only 11 "Armies" remained in Korea. (U)

During the period of intervention in Korea, the CCA was reorganized along more conventional lines. Almost one-half (32 of 69) of the previously-designated "Armies" were deactivated during this period and their personnel absorbed by the remaining units. By October 1964, the deployment of Army-level units was as reflected in Table 1. (U)

Between 1954 and 1960 the remaining 11 armies were withdrawn from Korea and redeployed principally to Northeast, North and East China areas, so that by 1 April 1960, the deployment of Army-level units was as depicted in Table 1. (U)

As shown in Table 1, deployment of army-level units of the CCA remained rather surprisingly stable during the period following the Korean War despite the Taiwan situation, the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the US buildup in South Vietnam, the cultural revolution, and the Sino-Soviet border disputes. In 1971, two additional army-level units were formed bringing the total to 36. Some redeployment was noted and the number of armies in Peking MR increased by two. Army strength for selected years is shown on Table 4.

Navy

At present, the PRC Navy is to all intents and purposes a coastal defense force which does not possess nuclear weapons. Naval nuclear strategy appears to be one of
survival in the event of a preemptive nuclear attack.(U)

The development of the navy since its formation in 1949 has been spectacular. From a heterogenous collection of World War II vessels left by the Chinese Nationalists in 1949, the force has expanded to a current strength of 1,235 units (Table 2). However, this expansion can nonetheless be attributed to a normal growth pattern and cannot be related to any external stimuli. To comply with a nuclear strategy of survival, the growth of the force necessitated a concomitant need for support and dispersion. ChiCom naval shore facilities have steadily developed, matching overall naval growth. From an approximate total of eight facilities in 1949, naval infrastructure now totals more than 170 shore facilities located throughout the three fleet areas.

Since 1963 at least, the Chinese have embarked on a program of providing a number of naval bases with underground facilities. At least 16 bases located throughout the fleet areas have in various stages of completion, underground facilities suitable for entry, berthing and repair of either boats or submarines. The function of the underground installations appears to be two-fold. They provide protected berthing to effect minor repairs as well as storage for missiles, ammunition and logistics. The dispersed location and reinforced construction will improve PRC naval chances of survival in the event of preemptive nuclear strike.