PHOTOGRAPH OF TELEGRAM FROM STATE DEPT.

FROM: Seoul 04596
TO: SECSTATE/ASH/DC

RE: REF: STATE 11396

SECRET

ITEM 2. I said I did not agree with his interpretation of the relative strength on the one hand and the use of the Philippine language in those assurances to Korea in line with those given to the Philippines.

2. I opened discussion with recall of USFOMs and defense arrangements as affected by several announcements, including statements by Secretary Dulles in 1954 and Eisenhower's communique of 1954 in which he said US had accorded more assurances to Philippines than to Korea in security matters. He said that ROK government wished to propose an exchange of notes with the US government which would incorporate these statements cited in paras. seven and eight, and that there were additional language or changes which might be devised at this time. I said these were not in accordance with our understanding and that any such proposals would be reported to the appropriate authorities.

I had opened discussion with recall of USFOMs and defense arrangements as affected by several announcements, including statements by Secretary Dulles in 1954 and Eisenhower's communique of 1954 in which he said US had accorded more assurances to Philippines than to Korea in security matters. He said that ROK government wished to propose an exchange of notes with the US government which would incorporate these statements cited in paras. seven and eight, and that there were additional language or changes which might be devised at this time. I said these were not in accordance with our understanding and that any such proposals would be reported to the appropriate authorities.

FOREIGN MINISTER CHOI ASKED ME TO CALL THIS MORNING. He opened discussion with recall of USFOMs and defense arrangements as affected by several announcements, including statements by Secretary Dulles in 1954 and Eisenhower's communique of 1954 in which he said US had accorded more assurances to Philippines than to Korea in security matters. He said that ROK government wished to propose an exchange of notes with the US government which would incorporate these statements cited in paras. seven and eight, and that there were additional language or changes which might be devised at this time. I said these were not in accordance with our understanding and that any such proposals would be reported to the appropriate authorities.

I HAD OPENED DISCUSSION WITH RECALL OF USFOMS AND DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS AS AFFECTED BY SEVERAL ANNOUNCEMENTS, INCLUDING STATEMENTS BY SECRETARY DULLES IN 1954 AND EISENHOWER'S COMMUNIQUE OF 1954 IN WHICH HE SAID US HAD ACCORDED MORE ASSURANCES TO PHILIPPINES THAN TO KOREA IN SECURITY MATTERS. HE SAID THAT ROK GOVERNMENT WISHED TO PROPOSE AN EXCHANGE OF NOTES WITH THE US GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD INCORPORATE THESE STATEMENTS CITED IN PARAS. SEVEN AND EIGHT, AND THAT THERE WERE ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE OR CHANGES WHICH MIGHT BE DEVISED AT THIS TIME. I SAID THAT THESE WERE NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR UNDERSTANDING AND THAT ANY SUCH PROPOSALS WOULD BE REPORTED TO THE APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES.
OBSCURE THESE CLEAR-CUT ASSURANCES.

3. AFTER CONSIDERING NOTES HE TOOK WHILE I WAS SQUAKING, CHOI BEGAN TO HEDGE. WE SHOULD UNDERSTAND HIS POSITION, HE SAID, THAT HE HAD THE ASSEMBLY TO

WORRY ABOUT AND HE NEEDED TO SHOW FORWARD MOTION IN MATTER OF US-ROK SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. HE ADMITTED STATEMENTS I HAD READ TO HIM WERE STRONG AND CLEAR BUT HE WOULD GIVE ME AN AIDE MEMOIRE WHICH HE HOPED WE WOULD CONSIDER IN VIEW OF HIS PROBLEMS. I REMARKED THAT IF HIS MAJOR PROBLEM WAS WITH THE ASSEMBLY, THAT BODY WOULD HOPEFULLY RECESS IN A DAY OR SO FOR SEVERAL WEEKS OR LONGER, AND THAT IN VIEW DOUBTFUL BENEFITS OF HIS PROPOSAL FOR NEW LANGUAGE FOR SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, HOPED HE WOULD AGREE THAT HE SHOULD HOLD OUT FOR ANOTHER DAY OR TWO WITHOUT INVOLVING ASSEMBLY IN THE MATTER.

4. HE HANDED ME THE AIDE MEMOIRE WHILE AGREEING MATTER SHOULD BE PLAYED DOWN FOR FORESEEABLE FUTURE, ADDING THAT EVENTUALLY HE MIGHT ASK ME FOR SOME COMMENT ON HIS AIDE MEMOIRE. I SAID I AGREED WE SHOULD PLAY IT DOWN, BUT I NOTED AS I ARRIVED THAT HIS OFFICE WAITING ROOM WAS FILLING

WITH PRESS PEOPLE, WE WERE OBVIOUSLY EXPECTING SOMETHING. IT WOULD NOT HELP FOR THEM TO LEARN THAT HE HAD HANDED ME A PIECE OF PAPER ON THIS SUBJECT. THE MINISTER SEEMED SOMewhat DISCONCERNED AS HE HAD EVIDENTLY INTENDED TO USE AIDE MEMOIRE AS A VEHICLE FOR PERSONAL PUBLICITY. HE AGREED HOWEVER THAT HE WOULD MAKE NO MENTION OF IT AND WOULD SIMPLY SAY WE HAD AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON SUBJECTS COVERED BY VANCE MISSION.
5. I judge from foregoing that we need not respond to Aide Memoire in immediate future. It was designed by Minister to cope with his and Government's problems here, and I think we are in a position to keep matters within bounds if necessary by appropriate use of statements cited in Ref Tel.

6. Will airgram full text of Aide Memoire. Following is operative portion. Quote the proposal is that through an exchange of notes, USG amplify (sic) to Government of Republic of Korea following statement: Inner quote under Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953 between Republic of Korea and United States, the United States will take all practical measures to maintain the security of Republic of Korea against Communist attack. The United States affirms that an armed attack on Republic of Korea should also be regarded as an attack against United States military forces in Korea and against the United States, and that an armed attack against US forces stationed in Korea should also be regarded as an attack against the Republic of Korea. Therefore, the United States makes it clear that any armed attack by the Communist forces against the Republic of Korea or against US forces stationed in Korea would be instantly repelled with concerned efforts of armed forces of the two countries. The United States further declares that she will put herself in a state of readiness to effectively cope with
NOTE: HANDLED LIMDIS PER S/S-0.
AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.