Enclosed for the information of the Department is a staff analysis prepared by the Embassy on the relationships between ROKG strategic intentions and its plans for the development of its Armed Forces.

Enclosure:

Staff Analysis on Relationships between
ROKG Strategic Intentions and Military Planning - A Politico-Military Assessment
SUBJECT: ROKG STRATEGIC INTENTIONS AND MILITARY PLANNING - A POLITICO-MILITARY ASSESSMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Over the year prior to the North Korean raid of January 21, 1968 on the Blue House, the defense policy and the military posture of the ROK has been shifting gradually to meet the changing nature of the North Korean threat to ROK security. From a policy and posture designed solely to defeat overt military aggression into ROK territory, the ROKG moved to a policy and posture of defense not only against invasion, but equally importantly against the increasingly apparent intention of North Korea to infiltrate substantial numbers of agents and guerrilla-type bands into ROK territory. The period also revealed that ROK leaders were disinclined to suffer the stepped-up North Korean forays and infiltrations in silence and their belief that such North Korean actions must not go unchallenged nor unpunished. Consequently, in secret and without U.S. prior knowledge, retaliatory forays into North Korean territory were undertaken on a number of occasions by ROKG forces.

2. During this period, the ROKG proposed only minor adjustments in force composition and manpower levels. Such adjustments as were proposed related primarily to those necessary to meet the infiltration problem or the receipt of new weapon systems or equipment. The ROKG attitude continued to reflect reliance on U.S. guidance and advice, the presence of U.S. forces and military assistance, and the expectation that such forces and assistance would be continuously available. The military aid program continued in the main to be designed to support the existing ROK force structure for its mission of defense against overt North Korean aggression but was, in part, modified and supplemented to enable the ROK Armed Forces to improve their specific capabilities to meet the threat of substantially increased infiltration by land and sea, and to neutralize rapidly infiltrators who had penetrated into the ROK.
3. The Blue House raid on January 21, 1968, and the seizure of the USS PUEBLO by North Korean naval forces two days later, clearly represents a turning point in ROK thinking about its national security policies, its defense posture, and its basic strategy concepts. These two events appeared to have caused ROK leaders to re-examine more deeply and fundamentally many of the premises on which they had earlier based their national security policy. In this process, ROK planners have undoubtedly given heavy weight to a series of manifestations of U.S. policy which they have interpreted in light of ROK interests. These include the U.S. reaction to the PUEBLO seizure; U.S. policies and attitudes as revealed during the Vance Mission discussions; U.S. policies and actions in Vietnam, particularly as they pertain to the bombing of North Vietnam and the U.S. readiness to engage in peace negotiations; and probably most importantly, to the domestic situation in the U.S. as reflected in public and press attitudes and statements by American political leaders and other key public figures. The extent of any change in ROK defense and strategic thinking since the Blue House raid resulting from this assessment has not yet emerged clearly or definitively. To date, no change has been officially presented to the U.S. nor announced publicly to the National Assembly or to the Korean people by the PARK Administration. However, high-level ROK civilian officials and defense and military authorities have presented a series of seemingly disconnected proposals to the Embassy and to CINCUNC/COMUSK. We believe these proposals to be closely interrelated; and that they indicate that a major shift in ROK defense policy and strategic concepts has probably taken place or is in the process of emerging.

4. Since the Blue House raid, there have been numerous discussions and exchanges between the ROK and U.S. military authorities on measures and actions to strengthen ROK defense capabilities against the North Korean overt military aggression and North Korean infiltration activities. In many of these discussions, rather extreme proposals were advanced informally by the ROKs and explored with their U.S. military counterparts. Formal proposals were, however, advanced by the Minister of National Defense (MND) in his letter of February 3 and March 19, 1968. Both of these letters focus on the need for increases in military manpower and the application of these increases tend to reveal the trend of ROK strategic thinking. These letters made no mention of the weapons and equipment
implications of the strength increase proposals. The March 1968 brochure on the ROK defense system carried by the Chairman of the ROK/JCS, General IM Chung-sik, to Washington last month was the first comprehensive statement on a new ROK force structure surfaced by the ROKG. Subsequently, in his paper of April 5, 1968, prepared for the aborted Johnson-Park Honolulu meeting of April 7, the Minister of National Defense surfaced the full outline of his force structure plans, his manpower needs, and his equipment requirements, but only by implication provided any indication of basic ROK national security objectives and strategic concepts.

5. We believe that likely ROK national security objectives can be identified and the probable trend of ROK defense policies and military strategy can be deduced through analysis of this information (particularly the April 5-MND-Plan), of the current political environment in Korea and internationally, and of the role and attitudes of key personalities. We have, also, examined the implications of this strategy and its related force requirements in terms of U.S. support and the impact on the Korean economy.

II - ANALYSIS OF ROK MILITARY DEVELOPMENT PROPOSALS

6. The ROK MND's paper of April 5, which was prepared for presentation to the U.S. at the aborted meeting between Presidents Johnson and Park and their principal advisers at Honolulu on April 7, 1968, is the most comprehensive statement of ROK thinking on the development of its Armed Forces that has been made available to U.S. authorities. While we do not know whether the April 5 MND Plan has been specifically approved by President Park, we believe that it is highly unlikely that the MND would have been prepared to advance the Plan for Secretary of Defense Clifford's consideration if it had not been approved in principle and in general concept by President Park. Consequently, an analysis of the April 5 MND Plan with its proposals for the development of the ROK Armed Forces should provide a reasonably reliable indication of emerging ROK defense policies and strategic concepts. There are, in addition, several other considerations which we feel are relevant to determining those policies and concepts.
7. The April 5 MND Plan - Assumptions: The Plan uses as a starting point the fact that the ROK should be militarily superior to North Korea in order to deter the North Korean provocative and war-like acts. It argues that only by immediate retaliation by ROK forces can the North Koreans be forced to abandon their aggressive actions. It also points out that the ROK has the necessary manpower to achieve this posture, and its related military forces, but requires special U.S. assistance for military equipment and materiel. It suggests that such assistance be provided over the next two years. The Plan goes on to postulate the following considerations as the basis for its force structure and equipment proposals:

A. North Korea has shifted from a policy of unification under communist rule by peaceful means to a policy of unification by armed force.

B. North Korea will initiate an armed attack against the ROK in 197 or sooner.

C. It is inconceivable that the U.S. could become engaged in another Korean War.

D. The threat of communist aggression is increasing daily. The strained relationship between the U.S., S.R., and Communist China does not alter this threat to the ROK; the U.S., S.R., and the U.S. will continue their effort to avoid a direct confrontation of war between themselves.

8. The April 5 MND Plan - Main Features: The following requirements are identified as being needed to achieve the desired superior military capability:

A. Ground Forces:

1. Strengthen the reserve forces: Convert and equip the present seven rear area security divisions into combat-ready reserve divisions to make a total of ten such divisions, basing three of these divisions North of Seoul for quick forward employment in defense of Seoul.
2. Strengthen capability of the two armored brigades: 
Add a self-propelled artillery battalion to each brigade.

3. Improve the airborne and airmobile force capability: 
Increase the number of special forces battalions and add helicopter companies.

4. Improve fire power capabilities: Provide more modern individual weapons and increase Corps artillery firepower by adding self-propelled battalions.

5. Improved protection of strategic facilities and installations and tactical positions: Harden defensive positions and place command and other key installations underground; provide light AAA battalions for local air defense of strategic areas.

6. Improved heavy engineering capability: Provide additional heavy construction engineering capability to assure rapid rehabilitation of key facilities and infrastructure damaged or destroyed by enemy action.

7. Improved mobility and communications: Fill the TE shortages, including providing a capability to support major echelon displacements; and the modernization of existing over-age equipment.

8. Arming of the Homeland Reserve Force: Complete the program of providing small arms to the 2 million members of the Homeland Reserve Force.

B. Naval Forces:

1. Improve the off-shore naval bombardment capability: 
Increase the number of DD's and DE's.
2. Improve the off-shore patrol/surveillance and port defense capability: Expand the present patrol craft and minesweeper fleet, equip the ships with more modern radars and sonars, and intensify the harbor defense activity.

3. Increase naval amphibious lift: Increase the number of LST's and LSM's in the fleet.

4. Improve naval infrastructure: To assure proper support of naval operations, modernize the shipyard and construct an additional dry dock.

C. Air Forces:

1. Attainment of air superiority: Increase the fighter/interceptor and fighter/bomber capability by five F4 squadrons to make a total of six; improve the F5 aircraft configuration; equip aircraft with improved weapons and ammunition; and extend radar coverage for air defense by the installation of gap filler systems.

2. Improved air infrastructure: The number of air bases should be increased; existing bases should be expanded and improved; dispersal facilities improved, and air bases hardened.

D. Marine Corps:

1. Increase the Marine reserve strength: Activate a new ready reserve division for training of reservists.

2. Expanded Marine amphibious and vertical envelopment capability: To enable the Marines to have an improved organic lift capability by increasing the number of LVT's and helicopters.
9. April 5 MND Plan - Combat Capability: The Plan would provide a balanced force capable of independent but not sustained combat action. The content of the Plan together with other information indicates that there would be a capability for fielding thirty-one ROK divisions after mobilization, including seventeen active Army divisions and one active Marine division in Korea, two active divisions now in Vietnam, and eleven ready-reserve divisions, of which ten would be Army and one Marine. The interior of the ROK below the DMZ would be protected by coastal security battalions on the periphery and a combination of ten counterinfiltration (CI) battalions and the Homeland Reserve Force in the interior, in addition to the Korean National Police, including its Combat Police companies. Offshore navy patrol detection capability would be more than doubled, and the Marine lift capability would be increased from a regimental landing team to almost a division. The shore bombardment capability also would be about doubled by the added DD's and DE's, and harbor defense and other improvements would be made. With regard to the Air Force, the fighter-interceptor/fighter-bomber capability with supporting infrastructure would be substantially increased over present capability.

10. April 5 MND Plan - Manpower Aspects: The Plan does not directly cover the strengths concerned. It is likely that the ROKG has not yet refined the requirements and is simply relying on the broad premise that the approximately two and a half million reservists of various categories can be drawn upon in the requisite numbers when the fate of the nation is at stake.

A. The present force level of ROK Forces in Korea is 578,940, whereas the manning level is 563,940. The difference represents the 15,000 decrease brought about by the 2-1/2 percent budgetary manning level reduction which was imposed by the ROKG in 1962. Prior to submitting the Plan, the MND had proposed and requested CINCUNC's support for an increase of 17,435 military spaces to increase reservists training, add two special forces battalions and an infantry battalion, and overcome personnel shortages in all services. This request has not been acted upon in view of the apparent unsettled thinking of the ROKs regarding this subject. For example, some aspects of the MND's earlier
proposals are included in the Plan, while others are not, and the Plan is considerably more comprehensive. However, early action on the MND's earlier requests is contemplated.

B. It is estimated that the manpower requirements of the Plan would add about 58,000 military spaces to the present 578,940, for a total of about 637,000. Approval of a force level of this magnitude would clearly require amendment of the revised Appendix B to the Agreed Minute of 1954, which establishes the force levels of the ROK National Defense Establishment at a total of 600,000, wherever deployed. This amendment would clearly have to go well beyond the revision to Revised Appendix B that the U.S. proposed in August 1967. That proposal would establish a force level ceiling of 600,000 in Korea and, while not specified, has heretofore been interpreted by U.S. officials in Korea as including the 21,032 spaces deployed to Vietnam in 1964-1965 which were not reconstituted in Korea. Given the ROK desire to increase their force levels in Korea, however, the ROKG might even under this proposal assert a U.S. commitment to support the full 600,000 in Korea.

C. The ROK manpower pool can support the additional military strength requirement through a variety of means. For the near term the present length of military service can be further extended. In February the ROKG extended the term of service by one month and gained about 16,000 in strength. Draft calls could be increased and reservists could be called to active duty. A combination of such steps could permit the increase of 60-70 thousand men without significant impact on the civilian labor market.

11. April 5 MND Plan - Equipment Aspects: It is recognized that much of the equipment proposed in the Plan is not available. It is likely that the ROKs are aware of this but hope for some unplanned source such as might come about through de-escalation of activities in Vietnam.

A. Rough order of magnitude estimate of investment costs for the Plan is approximately $1,225 million. This figure is over and above the current Korea MAP program and the additional $100 million program now under consideration by the Congress. Very
few of the proposed items contained in the Plan are being programmed in the FY 69-74 Korea MAP Plan now being developed. Furthermore, even assuming resumption of MAP transfer in 1970, which seems unlikely, only $193 million will be available for investment purposes over the six-year period under present MAP ceilings.

B. Similar order of magnitude operating costs for the investments called for in the Plan range between $60-$70 million. These costs would be in addition to presently planned austere operating costs in FY 69 of about $120 million, a figure which will be increased by about $15 million in following years to support CIGCOREP and the $100 million package.

12. April 5 MND Plan - ROK Defense Budget Aspects: The ROKG National Defense Budget was increased from 50 billion won ($180 million) in CY 67 to 60 billion won ($216 million) in CY 68. The ROK MND is aiming for about 90 billion won ($330 million) in CY 69. These increases are largely due to a 30 percent pay raise in 1968 and another 30 percent scheduled for 1969. Charges against the Defense Budget for the approximately 60,000 additional spaces required by the Plan would add about 6 billion won ($18 million) by 1970. These increased expenditures would obviously impair the ROKG's ability to finance its planned economic development programs.

13. April 5 MND Plan - Comments:

A. Any comments on the April 5 MND Plan should take into account an estimate of North Korean increased capabilities over the next two years. A major factor in this estimate is the amount and nature of any military assistance which the U.S.S.R. may provide. Such assistance would probably include advanced MIG type aircraft, tanks, Komar class boats, and other equipment. Depending upon the assumptions made on the extent and character of Soviet military aid, comparative relative combat capability between the ROK and North Korea could range between an advantage for the ROK and an opposite advantage for North Korea.
B. We believe that the present overt threat posed by North Korea can be countered, within the limits of acceptable risks, by a military posture based on a less ambitious program for the improvement of ROK forces, the size of which could vary depending on the timing and availability of U.S. augmentation forces. In this sense we consider the development of the balanced and significantly strengthened ROK forces on the scale proposed in the Plan to be excessive to the requirements for the defense of Korea as envisaged by the U.S. In addition, the concurrent availability of U.S. augmentation forces and the ready and mobilizable contemplated force structure under the April 5 MND Plan could be considered to be incompatible with the U.S. objective of maintaining the freedom of the ROK while restraining possible ROK-generated offensive action.

C. In considering the Plan in relation to the ROK/U.S. defense posture as we currently envisage it, we believe the following is pertinent:

1. In the case of the ground forces, improvements are required in such areas as the hardening of defensive positions and ground infrastructure where little has been done, along with the provision of certain equipment for modernization of existing units.

2. Considering the ROK Air Force, the present ROKAF aircraft program, including the additional F4 squadron in the $100 million package, provides an acceptable equipment position when combined with significant U.S. air force presence in Korea. The future ROKAF aircraft program, however, will be influenced by the likely future replacement by the U.S.S.R. of North Korean aircraft by more modern types in that an appropriate adjustment in US/ROK air capability would be required. There is, also, a need to reduce the present serious vulnerability of aircraft and ground facilities to air attack by dispersal and hardening in order to maintain a satisfactory defensive posture. The projected aircraft program under the Plan would enhance the ability of the ROKG to undertake a surprise quick strike action.
3. In case of overt North Korean aggression, the ROK Navy would require U.S. support to undertake naval operations against North Korean fleet units. The possession of additional destroyers and destroyer escorts with which to form an amphibious attack force, however, would enable the ROK Navy and Marine Corps to strike a significant blow unilaterally. The Plan's naval infrastructure requirements are valid statements of need to maintain the current naval force structure in an effective combat operational status.

III - ROK STRATEGY AND THE APRIL 5 MND PLAN

14. An analysis of the April 5 Plan shows that a force structure of the composition and size envisaged not only has a defensive capability in excess of that required to meet the North Korean threat, assuming the envisaged U.S. reinforcements, but represents a substantially augmented offensive capability as well. How the capabilities of this military machine might be employed can be estimated only by identifying the probable national security objectives and policies of the government. The key elements in the latter process are the personalities, attitudes and goals of Park and his key advisers; the policies and actions of North Korea; and the international situation in general, particularly as it involves the U.S. and Communist China.

15. Park, in light of how he views and interprets external attitudes and activities and how he has been and is being influenced by certain personal considerations, will be the determinant of ROK national security objectives, defense policies and the basic strategic concept. We believe the following are important factors in estimating the direction of his ultimate decision.

A. Park has a sense of destiny. He is very conscious of the part he is playing in shaping Korean history, and probably would like to see his place him on a level in Korean minds with that of Admiral Yi Sun-sin. To attain this position, he has devoted his
energies to Korea's economic development, to achieving political stability and to gaining for Korea international acceptability and respectability, including a reasonable measure of influence in the affairs of the East Asian and Pacific region.

B. Like all ROKs, Park's dream is to see Korea unified under a non-communist regime. Moreover, he wants the niche in history reserved for the leader who brings this about. He has in the past believed that reunification was dependent upon external considerations, largely the state of the free world-communist world confrontation, and that there was little he could do except improve the ROK position through greater political stability and economic progress. Over the past year, however, the already bitter enmity between the two regimes in Korea has become intensely personalized. Both Park and KIM Il-song have become more dominant and authoritarian in their respective areas. In the ROK, Park has asserted virtually complete control over the political apparatus, and the growing personality cult of KIM Il-song has become an overpowering feature of the political atmosphere in the North. Pyongyang propaganda proclaims the deity of KIM Il-song and the righteousness of all his acts in a manner that Mao and Stalin might envy. At the same time; it vilifies Park in ominous terms as the renegade communist, tool of the Japanese and the American imperialist aggressors, and traitor to the Korean nation. Park knows that he is a marked man, and that neither he nor even his name could survive a successful onslaught from the North. Given the image of belligerence approaching hysteria emanating from the North, Park may well conclude that time is growing short, that he cannot rely on unpredictable external considerations to bring about the conditions for reunification, that even peaceful co-existence with the North is not possible, and that he must consider some initiative if he and not KIM Il-song is to achieve the dream of unifying this land.

C. Of major significance to his present outlook is the fact that Park was deeply impressed by the Israeli success in the June 1967 Arab-Israel conflict. He saw in Israel a determined nation, believing
in itself, and prepared to take on a theoretically superior enemy to achieve its own national goals. He admires the strategic planning and military expertise the Israeli's employed. Probably more importantly, he admires the Israeli willingness to act contrary to the expressed views of the world's great powers. He is fully aware that these powers took no action once the Israeli's moved, that Israel has confronted the world with a fait accompli which no one is prepared to undo, and that Israel has militarily achieved certain national objectives it had never previously been able to attain through diplomatic or political means.

D. Park was deeply disturbed by the North Korean raid on the Blue House and sincerely felt a shattering loss of "face." The raid had personal meaning to him probably not as much in terms of the threat to his life, as in terms of the threat to his family, particularly his only son whom he holds very dear. In another sense he experienced a loss of "face" when the enemy, claiming to be "South Koreans," penetrated his capital and virtually assaulted his "palace" -- the traditional method employed in this part of the world by the revolting peasantry to attempt to bring down a ruling dynasty.

16. In considering North Korea, Park appears to be accepting the thesis of his advisers, which is buttressed by the undeniable belligerence of the North Korean regime, that KIM II-song is determined to reunify Korea by 1970 by force, if necessary, and that the increasing infiltration and subversive activities of the North are to prepare the way for the day of reunification. He is aware of the measures being taken by the North to strengthen its military capabilities and the improvements in the Armed Forces being effected with Soviet aid. He sees the North moving to maintain a balance - or more importantly, to acquire a measure of independence - in its relationships with the U.S.S.R. and Communist China, a move which he probably evaluates as entailing certain serious risks as well as having advantages, and possibly placing at stake the willingness of either to come to the assistance of the North in the event of trouble.

17. Communist China, with its massive military might and budding nuclear capabilities, has been and is the main threat in the eyes of the ROKs. However, the extent to which the threat is real has changed in the eyes of the ROKs since the start of the Cultural Revolution and
the coming of the Red Guards. Park and his close advisers believe that the internal disorders and strains that exist in China today seriously limit the extent to which it would be concerned with external developments to the point it would be willing to become militarily involved. They point to the limited involvement of China in Vietnam in distinction to its actions in the Korean War. They further feel that any confrontation involving Communist China would almost certainly involve the United States with its nuclear arsenal.

18. An essential element in determining ROK views is Park's appraisal of the U.S., its policies and its reliability as an ally. Vietnam and the PUEBLO are major measuring points in that appraisal.

A. The ROKs dispatched troops to Vietnam for a number of reasons, but prominent in their thinking was the belief that the U.S. was prepared to use such military force as was necessary to assure the independence of the Republic of Vietnam and to reduce, if not to eliminate, the communist threat to that independence. Events in Vietnam have led the ROKs to conclude that the U.S. is not prepared to engage in the type of military campaign which they believe is necessary to gain success, namely military victory by destruction of the enemy's fighting capacity.

B. While the U.S. has consistently stated that it will agree to a peaceful settlement in Vietnam only on honorable terms that will preserve the integrity and freedom of the Vietnamese people, the ROKs believe that the U.S. position has been gradually eroded under the pressures of public opinion in the U.S. and in other parts of the world. The demonstrations in the U.S., the statements of leading political and other public figures, and the reports from their own diplomatic establishments in the U.S. raise serious doubts in the ROK mind about the willingness of the U.S. to continue the war in Vietnam and to engage in hostilities against communism elsewhere in the region. They are concerned over the upcoming Presidential election, particularly its implications for Vietnam. They remember very well the platform on which the Republican candidate ran in 1952 and the effect it had on the Korean War. This concern
also carries over to the willingness of the U.S. to continue its support of Korea, most importantly as it relates to the defense of the ROK and assistance to the Armed Forces.

C. The U.S. reaction to the PUEBLO seizure was a bitter disappointment to the ROKs. After a speedy display of U.S. military might and the implied threat of punitive action, the U.S. failed to do anything but seek to gain the release of the crew and ship through diplomatic maneuvering and through direct negotiations with the enemy under conditions which the ROKs viewed as highly inimical to their interests if not an outright denigration of their sovereignty. The visit of the Vance Mission, intended to ease the strain in US-ROK relations, made amply clear to the ROKs that the U.S. was not prepared to engage the North militarily over the PUEBLO seizure and that the U.S. would not condone or support any ROK efforts to retaliate for reasons of their own. The ROKs doubtless feel that the North Koreans drew meaningful conclusions of their own from this exercise.

19. From the Blue House raid through the departure of the Vance Mission, the atmosphere in Seoul was charged with high emotion, with the ROKs insisting that if the U.S. would not militarily punish the North for the attack on the Blue House and the piratical act of seizing the PUEBLO on the high seas, it must publicly declare its intention to do so in the event of any repetition. This state of mind was reflected in the press, the National Assembly, street conversations and the utterances of government leaders. Since that time there has been a general quieting of the emotions and overtly things appear to be relatively normal. There have been, however, a number of major and minor developments initiated by Park that could have implications for the national security objectives and defense policies that are evolving within the closest confines of the ROKG. These include:

A. Park's call for greater "military independence" involving the establishment of the Homeland Reserve Force and the development of a small arms and ammunition industry in Korea.
B. The establishment of a secret special committee under the Prime Minister to develop defense mobilization plans, including the relocation and hardening of civilian ministries and facilities.

C. The dismissal of the former MND KIM Song-un and his appointment as Special Assistant to the President for Security Affairs. Kim has generally been considered to be a prime mover in the ROK retaliatory actions into North Korea.

D. A significant increase in the training and numbers of ROK Armed Forces infiltrator units; and the reorganization of the bureau in the ROK CIA responsible for covert operations, with indications of greater coordination and liaison between the Armed Forces and the CIA.

E. An expressed desire of the ROKG to receive surplus PL 480 grains to enable it to establish a large emergency reserve food stockpile for civilian population.

20. The factors outlined in the preceding paragraphs of this section taken in conjunction with the April 5 MND Plan, form we believe, a basis for estimating the future direction of President Park's policies with respect to the defense of the Republic of Korea.

IV-CONCLUSIONS

21. The April 5 MND Plan would provide a force structure and equipment capability vis-a-vis North Korea which would:

A. Give the ROK ground forces an advantage in quantitative combat power, an advantage considered to be beyond the needs of a purely defensive mission, assuming adequate U.S. augmentations.

B. Enable the ROK Air Forces to match more nearly the combat strength supported by a hardened base structure as possessed by North Korea, and give ROKAF a higher capability for surprise quick strike action.

C. Greatly increase the Navy/Marine offensive capability by establishing about a division-size amphibious force with a commensurate increase in shore bombardment means, as well as a significant surface striking force.
22. The implementation of the April 5 MND Plan would provide the
ROK with an increased military capability which could, without
U.S. support or sanction, engage in retaliatory actions of greater
scope and magnitude against the North.

23. If logistic needs were accumulated in advance or logistic support
from some source assured, the force structure contemplated
in the April 5 MND Plan could tempt the ROKG to undertake a pre­
emptive attack against the North in the belief that it could win a relatively
short war.

24. There are therefore grounds for serious concern that the ROK
national leadership may be contemplating military moves which may
range from substantially larger retaliatory actions to a preemptive
strike against the North to effect reunification. A move of the latter
type would be initiated at an appropriate time but prior to the anticipated
overt military action by the North. The ROKs may in fact be counting
on another dramatic raid by the North Koreans to provide the provocation
for a justifiable retaliatory move which the proposed force structure—
would permit developing into a full-scale assault on the North.

25. ROK national leadership believes that if reunification can be
effected rapidly by military means, the great powers will not intervene
and will accept the fait accompli.

26. Full U.S. support of the April 5 MND Plan, as we interpret it, is
not justified in terms of present U.S. objectives in Korea because it could
lead to a military force capable of independently taking courses of action
inimical to the U.S. national interest.

27. Since there are adequate indicators that the North Korean military
capability has, in the relatively recent past, been significantly improved
and its total defense posture enhanced, and if, as the ROKs expect,
the North will attempt to unify Korea by overt military means in 1970
or possibly sooner, the ROK/US defense posture requires improvement.
To effect a defense posture capable of holding North of Seoul, in addition
to the availability and timely arrival of envisaged U.S. augmentation
forces, certain elements of the Plan would, if implemented, contribute
to this objective. Extensive hardening of forward positions is necessary;
improvements in infrastructure for Army, Navy and Air Force should be undertaken, particularly construction for airfield dispersal and hardening and to support an air LOC; facilities to permit rapid receipt and forward movement of external combat and logistic support should be provided; selected improvements in mobility and communications for the existing force structure are required; and, though not mentioned in the April 5 Plan, the availability in the area, and largely under U.S. control, of ammunition war reserves for all services should be assured.