HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
MacDill Air Force Base, Florida 33608-7001

REGULATION
Number 525-3

Military Operations
MILITARY DECEPTION POLICY AND GUIDANCE

1. (U) PURPOSE. To establish policy and responsibilities for the effective employment of military deception in United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) operations.

2. (U)...

3. (U) REFERENCES.
   a. (U) JCS Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 116, "Military Deception" (U), 24 Mar 87, classified Top Secret.
   d. (U) JCS Pub 5-02.21, "Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS) (Draft), Volume II (OPLAN Format and Guidance Classified Supplement)" (U), 6 Nov 89, classified Secret.
   e. (U) JCS Pub 3-54, "Operations Security", 15 Dec 82, Unclassified.
   f. (U) CCR 380-4, "Nicknames, Code Words and Exercise Terms", 9 Jan 90, Unclassified.

4. (U)...

*This regulation supersedes USCENTCOM Reg 525-3, 21 May 1985 (C)
b. (U) US military deceptions shall not be designed to influence the actions of US citizens or agencies, and they will not violate US Law, nor intentionally mislead the American public, US Congress, or the media.

c. (8)

d. (8)

e. (8)

f. (U) Tactical military deceptions seek to influence opposing operational commanders, and their courses of action. Under the authority of commanders of unified and specified commands, tactical commanders at all levels are responsible for
developing and employing tactical military deception during peacetime, crisis or war. An operational commander is authorized to employ tactical military deception measures to (1) support OPSEC during all normal operations provided that prior coordination is accomplished when actions will impact on other commanders, and (2) when the commander's forces are subject to imminent attack (hostile intent) or when engaged. Capabilities to plan and conduct tactical military deception shall be developed and maintained.

b. (U) Tactical Deception: USCENTCOM CCJ3-PS is responsible for the development and integration of procedures and capabilities necessary to ensure tactical deception is considered and available as an employment option early in the planning cycle, and is effective if chosen for implementation.

(1) (U) Prepare and submit military deception plans (Appendix 7 to Annex C) in response to JSCP or specific JCS tasking.
(2) (U) Provide support for tactical military deception plans developed by commanders of other unified and specified commands.

(3) (U) Provide policy guidance and tasking in accordance with reference 3a to subordinate commanders, including commanders of subordinate unified commands and joint task forces.

c. (U) USCENTCOM/CCJ3 is designated as the office responsible for tactical deception operations. Within CCJ3, the Special Operations Branch of the Operations Plans Division will provide personnel to support deception planning.

d. (U) USCENTCOM component commanders will designate and maintain an office responsible for military deception matters.

6. (U) PROPOSED. USCENTCOM Operations Directorate, Operations Plans Division, Special Operations Branch, is responsible for the management of this regulation. Requests for changes or clarification of procedures should be addressed to HQ USCENTCOM, ATTN: CCJ3-PS.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

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APPENDIX A

TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

SECTION I

Purpose

To provide terms and definitions that apply to military deception.

SECTION II

General

1. (U) DEFINITIONS:

a. (U) Appreciations. Personal conclusions, official estimates or assumptions about another party's intentions, capabilities, and activities that are used in planning and decisionmaking.

(1) (U) Desired Appreciations. Foreign personal conclusions or official estimates, valid or invalid, that result in foreign behaviors and official actions advantageous to US interests/objectives.

(2) (U) Harmful Appreciations. Foreign personal conclusions, official estimates or planning assumptions, valid or invalid, that result in foreign behaviors and official actions harmful to US interests/objectives.

b. (U) Controlled Information. Information and indicators deliberately conveyed or denied to foreign targets to evoke invalid official estimates that result in foreign official actions advantageous to US interests/objectives.

c. (U) Counterdeception. Efforts to negate, neutralize, diminish the effects of, or gain advantage from foreign deception operations. However, counterdeception does not include the intelligence function of identifying foreign deception operations.

d. (U) Cover (Military). Deception actions intended to misrepresent and minimize concern/curiosity about observables in order to realize essential secrecy about actual intentions, capabilities and activities.
e. (U) **Deception Action.** The use of deception means to convey or deny controlled information to a foreign target to put across the deception story.

f. (U) **Deception Means.** Methods, resources, and techniques used to control administrative, physical, and technical actions in order to convey or deny information and indicators to foreign targets.

   (1) (U) **Administrative Means.** Methods, resources, and techniques to convey or deny selected oral, pictorial, documentary and physical evidence.

   (2) (U) **Physical Means.** Methods, resources, and techniques to convey or deny selected indicators derivable from foreign observations, imagery, or active sensor surveillance of physical entities and actions.

   (3) (U) **Technical Means.** Methods, resources, and techniques to convey or deny selected indicators derivable from electromagnetic, acoustic, or other forms of energy; the emission or suppression of chemical/biological odors; the emission or suppression of nuclear particles; or other phenomena detectable by passive sensors.

g. (U) **Deception Objective.** To elicit foreign intentions, capabilities, and activities advantageous to friendly interest or objectives.

h. (U) **Deception Story.** A detailed scenario outlining friendly activities that will be portrayed to a target in order to evoke invalid official estimates that will elicit the desired official action.

i. (U) **Deception Target.** The operational or military decisionmakers that the deception operation is designed to influence.

j. (U) **Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI).** Key questions about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities to which an adversary needs accurate and timely answers in order to act effectively in competitive circumstances.

k. (U) **Essential Elements of Information (EEI).** The critical items of information regarding the enemy and the environment needed by the commander by a particular time to relate with other available information and intelligence in order to assist in reaching a logical decision.
1. (U) **Essential Secrecy.** Specific unknowns or uncertainties that prevent or hinder adversary derivation of accurate estimates/knowledge of facts and effective planning/decisionmaking.

m. (U) **Execution Schedule.** Chronological schedule of actions required to execute a deception plan.

n. (U) **Imitative Electronic Deception.** The introduction of electromagnetic energy into systems that imitate enemy emissions.

o. (U) **Indicators.** Data inferred by foreign targets from open source materials or from detectable actions that they can piece together or interpret to reach personal conclusions or official estimates concerning friendly intentions, capabilities or activities.

p. (U) **Information.** Data obtained by foreign targets from secret or open source materials that provide a substantially complete picture of friendly intentions, capabilities or activities.

q. (U) **Intelligence System.** Any system to manage data gathering and evaluation; obtain, process, and interpret data; and prepare official estimates. The term is not limited to intelligence organizations or services, but includes any system in all its parts that accomplishes the listed tasks.

r. (U) **Manipulative Electronic Deception.** Actions to eliminate revealing, or convey misleading, telltale (electromagnetic) indicators that may be used by hostile forces.

s. (U) **Military Deception.** Actions executed to mislead foreign decisionmakers, causing them to derive and accept desired appreciations of military capabilities, intentions, operations, or other activities that evoke foreign actions that contribute to the originator's objectives.

(1) (U) **Strategic Military Deception.** Military deception planned and executed to result in foreign national policies and actions which support the originator's national objectives, policies, and strategic military plans.

(2) (U) **Departmental/Service Military Deception.** Military deception planned and executed by Military Services about military systems, doctrine, tactics, techniques, personnel or service operations or other activities to result in foreign actions which increase or maintain the originator's capabilities relative to adversaries.
Theater Military Deception. Military deception planned and executed by theater or sub-theater commanders to influence an opposing theater/sub-theater commander's strategies, policies, and/or preparations for combat in a manner that results in friendly advantage.

Tactical Military Deception. Military deception planned and executed by and in support of operational commanders against the pertinent threat, to result in opposing operational actions favorable to the originator's plans and operations.

Observables. Those indicators which if not protected reveal intentions, military capabilities or activities.

Operations Security (OPSEC). The process of denying adversaries information about friendly capabilities and intentions by identifying, controlling, and protecting indicators associated with planning and conducting military operations and other activities.

Perception Management. Actions to convey or deny selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning; and intelligence systems and leaders at all levels to influence their official estimates ultimately resulting in foreign behaviors and official actions favorable to the originator. Perception management combines in various ways international information, truth projection, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security into a single strategy and operational effort.

Simulative Electronic Deception. Actions to represent friendly notional or actual capabilities to mislead hostile forces.

Sources. Materials and actions which provide information and indicators.

Secret Sources. Friendly personnel, documents, materiel, etc., possessing classified or sensitive information.

Open Sources. Overt contacts with foreign parties, or oral, documentary, pictorial, and physical materials accessible by the public.
(3) (U) **Detectable Actions.** Physical actions or entities that can be observed, imaged, or detected by active sensors, and emissions and other phenomena detectable by passive sensors.
APPENDIX B
SECURITY (U)

SECTION I
PURPOSE

(U) To provide policy for security of joint military deception activities, to include guidance for clearance requirements, need-to-know criteria, special handling, classification guidance, disclosure of information, and use of code words.

SECTION II
BASIC POLICY (U)

1. (U) Clearance Requirements. Clearance requirements for access to military deception plans and operations shall be those for the level of classification assigned to the plan.

2. (U)

3. (U)

a. (U) Materials shall be marked as follows:

   (1) (U) On the front page of correspondence:
"SPECIAL HANDLING OF THIS DOCUMENT IS REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ANNEX C JCS MOP 116. HAND CARRY DURING ROUTING. NORMAL ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS SHALL NOT BE USED. ACCESS TO THIS DOCUMENT SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THOSE WHO MUST KNOW THE INFORMATION."

(2) (U) Incoming messages shall have a cover sheet attached that states the foregoing warning.

(3) (U) A code word or unclassified special control indicator will be marked immediately after the classification on correspondence.

(4) (U) Messages shall be marked after the classification either SPECAT "EXCLUSIVE FOR" or "LIMDIS", as appropriate, with code word or unclassified special control indicator.

b. (U) Material to be mailed will be delivered to mailrooms in a sealed envelope. The classification, address of the recipient, and the statement, "Deliver unopened to (special control indicator) or (point of contact by name)" will be marked on the envelope and all seams will be taped. Mailrooms shall treat the sealed envelope as a classified document, packaging and mailing it in accordance with instructions prescribed for the classification of the material involved.

c. (U) Mailrooms and message centers will deliver code word/special control indicator material only to designated personnel. Deception planners are responsible for providing lists of authorized personnel to mailrooms and message centers.

d. (U) Messages to be transmitted electronically will be hand delivered to message centers by authorized couriers only.

4. (U) **Classification Guidance.** Information related to military deception will be classified and declassified as follows:

a. (U) The following information is unclassified:

   (1) (U) That there exists general tactical military deception policy, doctrine, tactics, materiel, techniques, military deception training programs, and that new capabilities are developed.

   (2) (U) The assignment of responsibilities to plan tactical military deception operations.
UNCLASSIFIED

(3) (U) Information which reveals that there is a policy of employing in peacetime military deception to support operations security (OPSEC).

(4) (U) Information which reveals there is a policy that tactical military deception may be employed to enhance defense of forces attacked or to support the conduct of combat operations.

(5) (U) Information that reveals US policy concerning the planning and conduct of combined tactical military deception operations and exercises.

(6) (U) Information which reveals there is a wartime policy that theater military deception may be employed in wartime to support theater or sub-theater commanders' strategies and gain warfighting advantage.

(7) (U) The following military deception doctrine, tactics, and techniques will be unclassified:

(a) (U) Generic tactics and techniques such as feints, diversions, demonstrations, ruses, displays, electronic deception and communications intrusions.

(b) (U) Actual tactics or techniques whose effectiveness is not influenced by foreign knowledge.

(c) (U) The doctrine and theoretical uses of military deception in different types of warfare or in support of OPSEC, provided they do not identify specific geographic areas, planned operations, or classified equipment capabilities.

(8) (U) Doctrinal military deception objectives and concepts supporting OPSEC, the defense of foreign forces and/or the conduct of combat operations.

b. (U) Policies related to the disclosure of military deception information to foreign nations will be classified by content.

c. (U) Policy concerning the employment of deception means will be classified when knowledge of the information would aid foreign planning to nullify or counter the use of the means concerned, or when the existence of classified capabilities would be revealed.

d. (U) The following military deception doctrine, tactics, and techniques will be classified according to content.
(1) (U) Tactics or techniques which might reveal actual intelligence sources or collection capabilities.

(2) (U) Information concerning doctrine, tactics, or techniques that, if known, would aid the detection and subsequent nullification of military deception operations. The classification should be maintained for only that period necessary to ensure continued effectiveness of operations that might be undertaken.

(3) (U) Information related to special deception devices will be classified by content or derivatively.

e. (U) Administrative means not associated with specific military deception operations will be classified CONFIDENTIAL or SECRET when adversary knowledge of such means would detract from their effectiveness.

f. (U) Administrative means not associated with specific military deception operations will be classified CONFIDENTIAL or SECRET when adversary knowledge of such means would detract from their effectiveness.

g. (U) The specific objectives, concepts, and plans for actual use of military deception to support OPSEC, defense of forces, or combat operations shall be classified derivatively.

h. (U) Case studies and lessons learned of military deceptions should be classified at the lowest level possible. Material shall be declassified when foreign knowledge thereof will no longer affect the results of the operation or nullify the future effectiveness of the means employed.

5. (U). Disclosure of Information. The following disclosure guidance applies:

a. (U) Joint deception planning guidance in the Joint Operations Planning System may be revealed to foreign nations authorized to have access to the level of classification involved when necessary for combined deception planning.

b. (U) The Chiefs of the Services promulgate disclosure guidance related to tactical military deception organizations,
plans, operations, policy, doctrine, tactics, means, planning guidance, organization, training and education programs.

c.  

d.  

e.  

6. (U) **Code Words and Nicknames.** A code word from JANAP 299B, "The US Joint Codeword Index (U)", shall be assigned to identify tactical deceptions that require special handling. Nicknames may be used for overt, unclassified identification for cover, and to designate specific components/aspects of a plan. Nicknames shall not be substituted for or used in lieu of code words. Coordinate with CCJ3-O IAW reference 3f.