Iraqi Opposition Strategy

- U.S.-led Coalition forces will have the lead in liberated Iraq.
  - U.S. forces are committed to stay, and are committed to leave.
  - Success of mission requires unity of command and unity of message.

- The latest NSPD charges the Post-War Planning Office (PWPO) with administering liberated Iraq.
  - It is important that all policy be coordinated with the PWPO in order to coordinate “on-the-ground” implementation.

- The Principals’ Committee has decided that Iraqis will initially have only an advisory role.
  - The “Consultative Committee” should be a sounding board for policy, but not a voting body.
  - We should solicit opinions of a broad range of Iraqis.
  - Future committees might form out of the Consultative Committee.

- We should communicate the role of Iraqis post-liberation to prominent opposition figures.

- We disagree with the State Department’s assertion that the external opposition should be treated any differently than newly-liberated Iraqis.
  - Many external opposition groups have demonstrated their connections to those inside Iraq.
  - Establishment of quotas (for example 3:1, on slide 4) goes against principles of one-man, one-vote, and perpetuates artificial division.

- External opposition figures who return to Iraq should treated as full Iraqis and allowed to participate fully in any structures.
Specific Issues:

- A Judicial Council should begin legal reforms and serve as liaisons to war crimes tribunals.

- Consultative Council should be larger (~20) rather than smaller (~3). A small council aggravates the Sunni-Shi'a-Kurd divide.

- Technocrats might be drawn from the Future of Iraq program, but should not be exclusively drawn from the Future of Iraq pool.

- Census. We should support a non-ethnic, non-sectarian census to avoid the Lebanon model.
  
  - Any census asking ethnic or sectarian questions will be disputed by those who had exaggerated their claims.
  
  - Ethnic or sectarian parties should only be empowered by individuals at the ballot box.

Specific objections, if they arise.

- Adnan Pachachi (slide 6) prominently disputed Kuwait's right to exist while serving as Iraq's UN ambassador.

- Laith Kubba (slide 6) is an employee of the National Endowment for Democracy, and so linked to the U.S. government.

  - He was not able to win appointment by his peers to any of the 65-slots open for the Advisory Committee.

  - Further consultations with Kubba will raise serious questions among Iraqis.