Fact Sheet on So-Called Intel Cell
(or Policy Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group, PCTEG)

- There is a lot of misinformation in the media about this.
- Our policy office is a consumer of intelligence, not a producer.
- Under Secretary Feith created a tiny group – never more than two full-time people – to help our policy office digest the large volume of intelligence on terrorism:
  - The focus was an analysis of the connections among terrorist groups and their government supporters in Iran, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and the Palestinian Authority.
- By April 2002, the “group” had decreased to one staffer.
- Together with other staffers, this individual prepared a briefing for me in August 2002 on links between Iraq and al Qaida. I asked them to give the same brief to the DCI.
- The PCTEG’s responsibility was to analyze all interconnections among terrorist groups and their various sources of support, including state sponsors. The Iraq-al Qaida briefing grew out of that and out of the discovery by a staffer of some intelligence reports of particular interest.

Did the group deal with the Iraq WMD issue?

- No, the group focused on terrorism and the connections among terrorist groups and state sponsors, including Iraq.

Why did you form this group? Why didn’t you rely on CIA and DIA?

- The PCTEG reviewed the available intelligence and focused on what that intelligence implied for the development of strategy and policy for the global war on terrorism.
- That is a different function from the one performed by intelligence agencies.