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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: XA, PREL, PINR
SUBJECT: INR/AA'S AFRICAN TRENDS - 9/18/92 (NO. 19)

"ROME FOR FOLAN AND ALSO FOR VATICAN, LONDON FOR
MCKINLEY, BRUSSELS FOR DUBROW, MADRID FOR CLARKE, USNATO
FOR HAMILTON, BONN FOR KLEMP, USCINCEUR AND HQ US
CENTRAL COMMAND FOR POLADS, HQ USEUCOM FOR EC J-5,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: WILLIAM E LANDFAIR
DATE/CASE ID: 27 JUL 2005  200500286  UNCLASSIFIED
1. (S) TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR AFRICAN TRENDS 9/18/92

A. ESSAY: RWANDA: THREADING A NEEDLE
B. NOTE: ZAIRE: MOBUTU MANEUVERS TO MAINTAIN CONTROL
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A. ESSAY: RWANDA: THREADING A NEEDLE

2. (C) THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT AND THE TUTSI-DOMINATED REBEL RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) ARE LABORING TOWARD A SETTLEMENT, BUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A GENOCIDAL CIVIL WAR WILL LOOM IF THE ONGOING SERIES OF TALKS IN ARUSHA, TANZANIA, FAILS. WHETHER THE PARTIES REACH AGREEMENT depends partly on how much power President Habyarimana is willing to cede to the RPF and domestic opposition parties. But to be accepted by Kigali (and viewed as legitimate by the Rwandan people), a true settlement also depends on the RPF's willingness to accept a powersharing formula more in accordance with the Tutsis' 10-15 percent of the population than with the 50-50 share the RPF has been demanding.

3. (C) HABYARIMANA'S SIDE HAS BEEN PUSHED HARDER AND MORE SUCCESSFULLY TO COMPROMISE. THE GOVERNMENT IS VULNERABLE TO MILITARY PRESSURE FROM THE RPF AND TO POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE FROM MAJOR WESTERN DONORS. THE RPF LEADERSHIP BY CONTRAST ENJOYS SANCTUARY IN UGANDA AND IS NOT SO HEAVILY PRESSURED BY KIGALI, OUTSIDERS, OR THE COSTS OF A WAR WHICH IS FOUGHT ON RWANDAN SOIL. IT IS LIKELY, THEREFORE, THAT THE RPF WILL MAINTAIN A MORE INTRANSIGENT NEGOTIATING POSITION. THIS WOULD PERPETUATE THE CURRENT INSTABILITIY AND STIR PASSIONS THAT COULD LEAD TO THE SORT OF ANTI-TUTSI GENOCIDE THAT GRIPPED RWANDA AND NEIGHBORING BURUNDI IN THE PAST.

BACKGROUND
4. (C) DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM. THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE CONFLICT BEHIND THEM ARE MULTIFACETED: HUTU-TUTSI TENSIONS; THE EFFORT TO DECENTRALIZE POWER AND WEALTH NOW CONTROLLED BY HABYARIMANA'S INNER CIRCLE; AND THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION, PARTICULARLY THE ROLE OF WESTERN DONORS AND SECRET

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UGANDA.

5. (C) THE BASIS OF THE CONFLICT LIES IN ETHNIC TENSION BETWEEN THE TUTSIS--ABOUT 10 PERCENT OF RWANDA'S POPULATION OF 7 MILLION--AND THE HUTUS, WHO MAKE UP ALMOST ALL THE REST. THE TUTSIS THE COUNTRY'S RULING CLASS BEFORE INDEPENDENCE, WERE DISPLACED FROM THEIR DOMINANT POSITION IN 1959 BY A COMBINATION OF ELECTIONS AND HUTU UPRISINGS THAT KILLED THOUSANDS OF TUTSIS AND CAUSED HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS TO FLEE THE COUNTRY. ACCORDING TO THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSION FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), SOME 400,000 LONG-TERM RWANDAN REFUGEES--VIRTUALY ALL OF THEM TUTSIS--LIVE IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES.

6. (C) THE RPF, BASICALLY A TUTSI ORGANIZATION, TRIED TO GRAB POWER BY INVADING RWANDA FROM UGANDA ON OCTOBER 1, 1990. AFTER THE SURPRISE ATTACK WHICH SAW THE RPF STRIKE AS FAR AS KIGALI, THE RWANDAN ARMED FORCES (FAR), AIDED BY FRANCE, REGROUPED AND PUSHED BACK THE REBELS. THE RPF STRUCK AGAIN IN JANUARY 1991 AND BRIEFLY CAPTURED RUHENGERI BUT APPEARED TO WEAKEN IN THE SUBSEQUENT RAINY SEASON. FOR SIX MONTHS AFTER A MARCH CEASEFIRE. THE RPF RETREATED TO NORTHERN BORDER AREAS AND CONDUCTED OCCASIONAL AND LARGELY INEFFECTIVE HIT-AND-RUN ATTACKS. IN LATE 1991 IT BEGAN PRESSING ITS ATTACKS WITH RENEWED VIGOR AND EFFECTIVENESS.

7. (C) THE RPF, WHOSE CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF NEGOTIATOR ARE PROMINENT HUTUS, PORTRAYS ITSELF AS A NATIONALIST ORGANIZATION OPPOSED TO THE HABYARIMANA REGIME'S SECRET

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CORRUPTION, ABUSES OF POWER, AND FAVORITISM TOWARD THE HUTUS OF NORTHERN RWANDA. THE LATTER FORM THE CORE OF REGIME SUPPORT. THE RPF HAS NO SIGNIFICANT HUTU SUPPORT, BUT ITS CRITICISMS OF THE GOVERNMENT RESONATE AMONG THE HUTUS ESPECIALLY IN NEWLY FORMED OPPOSITION PARTIES.

8. (C) NEGOTIATIONS PROGRESS. THE ARUSHA TALKS ARE THE LATEST IN A LONG PROGRESSION OF NEGOTIATIONS DATING BACK TO MID-OCTOBER 1990. THEY FOLLOW A MAY 1992 US OFFER TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN CONCERT WITH NEIGHBORING STATES, FRANCE, AND BELGIUM.

9. (C) EARLIER NEGOTIATIONS FOUCUSED UNSUCCESSFULLY ON ACHIEVING A LASTING CEASE-FIRE. THEY FAILED ALSO TO MOVE THE TWO SIDES SIGNIFICANTLY TOWARD A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. IN PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE EARLIER ROUNDS, HELD IN DAR ES SALAAM IN FEBRUARY 1991, THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE THE TUTSIS' RIGHT OF RETURN PENDING AN END TO HOSTILITIES AND A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. THE TWO SIDES ALSO AGREED TO A CEASE-FIRE, WHICH WAS SHORT-LIVED. NEIGHBORING STATES AGREED TO GRANT SANCTUARY TO THOSE TUTSIS WHO PREFERRED NOT TO RETURN TO RWANDA AND CITIZENSHIP TO THOSE WHO DESIRED IT. SUBSEQUENTLY, HOWEVER, POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS AND THE CEASE-FIRE BROKE DOWN WHEN THE RPF OBJECTED TO THE PROPOSED TERMS OF SETTLEMENT AND THE IMPARTIALITY OF MEDIATORS WAS QUESTIONED.

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10. (C) THE CURRENT SERIES OF TALKS BEGAN WITH A JULY MEETING IN ARUSHA WHICH RESULTED IN A CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT. WITH MINOR EXCEPTIONS, THE CEASE-FIRE HAS HELD. THE PARTIES ALSO SET AN AGENDA CALLING FOR POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS TO BE CONCLUDED BY OCTOBER 10. A FOLLOWUP MEETING IN AUGUST LED TO AGREEMENT ON IMPLEMENTING "THE RULE OF LAW." A FURTHER ARUSHA ROUND THAT BEGAN SEPTEMBER 7 FOCUSED ON POLITICAL INTEGRATION--HOW TO BRING THE RPF INTO GOVERNMENT AND HOW TO MODIFY AND LIBERALIZE THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT.

11. (C) THE NEXT ROUND, TO BE HELD IN ARUSHA AFTER OCTOBER 1, WILL CONTINUE THE EFFORT TO REACH AGREEMENT
ON POLITICAL INTEGRATION BEFORE IT MOVES TO THE PROBLEM OF MILITARY INTEGRATION.

HABYARIMANA UNDER PRESSURE

12. (C) DONORS, TUTSIS, AND REFORMS. AN EX-BELGIAN-TRAINED PARATROOPER WHO TOOK OVER IN A 1973 MILITARY COUP. HABYARIMANA IN THE PAST TWO YEARS HAS FACED UNPRECEDENTED PRESSURE FROM DONORS AND THE RPF TO REFORM HIS GOVERNMENT. INITIALLY HE WAS VIEWED AS A MODERATE ON THE QUESTION OF HUTU-TUTSI RELATIONS BECAUSE HE HAD REPLACED A HUTU-CHAUVINIST GOVERNMENT LED BY THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT-PARMEHUTU (MDR-PARMEHUTU) AND HAD APPOINTED TUTSIS TO HIS CABINET. ALTHOUGH HABYARIMANA'S POLICIES FAVORED NORTHERN HUTUS, MAINLY IN THE PREFECTURES OF RUHENGERI AND GISENYI, HIS MDR-PARMEHUTU PREDECESSORS HAD JUST AS BLATANTLY FAVORED THE SOUTH.

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13. (C) IN 1975 HABYARIMANA ESTABLISHED THE NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT (MRND) AND MODIFIED THE CONSTITUTION TO MAKE THE MRND THE SOLE LEGAL PARTY. FOR 15 YEARS, HOWEVER, INTERNATIONAL DONORS VIEWED RWANDA AS ONE OF AFRICA'S MOST STABLE AND ECONOMICALLY SUCCESSFUL COUNTRIES.


15. (C) HABYARIMANA ATTEMPTED TO RESPOND TO THE CHANGES: ON JULY 5, 1990, HE ANNOUNCED A TWO-YEAR PROCESS TO MOVE TOWARD MULTIPARTY RULE, AND ON SEPTEMBER 21 HE APPOINTED A COMMISSION OF NATIONAL SYNTHESIS TO SUGGEST WAYS TO MOVE TOWARD GREATER DEMOCRATIZATION.
LESS THAN TWO WEEKS LATER, THE RPF INVASION BROUGHT NEW ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PRESSURE ON THE REGIME TO SOLVE THE TUTSI PROBLEM.

16. (C) THE WAR IS COSTLY TO RWANDA. IT HAS DISRUPTED ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN THE NORTH AND HAS DISPLACED SOME 350,000 RWANDANS, ACCORDING TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC). KIGALI MUST PAY FOR AN ARMY THAT HAS INCREASED IN SIZE FROM 5,000 IN OCTOBER 1990 TO ITS CURRENT AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF 30,000. TO FINANCE THE WAR, KIGALI HAS BEEN FORCED TO SELL VIRTUALLY ITS ENTIRE COFFEE STOCKPILE AT A TIME WHEN WORLD PRICES ARE LOW. IT HAS INCREASED BORROWING FROM INTERNATIONAL DONORS AND FALLEN BEHIND ON ITS PAYMENTS TO THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND. IN THIS SITUATION, KIGALI IS VULNERABLE TO FOREIGN DONOR PRESSURES FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM.

17. (C) UNDER PRESSURE AS WELL FROM NEIGHBORING STATES INTERESTED IN AMELIORATING THE PROBLEM OF TUTSI REFUGEES IN THEIR TERRITORIES. HABYARIMANA IN LATE 1990 AND EARLY 1991 IMPLEMENTED A SERIES OF REFORMS THAT BEGAN TO LIBERALIZE THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND RESPOND TO TUTSI COMPLAINTS. HE ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE THE TUTSI RIGHT OF RETURN; ANNOUNCED ELIMINATION OF THE NOTATION OF ONE'S ETHNIC BACKGROUND FROM NATIONAL IDENTITY CARDS (WHICH HAD LONG ANGERED THE TUTSIS); AND FORMALLY LIFTED PRESS RESTRICTIONS (THOUGH JOURNALISTS CONTINUED TO BE ARRESTED AND BEaten).

18. (C) IN JUNE 1991, HABYARIMANA ACCEPTED MANY OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION OF NATIONAL SYNTHESIS AND FORMALLY DECLARED RWANDA A MULTIPARTY STATE. HE RENAMED THE MRND AS THE NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRACY AND INVITED THE RPF TO ESTABLISH ITSELF AS A LEGAL PARTY AND COMPETE WITH OTHER PARTIES (CALCULATING THAT THE MINORITY TUTSIS COULD NOT WIN A
SIGNIFICANT SHARE OF THE POPULAR VOTE). TO DATE, 16 PARTIES HAVE REGISTERED, REPRESENTING A BROAD RANGE OF RWANDAN OPINION.

19. (C) AFTER NINE MONTHS OF SOMETIMES-ACRIMONIOUS NEGOTIATIONS, HABYARIMANA IN APRIL 1992 AGREED TO A COALITION GOVERNMENT, GIVING 11 OF 20 CABINET SEATS TO FOUR OPPOSITION PARTIES. HE HAS ANNOUNCED HIS INTENTION TO HOLD PRESIDENTIAL AND LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS NEXT APRIL' ALTHOUGH THIS SCHEDULE DEPENDS UPON THE RESULTS OF THE ARUSHA TALKS.

20. (C) DESPITE THE REFORMS, THE PRESIDENT RETAINS ULTIMATE POWER AND APPOINTS THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE CABINET. KEY PORTFOLIOS--DEFENSE, INTERIOR, AND CIVIL SERVICE--ARE HELD BY MRND LOYALISTS. ALTHOUGH THE PRESIDENT NOW SHARES WITH A SUPERIOR COUNCIL OF MAGISTRATES THE AUTHORITY TO APPOINT AND REMOVE JUDGES, HE CONTINUES TO MANAGE A CENTRALIZED POLITICAL SYSTEM AND APPOINTS LOCAL ADMINISTRATORS DOWN TO THE BURGOMASTER LEVEL.

21. (C) MULTIPARTY COMPLEXITY. ALTHOUGH THE PRESIDENT RETAINS ULTIMATE AUTHORITY, THE OPPOSITION PARTIES IN THE GOVERNMENT--OFTEN WORKING AS A BLOC--DO INFLUENCE DECISIONMAKING.

22. (C) THE LARGEST AND APPARENTLY MOST POPULAR OPPOSITION PARTY IS THE REFORMED DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN SECRET MOVEMENT (MDR), WHICH IS BASED ON THE OLD MDR-PARMEHUTU. LIKE ITS PREDECESSOR, THE MDR APPEALS MAINLY TO SOUTHERN HUTUS. ALTHOUGH IT INCLUDES A CONSERVATIVE WING THAT EXUDES MDR-PARMEHUTU'S HUTU CHAUVINISM, ITS CORE LEADERSHIP IS FAR MORE LIBERAL AND IS ACTIVELY SEEKING A SOLUTION THAT WOULD END THE WAR AND ACCOMMODATE THE RPF. PRIME MINISTER DISMAS NSENGIYAREMYE IS FROM THE MDR, ALONG WITH THREE OTHER CABINET MEMBERS INCLUDING MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND COOPERATION BONIFACE NGULINZIRA.

23. (C) THE LIBERAL PARTY (PL) AND THE SMALLER SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY EACH HOLD THREE CABINET POSITIONS WHILE THE MINUSCULE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY HAS ONE.
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THE PL HAS A HEAVY TUTSI MEMBERSHIP ALTHOUGH SOME OF ITS LEADERS ARE HUTUS. LIKE THE MDR, IT FAVORS MODIFYING THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS IN ORDER TO ACCOMMODATE THE RPF. LAST DECEMBER-JANUARY, FRUSTRATED WITH THE PL'S INITIAL REFUSALS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE GOVERNMENT, HABYARIMANA LASHED OUT AT IT AS BEING THE INTERNAL WING OF THE RPF. OTHER HUTUS SHARE HIS VIEWS.

24. (C) WHAT THE OPPOSITION PARTIES HAVE IN COMMON WITH THE RPF IS A DESIRE TO LIMIT THE PRESIDENT'S POWERS. THEY ALL FAVOR MODIFYING THE CONSTITUTION TO INCREASE THEIR OWN POWERS. BUT AS PART OF THE APRIL AGREEMENT WITH HABYARIMANA THAT GAVE THEM A CABINET MAJORITY AND THE PREMIERSHIP, THEY AGREED NOT TO TAKE MOVES TO CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION.

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25. (C) THE DEGREE OF THE OPPOSITION PARTIES' INFLUENCE IS DEMONSTRATED BY THE FACT THAT THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT DELEGATION TO THE ARUSHA TALKS HAS BEEN LED BY FOREIGN MINISTER NGULINZIRA. HE PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS TO THE RPF IN THE SEPTEMBER TALKS THAT WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE THE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT. THE PROPOSALS STATED, INTER ALIA, THAT: ALL PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS WOULD BE TAKEN ONLY WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF THE CABINET; THE CABINET WOULD INCLUDE THE RPF; AND ANY AGREEMENTS REACHED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RPF WOULD HAVE LEGAL PRECEDENCE OVER THE CURRENT CONSTITUTION AND CURRENT LAWS. THESE PROPOSALS, WHICH APPARENTLY WERE NOT APPROVED IN ADVANCE BY HABYARIMANA, MAY WELL BE REJECTED BY KIGALI.

26. (C) THE HUTU RIGHT AND THE GENOCIDE CARD.

HABYARIMANA ALSO FACES PRESSURE FROM HUTU CHAUVINISTS CONCERNED WITH RETAINING ACCESS TO THE NATIONAL WEALTH. ANTI-TUTSI FEELING, SUBMERGED DURING MOST OF HABYARIMANA'S TENURE IN OFFICE, REEMERGED AFTER THE RPF INVASION.

27. (C) THE MOST OBVIOUS POLITICAL MANIFESTATION OF HUTU SUPREMACISM WAS THE ESTABLISHMENT EARLIER THIS YEAR OF THE COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE REVOLUTION (CDR) AS A POLITICAL PARTY. THE CDR'S CLEAR MESSAGE IS THAT HUTUS AND TUTSIS ARE FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT PEOPLES WHO
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CAN DO NO BETTER THAN UNEASILY COEXIST. THE CDR APPEALS MAINLY TO NORTHERN HUTUS WHO HAVE BENEFITED MOST UNDER THE HABYARIMANA REGIME AND WHO ARE THREATENED BY THE RPF.

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FIGHTING. HABYARIMANA'S WIFE AND SOME OF HER FAMILY ARE THOUGHT TO BE ACTIVE SUPPORTERS OF THE CDR.

28. (C) BECAUSE OF THESE FAMILY TIES, HABYARIMANA SOMETIMES IS DESCRIBED AS A PRISONER OF THE FAR RIGHT. HIS REFORMS SUGGEST THAT THIS VIEW EXAGGERATES THE TRUTH. NONETHELESS, CREDIBLE REPORTS OF OFFICIAL PARTICIPATION IN ANTI-TUTSI COMMUNAL VIOLENCE ARE DISTURBING IN A SMALL COUNTRY WITH SUCH A CENTRALIZED ADMINISTRATIVE AND SECURITY SYSTEM. SINCE THE RPF INVASION. THERE HAVE BEEN AT LEAST FOUR EPISODES IN WHICH 300 OR MORE PEOPLE HAVE BEEN KILLED IN ANTI-TUTSI VIOLENCE, THE MOST RECENT IN KIBUYE PREFECTURE LAST MONTH. THE THREAT OF GENOCIDAL VIOLENCE IS LIKELY TO REMAIN DESPITE FORMAL POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE OPPOSITION AND THE RPF.

RPF PRESSES ITS ADVANTAGE

29. (C) COMPARED WITH KIGALI'S DECISIONMAKERS. THE RPF LEADERSHIP APPEARS TO BE MORE UNIFIED, FOR NOW, AROUND A HARDLINE NEGOTIATING POSITION. SINCE 1990, IT HAS SKILLFULLY COMBINED ITS POLITICAL AND MILITARY STRATEGIES. AFTER BEING PUSHED INTO THE HINTERLANDS OF RUHENGERI AND THE AKAGERA AND VOLCANOES NATIONAL PARKS IN MID-1991, THE RPF CONSISTENTLY REJECTED HABYARIMANA'S REFORMS AND HIS INVITATION TO RETURN TO RWANDA TO PARTICIPATE IN ITS MULTIPARTY SYSTEM. WHEN IT RETURNED IN STRENGTH TO THE BATTLEFIELD LATE IN THE YEAR, THE RPF CONCENTRATED ON BUILDING A GUERRILLA EFFORT RATHER THAN ON STRIKING SUCH MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS AS RUHENGERI.

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AND KIGALI.

30. (C) THE FAR, WHICH HAS BECOME MORE UNDISCIPLINED AND INEFFECTIVE AS IT HAS GROWN LARGER, HAS PROVED

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INCAPABLE OF DISLODGING THE REBELS. EARLIER THIS YEAR IT APPEARED TO BE SAVED FROM COLLAPSE ONLY BY THE PRESENCE OF FRENCH MILITARY ADVISERS.

31. (C) THE RPF HAS SUCCEEDED THROUGH WAR AND DIPLOMACY IN WINNING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT TO NEGOTIATE AN RPF ROLE IN A FUTURE RWANDAN REGIME. EVEN THE FRENCH, WHO HAVE LONG BEEN STAUNCH SUPPORTERS OF HABYARIMANA'S SUPPORT THE SEARCH FOR A SETTLEMENT THAT IS AT LEAST MINIMALLY ACCEPTABLE TO THE RPF.

32. (C) THE PROBLEM IS FINDING THAT SETTLEMENT. RPF NEGOTIATING POSITIONS HAVE ALTERNATED BETWEEN VAGUENESS AND OBSTINACY. MUCH OF THE RPF'S ENERGY HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO CRITICIZING THE CORRUPTION AND HYPOCRISY OF THE HABYARIMANA GOVERNMENT, AN EASY TASK. THE RPF ENTERED THE ARUSHA ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS CALLING FOR SCRAPPING THE CONSTITUTION AND REPLACING THE PRESIDENT AND NATIONAL LEGISLATURE WITH AN APPOINTED, ALL-POWERFUL NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF RECONCILIATION THAT WOULD RULE THE COUNTRY DURING A FOUR-YEAR TRANSITION PERIOD.

33. (C) THE RPF REJECTS INVITATIONS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MULTIPARTY SYSTEM, PARTLY BECAUSE HABYARIMANA CONTINUES TO HOLD REAL POWER. IT HAS EVEN REJECTED A FORMULA THAT WOULD REDUCE HABYARIMANA'S POWERS SIGNIFICANTLY.

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34. (C) THE RPF IS RELUCTANT TO COMMIT TO A MORE LIBERAL MULTIPARTY SYSTEM WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT GUARANTEES, BECAUSE IT COULD NOT WIN SIGNIFICANT POWER THROUGH ELECTIONS WITHOUT FORMING A COALITION. EVEN IF ALL THE TUTSIS RETURNED TO RWANDA, THEY WOULD CONSTITUTE NO MORE THAN 14 PERCENT OF RWANDA'S TOTAL POPULATION.

35. (C) WHEN THE TALKS TURN TO MILITARY INTEGRATION, THE RPF IS LIKELY TO TAKE AN EVEN HARDER OPENING LINE. PAUL KAGAME, THE RPF MILITARY COMMANDER AND DE FACTO LEADER OF THE REBELS. IN A JULY STATEMENT SAID: "WE SHALL INSIST ON A 50-PERCENT STAKE IN THE NATIONAL ARMY. THERE WILL BE NO COMPROMISE ON THAT BECAUSE WE ARE NOT A DEFEATED ARMY." ALTHOUGH POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERS IN KIGALI HAVE AGREED AMONG THEMSELVES TO THE NECESSITY OF INTEGRATING RPF FIGHTERS INTO THE
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ARMY, THE RPF’S OPENING POSITION IS A NONSTARTER.

36. (C) AT BOTTOM, THE RPF Wants A SHARE OF POWER AS WELL AS SECURITY GUARANTEES FOR RPF MEMBERS AND TUTSIS IN GENERAL. IT DOES NOT BELIEVE IT CAN ACHIEVE THESE AIDS WITHOUT A NEGOTIATED ARRANGEMENT THAT WOULD GIVE IT PARTICIPATION IN THE KIGALI GOVERNMENT OUT OF PROPORTION TO TUTSI NUMBERS FOR A LONG (FOUR-YEAR) TRANSITION PERIOD. THE RPF LEADERSHIP APPEARS TO REALIZE THAT ITS POSITION CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED ON THE BASIS OF DEMOCRATIC IDEALS, BUT IT IS ATTEMPTING TO DETERMINE THE GOVERNMENT’S BOTTOM LINE BEFORE DECIDING WHETHER A SETTLEMENT IS ACCEPTABLE.

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PRESSURING THE RPF

37. (C) THE RPF HAS BEEN FAR LESS WILLING THAN THE GOVERNMENT TO COMPROMISE, PARTLY BECAUSE IT HAS HAD LITTLE TO LOSE BY CONTINUING ITS STRUGGLE. ALTHOUGH IT HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO WIN THE WAR OUTRIGHT, IT HAS DEMONSTRATED ITS ABILITY TO INTENSIFY THE REBELLION IF THE POLITICAL TRACK BOGS DOWN. RPF INTRANSIGENCE DEPENDS TO A LARGE DEGREE ON UGANDA, WHICH CONTINUES TO PROVIDE LOW LEVELS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND POLITICAL SUPPORT AND IS THE SITE OF THE RPF’S HEADQUARTERS.

38. (C) ALTHOUGH UGANDAN PRESIDENT MUSEVENI HAS LITTLE BUT CONTEMPT FOR HABYARIMANA AND CLEARLY FAVORS A SOLUTION THAT WOULD LEAVE THE RPF WITH A DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE OF POWER, HIS SUPPORT FOR THE RPF MAY BE SOFTENING. WHILE MUSEVENI DOES NOT YET APPEAR TO HAVE REDUCED MILITARY SUPPORT FOR THE REBELS, UGANDA AND RWANDA SIGNED A NONAGGRESSION TREATY IN AUGUST THAT PROVIDES FOR RWANDAN MONITORING TEAMS ON THE UGANDA SIDE OF THE BORDER.

39. (C) MOREOVER, IN THE SEPTEMBER NEGOTIATIONS IN ARUSHA, UGANDAN OBSERVERS JOINED OBSERVERS FROM RWANDA’S OTHER NEIGHBORS TO TRY TO PRESSURE THE RPF TO ACCEPT THE GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS. MUSEVENI EVEN SENT WORD THAT HE DID NOT APPROVE OF THE RPF PROPOSAL TO EXCLUDE HABYARIMANA AND THE MRND FROM THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT. ALTHOUGH THE RPF MIGHT CONTINUE TO RECEIVE
SUPPORT FROM TUTSI SYMPATHIZERS IN THE UGANDAN ARMY AND SECRET

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FROM WEALTHY TUTSIS IN THE REGION AND THE DIAPORA, THE ONLY CLEAR WAY TO PRESSURE THE RPF APPEARS TO BE THROUGH KAMPALA.

40. (C) BY HOLDING TO A HARD LINE, THE RPF RUNS OTHER RISKS. FIRST, IT MAY ALIENATE THE INTERNAL PARTIES THAT SHARE ITS INTEREST IN LIMITING PRESIDENTIAL POWERS. IT ALSO RISKS OFFENDING THE FOREIGN ACTORS—STATES IN THE REGION, THE US, FRANCE, AND BELGIUM—WHOSE ATTENTION HAS GIVEN THE RPF/TUTSI ISSUE A NEW DEGREE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY. IT IS LIKELY THAT, WHILE PROFESSING A WILLINGNESS TO TALK AND BY BEING TACTICALLY FLEXIBLE, THE RPF WILL SEEK TO DELAY SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS AS LONG AS POSSIBLE AND WAIT FOR KIGALI AGAIN TO LOWER ITS BOTTOM LINE.

41. (C) BUT THE RPF IS IN A CATCH-22 SITUATION: IT WILL RISK A HUTU BACKLASH IF IT IS GENERALLY SEEN BY THE HUTU MAJORITY—OR BY HARDLINE HUTUS CLOSE TO HABYARIMANA—AS MOVING TO REASSERT TUTSI HEGEMONY OVER THE POLITICAL SYSTEM. ANTI-TUTSI ATTACKS DEMONSTRATE THAT NO MATTER WHAT IS AGREED TO IN POWERSHARING TALKS, THE RPF MUST TREAD A FINE LINE IF IT WISHES TO RETURN PEACEFULLY TO RWANDA. IN THE END, THE RPF MAY DECIDE THAT THE RISK OF RETURNING IS TOO GREAT. (EHRENREICH)

B. NOTE: ZAIRE: MOBUTU MANEUVERS TO MAINTAIN CONTROL

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C. NOTE: SOUTH AFRICA: SMALL STEPS TOWARD PEACE
E. NOTE: ANGOLA: THE CABINDA POT KEEPS SIMMERING