DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF
OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

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CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
DECLASSIFICATION: OADR

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OR METHODS INVOLVED (WNINTEL)
Commandant of the Engineer School. There were 167 conference attendees. The conference was very successful with presentations by personnel from DMA, USATEC, and the US Army Engineer School as well as the three Topographic Engineering Battalion Commanders.

(d) (U) Conducted major review of prototype Landsat Image Maps (LIM). This product was designed to provide hasty map coverage in areas where no large scale mapping exists. The prototype came in two versions: a 72 hour version to satisfy the very initial planning requirements, and a 7 day version which was enhanced with additional features and text. The product was very well received and appeared to satisfy a significant deficiency in coverage during crisis support.

(e) (U) Other significant activities included the initiation of a dialogue between DMA and the Army Vice Chief of Staff on increased liaison from DMA to the Army. By year's end it was decided that DMA would provide two liaisons to the Army, one at ODCSINT and one at USATEC. The liaison at ODCSINT would move from current offices within the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Development, while the liaison at USATEC would be a new position. A revision to AR 115-11, Army Topography, was prepared and staffed. This was the first revision since 1980, and badly needed. The Topographic Imagery Integration Prototype (TIIP) was developed at USATEC to enable the field to produce hard copy products from imagery source in areas where no mapping exists. Operational needs statements were received from 5 CINCs for a total of 6 systems. Funds were received at USATEC at the end of the year to buy 2 of the systems. DMA resurrected the Geospatial Standards Management Committee (GSMC) and its General Officer counterpart, the MC&G Joint Interoperability Board (MJIB), to attempt to better manage the services' diverging digital data requirements. By year's end, the groups became the premier interoperability vehicles in the MC&G field.

d. (U) Conclusion (POI). FY93 was a year of personnel turnover, organizational changes, and continued efforts to integrate data into the current and future tactical battlefield for the warfighters. National level interests and activities centered on reevaluating policies on domestic disaster missions, Central Imagery Office integration, and imagery declassification activities. Meeting Army requirements during overall downsizing and restructuring efforts continued to be a challenge into the next fiscal year.

3. (U) Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Division (POH)
a. (CONF) Overview. HUMINT Division continued to focus on the restructure of DOD HUMINT (see para c(1)). HUMINT collection and reporting replaced the traditional Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat focus with collection against The end of the Cold War presents a paradox for the Army and the Intelligence Community: We now have unprecedented access to traditional targets, but diminished interest. The Cold War luxury of a small number of high priority fixed targets is gone. As demonstrated by its varied and successful intelligence activities this fiscal year, HUMINT has both the capability and flexibility to meet these challenges.

b. (CONF) Organization/Personnel. Became the Chief of the HUMINT Division in Oct 92 following retirement. was division chief for less than a year due to his unforeseen medical retirement in Sep 93. was transferred from the division in Nov 92. was the acting division chief from mid-Jan through the end of Jul 93 between the time was diagnosed and his early retirement. reported for duty as division chief on 30 Jul 93. Key personnel as of 30 Sep 93: Coordinated two-week active duty annual training for five IMAs assigned to the HUMINT Division.

c. (U) Narrative. (Note: Classification authority for all classified paragraphs is DIAM 58-13; Declassify on OADR.)

(1) (U) Status of DOD HUMINT Restructure.

(a) Soon after SECARMY's concurrence with the new restructure concept, it appeared DIA did would not allow the services to continue to exercise command and control over service collectors beyond the transition period. SECARMY insisted on retaining his Title 10, Sec 3013(c)(7) responsibilities for the effective supervision and control of Army's HUMINT activities. In addition, Army wanted to retain day-to-day control of operations. The September 92 agreement called for DIA, with Service
representatives embedded in the Clarendon Staff, to exercise HUMINT Operational Tasking Authority (HOTA) to the service entry-points.

In short, DIA would acquire greater collection management control over service collectors, while the services would retain their responsibilities for the conduct of the intelligence operations (DIA would tell us what to collect - we'd figure out how to do it and be responsible for the results). In short, Army considered this an excellent division of responsibility. DIA indications they never really believed in the Restructure Concept follow:

(b) DIA’s interpretation of the concept of the Joint Operating Base (JOB). Originally, a JOB would be established if and wherever collocation of DIA or various service elements became desirable or possible. The goal was to save resources. After the Service Secretaries concurred with the concept, a JOB essentially became anything DIA decided. Organizations within a given JOB did not even have to be collocated. DIA apparently decided to create JOBS wherever they could because the approved concept called for DIA to exercise complete, day-to-day control over all JOBS.

Whether or not such a set-up would be beneficial to the CINC's is unknown. The point is that DIA was using the concept of a JOB as a means of wresting control of day-to-day operations from the Army.

(c) ...

(d) Exercise of HUMINT Operational Tasking Authority (HOTA). Another indicator was a draft DIA-prepared DOD HUMINT Reorganization matrix depicting a

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management structure for the reorganization as only a temporary arrangement. The proposed solution depicted DIA exercising permanent, direct day-to-day supervision over Army units, with the gone.

(e) The DEPSECDEF signed DOD Directive 5200.37, "Centralized Management of DOD HUMINT Operations (U)." This was the definitive "order" for the implementation of the HOTA Concept proposed by in Aug 92 and concurred with by the SECARMY on 23 Sep 92. This was followed by 18 Jan 93 memo from ASD(C3I) (still providing implementation instructions.

(f) There were recurring sessions of the HUMINT Restructure Working Group (WG). This WG was established to identify service requirements for "embedded" staffers. Although there was much back-and-forth discussion, once agreed, DIA was to draft an MOU with the Services finalizing embedded staff requirements, responsibilities, etc.

and designated to assist Mastrangelo in setting up DIA to accept the 16 embedded. Between Jan and May 93, very little occurred.

(g) Jan - May 93, a small cell of Army personnel worked at DIA as DOP-X. They were not integrated into DIA HUMINT management, supported by argued that at least during the transition, with so few people, he needed to keep them in a single cell. They instead functioned as a DIA-based Army coordination cell headed by DIA did not find this acceptable, they wanted more Army people sooner, and they wanted the Army people truly embedded i.e., integrated into as soon as they arrived at

While this occurred, arguments were ongoing between DIA and regarding specific embedded staff billets. A decision about the staff's structure was delayed until could host an IPR on the Restructure implementation. Only after the IPR would consideration be given to finalizing the DIA-Army MOA regarding the embedded staff. This entire issue of the IPR became moot with Lt Gen Clapper's decision to establish the Defense HUMINT Service.
(h) In retrospect, it appears the basic problem was opposing views of what was meant by HOTA and the new DOD Directive.

Indeed, among the many problems encountered in developing the MOU was the performance evaluation rating scheme for DHS military personnel. Air Force in particular insisted on maintaining a pure AF rating scheme rather than have DIA supervisors interspersed.

(i) The formation of the DHS: In response to a 14 May 93 memo expressing concern about the slow pace of the restructure, on 19 May 93 sent a message to the Service Intelligence Chiefs faulting the services for "seeming recalcitrance" in implementing HOTA. He directed several key actions.

(j) In early June Lt Gen Clapper met with Service Intelligence Chiefs and outlined his concept for a Defense HUMINT Service (DHS).

(k) 11 Jun, Lt Gen Clapper briefed the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), Mr. Woolsey, and the DEPSECDEF, Dr. Perry. He outlined his DHS concept, stressing that the previous restructure implemented by the Dec 92 DOD Directive "should be regarded only as a transition to even more change." He justified this conclusion by citing "resource realities." Overall conclusion: The briefing was well received by Mr. Woolsey and Dr. Perry. Dr. Perry directed on 16 Jun 93 the ASD(C3I) "to prepare a proposal for creation of a Defense HUMINT Service."

He gave a suspense of 13 Aug 93.
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(1) This set into motion a hurried series of working groups to further develop the proposal. The groups, covering personnel, operations, structure, cover, etc., met the week of 22 Sep 93, and produced a draft concept that was circulated to the Services. This resulted in a formal proposal 3 Aug to the Services and other agencies by ASD(CJl).

(m) 16 Aug, Mr. Shannon, the Acting Secretary of the Army, concurred, with comments, with the DHS concept. His primary concerns: Undue haste might damage functioning structures and harm the professional HUMINT force;

stressed that would try to minimize disadvantages of DHS including: dangers of too great a span of control; a possible lack of responsiveness to the tactical force due to overresponsiveness to higher echelons; civilian oversight remote from the action; propensity to conduct self-evaluations; and potential for civilianization and separation from the warfighter.

(n) Year ended with General Powell's, CJCS, 28 Sep 93 concurrence with the DHS concept. The Chairman's primary caveat was "ensure that HUMINT continues to be responsive to the warfighter. Tactical intelligence...must continue to be subject to the authority, direction, and control of the combatant commanders. To ensure the responsiveness of...

(2) with the beginning of the fiscal year. Operational testing scheduled following final design review could not begin until accepted the system.

requested vulnerability and risk assessment prior to initiating operation. assisted in developing a three phase test plan which included vulnerability assessment in phase I.
Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

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late in FY 92 with 12 findings. The findings stem from the two regulations governing these programs, AR 614-115 and AR 690-950-19-1. These regulations were outpaced by changes in the programs they govern and did not reflect changes made to meet specific operational requirements. Revision of the regulation is now underway, but other ongoing activities will greatly affect these two personnel programs and considerable time will elapse before revision is complete.

(5) (NF) A robbery of the mailroom at the Base Post Office in the Offenbach, Germany, Support Facility on
24 Apr 93 resulted in a major compromise of U.S. Army...

The robbers stole a large quantity of...

registered mail...

(a) (F)

(b) (F)

(c) (F)

(d) (F)

(7) (F)

(a) (F)
(U) General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP).

Reductions established previously under VANGUARD continued with Total Army Analysis cuts and GDIP-related decrements.

(b)(5)(NF) It became clear that the horizontal cut strategy (or "salami slicing") previously used was unworkable. FOH, with INSCOM, identified high-priority, essential "core" activities. These would be defended and resourced fully to avoid "hollow" structures.

(c)(6)(NF) After review, it was decided traditional controlled HUMINT operations were less than cost-effective and responsive to the Army and the warfighters' needs than other types of collection efforts. In contrast, support to military operations was deemed effective, as proven in recent crises, including
Somalia. These very non-traditional missions therefore were vigorously defended and resourced, and by fiscal year-end, ODSCINT had fully manned and resourced these operations, eliminating chronic and severe manpower and fiscal shortfalls.

(d) (S) It was increasingly important in the new post-Cold War environment of openness in formerly closed societies. Although continued Army reductions and CONUS basing kept these operations from being increased, they were successfully defended from drastic cutbacks.

(9) (U) Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) Functional Requirements Review Board. JDISS, a joint program to develop a three tier multi-media and scalable deployable intelligence support system for operating forces, will enable deployed intelligence analysts and planners to "pull down" intelligence from other commands, agencies, and data bases, and to coordinate with other analysts. POH was tasked by the board chairman to submit a set of functional requirements by level of command.

(10) (U) Compared collection management applications of the Collection Requirements Management Applications (CRMA) and Collection Management Support Tools (CMST) to assess their value to the Army. Technical discussions focused on ADP environment, standards, maintainability, configuration management, documentation and system administration. Neither system was superior to the other in requirements management and mission management. Both systems favor strategic-level collection, even though some features in both systems support tactical collection managers.
Army maintains an extensive worldwide commitment to the debriefing of foreigners. These activities historically provided highly valuable intelligence to the Army at low cost and low risk. FY93 debriefing results reflect a heavy, but lessening investment in the Cold War—over half the resources are targeted against the FSU and East Bloc. Examples of
significant intelligence information acquired by Army from emigre sources include:

(a)  

(b)  

(c)  

(d)  

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(14) [U] POH attended a two-day conference of Overt CONUS-based units to determine the most efficient use of assets for maximum production in the future. Reviewed current location of all CONUS debriefer/contact specialist spaces; the current target topics and countries and the locations of all target groups; current rates of production, and discussed recommendations for future personnel and office movement which will improve access and production and decrease costs.

(15) [U] In-progress review of DOD Strategic Debriefers Course (DSDC) held at the DIAC. POH represented the meeting (Army is the DSAC Executive Agent), and representatives from DIA, INSCOM, Navy, and DSOC attended. Agenda items included: ATRRS data, class size, quality of instructors, service requirements, quota management, and ensuring the right individuals attend this course. TRADOC agreed to support a class size of 18 students per class for FY94. The course optimum of 12 was seen as more manageable due to instructor turnover and physical limitations on booths. The Services were asked to review their yearly requirement for DSOC quotas. These minimum allocations were determined necessary to sustain Service requirements (Army = 7; Air Force = 5; Navy = 1; Marine Corps = 1; DoD/Other = 1; = 15). Consensus was reached that future class size should be 15 students. Discussion was given to using an alternate standby listing to make use of "no show" student slots. Air Force and Navy
said they had no trouble filling their slots with standbys (Marine Corps representative did not attend this meeting). INSCOM said they had recently implemented a standby list of individuals who were willing to attend the course if the primary attendee was unable to attend. DSDC commented that they were reviewing and scrubbing their TDA. Efforts will be made locally to realign current assigned instructor personnel as well as recruit fully qualified instructors to ensure that there is no instructor shortage. If the class size remained at 18 students, there would be an instructor shortage in addition to the problem of insufficient debriefing booths in the physical plant to support them. The Services were asked to look into providing a by-position listing of personnel who require DSDC training to ensure the right people are being trained as strategic debriefers.

POH prepared daily status reports on HUMINT support to OPERATION RESTORE HOPE in Somalia. We also passed several potential intelligence leads to INSCOM for action. INSCOM supplied numerous personnel in direct support to RESTORE HOPE. Produced 20 IIRs in FY 93 as well as participating in debriefings. Controlled HUMINT also ran several recruited assets. The 513th MI Bde screened to determine likely candidates for debriefings. General topics of information reported by

Balkan crisis. in response to events in the Balkans:

Joint Interrogation Centers (JIC). JICs were given priority to identifying and debriefing sources knowledgeable of events in former Yugoslavia (FRY). JIC chiefs were instructed to make Serbo-Croatian debriefers
available to other JICs should sources become available at other sites. Debriefers were sent TDY as needed.

(b) (C/NI) Augmentation. 18th MI Battalion provided Serbo-Croatian debriefer support to WESTPORT on an on-call basis.

c) (C/NI) FORMICA. Project FORMICA personnel debriefed DOD and DOD-affiliated personnel returning to Germany or transiting from the crisis area. Planning was completed to deploy FORMICA debriefers to Italy if necessary.

(f) (C/NI) Language Enhancement Training.

(h) (C/NI)
(c) Significant Controlled/Overt HUMINT Reporting for FY93 (includes unit, summary, evaluation, and analysts' comments):

(a) (U) [Redacted]

(b) (S/F) IIR 2 219 0559 92 and 0560, prepared by the [Redacted] provided information of MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE concerning alleged atrocities committed against Bosniac Moslems at the Serbian controlled concentration camp at Luka-Brcko. The reports claim that the Serbian guards at the camp cremated many of the 3,000 Moslems killed at the camp to cover evidence of "ethnic cleansing."

(c) (UAR) IIR 2 325 0014 93, submitted by [Redacted] provided information of MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE concerning mass murders and other atrocities perpetrated at Omarska Camp by Bosnian Serb "Irregulars" against Bosniac Moslems. The IIR detailed nightly massacres of 5 to 20 Moslems by clubbing, stabbing, and firing squad. The report describes a massacre of 170 men by Serb "Regulars" which included racial taunting and firing squad-style killings. The remains of the victims were left by the side of the road.

(d) (S/F) IIR 2 323 0016 93, produced by [Redacted] and IIR's 2 322 0212 92 and 0217, produced by [Redacted] provided further information of MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE concerning Serb atrocities committed against Moslems. The reports state that Moslem and Croatian prisoners at a pet
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(19) (S/NF) Significant Controlled/Overt HUMINT Reporting for FY93 (includes unit, summary, evaluation, and analysts' comments):

(a) (S/NF) IIR 2 340 0143 93, submitted by the 202d Military Intelligence Battalion, 513th MI Brigade, contained information of HIGH VALUE concerning airfield conditions at Kismayo, Somalia. The report detailed the condition of the tarmac, aprons, runways, and nearby buildings and background information regarding the group controlling the airfield. DIA analysts commented, "This is excellent information that was put to use immediately by analysts in DIA's Somalia Intelligence Task Force. The source's unique access has provided insights on the Somalia situation that have been unavailable from any other source."

(b) (S/NF) IIRs 2 219 0559 92 and 0560, prepared by the provided information of MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE concerning alleged atrocities committed against Bosnian Moslems at the Serbian controlled concentration camp at Luka-Broko. The reports claim that the Serbian guards at the camp cremated many of the 3,000 Moslems killed at the camp to cover evidence of "ethnic cleansing."

(c) (S/NF) IIR 2 325 0014 93, submitted by provided information of MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE concerning mass murders and other atrocities perpetrated at Omarska Camp by Bosnian Serb "Irregulars" against Bosnian Moslems. The IIR detailed nightly massacres of 5 to 20 Moslems by clubbing, stabbing, and firing squad. The report describes a massacre of 170 men by Serb "Regulars" which included racial taunting and firing squad-style killings. The remains of the victims were left by the side of the road.

(d) (S/NF) IIR 2 323 0016 93, produced by and IIR's 2 322 0212 92 and 0217, produced by provided further information of MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE concerning Serb atrocities committed against Moslems. The reports state that Moslem and Croatian prisoners at a pet
food factory in Brcko were being killed daily. Allegedly, the corpses were being disposed of by incorporating them into the pet food made at the factory. Sources also claim that bodies were originally thrown into the Sava River. However, a realization of the contamination of drinking water caused the Serbs to dispose of the bodies not only in the factory, but also in a mass landfill outside of town. In order to deceive the International Red Cross Commission, Serbs gave each other light wounds and pretended to be prisoners. Report 0217 also stated that the murders committed by the Serbs were random, rarely on orders from "higher up".

(18) [REDACTED] IIR 2 219 0001 93, prepared by [REDACTED] provided information of MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE detailing the Serbian-controlled Luka-Broko concentration camp. This report provided a physical description of the camp which was partially located in a warehouse at the former Broko-Sava River Port Facility. The IIR also describes the segregation of prisoners according to class and wealth status. Those prisoners who were intellectuals, politically active, wealthy, or owned homes were more likely to be killed than other detainees.

(20) [REDACTED] IIR 2 231 0091 93, submitted by the [REDACTED], provided information of MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE concerning violent attacks against American interest by a former member of the Panama Defense Force and current member of the Panama National Police. This campaign against U.S. interests was to include kidnapping, attacks against the U.S. Embassy in Panama City, and grenade throwing as a diversionary tactic. Although most of the participants in the planned attacks were motivated by a deep hate of Americans resulting from Operation Just Cause, the decision makers of the group had a larger agenda. The leaders hoped they could provoke an interventionist response from the U.S., thereby swaying public sentiment in their favor and away from the Endara government.

(21) [REDACTED] IIRs 2 218 1026 93 and 2027, prepared by the [REDACTED] provided information of MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE concerning the activities of the 3rd and 7th Departments of the KGB in Tallinn, Estonia, prior to the
break-up of the Soviet Union. IIR 1026 reported on the 3rd Department, whose mission was to combat corruption within the Militsia (police force). IIR 1027 reported on the 7th Department, whose mission was to monitor foreign political figures, businessmen, scientists, and journalists in Tallinn.

IIRs 2 212 4057 92 and 4062, submitted by the provided information on neo-Nazi organizations in Germany. IIR 4057 attributes the growing membership of far-right groups to the unification of Germany. IIR 4062 equates the party platform of neo-National Socialism with the NSDAP of 1920, which called for an elitist state populated by a pure race of Germans. Skinhead groups in eastern and western Germany have been drawn to this movement.

IIRs 2 226 0555 92, 2 243 0086 92, 2 243 0088 92 and 2 774 0033 92, prepared by the

IIR 2 219 0073 93, prepared by the provided information of MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE concerning the activities of the Front Islamique de Salvation (FIS), an important Islamic fundamentalist political party operating in Algeria. Details were provided
on FIS assassinations and a death threat to the source of the information.

(24) (TFN) IIR 2 240 0501 93, produced by
 provided valuable information on
Soviet Landmine warfare equipment and techniques.

(25) (TFN) IIR 2 201 0228 93, produced by
 provided valuable information on
directed energy programs in the former Soviet Union.

(26) (TFN) IIRs 2 240 7174 92, 7175, and 7176,
submitted by
 provided input concerning the
status of Cuba's biological warfare (BW) program. Since
these IIRs were published, AFMIC has briefed the information
in the reports to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Latin America and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Latin America.

(27) (TFN) IIRs 2227 0013 and 0014, produced by
the 500th MI Bde, provided information of MAJOR
SIGNIFICANCE/HIGH VALUE concerning the construction by the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam of a pilot plant for
processing monazite into uranium with Indian assistance and
new uranium deposits discovered in Vietnam, respectively.
IIR 0014 is supplemental to 0013 and provided information on the discovery of domestic uranium deposits and other rare earth elements.

IIR 2 228 0059 93, produced by the [redacted] provided information concerning the purchase of advanced tunnel boring equipment by North Korea.

IIR 2 201 0180 93, produced by the [redacted] provided valuable information on the status of the former Soviet Union's neutral particle beam program.

IIR 2 201 0250 93, produced by the [redacted] provided information concerning the SHTOR-A-1 optical and electronic countermeasures system for the T-80U tank.

IIR 2 218 9272 93, produced by the [redacted] provided information concerning the suspension of ICBM development in the Dneprpetrovsk "South" design bureau. This IIR provided valuable information on the suspension of ICBM development in the Dneprpetrovsk "South" design bureau and Russia's inability to fund the development program.
(32) (CIA) IIRs 6 933 0040, 93, 0059, and 0060, prepared by the German Intelligence Service, provided MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE information on a geographic coordinated and network of fixed military radio relay sites in the Krajina of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Yugoslavia under the control of the Yugoslav Army.

(33) (CIA) IIRs 6 933 0012, 93, 0014, and 0023, prepared by the German Intelligence Service, provided reporting of MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE on chemical weapons production in the former Yugoslavia, about an army offensive in the pink zone near Zadar, and on Yugoslav navy mine warfare plans for the Montenegrin Coast. IIR 0012 provided information regarding chemical warfare capabilities in the former Yugoslavia.

(34) (CIA) IIR 2 240 7182 93 provided HIGH VALUE information concerning Cuban eavesdropping equipment.
(35) (SECRET) IIRs 2 241 0004 93, 0005, 0008, 0010, 0018, 0059, 0060, 0064, 0068, 0070, 0071, 0072, 0075, 0076, 0086, 0087, 0092, 0094, 0113, 0114, and 0120, produced prepared by the

(36) (SECRET) IIR 6 853 0440 93, 0442 and 0446, provided additional information of MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE concerning the illegal shipment of spare parts from Zarqa and Aqaba free trade zones has been intercepted by the Jordanian director of customs.

(37) (SECRET) IIRs 2 764 0323 93 and 0340, prepared by the

provided information of MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE concerning Somali airfields. IIR 0323 describes the condition of ten airfields in Eastern Africa. Also included was the clan or organization controlling the installation. IIR 0340 stated that control of Somali airfields is in a constant state of flux. The information also included the types of weapons and capabilities of the controlling factions at each of the airfields.

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IIR 2 764 0112 93, prepared by
provided information of MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE
concerning the secret storing of military equipment by
Somali warlord General Muhammad Farah AIDID. General
Aideed reportedly removed weapons and equipment from
southern Somali cities to sanctuary in the Somaliland
Republic.

IIRs 2 768 0320 92 and 0322,
prepared by
provided information of
HIGH VALUE concerning the role of Panamanian air cargo
companies in narco-trafficking. The reports provide the
names of companies providing air cargo service between
Colombia and Panama, as well as the owners and their
possible links to narco-trafficking.

IIRs 2 768 0202 93, 0205, 0222,
0240, 0242, 0267, prepared by
provided the
most significant reporting received to date from DOD sources
relating to Major Eastern Pacific (MEPS) maritime smuggling
entities, vessels, and operations.
(41) [S/N/NN] IIR 2 763 0043 93, produced by [redacted]. This document provided valuable information on political instability and the presence of [redacted] nuclear technicians.

(42) [S/N/NN] IIRs 2 768 0132 93, 0428, and 0446, [redacted].

(43) [S/N/NN] IIR 2 760 0443 93, [redacted].

(44) [S/N/NN] IIRs 2 764 0213 93, 0216, 0219, and 0221, prepared by [redacted]. This document provided information of MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE concerning the sanctions on Iraq. IIR 0213 provided an [redacted] document on Iraqi
(c) (S/NF) RED 451644/XMX-074-93, reported on a planned coup d'etat supported by Russia in Afghanistan.

(d) (S/NF) RED 451633/XMX-063-93, provided the first detailed information on artillery assets assigned to Croatian army units.

(e) (S/NF) RED 797033, reported on development and production of a disposable mortar system by the Serbs.

(f) (S/NF) RED 719999, (RED-750231) provided the first information from a source on the ground in Travnik since capture of the Novi Travnik weapons production facility by Serb forces. He reported that the facility was back in operation.

(g) (S/NF) (RED-750231) provided rare and valuable insight on the location, organization, personnel, equipment, and curriculum of the Penza Higher Artillery Engineering Order of the Red Star School in Penza, RSFSR.

(h) (S/NF) provided information and confirmation on the availability to a front commander and the tactics of deployment and employment.

(i) (S/NF) RED 787259, with a missile brigade in the WGF provided previously unreported information on the
2A72 30-mm automatic gun, BMD-3 airborne combat vehicle, 2S7, 2S4, and 2S23 combination gun.

d. **Conclusion (POH).** HUMINT must focus on a changing world that will continue to present new challenges, opportunities and uncertainties. Collection requirements will continue to refocus away from the priorities and subjects which guided Army HUMINT in the past. The traditional Cold War threat scenario has been replaced with
a much more diversified one in the face of fundamental changes in the former Soviet military establishment and the emergence of locally controlled armed forces in the various republics.

Low intensity conflict and special operations requirements, especially in Third World crisis areas, are expected to increase. The increasing demands on HUMINT resources for worldwide support of new and complex issues are not expected to abate. As demonstrated by its varied and intensive collection role in FY 93, HUMINT has the capabilities and flexibility to respond and contribute. There simply is no substitute for friendly eyes and ears on the ground.