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SUBJECT: INR ANALYSES

"ROME FOR CHACON AND ALSO FOR VATICAN, LONDON FOR MC
KINLEY, BRUSSELS FOR DUBROW, MADRID FOR CLARKE, PARIS
FOR PERLOW, USNATO FOR FOX, BONN FOR KLEMP, USCINCEUR

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

REVIEW
AUTHORITY: ROBERT R. STRAND

UNCLASSIFIED
1. SECTIONS ON ANGOLA AND NIGERIA ARE SECRET, ALL OTHER SECTIONS ARE CONFIDENTIAL.

2. THIS CABLE TRANSMITS THE FOLLOWING RECENT INR ANALYSES FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND COMMENTS, AS APPROPRIATE.

INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS
A. ANGOLA/NATIONAL UNITY TALKS: A WAY OUT OF THE IMPASSE?; 3/19
B. SOUTH AFRICA: THE HOMELANDS CONUNDRUM; 3/21

INTELLIGENCE VIEWPOINTS
C. RWANDA/BURUNDI: REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF UPEHVAAL; 3/9
D. NIGERIA/CAMEROON: SABRE-RATTLING IN THE SWAMPS; 3/18

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BEGIN TEXT

A. ANGOLA/NATIONAL UNITY TALKS: A WAY OUT OF THE IMPASSE?

3. THE GOVERNMENT DECLARED YESTERDAY THAT ITS MARCH 10 OFFER OF HIGH-LEVEL POSITIONS FOR UNITA WAS NON-NEGOTIABLE, EVEN THOUGH UNITA'S MARCH 17 COUNTERPROPOSAL HAD REVEALED A SHIFT IN EMPHASIS FROM A REQUEST FOR MORE MINISTERIAL POSITIONS TO GREATER REPRESENTATION IN PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.

4. PROPOSALS AND COUNTER-PROPOSALS. THE GOVERNMENT'S OFFER ALLOCATED FOUR INSIGNIFICANT MINISTRIES (HEALTH, TOURISM, COMMERCE, AND CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS), SIX VICE-MINISTRIES (INCLUDING DEFENSE), THREE GOVERNORSHIPS, AND FIVE VICE-GOVERNORS AS WELL AS SEVERAL AMBASSADORSHIPS AND LOCAL-LEVEL POLITICAL ADMINISTRATIVE POSITIONS TO UNITA. THE OFFER DID NOT INCLUDE MINISTRIES UNITA CONSIDERS KEY--FOREIGN AFFAIRS, INTERIOR, INFORMATION, TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION, OR GEOLOGY AND MINERALS.
5. Among the offered governorships—in Uige, Luanda Sul, and Cuando Cubango provinces—the first are areas where UNITA has little political following, and the last is in remotest southeastern Angola. The government did not offer Huambo or Bie, the UNITA heartland, and UNITA probably regarded the proposed posts as an attempt to scatter its forces and exile it into hinterlands with scant resources—most likely the government's intent.

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6. UNITA's new proposal plays down earlier demands for ministerial portfolios but seeks to strengthen its presence in provincial and local governments. UNITA accepted the offer of four cabinet ministries but asked for public works in place of construction materials; it requested vice-ministerial positions in Interior, Finance, and Territorial Administration. UNITA requested the governorship in Huambo and three other vice-governorships as well as more local administrative posts. The government flatly rejected this proposal and any further discussion of its earlier offer.

7. Government wrapped in legitimacy. The government believes that as the legally constituted and internationally recognized authority it has the right to define the number and significance of the positions to be allocated to UNITA. Luanda holds its legitimacy was further confirmed by the July 15 UNSC resolution asserting the government's right to protect itself and blaming UNITA as the sole cause of the civil war.

8. UNITA's electoral power and bullets. UNITA bases its demands for significant positions on its winning 34 percent of the total vote in the legislative elections, including an outright majority in four provinces, and its military control, however loose, over 75 percent of the country. UNITA also believes that if the government is allowed to dominate the administrative and security forces, it will attempt to destroy UNITA as a political organization.
9. UNITA'S NEW PROPOSALS, EMPHASIZING A GREATER AND
MORE CONSOLIDATED PRESENCE IN THE PROVINCES AND IN LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS, AIM AT STRENGTHENING ITS POLITICAL BASE FOR
FUTURE NATIONAL COMPETITIONS. UNITA'S CHANGE IN TACTICS
CHALLENGES LUANDA TO COME UP WITH A COMPROMISE THAT WILL
BE ACCEPTABLE TO UNITA BUT MAINTAIN GOVERNMENT
SOVEREIGNTY. THE SHIFT IN FOCUS OF THE TALKS FROM
SCARCE CABINET SEATS TO MORE PLENTIFUL PROVINCIAL AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT POSITIONS COULD PROVIDE SUFFICIENT
SLACK FOR THE TWO SIDES TO COME TO AN ACCEPTABLE
AGREEMENT. (BERNNTSEN)

B. SOUTH AFRICA: THE HOMELANDS CONUNDRUM

10. THE VIOLENCE THAT ROCKED BOPHUTHATSWANA THE WEEKEND
OF MARCH 11-13 IS NOT LIKELY TO BE REPEATED IN SOUTH
AFRICA'S OTHER HOMELANDS. BUT A NUMBER OF THEM SUFFER
THE TENSIONS THAT OPENED THE WAY FOR THE BOPHUTHATSWANA
VIOLENCE AND THUS WILL PRESENT THEIR OWN PROBLEMS IN THE
RUN-UP TO THE APRIL 26-28 ELECTIONS - AND LATER.

11. BECAUSE SOUTH AFRICA'S 10 HOMELANDS WILL CEASE TO
EXIST AFTER THE ELECTIONS, REINTEGRATION INTO THE NEW
SOUTH AFRICA IS A POLITICALLY AND EMOTIONALLY CHARGED
ISSUE. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF KWAZULU, ONLY THE FOUR
"INDEPENDENT" HOMELANDS--TRANSKEI, BOPHUTHATSWANA
VENDA, AND CISKEI--WEIGH HEAVILY IN SOUTH AFRICA'S
PRE-ELECTION CALCULUS. THEY WILL ADD SOME 1.5 MILLION
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VOTERS TO THE ESTIMATED 18 MILLION BLACK VOTERS IN SOUTH
AFRICA PROPER, OVERWHELMINGLY FOR THE ANC.

12. THE REMAINING HOMELANDS, THOUGH DESIGNATED AS
"SELF-GOVERNING," HAVE ALWAYS BEEN LEGALLY PART OF SOUTH
AFRICA, AND THEIR POPULATIONS, WITH AN ADDITIONAL 1.6
MILLION ELIGIBLE VOTERS, HAVE RETAINED THEIR SOUTH
AFRICAN CITIZENSHIP. THE ANC VOTE IN THE
"SELF-GOVERNING" HOMELANDS IS LESS EASY TO PREDICT.
15. SHARED PROBLEMS. WHETHER INDEPENDENT OR SELF-GOVERNING, THE HOMELANDS ALL SUFFER FROM A CONGREGIES OF WOES: HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT, POOR EDUCATION, WEAK ECONOMIES, GROSS MISMANAGEMENT AND CORRUPTION, MANIPULATION BY PRETORIA, AND BLOATED BUREAUCRACIES MORE CONCERNED WITH SELF-PRESERVATION THAN PUBLIC SERVICE. GQOZO, RECENTLY AVERTED A PROCLAIMED "BOPHUTHATSWANA-STYLE ACTION" BY CIVIL SERVANTS DEMANDING PENSION PROTECTION BY AGREEING TO PAY PARTIAL BENEFITS INTO THEIR PENSION FUND.

16. PRESIDENT DE KLERK AND MANDELA RESTATE THAT
HOMELAND BUREAUCRATS WOULD BE REINCORPORATED INTO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. IT WILL PROVE MORE DIFFICULT TO REINTEGRATE THE HOMELANDS ECONOMICALLY AND SOCIA LLY, HOWEVER, FOR THEIR MAIN CONTRIBUTION TO THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA WILL BE TO ADD TO THE ECONOMIC BURDENS ON THE NEW GOVERNMENT, WHICH NO LONGER WILL BE ABLE TO AVOID IMPROVING LIVING STANDARDS FOR BLACKS IN SOUTH AFRICA PROPER IN FAVOR OF SUBSIDIZING AN INHERITED HOLDOVER OF APARTHEID. (RISTAINO)

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C. RWANDA/BURUNDI: REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF UPHEAVAL

17. THE ONGOING TURMOIL IN RWANDA AND BURUNDI--ROOTED IN THE CENTURIES-OLD FRICTION BETWEEN THE MAJORITY HUTU AND HISTORICALLY DOMINANT TUTSI ETHNIC GROUPS, IS UNLIKELY TO FAN VIOLENCE BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE REGION, BUT THE BURDEN OF THE REFUGEE POPULATIONS CREATED BY THE UPHEAVAL WILL CONTINUE TO BE FELT THROUGHOUT A WIDER AREA. ETHNIC VIOLENCE, WHICH HAS ALREADY DISPLACED ROUGHLY ONE-SIXTH OF THE RWANDA/BURUNDI POPULATION, WILL IMPED DEVELOPMENT AND FUEL DEMANDS FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.

18. REGIONAL LIMITS. THE CONFLICTS IN RWANDA AND BURUNDI ARE LARGELY CONFINED TO THOSE TWO COUNTRIES AND ADJACENT AREAS OF NEIGHBORING STATES. DESTABILIZATION MAY WELL INTENSIFY IN CURRENTLY AFFECTED AREAS, BUT PROBABLY WILL NOT SPREAD FAR BEYOND. RWANDANS AND BURUNDIANS--UNLIKE, FOR EXAMPLE, THE FULANI OF WEST AFRICA AND THE SAHEL--ARE NOT TRADITIONALLY MIGRATORY SOCIETIES, AND THEIR RELATIVE CULTURAL ISOLATION IS REINFORCED BY EXISTING NATIONAL BOUNDARIES. THE UNIQUENESS OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI WAS RECOGNIZED BY 19TH CENTURY GERMAN COLONIAL RULERS, WHO ADMINISTERED THESE TERRITORIES SEPARATELY FROM TANGANYIKA, THEIR OTHER EAST AFRICAN POSSESSION. THE UNIQUE SYSTEM OF STRATIFICATION THAT PROVIDED THE BASIS FOR THESE TWO KINGDOMS ENABLED THE TUTSI MINORITY--ROUGHLY 14 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION--TO DOMINATE THE HUTU MAJORITY FOR AT LEAST FOUR CENTURIES IN A FEUDAL SOCIETY, FUELING THE SECRET
JEALOUSIES THAT PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR THE CURRENT CONFLICTS.

19. REFUGEE FLOWS. OUT OF A COMBINED POPULATION OF ROUGHLY 14 MILLION IN RWANDA AND BURUNDI, NEARLY THREE MILLION HAVE BEEN INTERNALLY DISPLACED OR FORCED TO FLEE TO NEIGHBORING STATES SINCE 1990. IN BURUNDI, WITH A POPULATION OF ROUGHLY SIX MILLION PEOPLE, ABOUT ONE MILLION WERE INTERNALLY DISPLACED BY THE VIOLENCE THAT FOLLOWED PRESIDENT NDADAYE’S OCTOBER 1993 ASSASSINATION, WHILE 750,000 OTHERS FLED TO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES; NEARLY HALF HAVE SINCE RETURNED. IN RWANDA, THE 1990-93 CIVIL WAR DISPLACED UP TO ONE MILLION PERSONS, OUT OF A TOTAL POPULATION OF ABOUT EIGHT MILLION, BUT RELATIVELY FEW FLED THE COUNTRY.

20. THE RECENT POPULATION FLOWS COMBINE WITH EARLIER GENERATIONS OF REFUGEES. IN 1959-62 ALONE, BETWEEN 150,000 AND 250,000 MAINLY TUTSI REFUGEES FLED RWANDA, WHILE IN BURUNDI, ETHNIC CONFLICT BETWEEN 1972 AND 1992 FORCED NEARLY 200,000 PEOPLE--MAINLY HUTUS--TO FLEE. OVER A MILLION BURUNDIAN AND RWANDAN REFUGEES AND THEIR DESCENDANTS NOW INHABIT RWANDA, BURUNDI, TANZANIA, UGANDA AND EASTERN ZAIRE.

21. REFUGEE EFFECTS--NATIONAL POLITICS. DESPITE THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACT OF THE REFUGEES IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES, THESE POPULATION MOVEMENTS HAVE NOT SERIOUSLY AFFECTED THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS IN ZAIRE OR TANZANIA--WHOSE CAPITALS ARE LOCATED SEVERAL HUNDRED MILES AWAY--AND ARE UNLIKELY TO DO SO. IN EASTERN SECRET

ZAIRE, THE REGIONAL ECONOMY HAS OPERATED WITH VIRTUAL AUTONOMY FROM KINSHASA FOR MORE THAN A DECADE. IN 1993, SERIOUS OUTBREAKS OF ETHNIC VIOLENCE DIRECTED AT RWANDAN INHABITANTS OF EASTERN ZAIRE WERE LARGELY IGNORED IN KINSHASA.
22. IN CONTRAST, RWANDAN REFUGEES IN UGANDA HAVE HAD A
SUBSTANTIAL IMPACT ON NATIONAL POLITICS OVER THE PAST 15
YEARS. TUTSI RESIDENTS OF SOUTHERN UGANDA HELPED OUST
FORMER PRESIDENT IDI AMIN IN 1979 AND SUPPORTED
PRESIDENT MUSEVENI--WHO TRACES HIS OWN ETHNIC ROOTS TO
THE TUTSI POPULATION OF RWANDA/BURUNDI--IN THE 1980-86
CIVIL WAR AS MEMBERS OF HIS NATIONAL RESISTANCE ARMY
(NRA). AFTER MUSEVENI TOOK POWER, HE APPOINTED TWO
RWANDAN-BORN TUTSI NRA VETERANS, FRED RWIGYEMA AND PAUL
KAGAME, AS UGANDA'S DEFENSE MINISTER AND ARMY CHIEF OF
INTELLIGENCE, RESPECTIVELY. THEY SUBSEQUENTLY LEFT TO
LEAD THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) REBEL ARMY IN ITS
1990-93 WAR AGAINST PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA'S MAINLY HUTU
GOVERNMENT.

23. REFUGEE EFFECTS--LOCAL POLITICS. REFUGEE INFLOWS
HAVE UPSET LAND OWNERSHIP AND PRODUCTION PATTERNS IN THE
DENSELY-POPULATED EAST/CENTRAL AFRICA HIGHLANDS, WHICH
INCLUDE BURUNDI, RWANDA, AND THE ADJOINING KIVU
PROVINCES OF EASTERN ZAIRE. THEY ALSO DRAIN DWINDLING
RESOURCES FOR HEALTH, EDUCATION AND OTHER SOCIAL
SERVICES. LONG-TERM RWANDAN REFUGEES IN UGANDA AND
ZAIRE--MOSTLY TUTSIS--HAVE FOR DECADES SUFFERED
DISCRIMINATION AT THE HANDS OF INDIGENOUS RESIDENTS.
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DISCRIMINATION IN SPARSELY POPULATION AREAS OF TANZANIA
NEAR THE RWANDA/BURUNDI BORDER HAS, HOWEVER, BEEN LESS
PRONOUNCED. DESPITE ADVERSITY, SOME REFUGEES HAVE
FLOURISHED--NOTABLY A SMALL, RELATIVELY WEALTHY
POPULATION OF RWANDAN TUTSIS WHO NOW FORM THE CORE OF A
SUCCESSFUL BUSINESS COMMUNITY IN NAIROBI AND OTHER URBAN
CENTERS IN EAST AFRICA.

24. DIRECT ECONOMIC EFFECTS. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF
THE CONFLICTS IN RWANDA AND BURUNDI HAS BEEN ENORMOUS.
RWANDA BEFORE 1990 WAS RELATIVELY STABLE AND
PROSPEROUS--A WORLD BANK "SUCCESS STORY." THE RPF
INVASION IN 1990 SEVERED IMPORTANT TRANSPORTATION ROUTES
THROUGH UGANDA, IMPERIOUS TRADE, EMPTIED THE TREASURY AS
THE GOVERNMENT IN KIGALI SOUGHT TO PAY FOR THE WAR, AND
DISRUPTED AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AS PEOPLE FLED THE
CONFLICT. THE 1993 UPHEAVAL IN BURUNDI CAUSED CASH-CROP
CULTIVATION TO PRACTICALLY CEASE FOR THREE MONTHS. THE
DISRUPTION, HOWEVER, APPARENTLY DID NOT HURT COFFEE
PRODUCTION, WHICH IS EXPECTED TO BE HIGHER THAN LAST YEAR.

25. ALTHOUGH BURUNDI AND RWANDA ARE NOT IMPORTANT REGIONAL "ENGINES OF GROWTH," BOTH COUNTRIES EXPERIENCED POSITIVE GROWTH DURING THE 1970S AND 1980S, EVEN WHILE THE ECONOMIES IN NEIGHBORING UGANDA, ZAIRE AND TANZANIA WERE DEGENERATING. A FAIRLY GOOD NETWORK OF ROADS HELPED INTEGRATE RWANDAN AND BURUNDIAN COMMERCE INTO THE EAST AFRICAN ECONOMY ANCHORED BY NAIROBI AND MOMBASA TO THE WORLD MARKET. THE TRANSTATIONAL EFFECTS OF INSTABILITY IN RWANDA AND BURUNDI WILL PROBABLY BE MOST SECRET.

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SIGNIFICANT IN EASTERN ZAIRE. ZAIRE’S EASTERN HIGHLANDS AND KIVU PROVINCES--WITH A POPULATION OF AT LEAST 1 MILLION--HAVE BEEN INCREASINGLY DEPENDENT ON TRADE THROUGH RWANDA AND BURUNDI SINCE 1980 AS ZAIRE’S ROAD AND TRANSPORT SYSTEM DETERIORATED.

26. EFFECTS ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE. EFFORTS TO PROMOTE REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND USE DEVELOPMENT AID EFFICIENTLY WILL DEPEND ON THE AMELIORATION OF ETHNIC VIOLENCE. WORLD BANK AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF) PROGRAMS IN RWANDA HAVE BEEN SUSPENDED UNTIL A TRANSITION GOVERNMENT IS IN PLACE. IN BURUNDI, THE IMF AND WORLD BANK HAVE EFFECTIVELY ENDED THEIR DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE UNTIL THE POLITICAL/SECURITY SITUATION IS SETTLED. INCREASED LEVELS OF HUMANITARIAN AID, THOUGH ESSENTIAL FOR FEEDING AND HOUSING REFUGEES, CANNOT TAKE THE PLACE OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN PROMOTING SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC GROWTH. (BYRNES/EHRENREICH)

C. NIGERIA/CAMEROON: SABRE-RATTLING IN THE SWAMPS

27. WHILE NEITHER NIGERIA NOR CAMEROON WANTS THE BAKASSI PENINSULA BORDER DISPUTE TO Erupt INTO A SERIOUS CONFLICT, THE CURRENT CRISIS WITH NUMEROUS AFRICAN LEADERS OFFERING MEDIATION, A RESOLUTION OF THE IMMEDIATE CRISIS, IF NOT THE LONG-STANDING BORDER DISPUTE, IS LIKELY.
28. Public outrage over Cameroonian harassment of Nigerian nationals in the disputed area has momentarily diverted Nigerian attention from the collapse of democratization and the worsening economy. Foreign minister Kingibe has stoutly asserted that Nigeria will not cede any of its territory, and has refused to withdraw troops from the disputed area.

29. Cameroon is enjoying a rare anglophone-francophone harmony in the face of the common threat, and the painful effects of the CFA devaluation may be less noticed during the Bakassi crisis. At the same time, some blame the Biya regime for provoking the Nigerians, saying gendarmes have engaged in the same kinds of harassment of them.

30. Competing claims. Germany and Great Britain in 1895 agreed that the Rio del Rey River would be the boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon, thus placing the Bakassi Peninsula entirely on the Nigerian side. Later it was discovered the Rio del Rey was not an 80-mile long river, but merely an estuary that joined the Akpa Yafe River a short distance inland and did not extend out to the ocean. An imaginary line extended seaward through the estuary would have placed the peninsula on the Nigerian side, but this was a hypothetical, not an actual, boundary.

31. The 1913 treaty between Germany and Great Britain set the boundary as the Akpa Yafe River, extending three nautical miles seaward in the thalweg (deepest navigable channel), thus placing all of the Bakassi Peninsula in Cameroon. Provisions were made in the treaty for an exact demarcation of the nautical boundary but this was not done. The treaty was never ratified by either country's parliament because of the outbreak of World War I.
After the war, France and Great Britain administered Cameroon in a trusteeship.

32. With the discovery of offshore oil by both countries in the 1960s, the nautical boundary became critically important. Presidents Gowon of Nigeria and Ahidjo of Cameroon in 1975 delineated and agreed upon this boundary extending out from the Akpa Yafe River. Gowon was overthrown a month later and the treaty was never ratified by the Nigerian government. According to the British government, the agreement was registered with the UN and there was no Nigerian protest lodged within the prescribed six months' waiting period. Subsequent Nigerian governments have rejected the agreement, while Cameroon has steadfastly adhered to it. Other than the 1895 British/German agreement, Lagos bases its claim to the peninsula on the fact that most Bakassi inhabitants are ethnic Nigerians.

33. The inhabitants, mostly fishermen who even Cameroon acknowledges are overwhelmingly Nigerian, are tired of being harassed by Cameroonian gendarmes. At the last border commission hearing on the subject in August 1993, the Nigerians thought Cameroon had agreed to stop the harassment while negotiations continued at a higher level on the final status of the area. Fishing, as well as oil; rights are an issue for both countries.

34. Tensions erupt. The most recent eruption of the long-standing dispute occurred in the latter part of 1993 when [ ] Cameroonian gendarmes launched a punitive anti-smuggling campaign which upset both the Cameroonian and Nigerian inhabitants. This is the third such border crisis in the past 15 years. Smuggling of less expensive Nigerian oil into Cameroon has been going on for years and has caused concern in both countries, but especially in Cameroon. The Nigerians complained of this latest crackdown, in which several people were reportedly killed, to their authorities in Calabar. Nigerian troops in retaliation on January 4 took over Atabong in Southwest Cameroon, just north of the Bakassi Peninsula.

37. NIGERIA NERVOUS. NIGERIA IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE FATE OF ITS 1-2 MILLION CITIZENS IN CAMEROON;
UNCONFIRMED RUMORS HAVE BEEN FLYING IN NIGERIA ABOUT PLOTS TO ARREST NIGERIAN BUSINESSMEN AND FREEZE THEIR ASSETS. LAGOS, IN APPARENT RETALIATION, HAS BEEN GATHERING INFORMATION ABOUT THE WHEREABOUTS AND ASSETS OF CAMEROonian BUSINESSMEN IN NIGERIA.

ANNOUNCED ON MARCH 15 THAT HE WOULD TRAVEL TO NIGERIA TO HELP RESOLVE THE BORDER DISPUTE.

38. THE FEBRUARY 27 ARRIVAL OF 15-30 REGULAR FRENCH TROOPS IN YAOUNDE, ADDING TO THE NORMAL COMPLEMENT OF FRENCH MILITARY ADVISORS. LAGOS ACCUSED FRANCE OF LEADING THE DEPLOYMENT OF CAMEROonian TROOPS IN THE PENINSULA, WHICH BOTH PARTS AND YAOUNDE HAVE DENIED. CITING "SELF-DEFENSE," LAGOS IS NOW BUILDING A PERMANENT MILITARY INSTALLATION ON THE PENINSULA. NIGERIAN BRAVADO NOTWITHSTANDING, ABACHA WILL, HOWEVER, GO TO GREAT LENGTHS TO AVOID A MILITARY ENCOUNTER.

39. FRENCH AND U.S. INTERESTS. WHILE FRANCE HAS SIGNIFICANT INVESTMENTS IN BOTH COUNTRIES, IT HAS STRONGER LINGUISTIC AND CULTURAL TIES, AS WELL AS A DEFENSE PACT, WITH CAMEROON. FRANCE HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY CONCERNED BY THE LACK OF PROGRESS IN RESOLVING THE DISPUTE AND THE BUILD-UP OF TROOPS ON BOTH
SIDES. THE STATE-OWNED OIL FIRM ELF, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE US FIRM PECTEN, OPERATES MOST OF CAMEROON'S OIL RIGS, NEARLY ALL OF WHICH LIE IN THE DISPUTED AREA.

40. AFRICAN MEDIATION EFFORTS. FRENCH, INTERNATIONAL AND BILATERAL MEDIATION EFFORTS HAVE SO FAR PROVED UNSUCCESSFUL, BUT THERE IS A GLIMMER OF HOPE ON THE AFRICAN FRONT. PRESIDENT EYADEMA OF TOGO AND PRESIDENT SOGLO OF BENIN, THE PRESENT ECOWAS CHAIRMAN, MAY SERVE AS POSSIBLE MEDIATORS. BIYA SAID HE WOULD NOT MEET WITH ABACHA UNTIL NIGERIAN TROOPS WERE WITHDRAWN FROM THE PENINSULA, AND ABACHA WAS JUST AS INSISTENT THAT THEY REMAIN.

Lagos has just agreed to Biya's suggestion of meeting with Abacha in Cairo with OAU President Mubarak as intermediary. Foreign Minister Kingibe went to Egypt on March 16 to arrange the meeting.

41. HOPE FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. WHILE NEITHER SIDE WANTS WAR, WITH SUBSTANTIAL RECIPROCAL TROOP BUILD-UPS IN CLOSE PROXIMITY THERE IS A CHANCE THAT NEW FIGHTING COULD, PERHAPS INADVERTENTLY, BREAK OUT AND ESCALATE. THE STEPPED-UP PACE OF BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS INDICATES THAT BOTH SIDES WANT TO AVOID AN ESCALATION OF THE CONFLICT AND RECOGNIZE THE URGENT NEED FOR A MUTUALLY FACE-SAVING SOLUTION. THE MEDIATORY EFFORTS OF OTHER
AFRICAN LEADERS MAY WELL BRING A REDUCTION IN TENSIONS AND A WITHDRAWAL OF SOME OF THE TROOPS IN BAKASSI REGION. UNLESS THE BORDER ISSUE IS DEFINITIVELY RESOLVED, SIMILAR CRISES ARE LIKELY IN THE FUTURE. (WAGONER) CHRISTOPHER