OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN UNATIONS NEW YORK
FROM: DALLAIRE UNAMIR KIGALI RWANDA
DATE: 16 NOVEMBER 1993
NUMBER: CRN-04
SUBJECT: WEEKLY SITREP NO. 5

NEW YORK COMM CENTRE: PLEASE ON FAX TO
MATTWAZA UNOMUR KABALE UGANDA
I. GENERAL

THE OVERALL SITUATION IS STILL RELATIVELY CALM EVEN THOUGH THERE ARE LOTS OF RUMOURS ABOUNDING OF RPF INCURSIONS IN THE DMZ AND OF POSSIBLE RPF REINFORCEMENTS. RIGHT WING HUTU ORGANISATIONS ARE EXPRESSING CONCERNS OVER THE BELGIUM PARTICIPATION IN THE KIGALI BATTALION. WE HAVE INVESTIGATED ALL OF THE ALLEGATIONS AND CONTINUED OUR LIMITED AT BEST MONITORING OF THE UGANDAN/RWANDAN BORDER WHICH HAS PRODUCED NO SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION, EXCEPT FOR A POINT ON NGARAMA LISTED BELOW. THE ABSENCE OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES IN BOTH MISSIONS AND THE ACUTE LACK OF VEHICLES AND RADIOS FOR THE DMZ SECTOR ARE REDUCING OUR OPERATIONS TO NEXT TO NIL AT A TIME WHEN MORE AND MORE PRESSURE IS BEING EXERCISED BY ALL CONCERNED TO GET THE PARTIES TOGETHER AND IMPLEMENT THE PEACE AGREEMENT BEFORE THE EXTREME Factions GAIN THE UPPER HAND IN SPREADING DISCONTENT THROUGH MISINFORMATION.

II. POLITICAL

A. OVERTLY THE SITUATION SEEMS RELATIVELY CALM, BUT THERE IS A LATENT TENSION WITHIN ALL THE OPPOSITION PARTIES AS ETHNIC POINTS ARE COMING TO THE FORE AS WE APPROACH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BBTG. ON 11 NOV. 93, FOUR POLITICAL PARTIES (MDR, PSD, PDC, PL) PUBLISHED A SEVEN-POINT DECLARATION TO WHICH THE MRND DID NOT ADHERE. IN THE AFTERNOON OF 12 NOV 93, THE MRND HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE HERIDIEN HOTEL TO EXPLAIN ITS POSITION, AS FOLLOWS: CONSIDERS INAPPROPRIATE THE PROCEDURE ADOPTED BY THE OTHER PARTIES; DEEMS UNTIMELY THE APPEAL ADDRESSED TO THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT BY THE FOUR POLITICAL PARTIES (PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE DECLARATION); CONSIDERS THAT ONLY THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT IS ACCREDITED TO APPEAL TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND NOT THE POLITICAL PARTIES; RECALLS THAT THE MRND IS NOT AGAINST BELGIUM NOR THE BELGIAN PEOPLE.

B. ON THE EVENING OF 13 NOV 93, THE NATIONAL RADIO, IN RESPONSE TO REACTIONS FROM THE POLITICAL MILIEU CONCERNING BELGIUM'S PARTICIPATION, COMMENTED THE PRESS CONFERENCE OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF RWANDA, MR ANASTASE GASANA, STRESSING THAT THE VARIOUS CONTINGENTS ASSIGNED TO UNAMIR FORCE HQ ARE UNDER THE SOLE COMMANDMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND NOT UNDER THE COMMANDMENT OF THEIR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS.

PERSONAL STAFF WHO ATTENDED THIS UNUSUAL PARTY MEETING. THIS IS THE SECOND PARTY TO DO THIS (MDR PREVIOUSLY OVER PRIME MINISTER DESIGNATE APPOINTMENT).

D. THERE IS OVERREACTION ON THE PART OF THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE, AS YOU WILL SEE BELOW. HE IS CONTINUOUSLY FEEDING US WITH INFO ON RPF INCURSIONS IN THE DMZ AND HE IS ALWAYS LOOKING FOR WAYS TO GO THERE (HE IS FROM THAT AREA).

III. MILITARY

A. UNOMUR. THE OFFICIAL FLAG RAISING AT CHECK POINT 3 (KATUNA) WAS HELD ON 13 NOV 93 WITH A LARGE DELEGATION OF OFFICIALS AND LOCAL POPULATION. FC DID NOT ATTEND FOR PREVIOUSLY DESCRIBED REASONS. WE ARE FORMALISING PROCEDURES WITH UGANDAN OFFICIALS FOR THE PASSAGE OF CIVILIANS, UN PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT FROM RWANDA INTO UGANDA. WE HAVE UNCONFIRMED INFO THAT POSSIBLE RPF WEAPON CASHERS EXIST IN THE AREA OF NGARAMA. WAITING FOR YOUR CONSENT FOR US TO INITIATE A COORDINATED EFFORT WITH NRA AUTHORITIES IN THAT AREA. THE VEHICLE MAINTENANCE, COMMUNICATIONS AND MEDICAL SUPPORT SITUATIONS ARE INEFFECTIVE AT BEST, IT IS AFFECTING OUR CREDIBILITY IN A SERIOUS WAY.

B. DMZ SECTOR. INFORMATION ON MOVEMENT OF POPULATION IN BWISIGE AREA (EAST OF BYUMBA) DUE TO PRESENCE OF RPF WAS GIVEN OVER THE RADIO. WE ARE INVESTIGATING THIS ALLEGATION. WE ARE INCREASING THE NUMBER OF UNMO TEAMS BY REDISTRIBUTING PERSONNEL IN ORDER TO ENSURE MORE PATROLS AND ESCORT CAPABILITIES. THE RHYTHM OF ACTIVITY INSIDE THE DMZ DUE TO THE RUHENGERI COMMUNAL ELECTIONS AND THE JOINT DISCUSSIONS IN KINIHIRA BY BOTH Factions WITH NGOS AND UN AGENCIES ON THE RECONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION IN THE POST DEMOBILIZATION PERIOD HAS PUT SEVERE AND UNMANAGEABLE A STRAIN ON OUR VERY LIMITED PERSONNEL AND VEHICLE RESOURCES. FC HAS MAINTAINED THE LIMITATIONS ON VEHICLE MOVEMENT TO TRAILS IN DAYLIGHT AS INDICATED IN PREVIOUS SITREP. WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO MOVE DMZ HQ INTO BYUMBA NEXT WEEK AS HQ BUILDING IS CONFIRMED BUT ONLY IF WE GET A FAVOURABLE RESPONSE TO OUR QUERY ON DMZ CMD AND HIS STAFF SUBSISTENCE STATUS AS WE CAN MEET THEIR NEEDS IN THAT DESTROYED AREA. WE CAN SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE OUR EFFECTIVENESS IN THAT TROUBLED AREA IF WE GET MORE BLUE BERETS PERMANENTLY IN THE DMZ.

C. MILOR GROUP. TASKING HAS BEEN GIVEN TO THAT HQ TO CONDUCT FORMAL 3 DAY TRAINING PROGRAM FOR EX-NMCS PERSONNEL ON THE INTRICACIES OF UNMO DUTIES (NEXT WEEK). FURTHERMORE, THE GROUP IS CONDUCTING THE DETAILED SOP WORK FOR THE KIGALI SECTOR UNMO RESPONSIBILITIES. ONCE REASONABLE COMMUNICATIONS HAVE
been acquired, UNOMUR will revert to under command to MILOB GP HQ as per phase 1 concept of operations.

D. Belgium rear party. They are still conducting reconnaissance of the Kigali weapons secure area for operational information and for bivouac/infrastructure sites. Have been informed that the first C-130 chalk will arrive on Thursday 18 Nov and the first coy of only two (2) platoons will arrive on 19 Nov. Reception plan is being finalized with staff. Recce plan for the Bangladesh recce group is being prepared. Still no word on this recce party. Proposed arrival of the rest of the Kigali BN from Bangladesh by late Dec is much too late. That date must be advanced by at least two weeks. Details of the Belgium contingent for Kigali BN are two coy of two platoons each for 90 personnel per coy, HQ of 30 pers, recce platoon of 8 jeeps and 24 pers, helo platoon of 2 aircraft, CSS coy of 125 pers. A total of 20 staff officers are also supposed to arrive with the contingent before the end of Nov 93.

E. Force HQ. FC received a call from Rwandan minister of defence in evening of 14 Nov indicating that the RPF were reinforcing their troops from Kabadde for an eminent attack. He indicated info was received from their staff in Washington. FC put UNOMUR on increased vigil. FC found out from separate source that info provided to minister of defence was given to him from Head of State entourage. We have put a deadline of Friday 19 Nov for the government to provide us the compounds in which they recommend to put the RPF security battalion and VIPs in Kigali. FC has published operations directive no 1 which gives all subordinate sectors and staffs their marching orders during phase 1. Operations order for Kigali sector and DMZ sectors are being finalized. Official opening of the force HQ is planned for Wednesday 17 Nov. The president (Head of State) with all the diplomatic corps and NGOs and ministers are invited.

F. Logistics. The vehicles that we acquired from the NMOG have been inspected and all but 10 have been condemned for disposal. No maintenance and excessive mileage (200,000 kms per veh) have rendered them beyond repair. Local purchase is urgently required as we cannot meet our DMZ escort and patrol commitments with less than 30 vehicles. We are barely able to react to emergency requests for escort, let alone respond to the increasing number of reported/alleged violations.

G. It goes without saying that we also have a desperate need for radios. Only three vehicle radios and three base stations are operational. The rest have been deemed ineffective (especially the VHF radios) or inoperable. This is a major restriction in our ability
TO SEND OUT PATROLS EVEN IF WE HAD THE VEHICLES. FURTHERMORE, WE HAVE ABSOLUTELY NO IDEA OF THE COMMUNICATIONS CONCEPT OF THE MISSION ABOVE THE FORMED UNITS. THIS IS A VERY HIGH RISK SITUATION AS WE ARE CONDUCTING OPERATIONS ON NON-SECURE, NON-RELIABLE PHONES. WE CANNOT RESPOND TO ANY EMERGENCY AT THIS TIME AT ALL.

H. THE PROCESS OF INSTALLING THE MISSION IS ON-GOING WITH DEFICIENCIES IN ALL TYPES OF ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS TO OPERATE THE VARIOUS HQS. APART FROM THE PHONE AND INCONSISTENT FAX CAPABILITIES, WE HAVE NO COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN MY SUBORDINATE HQS. THE KIGALI SECTOR IS ABOUT TO START UP FROM SCRATCH. ADP ASSETS HAVE BEEN LOANED TO THE FORCE HQ FROM STOCKS SENT TO THE ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT DIVISION BUT WE HAVE NO PAPER NOR OTHER ESSENTIAL OPS RELATED STATIONERY.

I. THE USEFULNESS OF THE TUNISIAN COY(-) IS STILL VERY LIMITED AS THEY HAVE ABSOLUTELY NO OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES EXCEPT THE CLOTHES ON THEIR BACK AND A PISTOL EACH. THAT SUB-UNIT HAS NO RESOURCES TO SURVIVE ON ITS OWN AND HAS NO MOBILITY. WE ARE FEEDING THEM UNDER CONTRACT FROM APAR WITH LIMITED SUCCESS AND ARE DESPERATELY AWAITING FOR EQUIPMENT FROM THEIR COUNTRY.

J. THE MEDICAL SITUATION IS SUCH THAT WE HAVE A CONTINUATION OF MALARIA AND RELATED PROBLEMS. A LARGE PROPORTION OF THE MILITARY PERSONNEL ARE NOT IMMUNISED FOR THIS COUNTRY. WE HAVE NO MEDICAL STOCKS AT ALL AND WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO WORK OUT SOME ARRANGEMENT WITH THE UNDP CLINIC AND THE LOCAL HOSPITAL UNTIL THE BELGUE MEDICAL TEAM WITH THE SMALL BN WILL ARRIVE. THE MEDICAL OFFICER IS LOOKING AT THE OPTION OF WHAT CIVILIAN SPECIALISTS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO USE THE FAYSAL HOSPITAL IF WE HAD IT BY CIVILIANS ONLY IN CASE THE RUSSIAN PLATOON DOES NOT APPEAR. THIS LIST WILL ALSO BE HELPFUL FOR THE RUSSIANS SHOULD THEY STILL BE COMING. WE HAVE NO MEDICAL EVACUATION CAPABILITY AT THIS TIME WITHIN THE COUNTRY AND TO OUTSIDE.

K. PERSONNEL. WE ARE ANXIOUSLY AWAITING THE PERSONNEL ESSENTIAL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE KIGALI SECTOR HQ. THE FORCE HQ REQUIRES A SERIOUS INJECTION OF STAFF QUALIFIED OFFICERS IN ORDER TO BUILD THE FUNDAMENTAL DOCUMENTS NEEDED TO GET THE MISSION OPERATIONAL AND SUSTAIN THE INCREASING FAST PACE OF THE DAY TO DAY OPERATIONS.

L. WE HAVE BEEN APPRAISED OF THE RULES GOVERNING THE ADMINISTRATION OF STAFF OFFICERS AND THE SITUATION DEFIES ALL LOGIC AND RESPONSIBLE MANAGEMENT. WITH THE CURRENT CONTRACT FOR FEEDING AN LODGING, WE HAVE SERIOUSLY REDUCED OUR FLEXIBILITY IN OUR WORKING HOURS. THE OFFICERS INVOLVED HAVE NO PERSONAL FUNDS
NOR ANY AMENITIES THAT NORMALLY ARE MADE AVAILABLE TO MILITARY PERSONNEL IN A FORMED CONTINGENT. ARRANGEMENTS ARE BEING WORKED OUT TO MAKE HAIRCUT ETC CONTRACTS BUT THE EFFORTS BEING EXPENDED IN THIS AREA FOR THE EFFICIENCY OF THE RESULTS IS QUESTIONABLE AT BEST. FC IS PREPARING A FORMAL REPORT ON THIS SUBJECT TO MR. KOPI ANNAN FOR HIS ACTION AS THIS CURRENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM RELATING TO MILITARY PERSONNEL NOT PART OF A FORMED CONTINGENT(IE STAFF OFFICERS IN HQS) IS NOTHING LESS THAN LUDICROUS WHEN THE LETTER OF THE LAW IS APPLIED.

IV. CONCLUSION

A. THE OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR MISSION IN UNOMIR IS STILL SERIOUSLY AFFECTED DUE TO A LACK OF VEHICLES, RADIOS AND ESPECIALLY EMERGENCY MEDICAL SUPPLIES. THE SITUATION IN UNAMIR; IN THE DMZ SECTOR IN PARTICULAR IS NOT EFFECTIVE. THE LOSS OF THE FEW OAU VEHICLES DUE TO THEIR DANGEROUS STATE OF DISREPAIR AND THE WORSENING OF THE WEATHER AND OF THE ROAD CONDITIONS, THIS AT A TIME WHEN MORE AND MORE PRESSURE IS BEING EXERCISED BY THOSE WHO WISH THE MISSION TO SUCCEED IN PHASE 1 AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AND BY THOSE WHO ARE CREATING TURMOIL THROUGH INFLAMMATORY Rhetoric AND ERRONEOUS INFORMATION THAT CANNOT BE VERIFIED AND PROVEN WRONG IS BECOMING MOST TROUBLESOME.

B. IT IS THE FC ESTIMATE THAT WITH THE LIMITED STRENGTH OF THE BELGQUE PORTION OF THE KIGALI BN, COUPLED WITH OUR LIMITED EFFECTIVENESS IN MONITORING THE DMZ, AND OUR OVERALL LACK OF VEHICLES, COMMUNICATIONS, MEDICAL AND BASIC WORKING TOOLS IN THE HQ, WE MAY FACE AN UNACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF INCAPACITY TO INFLUENCE THE SITUATION OVER THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. LOW MORAL IN THE STAFF DUE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF VERY STRINGENT AND BASICALLY UNREASONABLE RULES TO MILITARY PERSONNEL EMPLOYED AS STAFF OFFICERS EVEN THOUGH THEY WERE UNMOS WHO VOLUNTEERED TO COME AND HELP LAUNCH THIS MISSION AT CONSIDERABLE LOSS OF PERSONAL WELLBEING IS MAKING INNOVATIVE APPROACHES AND SOLUTIONS TO THIS MISSION'S CURRENT EQUIPMENT DIFFICULTIES AND OVERTASKINGS MOST DIFFICULT TO BRING ABOUT.

C. LASTLY, THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE TUNISIAN ARMY HAS INFORMALLY REQUESTED TO COME AND VISIT HIS PERSONNEL AT THE END OF NOVEMBER 1993. IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, FC WOULD VERY MUCH PREFER THIS VISIT TO BE POSTPONED UNTIL JANUARY WHEN PHASE 1 IS COMPLETED AND WE ARE AT A REASONABLE STEADY STATE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF PHASE 2. YOUR INTERVENTION IN THIS AREA IS REQUESTED SOONEST.

V. REGARDS. PEUX CE QUE VEUX.