OUT GOING CODE CABLE

TO : ANNAN, UNATOS, NEW YORK
FROM : DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA
DATE : 09 DEC 1993
NUMBER : MIR-207
SUBJECT : WEEKLY SITREP NO 8, 30 NOV TO 07 DEC 93

1. GENERAL SITUATION AND HIGHLIGHTS

DURING THE PERIOD UNDER REVIEW NO MAJOR INCIDENTS OCCURRED. SITUATION IN GENERAL REMAINED TENSE IN THE CAPITAL AND IN THE NORTH WESTERN TOWN OF RUKINGARI OVER THE KILLING OF 17 CIVILIANS ON THE NIGHT 29/30 NOV 93 (REPORTED IN WEEKLY SITREP NO 7). AS A FOLLOW UP OF THE KILLING, THROUGHOUT THE DAY HOURS OF 30 NOV 93 RUKINGARI TOWN DwellERS SAW MOVEMENT AND DEPLOYMENTS OF RGF FORCES AROUND THE TOWN. MOST CIVILIANS HAD VACATED THE TOWN IN PANIC ANTICIPATING A FRESH BREAK OUT OF WAR BETWEEN THE RGF AND RPF FORCES. ON 01 DEC A SPECIAL UNAMIR PATROL DISCOVERED 5 DEAD BODIES OF YOUNG GIRLS AGED BETWEEN 12 TO 15 YEARS IN THE BAMBOO FOREST NOT FAR FROM THE VILLAGE WHICH WAS ATTACKED ON THE NIGHT OF 29/30 NOV. ONE GIRL WAS FOUND ALIVE WHO WAS EVACUATED TO RUKINGARI HOSPITAL AND DIED THE NEXT MORNING. ON 04 DEC A UNAMIR TUNISIAN PATROL WAS SENT TO THE SAME SPOT TO FIND TRACES OF ATTACKERS. ONE CIVILIAN GUIDE OF THE PATROL WAS HIT BY A MINE AND WAS SERIOUSLY INJURED. EOD TEAM INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT SIMILAR MINES ARE USED BY RGF FORCES. THE PATROL WAS DEEMED TO BE THE TARGET OF THIS MINE, AS WHOEVER IS TO BE BLAMED, DID NOT WANT THE UNAMIR IN THE FOREST. RGF DID NOT FOLLOW PERPETUITIES IN THE FOREST AT ALL. INVESTIGATION IS LEANING AWAY FROM LOCALLY HELD OPINION THAT RPF FORCES WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS VIOLENT ACT. EVIDENCE OF OTHER DESTABILIZING INCIDENT IS A LARGE BOOBY TRAPPED MINE EXPLOSION ABOUT 40 KM WEST OF KIGALI NEAR A SCHOOL BUILDING KILLING 11 CHILDREN AND INJURING SEVERAL OTHERS ON 03 DEC 93. THE RESULTS OF INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE KILLINGS IN NOLMA (SOUTH) NEAR REFUGEE CAMP BY ALLEGED BURUNDI FORCES IS STILL INCONCLUSIVE.

2. MILITARY

A. DEPLOYMENT

(1) HQS

HQ UNAMIR, KIGALI SECTOR HQ AND DMZ SECTOR HQ HAVE RECEIVED ALMOST FULL COMPLIMENT OF STAFF OFFICERS FROM BANGLADESH AND BELGIUM EXCEPT THE
DFC AND CHIEF OPERATIONS OFFICER. ALL THE HQS ARE OPERATIONAL AS FAR AS MAN POWER IS CONCERNED. OFFICE EQUIPMENTS, FURNITURE, COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENTS AND TRANSPORTS ARE STILL SCANTY. SHORTAGES OF THESE IMPORTANT ITEMS ARE MAKING STAFFING AND COMMAND AND CONTROL ALMOST INEFFECTIVE.

(2) KIGALI SECTOR

BELGIUM BATTALION IS ALMOST 80% ON GROUND WITH MEN AND MATERIAL. BANGLADESH BATTALION IS 50% ON GROUND WITH MEN ONLY (ARRIVED ON 08 DEC). REST OF THE BANGLADESH INFANTRY IS SCHEDULED TO REACH KIGALI ON 11 DEC 93. DUE TO SHORTAGE OF INTEGRAL TRANSPORT THE BANGLADESH INFANTRY BATTALION WILL HAVE REDUCED MOBILITY AND THUS LESS EFFECTIVE IN THEIR OPERATIONAL TASKS. IT IS STRONGLY RECOMMENDED THAT FALLOW ON EQUIPMENT AND TRANSPORT FROM BANGLADESH BE SHIPPED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE (EVEN BY AIRCRAFT IF POSSIBLE).

(3) MILOB HQ

13 NEW OBSERVERS JOINED THE MISSION (7 FROM BANGLADESH AND 6 FROM URUGUAY). THEY ARE BEING DEPLOYED IN TO THE DMZ SECTOR AS A FIRST PRIORITY. BUT SHORTAGES IN TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT WILL HINDER THE OBSERVERS IN CARRYING OUT THEIR MISSION. OBSERVERS FROM GHANA, TOGO, MALE AND AUSTRIA HAVE NOT YET ARRIVED IN THE MISSION AREA BUT ARE EXPECTED IN THE NEXT WEEK.

(4) DMZ SECTOR

WITH THE INCREASE OF VEHICLE FLEET TO 40 (FOR THE WHOLE FORCE) AND WITH THE INCREASE IN UNMOS STRENGTH THE DMZ SECTOR IS GRADUALLY GETTING OPERATIONAL. ESCORT DUTIES STILL CONTINUES TO BE ONE OF THE MAJOR OPERATIONAL COMMITMENT WHICH TAKES AWAY LOT OF EFFORT IN TERMS OF ALREADY MEAGER OPERATIONAL RESOURCES. THE HQ COULD NOT YET BE MOVED TO ITS OPERATIONAL LOCATION IN BAYUMBA DUE TO LIMITATIONS IN COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT. 4 UNMO TEAMS ARE SO FAR DEPLOYED IN DMZ AREA. DEPLOYMENT OF MORE UNMO TEAMS AND AN EARLY DEPLOYMENT OF INFANTRY BATTALION IN DMZ WOULD BE EXTREMELY HELPFUL IN INSTILLING CONFIDENCE IN THE LOCAL POPULATION ABOUT UNAMIR.

(5) UNOMUR SECTOR

A TOTAL OF 81 UNMOS ARE DEPLOYED IN UGANDA-RWANDA BORDER. NORMAL PATROL ACTIVITIES ARE ROUTINELY BEING CARRIED OUT BY UNOMUR UNMO TEAMS. DURING
THE PERIOD UNDER REVIEW UNMO TEAMS WERE AT TIMES STOPPED BY NRA SOLDIERS TO GO TO THE BORDER OUT POSTS WITH SOME PRETEXT OR THE OTHER. THE MATTER WAS HOWEVER SOLVED AFTER DISCUSSION WITH NRA BATTALION COMMANDERS. UGANDA-RWANDA BORDER IS STILL CLOSED FOR CROSS BORDER MOVEMENT. FC PROCEEDING TO UGANDA ON 11 DEC (SATURDAY) TO HAVE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE UGANDAN GOVERNMENT ON THE BORDER ISSUE AND ON OTHER UNAMIR- UNOMUR RELATED SUBJECTS.

(6) FORCE LOG, MED AND ENGINEERS ELEMENT

WITH THE ARRIVAL OF BANGLADESH CONTINGENT ON 08 DEC ADVANCE PARTIES OF FORCE ENGINEERS, LOG AND MED ELEMENTS HAVE ARRIVED:

B. UNAMIR-FORCE STRENGTH

THE FORCE STRENGTH AS ON 09 DEC 93 IS :-

BANGLADESH CONTINGENT - 225
BELGIUM CONTINGENT - 398
MOV CON - 20
TUNISIAN CONTINGENT - 59
STAFFS - 53
UNAMIR OBSERVERS - 73
UNOMUR OBSERVERS - 81

TOTAL - 909

C. MEDICAL AND HEALTH STATE

THERE IS NO SERIOUS CONCERN ABOUT THE GENERAL HEALTH STATE OF MILITARY COMPONENT. DEDICATED FIELD HOSPITAL IS YET TO BE ESTABLISHED FOR THE FORCE (COMPLETE COMPLIMENT OF BANGLADESH MEDICAL PLATOON WILL ARRIVE ON 11 DEC 93). WITH THE BUILD UP OF FORCE MEDEVAC CAPABILITY BY HELICOPTER IS ESSENTIAL.

3. POLITICAL

A. POLITICAL SITUATION IN RWANDA IS TENSE. EXTREMIST HOUTO ELEMENTS OF GOVERNMENT HAVE BEEN ALLEGING THAT THE MASSACRES ON 17/18 NOV AND ON 29/30 NOV HAVE BEEN COMMITTED BY THE RPF. THEY ALSO CLAIMS THAT TUTSI TRIBE HAS A REGIONAL PLAN TO ULTIMATELY DOMINATE THE PARTS OF RWANDA, UGANDA AND BURUNDI. UNAMIR ASSESS THAT THERE IS NO PROOF IN IT.

B. THERE HAVE BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL TURMOIL IN EITHER THE CAPITAL OR ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY EXCEPT THE PUBLIC CHAOS IN RUGINGERI ON 30 NOV AND 01 DEC 93 AS AN AFTER EFFECT OF MASSACRE IN THAT GENERAL AREA. THE SITUATION HOWEVER HAS BEEN STABILIZED BY THE
GOVERNMENT BY DEPLOYING MASS TROOPS.

C. RELATIONS WITH HOST NATION

VISIT THIS WEEK BY MR JAMES JONAH TO THE PRESIDENT OF RWANDA REAFFIRMED BOTH UN COMMITMENT AND THAT OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE PEACE PROCESS. THE HEAD OF STATE WAS IN VERY POSITIVE SPIRITS. SEVERAL INFORMAL MEETINGS WERE HELD BY THE SRSG AND FC WITH POLITICAL LEADERS AND SENIOR GOVT OFFICIALS. ALL DEMONSTRATED CONCERNS ON DELAYS OF UNAMIR LETTING BBTG COME INTO EFFECT IN KIGALI AND THE FUTURE ANTICIPATED SUBVERSIVE ACTIONS WHEN THE FRENCH FORCES LEAVE ON 12 DEC 93.

4. CONCLUSION

THE MILITANT ACTIVITY TO DESTABILISE THE SITUATION IN PHASE 1 HAS INCREASED. UNAMIR IS MAKING ITS ALL OUT EFFORT TO DEMONSTRATE CONCRETELY THAT IT IS GROWING IN STRENGTH, EFFECTIVENESS AND ENERGY IN GETTING THE BBTG IN PLACE BEFORE THE NEW YEAR. FOLLOW ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICS BUILD UP MUST CONTINUE WITH SAME ENERGY AND PRIORITY DEMONSTRATED OVER THE LAST WEEK. INITIAL RESULTS ARE MOST ENCOURAGING (SHIPMENT OF VEHICLES AND COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENTS), BUT THE OVERALL VERY TIGHT CONTROL ON RESOURCES DUE TO NO BUDGET OR SPECIFIED FUNDING IS MOST LIMITING TO OPPORTUNITY AND TIMELY STAFF ACTIONS. ARRIVAL OF BANGLADESH CONTINGENT ON 08 DEC WILL GREATLY HELP IN CREATING A SECURE ENVIRONMENT IN KIGALI WITHIN THE STIPULATED TIME FRAME. THE REPORT OF VIOLENT ACTIVITIES IN THE NORTH ALLEGEDLY BY THE RPF CAN NOT BE COMPLETELY VERIFIED OR MONITORED UNLESS MORE UNMO TEAMS WITH ENOUGH TRANSPORTS AND COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENTS CAN BE DEPLOYED. UNAMIR IS UNDER CONSTANT AND ENORMOUS PRESSURE FROM MODERATES TO PURSUIT BBTG TO BE ESTABLISHED SOONEST. FC WILL NOT RECOMMEND THIS UNTIL BANGLADESH BATTALION IS REASONABLY EFFECTIVE ON THE GROUND.

REGARDS.