SUMMARY

1. Secretariat present to Council members two options for future of UNAMIR: to leave force in place at current strength minus Belgian contingent (the Secretary-General's preference); or to withdraw bulk of force leaving behind Secretary-General's Special Representative with staff and some 150 troops as security. Both options predicated on the existence of a cease-fire. No substantive discussion of options although some concern that Secretariat have not spelt out clearly enough the mandates relating to either option or taken into account the fact there is not a cease-fire. Secretariat explain that Force Commander wants to use threat of UNAMIR withdrawal to persuade parties to agree a cease-fire. Likelihood that Council may give the parties a five-day deadline to achieve a cease-fire, after which substantive decisions will be taken.

2. Inconclusive working group discussions on the NAM draft resolution. The key operative paragraphs remain in square brackets. Instructions requested.

DETAIL

3. At the informal consultations of Security Council members on 14 April, de Soto (Secretary-General's Special Political Adviser) said that the Secretary-General had been following closely the events in Rwanda. He had been in direct contact with the Force Commander and the Special Representative as well as with Headquarters. De Soto wanted to make clear that the Secretary-General's letter of 13 April had been written following his consultations with the Foreign Minister of
Belgium. They had agreed that the Secretary-General would need
to alert Council members of the need for a replacement
battalion, or for reconsideration of the Belgian decision. It
was in this context that the Secretary-General had put forward
the suggestion of a possible withdrawal by UNAMIR. He had not
recommended that UNAMIR withdraw.

4. Riza (ASG DPKO) gave a brief update on the situation on the
ground. The fighting was at a lower level but still continued.
A line of control seemed to be emerging across the city. There
was fighting outside Kigali as well. An ICRC convoy had been
attacked and several wounded. There had also been an attack on
the airport (he subsequently indicated that the attack had been
from the RPF). The talks between the parties which had been
scheduled for 14 April had not happened. The Force
Commander was now trying to reschedule the meeting for 15
April.

5. As far as the options for UNAMIR were concerned, the
Secretary-General believed an abrupt withdrawal was neither
feasible nor advisable. There had been a fundamental change in
the situation in Rwanda and it was therefore not possible for
UNAMIR to fulfil its original mandate. The Secretary-General
saw two broad options. Both were predicated on a cease-fire.
The first would be to keep UNAMIR in place at its current
strength minus the Belgian contingent. They would redeploy
into Kigali. The parties would be informed that they had three
weeks to get back to the Arusha Peace Agreement. Certain
conditions would have to be set. The parties would be
responsible for security in the zones they controlled. Freedom
of movement would have to be guaranteed for UNAMIR. The
airport would remain a neutral zone. The intention would be to
give parties the time to negotiate and to agree on a return to
the peace process. It might not be exactly the Arusha process
but the aim would be to achieve agreement on some kind of
political solution. Six days before the deadline, the parties
would be warned and the Force would prepare for a complete
withdrawal. (Comment: although Riza did not make this point
when Annan described this option to me in the margins of a P5
meeting on Bosnia, he said that the key purpose of this option
would be for UNAMIR to secure the airport.) The second option
was to reduce UNAMIR immediately to a minimal political
presence: the SGSR, his support staff plus at least 150 troops as a security detail. Total numbers would not exceed 200. This option assumed no immediate prospect of a settlement and that maintaining UNAMIR at a greater strength was not an option. If the Council were to decide to adopt the first alternative, which was the Secretary-General's preference, and if there was no progress by the deadline imposed by the Council, then it would be possible to move to option 2 rather than withdraw the force totally.

6. Keating (NZ, Council President) said he had circulated a letter from the OAU Secretary-General enclosing a statement from the OAU Conflict Resolution Mechanism on the situation in Rwanda (faxed to AD(E)). He also drew attention to the press release by the ICRC. The representative of the ICRC had asked him to bring to Council members attention the ICRC's concern at the publicity which emanated from Kigali, which implied the problems related to the RPF alone. This did not reflect reality.

7. Kovanda (Czech Republic) asked what happened if there was no cease-fire. Both options were predicated on a cease-fire. How long would the Council be prepared to wait for one before taking a decision? This concern was echoed by Sardenberg (Brazil) and Gambri (Nigeria). The latter said that since UNAMIR was even now engaged in helping to secure a cease-fire it was illogical to suggest that for UNAMIR to remain there had to be a cease-fire. Pedauye (Spain) said it was unclear from the Secretariat's presentation what mandate UNAMIR would fulfil under the two different options. Merimee (France) said he preferred the first option. But it was clear that under this option the security of the force would need to be assured. The Council could say that in principle it favoured the first option, but if within a specific time, say five days, a cease-fire was not in place and respected, then we would choose option two. The question of the cease-fire was essential. If there was no cease-fire and the security situation deteriorated still further then there was a danger of more UNAMIR casualties.

8. I agreed with Spain that the two options were more precise on force levels than on mandate. However the mandate must be described in any resolution adopted by the Council. I underlined that the Council should not seek to give either two
battalions or 200 men a mandate to protect Rwandan civilians. It was heartbreaking to have to say so but this was simply not achievable. I was as perplexed as others on the fact that both options were predicated on a cease-fire. This condition was very unlikely to be fulfilled given the fighting going on on the ground. It would seem to be more sensible to have a different articulation which would be to choose option two and then move to option one when a cease-fire had been achieved. Merimee's suggestion that the Council give a short deadline and then make a decision to withdraw the bulk of the force if there was no commitment to a cease-fire therefore had some merit. As far as the draft resolution was concerned, I understood that there was still disagreement on key paragraphs. I drew attention to the OAU text which was a carefully balanced one. Rather than the Council continuing to be held up on the disputed text, we should use the OAU language.

9. Albright (US) expressed concern that both options depended on a cease-fire. The truce was supposed to expire at noon on 15 April. The fighting would then continue. The airport was insecure. Given this, we needed a resolution to authorise an orderly evacuation.

10. Riza intervened to say that when he had stated both options were predicated on a cease-fire it had indeed begged the question of how a cease-fire would be achieved. He had hoped that by the time the options were presented to the Council that further progress would have been made on the ground towards this. The Force Commander had stressed that both sides wanted UNAMIR to stay. His approach was to use this as leverage. A tight timetable should be drawn up for achieving a cease-fire during which UNAMIR would strengthen its presence at the airport and make preparations to withdraw. Both the SRSG and the Force Commander wanted to use the threat of UNAMIR's withdrawal to pressure the parties into a cease-fire. He wanted to underline that it would be very difficult logistically and politically to withdraw then bring the force back. This was why the Secretary-General preferred option one.

11. Keating said that if the Force Commander was essentially asking for the Council's support to put pressure on the parties by setting a very tight deadline for a cease-fire then the resolution being drafted was perhaps not what was required. It
might be better to aim for a short Council decision giving the parties five days to agree a cease-fire and then taking a decision on whether to maintain or significantly reduce UNAMIR thereafter depending on the outcome. Since the NAM caucus had insisted on being able to consult before making any substantive comments on the options presented, it was agreed that Council members would suspend their consideration of Rwanda until 151600Z with the aim of adopting a resolution later that day. The US have since told us that shortly after the informal consultations the French, Nigerians and New Zealanders agreed three additional paragraphs for the resolution. These are:

i) Demands that all parties agree on a cease-fire throughout Rwanda.

ii) Decides that if within five days of the adoption of this resolution there is an effective cease-fire in place, the Security Council will review the mandate and composition of UNAMIR with a view to assisting the parties in a resumption of the peace process in Rwanda based on the basis of the Arusha Peace Agreement.

iii) Further decides that if within five days of the adoption of this resolution there is no effective cease-fire in place, the Council will reconsider the continued presence of UNAMIR in Rwanda.

12. The working group discussions on the draft resolution earlier in the day had proved inconclusive. There was disagreement on references to the RPF and neighbouring countries and the key operative paragraphs therefore remain in square brackets pending consideration by Council members. (Text by fax to AD(E).) It is likely however that the working group discussions will be overtaken by the apparent agreement on the five-day language as above.

COMMENT

13. If the Nigerians can persuade the rest of the NAM caucus, it is likely that a resolution will be adopted containing the language on the five day option. The Belgian assessment is that a cease-fire within this period is extremely unlikely. The Council is thus likely to end up deciding on option 2 after the five days have elapsed.
14. Grateful for any comments you might have on the Secretary-General's options and on the language in para 11 above desk by 151300Z please.

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