PART 1 OF 7

This message represents DIA's initial assessment of the events of April through June 1989 that culminated in the Tiananmen Massacre of 3/4 June. We have reconstructed the sequence of events, paying particular attention to perceptions and analyzing how these perceptions influenced the course of events. We have also tried to identify critical events, decision points, and the roles of the most important actors. Military activity is generally described, and we conclude with our current assessment of the political consequences of the events.

2. Until the 7th National People’s Congress (NPC), which was held in the spring of 1988, it appeared that the disagreement among the Chinese leadership concerned only the pace and scope of economic reform. After the NPC, however, it became apparent that the disagreement was deeper. More conservative elements were concerned that the “open door” policy of the past decade had subjected China to influences that were moving the country away from socialism towards capitalism. On the other hand, more moderate elements tried to preserve what they could of reforms started earlier in the decade. In any case, economic reforms that were already in place seemed to have led to an economy that was out of control.

3. The NPC’s appointment of Li Peng as premier, the decision in the fall of 1988 for economic retrenchment, and the fact that political reforms were largely ignored by the NPC plenum in early April 1989, all signalled a conservative turn that put Zhao Ziyang and his reform-minded allies on the defensive.

4. For at least a year, China’s students and urban intellectuals had steadily—if unsystematically—developed ideas for political reform. In the wake of the NPC, “democracy salons” and student networks sprung up in Beijing and other cities as students planned to use the 70th anniversary of the May Fourth movement to stage demonstrations in support of their cause.

5. In addition to the anniversary of the May Fourth movement, at the same time, a meeting of the Asian Development Bank, featuring the first open Taiwan representation in a forum on the mainland, was scheduled. The ultimate event of the spring, however, was to be the first Sino-Soviet summit meeting in 30 years and the normalization of relations between the PRC and USSR.

6. The international media was expected to focus on Beijing to a greater degree than normal in order to cover these events. China had the opportunity to show the world the progress it had made in the past 10 years and demonstrate that it could be a responsible player at the beginning of a new era of international relations.

7. It was important for China to present an image of stability. Above all, the developing power struggle must be kept from public view. However, both sides of the political leadership knew that, after the summit, the 4th plenum of the 13th CCP Central Committee probably would produce changes in the party hierarchy. Mindful of the upcoming challenge to his leadership, Zhao had probably already begun to seek support within the party, government, and military.
8. (U) THE UNFORESEEN DEATH OF HU YAOBANG ON 15 APRIL GALVANIZED THE STUDENTS INTO ACTING SOONER THAN THEY HAD PLANNED. THE STUDENTS USED THE MEMORY OF HU MORE AS AN EXCUSE FOR THEIR DEMONSTRATIONS THAN AS A GENUINE EXPRESSION OF GRIEF OVER HIS DEATH. TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THIS OPPORTUNITY, STUDENT DEMANDS INCLUDED:

- THE ELIMINATION OF CORRUPTION;
- FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE OF SENIOR OFFICIALS;
- FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE PRESS;
- CALLS FOR AN IMPRECISELY DEFINED "DEMOCRACY";
- A DIALOGUE WITH THE GOVERNMENT;
- RECOGNITION OF NON-OFFICIAL STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS.

9. (U) TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD, THESE DEMANDS WERE NOT UNREASONABLE, EVEN IN A COMMUNIST CONTEXT.

10. (U) ALTHOUGH THEY WERE CAREFUL TO COUCH THEIR DISSENT IN PATRIOTIC AND NON-CONFRONTATIONAL TERMS, THESE DEMONSTRATIONS, IN REALITY, ATTACKED DENG AND CHALLENGED HIS, AND THE PARTY’S, LEGITIMACY. IN EARLY DEMONSTRATIONS THEY INDIRECTLY MADE THIS POINT BY THROWING SMALL BOTTLES, "XIAO PING." (IN MANDARIN CHINESE, DENG XIAOPING'S GIVEN NAMES, "XIAO PING," ARE PRONOUNCED IDENTICALLY AS THE WORDS FOR "SMALL BOTTLE." ) MOST OF CHINA'S SENIOR LEADERSHIP CORRECTLY SAW THIS AS A THREAT TO THEIR AUTHORITY.

11. (U) UNLIKE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS OF THE PAST, THIS ROUND OF ACTIVITY REFLECTED THE FRUSTRATIONS AND GAINED THE SUPPORT OF MUCH OF THE URBAN POPULATION.

END PART 1 OF 7 (DELETION)

BT
ADMIN
#5709
****
III. WHY IT TOOK SO LONG FOR THE LEADERSHIP TO ACT

12. (U) OBSERVERS AND MOST CHINESE WERE SURPRISED WITH THE LACK OF GOVERNMENT REACTION TO THE INITIAL DEMONSTRATIONS IN BEIJING. EXCEPT FOR AN INCIDENT INVOLVING THE BEATING OF SOME DEMONSTRATORS OUTSIDE OF ZHONGNAIhai ON THE NIGHT OF 19 APRIL, THE DISCIPLINE AND RESTRAINT DISPLAYED BY BOTH THE POLICE AND THE DEMONSTRATORS WERE ALSO SURPRISING. THIS WAS A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN ENCOURAGING MORE STUDENTS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS INTO THE STREETS.

13. (U) PRIOR TO THE DEMONSTRATIONS' EVOLUTION INTO THE MASSIVE SPECTACLES OF MID-MAY, WE BELIEVE THAT THE GOVERNMENT COULD HAVE DEFUSED THE SITUATION AT SEVERAL TIMES. FOR EXAMPLE, IN APRIL, IMMEDIATELY AFTER HU'S FUNERAL, HAD THEY SIMPLY MET WITH THE STUDENT LEADERS OR ACCEPTED THEIR PETITIONS, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE MOMENTUM OF THE DEMONSTRATIONS COULD HAVE BEEN SLOWED. HOWEVER, UNTIL THE END OF THE MONTH, THE LEADERSHIP PUBLICLY DID NOTHING.

14. (U) WE BELIEVE THERE WERE SEVERAL REASONS FOR THIS LACK OF ACTION:

FIRST, THE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS STARTED DEBATE WITHIN AN ALREADY DIVIDED LEADERSHIP OVER THE NATURE OF THE PROTESTS AND THE THREAT THEY REPRESENTED.

A SECOND REASON INVOLVED THE QUESTION OF WHAT MEANS SHOULD BE USED TO DEAL WITH THE PERCEIVED CHALLENGE. THE HARDLINE ARTICULATED BY DENG XIAOPING, YANG SHANGKUN, AND LI PENG PERCEIVED THE MOVEMENT TO BE A DIRECT CHALLENGE TO THE PARTY LEADERSHIP AND ADVOCATED
IMMEDIATE REPRESSION. OTHER, MORE LIBERAL ELEMENTS, IDENTIFIED WITH
ZHAO ZIYANG AND HU QILI, WHILE MINDFUL OF THE NEED TO PRESERVE THE
ROLE OF THE PARTY, ARGUED FOR A MORE CONCILIATORY APPROACH.
THIRD, THE UPCOMING MEETING OF THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK AND
THE IMPENDING SINO-SOVIET SUMMIT WITH THEIR ATTENDANT MEDIA COVERAGE
MADE DIRECT ACTION DIFFICULT.

15. THE SCALE OF THESE DEMONSTRATIONS SOON APPEARED TO GROW
BEYOND THE CAPABILITY OF THE POLICE TO CONTAIN. THIS FORCED THE
LEADERSHIP TO TURN TO THE MILITARY. HOWEVER, THE PLA WAS AMBIVALENT
IN ITS RESPONSE.

16. IN OUR JUDGMENT, THIS AMBIVALENCE AROSE FROM FOUR SOURCES:
PERHAPS THE KEY FACTOR WAS THAT SOME COMMANDERS WERE
UNWILLING TO COMMIT THEMSELVES UNTIL THE CONFLICT WITHIN THE
NATIONAL PARTY LEADERSHIP OVER THE APPROPRIATE COURSE OF ACTION WAS
RESOLVED.

MILITARY REGION AND GROUP Army COMMANDERS DEFINED THE PRIMARY
PLA MISSION AS DEFENSE AGAINST EXTERNAL THREAT. SUPPRESSION OF
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE, WHILE OFFICIALLY WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE ARMY,
WAS, IN THE PERCEPTION OF THE COMMANDERS, A TASK FOR THE INTERNAL
SECURITY APPARATUS.

HIGH LEVEL MILITARY LEADERS WERE PROBABLY AS DIVIDED OVER
COMPETING VISIONS OF CHINA’S FUTURE AS WERE THEIR CIVILIAN
COUNTERPARTS. MOREOVER, MILITARY PERSONNEL AT ALL LEVELS PROBABLY
IDENTIFIED TO VARYING DEGREES WITH MANY OF THE STUDENT DEMANDS.

FINALLY, WE BELIEVE THAT THE PROSPECT OF EMPLOYING DEADLY
FORCE AGAINST THE CIVILIAN POPULATION WAS DISTASTEFUL. PARTICULARLY
SINCE THE FAMILIES OF SOME BEIJING-BASED SOLDIERS WERE INVOLVED IN
THE DEMONSTRATIONS.

IV. THE DECISION TO IMPOSE MARTIAL LAW

17. THE DECISION TO IMPOSE MARTIAL LAW ILLUSTRATES THE
SINGULAR IMPORTANCE OF PERSONALITY AND THE PARAMOUNT LEADER IN
CHINESE POLITICS. BY 25 APRIL, DENG XIAOPING HAD DETERMINED THAT
THE DEMONSTRATIONS SHOULD BE FORCIBLY REPRESSED. TO ATTAIN HIS
GOAL, DENG USED HIS NETWORK OF PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH SENIOR
LEADERS OF HIS OWN GENERATION TO BUILD SUPPORT FOR HIS VIEWS. IN
DOING SO, HE STEPPED OUTSIDE OR IGNORED ESTABLISHED, INSTITUTIONAL
CHANNELS AND METHODS. DECISIONS WERE MADE INFORMALLY BY THE GROUP
OF OCTOGENARIAN STATESMEN AND THEIR PROTEGES WHO WIELD POWER TODAY.
THUS, DENG’S POSITION WAS MAINTAINED AT THE COST OF UNDERMINING
CHINA’S FRAGILE STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.
18. (G) AT FIRST THE ARMY WAS NOT CALLED IN. HOWEVER, ON 25 APRIL, WHILE ZHAO WAS IN NORTH KOREA, TEMPORARILY REMOVING THE PRIMARY ADVOCATE FOR THE STUDENTS, AN EMERGENCY SESSION OF THE POLITBURO WAS HELD. DENG GAVE INSTRUCTIONS THAT FORMED THE BASIS FOR THE HARDLINE "PEOPLE'S DAILY" EDITORIAL OF THE FOLLOWING DAY. WHAT IS KNOWN OF DENG'S INSTRUCTIONS DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE EXPLICITLY AUTHORIZED THE USE OF DEADLY FORCE AGAINST THE STUDENTS AT THE TIME. IN 1986 AND 1987, A SIMILAR EDITORIAL WAS A KEY FACTOR IN DEFUSING STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS. HOWEVER, THIS SPRING'S EDITORIAL, ACCUSING THE PROTESTORS OF "CONSPIRACY TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT," SO INCENSED THE BEIJING POPULATION THAT, ON THE NEXT DAY, THEY TURNED OUT IN LARGER NUMBERS THAN EVER BEFORE.

19. (G) THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE LEADERSHIP CONFLICT HAD PROGRESSED WAS NOT KNOWN TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD. MOST OBSERVERS THOUGHT THAT DENG WAS STANDING ALOOF WHILE THE FIGHTING WAS CONTAINED AMONG ZHAO AND HIS "MODERATES" AND THE "HARDLINERS" LED BY LI PENG AND YANG SHANGKUN. IT WAS NOT APPARENT THAT BY THIS TIME, IN ACTUALITY, DENG HAD ALREADY DEFINED THE HARDLINE POSITION AND THAT ZHAO'S POINT OF VIEW WAS SO FAR FROM THE EMERGING CONSENSUS.

END PART 2 OF 7 (DEOLOADR)
20. (U) THE FIRST GOVERNMENT ATTEMPT AT DIALOGUE WITH THE STUDENTS DID NOT OCCUR UNTIL 29 APRIL, WHILE ZHAO WAS STILL IN NORTH KOREA. DEMONSTRATION LEADERS BOYCOTTED THE MEETING BECAUSE ONLY REPRESENTATIVES OF "OFFICIAL" STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS WERE ALLOWED TO MEET WITH YUAN MU, THEN A RELATIVELY LOW-LEVEL PARTY OFFICIAL. PROBABLY MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE MINIMAL RESULTS OF THE MEETING, HOWEVER, WAS THE FACT THAT IT WAS BROADCAST ON TELEVISION AND RADIO--SETTING THE PRECEDENT FOR GREATER CHINESE MEDIA ACCESS AND COVERAGE OF FUTURE EVENTS.

21. (U) DRAWING ON MOMENTUM OF PREVIOUS WEEKS, THE DEMONSTRATIONS ON 4 MAY WERE VAST AND, PERHAPS UNEXPECTEDLY, NON-CONFRONTATIONAL. IN THAT RESPECT, THE DAY WAS ALMOST ANTI-CLIMACTIC.

22. (U) HOWEVER, AT THE SAME TIME AS THE DEMONSTRATIONS IN TIANANMEN, ZHAO MADE A SPEECH TO THE MEETING OF THE ADB IN WHICH HE VOICED SUPPORT FOR THE STUDENTS AND OPPOSED CORRUPTION. BY EARLY MAY ZHAO PROBABLY UNDERSTOOD THAT HE WAS FIGHTING FOR HIS OWN POLITICAL SURVIVAL. THEREFORE, HE SOUGHT TO USE THE SUPPORT OF THE STUDENTS AND THEIR GROWING NUMBER OF SUPPORTERS AS A RESOURCE IN HIS FIGHT FOR SURVIVAL.

23. (U) AFTER THE DEMONSTRATIONS ON 4 MAY THE STUDENTS RETURNED TO THEIR CAMPUSES FOR ABOUT A WEEK AND THE SITUATION APPEARED TO HAVE QUIETED DOWN IN PREPARATION FOR THE SINO-SOViet SUMMIT.

24. (U) ON 12 MAY, THE STUDENTS ORGANIZED THEMSELVES FOR A HUNGER STRIKE TO TAKE PLACE AT TIANANMEN DURING THE SUMMIT. THEY ALSO PREPARED BANNERS PROCLAIMING THEIR SUPPORT AND ADMIRATION FOR THE
REFORMER GORBACHEV. THE FOLLOWING DAY, AS THEY MARCHED TO THE SQUARE, BEIJING RESIDENTS, PROFESSORS, FACTORY, HEALTH, AND TRANSPORTATION WORKERS, JOURNALISTS, AND EVEN PARTY MEMBERS FROM ALL OF THESE GROUPS PARTICIPATED OR SHOWED ENTHUSIASTIC SUPPORT.  

25. (CR) THIS WIDESPREAD SUPPORT LENDS CREDENCE TO ALLEGATIONS THAT ZHAO USED HIS POSITION AS PARTY GENERAL SECRETARY DURING THE TIME BEFORE THE SUMMIT TO MOBILIZE HIS FOLLOWERS TO SUPPORT THE STUDENTS. REPORTING ALSO INDICATES THAT, LATER, ON 23 MAY, AS THE DEMONSTRATIONS WERE AT THEIR PEAK, PARTY OFFICIALS LOYAL TO ZHAO TELEPHONED ALL BEIJING GOVERNMENTAL MINISTRIES ORDERING DIVISION CHIEFS AND ABOVE TO GO OUT AND MARCH IN SUPPORT OF THE STUDENT MOVEMENT. THESE ACTIONS INDICATE THAT, WHILE THE STUDENTS' ACTIVITIES WERE NOT DIRECTLY CONTROLLED BY ANYONE IN THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP, ZHAO AT LEAST ATTEMPTED TO USE THEM FOR HIS OWN POLITICAL BENEFIT.  

26. (U) AS DENG XIAOPING HAD PROBABLY COME TO FEAR, GORBACHEV'S VISIT, IN MANY WAYS, WAS A MAJOR EMBARRASSMENT. BECAUSE OF THE MASSIVE DEMONSTRATIONS--OVER A MILLION PEOPLE TOOK TO THE STREETS IN TIANANMEN AND THROUGHOUT BEIJING--ITINERARIES HAD TO BE CHANGED AND MUCH OF THE POMP THAT IS AFFORDED TO HEADS OF STATE HAD TO BE ELIMINATED. MOREOVER, THE PROTESTORS DID INDEED WELCOME GORBACHEV AS A POLITICAL REFORMER. TO DENG, THE CROWDS MUST HAVE APPEARED CHAOTIC, UNRULY, AND UNAPPRECIATIVE.  

27. (U) HOWEVER, DENG WAS PROBABLY MOST OFFENDED WHEN, ON 16 MAY, IN A MEETING WITH GORBACHEV, ZHAO ZIYANG EMPHASIZED THAT DENG WAS STILL CHINA'S PARAMOUNT LEADER, IMPLYING THAT DENG WAS ULTIMATELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DISRUPTIONS IN TIANANMEN, AND, REVEALING A "STATE SECRET," THAT THIS LEADERSHIP DECISION HAD BEEN MADE IN 1987. IF ZHAO WAS TRYING TO PRESSURE DENG TO MODERATE HIS STAND TOWARD THE DEMONSTRATIONS, HE FAILED.  

28. (U) ON THE STREETS, IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SUMMIT, THE DEMONSTRATIONS REACHED THEIR HIGHEST LEVELS, ENJOYING WIDESPREAD POPULAR SUPPORT. AS EXPECTED, THEY RECEIVED WHOLESALE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA, AND UNPRECEDENTED CHINESE MEDIA, COVERAGE. MOREOVER, AT THE SAME TIME, THE PROTESTORS BEGAN TO ATTACK DENG AND LI PENG BY NAME. TROOPS IN AND AROUND BEIJING WERE SURROUNDED AND STOPPED BY MASSES OF CITIZENS. (SEE SECTION VI FOR ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION OF TROOP MOVEMENTS.) ALSO TWO RETIRED MARSHALLS AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICERS URGED DENG IN WRITING TO BEGIN A DIALOGUE WITH THE STUDENTS AND OPPOSED THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE TO CONTAIN THE DEMONSTRATIONS. THE IDEA OF "PEOPLE POWER," AS PREVIOUSLY SEEN IN THE PHILIPPINES, APPEARED TO BE TAKING HOLD.
29. (U) THE MEETING ON 18 MAY BETWEEN LI PENG AND STUDENT HUNGER STRIKERS RESULTED IN THE PREMIER BEING LECTURED TO ON NATIONAL TELEVISION. TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD, IT LOOKED LIKE ZHAO WAS WINNING THE CONTEST FOR POPULAR SUPPORT OVER LI AND THE HARDLINERS.

30. (G) HOWEVER, AT THIS SAME TIME, DENG AND YANG WERE PREPARING TO BRING IN THE PLA IN FORCE. IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SUMMIT, WHILE DENG WAS AWAY FROM BEIJING, YANG REPORTEDLY CALLED AN INFORMAL MEETING OF THE MILITARY REGION COMMANDERS IN BEIJING. SEVERAL COMMANDERS DID NOT ATTEND BUT SENT THEIR DEPUTIES INSTEAD. YANG THEN FACED A MAJORITY OF OFFICERS WHO RESISTED THE IDEA OF SENDING TROOPS TO BEIJING.

END PART 3 OF 7 (DECL:A BR)
PART 4 OF 7

SUBJ: SPECIAL ASSESSMENT FOR CUSTOMERS OF DIA NADA INTSUM. (U)

31. (S) SOON THEREAFTER, IN WUHAN, PERHAPS BECAUSE OF THE UNSATISFACTORY RESULTS OF YANG'S MEETING, DENG CALLED ANOTHER MEETING OF MR COMMANDERS. A FEW MR COMMANDERS ON THE FIRST DAY FELL IN BEHIND DENG. AFTER WHAT MUST HAVE BEEN CONSIDERABLE PERSUASION, ALL THE MILITARY REGION COMMANDERS FINALLY AGREED TO SEND TROOPS TO BEIJING. THOSE IN STRONG SUPPORT OF THE MILITARY CRACKDOWN WERE LI JIULONG OF JINAN, XIANG SHOUZHI OF NANJING, AND FU QUANYOU OF CHENGDU. RELUCTANT SUPPORTERS WERE ZHOU YIBING OF BEIJING, ZHANG WANNIAN OF GUANGZHOU, LIU JINGSONG OF SHENYANG, AND ZHAO XIANSUN OF LANZHOU.

32. (S) ON 18 OR 19 MAY, REFLECTING THE OPINION OF THE PARTY ELDERS, THE POLITBUTO'S STANDING COMMITTEE VOTED, WITH ZHAO THE ONLY VOICE OPPOSING, TO USE FORCE AGAINST THE STUDENTS. ONCE AGAIN, HOWEVER, THE DEGREE OF MILITARY FORCE TO BE USED WAS NOT SPECIFICALLY DEFINED. WHILE THIS VOTE INDICATED A CONSENSUS OF SENIOR PARTY OFFICIALS, THE ACTUAL ORDER TO EMPLOY THE PLA WOULD HAVE TO COME FROM THE CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION.

33. (S) THE NEXT FEW DAYS WERE SPENT CONSOLIDATING THIS DECISION AMONG THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP. TROOPS FROM MILITARY REGIONS OUTSIDE OF BEIJING BEGAN TO DEPLOY TO THE CAPITAL.

34. (U) BY LATE 18 MAY, ZHAO PROBABLY HAD REALIZED THAT HIS CALLS FOR MODERATION IN DEALING WITH THE STUDENTS HAD BEEN DEFEATED. EARLY ON THE MORNING OF 19 MAY, ZHAO, FOLLOWED BY LI PENG, WENT INTO TIANANMEN SQUARE TO MEET WITH THE STUDENTS AND HUNGER STRIKERS. HIS WORDS, "WE HAVE COME TOO LATE," HAVE BEEN INTERPRETED AS AN
EXPRESSION OF FATALISM AND AN IMPORTANT INDICATOR OF THE CRACKDOWN THAT WOULD EVENTUALLY COME. ON 19 MAY, THE HUNGER STRIKERS DECLARED THEIR STRIKE OVER.

35. (U) ALSO BY 19 MAY, DENG, AND A GROUP OF CONSERVATIVE PARTY ELDERS, HAD DECIDED TO REMOVE ZHAO ZIYANG FROM HIS POSITION OF PARTY SECRETARY. THEY BLAMED ZHAO FOR THE UNREST THAT HAD DEVELOPED BECAUSE OF HIS SUPPORT OF THE DEMONSTRATORS. EVENTUALLY, HU QILI, AS A SUPPORTER OF ZHAO, WOULD ALSO BE REMOVED.

36. (U) FINALLY, ON THE EVENING OF 19 MAY, AT A MEETING OF HIGH-LEVEL PARTY LEADERS, LI PENG MADE ANOTHER TELEvised HARDLINE SPEECH ANNOUNCING THAT THE GOVERNMENT INTENDED TO QUELL THE DISORDERS. ZHAO'S ABSENCE INDICATES THAT HE HAD ALREADY BEEN REMOVED.

V. WHY MARTIAL LAW WAS SLOW TO BE ENFORCED

37. (U) ON 20 MAY, MARTIAL LAW WAS DECLARED IN BEIJING. HOWEVER, THE PROTESTS CONTINUED.

38. (U) WE BELIEVE THAT PLA EFFORTS TO ENFORCE MARTIAL LAW WERE HINDERED BY SEVERAL FACTORS, THE MOST IMPORTANT OF WHICH WAS THE ABSENCE OF A CLEARLY DEFINED MISSION AND CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.


40. (U) BY THIS TIME THE STUDENTS THEMSELVES HAD PROVED TO BE MUCH MORE ORGANIZED THAN EXPECTED. BEGINNING IN THE EARLY WEEKS OF THE DEMONSTRATIONS THEY USED BICYCLES AND MOTORCYCLES TO COMMUNICATE AMONG CAMPUSSES. GRADUALLY THEY ALSO DEVELOPED AN INTELLIGENCE NETWORK REPORTING ON TROOP MOVEMENTS AND PLANS. NEWER FORMS OF COMMUNICATIONS WERE ALSO WIDELY USED. THEIR EXCELLENT COMMUNICATIONS ALLOWED THE STUDENTS TO COORDINATE MOVEMENTS THROUGHOUT THE CITY. THERE WERE TIMES WHEN THE STUDENTS AND DEMONSTRATORS STOPPED AND SURROUNDED CONVOYS OF TROOPS USING OVERTLY CHOREOGRAPHED MANEUVERS. THE STUDENTS ALSO EFFECTIVELY UTILIZED PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUES TO "EDUCATE" THE SOLDIERS TO THEIR POINT OF VIEW. IN SPITE OF THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW, THE DEMONSTRATORS SEEMED TO HAVE THE UPPER HAND. IGNORANT AS THEY WERE OF EVENTS IN OTHER QUARTERS, THE STUDENTS STILL SEEMED TO HOPE THAT ZHAO ZIYANG AND THE MODERATES WOULD PREVAIL IN THE PARTY INFIGHTING.
41. (U) THE PRESENCE OF THE FOREIGN PRESS CORPS WAS ALSO AN INHIBITING FACTOR ON THE PLA AND GOVERNMENT LEADERS. MEDIA COVERAGE CONTINUED AS IN THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS EXCEPT THAT LIVE-SATELLITE BROADCASTS WERE PROHIBITED.

42. (U) INTERNAL CHINESE MEDIA COVERAGE OF EVENTS IN THE CAPITAL ALSO WAS A MODERATING INFLUENCE.

43. (U) THE STUDENTS ERECTED THEIR "GODDESS OF DEMOCRACY" STATUE ON THE NIGHT OF 29 MAY. THE FOLLOWING DAY AT ITS UNVEILING THEY ANNOUNCED THAT THEY WOULD STAY IN THE SQUARE UNTIL 20 JUNE. HOWEVER, THEY WERE UNAWARE OF THE DECISION THAT HAD ALREADY BEEN MADE IN THE CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION.

44. (S) SOMETIME BETWEEN THE 24 AND 31 MAY, YANG SHANGKUN HIMSELF OR IN DENG'S NAME, SPEAKING FOR THE CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION, GAVE THE ORDER TO USE FORCE TO REMOVE THE STUDENTS FROM THE SQUARE. BY THIS TIME, THE SENIOR LEADERSHIP OF THE PLA HAD PLEDGED LOYALTY TO DENG AND HIS IMMEDIATE GOAL OF RESTORING ORDER. QUESTIONS ABOUT THE DEGREE OF GENUINE SUPPORT DENG HAD FOR THE CRACKDOWN PERSIST. AT VARIOUS TIMES IT WAS REPORTED THAT QIN JIWEI, CHI HAOTIAN, HONG XUEZHI, AND WANG HAI, IN ADDITION TO THE MR COMMANDERS ALREADY MENTIONED, WERE OPPOSED TO THE USE OF FORCE.

END PART 4 OF 7 (DECL OADR)
PART 5 OF 7

BODY

SUBJ: SPECIAL ASSESSMENT FOR CUSTOMERS OF DIA NADA INTSUM. (U)

45. (c) WE BELIEVE THAT THE PLA LEADERSHIP OVERCAME ITS INITIAL AMBIVALENCE FOR SEVERAL REASONS IN ADDITION TO LOYALTY TO DENG AND THE PARTY.

BY THE END OF MAY DISAGREEMENTS WITHIN THE NATIONAL PARTY LEADERSHIP HAD BEEN RESOLVED AND THE HARDLINE COALITION WAS FIRMLY IN CONTROL. IN AS MUCH AS A FIRM DIRECTION HAD BEEN DECIDED UPON, MILITARY LEADERS COULD NO LONGER AVOID DECLARING THEMSELVES.

ALSO, MILITARY REGION AND GROUP ARMY COMMANDERS WERE PROBABLY SINCERELY CONCERNED ABOUT THE EXTENT OF DISORDER WHICH HAD ALREADY SPREAD OUTSIDE OF BEIJING.

WE DISCOUNT REPORTS THAT MILITARY PARTICIPATION WAS BOUGHT BY PROMISES OF INCREASED DEFENSE BUDGETS OR RETURN TO PRE-1985 FORCE LEVELS.

VI. MILITARY ACTIVITY UP TO AND THROUGH THE NIGHT OF 3 AND 4 JUNE

46. (c) SOON AFTER HU YAOBANG'S DEATH, A FEW UNITS FROM OUTSIDE BEIJING, BUT STILL WITHIN THE BEIJING MILITARY REGION, BEGAN MOVEMENT TOWARD THE CITY. WE ARE NOT SURE WHO OR WHAT LEVEL OF COMMAND GAVE THE ORDERS FOR THESE FIRST MOVEMENTS. TRUCK-MOUNTED TROOPS WERE DEPLOYED ALONG THE ROUTES USED BY THE STUDENTS DURING THEIR MARCHES FROM THE UNIVERSITY LOCATIONS INTO THE HEART OF THE CITY. BY THE TIME OF THE MARCHES IN DEFIANCE OF THE 26 APRIL "PEOPLE'S DAILY" EDITORIAL, ADDITIONAL UNITS HAD BEGUN TO AUGMENT PEOPLE'S ARMED POLICE UNITS TO PROVIDE SECURITY AND CROWD CONTROL.
TO THE SOUTHEAST, IT IS LIKELY THAT ADDITIONAL CASUALTIES ALSO
RESULTED FROM THAT ENGAGEMENT.

53. (G) THERE WERE ALSO NUMEROUS REPORTS OF FIGHTING AMONG PLA
AND/OR PAP UNITS. THERE ARE EVEN REPORTS OF ARTILLERY FIRE. IT IS
LIKELY THAT SOME UNITS EXCHANGED SMALL ARMS FIRE WITH EACH OTHER
BECAUSE OF CONFUSION AND RAPID MOVEMENTS OF THE NIGHT. HOWEVER, WE
DO NOT KNOW WHO OR WHAT LEVEL OF COMMAND GAVE THE ORDERS, IF ANY, TO
FIRE ON PLA OR PAP UNITS. NEVERTHLESS, THERE HAS BEEN NO
INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF FIGHTING AMONG PLA UNITS.

54. (G) MOREOVER, IN THE DAYS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE NIGHT OF
3/4 JUNE, WE BELIEVE THAT THE RUMORS OF CIVIL WAR--OR ARMY VS ARMY
FIGHTING--WERE UNFOUNDED. FOR EXAMPLE, NEWS REPORTS OF POTENTIAL
FIGHTING BETWEEN "YANG SHANGLUN'S ARMY," THE 27TH, "THE BUTCHERS OF
BEIJING," AND THE 38TH GROUP ARMY, "THE ARMY THAT REFUSED TO BE USED
AGAINST THE STUDENTS," MAY WELL HAVE ONLY BEEN DISINFORMATION.

END PART 5 OF 7 (DECL-OADR)

BT

ADMIN

#5713

NNNN
VII. THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE TIANANMEN MASSACRE

55. (U) THE "TIANANMEN MASSACRE" SHOCKED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. IN THE SHORT TERM, IT HAS UNDERMINED 10 YEARS OF PROGRESS TOWARD BUILDING INTERNATIONAL CONFIDENCE IN THE CONTINUITY AND STABILITY OF CHINESE POLICIES. THE BRUTALITY OF THE MASSACRE AND THE CONTINUING REPRESSION IS CAUSING CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE TO PLUMMET.

56. (U) FOR THE MOMENT, THE POLITICAL REFORMS DEMANDED BY STUDENTS AND OTHERS HAVE NO CHANCE OF REACHING FRUITION. THE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY LABEL THAT THE LEADERSHIP HAS SLAPPED ON THE MOVEMENT INSURES THIS. THE GOVERNMENT WILL CRUSH INDIVIDUAL ADVOCATES FOR CHANGE. HOWEVER, THE PRESSURE FOR POLITICAL REFORM WILL NOT DISSIPATE. UNTIL THE LEADERSHIP IS WILLING TO ADDRESS ISSUES OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORM, CHINA WILL REMAIN SUSCEPTIBLE TO INSTABILITY.

57. (C) DESPITE THE OFFICIAL LINE THAT CHINA REMAINS COMMITTED TO A POLICY OF OPENING TO THE WEST, THE CURRENT LEADERSHIP HAS CONSISTENTLY EXPRESSED CONCERNS ABOUT FOREIGN INFLUENCES THAT UNDERMINE SOCIALISM. XENOPHOBIA, PLUS ECONOMIC UNCERTAINTY, WILL HAVE A CHILLING EFFECT ON CHINA'S INTERACTIONS WITH THE WEST.

58. (C) THE EVENTS OF JUNE HAVE NOT SETTLED THE QUESTION OF CHINA'S FUTURE LEADERSHIP. IRONICALLY, DENG XIAOPING HAS ALLIED HIMSELF WITH THE VERY ELDERS WHOM HE FORCED TO STEP DOWN FROM POWER IN 1987, PRECISELY BECAUSE THEY REPRESENTED AN OBSTACLE TO CHINA'S
FURTHER ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION. IN EFFECT, THE LEADERSHIP SITUATION IN CHINA HAS REVERTED TO WHERE IT WAS BEFORE THE 13TH PARTY CONGRESS (OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 1987).

59. THE CURRENT HARDLINE COALITION IS COMPOSED OF CONSERVATIVE PARTY ELDERS AND THEIR PROTEGES. THIS UNION OF OCTOGENARIANS IS A MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE NEED TO SMASH THE DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT. FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS, WE BELIEVE IT WILL NOT LAST MUCH BEYOND THE DEATH OF DENG:

- THE ELDERS ARE DEEPLY DIVIDED ON THE PACE AND SCOPE OF ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION POLICIES, PARTICULARLY ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ECONOMIC REFORMS.
- THE ADVANCED AGES OF THE ELDERS LIMITS THEIR TENURE.
- PERSONAL ANIMOSITIES ACCUMULATED OVER DECADES OF POLITICAL INFIGHTING WILL UNDERMINE UNITY AFTER THE IMMEDIATE POLITICAL CRISIS IS RESOLVED.
- UNCERTAIN SUPPORT IN THE MIDDLE AND LOWER REACHES OF THE PARTY AND GOVERNMENT MAY OBSTRUCT THE COALITION'S ABILITY TO GOVERN.
- PARTY ELDERS ARE OUT OF TOUCH WITH THE REALITY AND DEPTH OF POPULAR DISCONTENT.

60. IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE 4TH PLENUM IN LATE JUNE RESULTED IN THE SELECTION OF A NEW PARTY SECRETARY AND A NEW STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE POLITBURO, DENG XIAOPING AND THE CONSERVATIVE ELDERS CONTINUE TO BE THE REAL POWER BROKERS IN CHINA.

61. JIANG ZEMIN WAS CHOSEN TO BE THE PARTY SECRETARY FOR SEVERAL REASONS:

- FIRST, HE IS POLITICALLY CONSERVATIVE AND ACCEPTABLE TO THE WHOLE RANGE OF PARTY ELDERS;
- SECOND, HE IS AN ECONOMIC REFORMER;
- FINALLY, HE WAS NOT DIRECTLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE DECISION TO USE FORCE IN BEIJING. THIS WAS PROBABLY A CONSIDERATION FOR REESTABLISHING THE PARTY'S CREDIBILITY WITHIN CHINA.

62. UNTIL THE SHADOW OF THE PARTY ELDERS IS REMOVED, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT JIANG WILL BE ABLE TO DEVELOP HIS OWN POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC AGENDA. INDEED, IT IS NOT KNOWN IF HE HAS AN AGENDA. IN ANY CASE, WHETHER HE WILL SURVIVE AS PARTY CHIEF LONG ENOUGH TO DEVELOP ONE IS QUESTIONABLE.

63. THE NEW STANDING COMMITTEE IS A STARK REPRESENTATION OF A RESURGENT POLITICAL CONSERVATISM IN THE PARTY. IT WILL ALLOW ONLY MINIMAL POLITICAL REFORMS WHICH DO NOT CHALLENGE THE PRIMACY OF THE PARTY. ON DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUES THIS STANDING COMMITTEE WILL SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE. HOWEVER, THEY, TOO, WILL PROBABLY DIVIDE OVER ECONOMIC ISSUES. CONSEQUENTLY, THEY WILL MORE THAN LIKELY PROVE
INCAPABLE OF SOLVING CHINA'S COMPLEX ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WITHOUT TURNING ON THEMSELVES OR THEIR MENTORS.

64. THE DEATH OR INCAPACITATION OF DENG XIAOPING WILL REMOVE THE ONE FORCE CAPABLE OF BINDING THIS DISPARATE GROUP TOGETHER. IN THE AFTERMATH OF DENG'S DEPARTURE, CHINA WILL BE RULED BY A SERIES OF UNEASY, SHORTLIVED, CONSERVATIVE COALITIONS CONSISTING OF THE SURVIVING ELDERS AND THEIR PROTEGES. NONE WILL OFFER THE VISION NEEDED TO MAKE THE LONGTERM DECISIONS THAT CONTINUED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WILL DEMAND.

65. MORE IMPORTANT, FOR CHINA'S LONGTERM STABILITY, NONE OF THESE SUCCESSOR COALITIONS WILL BE WILLING OR ABLE TO ADD A POLITICAL DIMENSION TO CHINA'S REFORMS UNTIL ALL THE PARTY ELDERS LEAVE THE SCENE--EITHER THROUGH DEATH OR POLITICAL PURGES.

66. THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE TRANSITION PERIOD, DEFICIENCIES WILL UNDERMINE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE CONSERVATIVE SOLUTION TO CHINA'S PROBLEMS. WE ASSESS THAT IT TAKE AT LEAST 5 YEARS BEFORE THE LEADERSHIP WILL BE ABLE TO ACT WITHOUT THE CURRENT POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS.

END PART 6 OF 7
DTG 152059Z AUG 89
FROM FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
TO (b)(3):50 USC 403-1 (i)

PART 7 OF 7

BODY

SUBJ: SPECIAL ASSESSMENT FOR CUSTOMERS OF DIA NADA INTSUM. (U)

67. (U) INCIDENTS THAT COULD TRIGGER A STABILITY CRISIS WOULD BE A MAJOR ECONOMIC EMERGENCY, A SERIES OF ANTI-GOVERNMENT TERRORIST OR SABOTAGE INCIDENTS, FAILURE OF THE PLA TO RESPOND TO A MILITARY THREAT, OR A NATURAL DISASTER, SUCH AS A MAJOR EARTHQUAKE OR FLOOD.

68. (G) TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD, THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY IS UNITED IN ITS SUPPORT OF THE CURRENT HARDLINE COALITION. ITS LEADERS WILL CARRY OUT MARTIAL LAW, ENFORCE THE CURRENT CRACKDOWN, AND EMPLOY DEADLY FORCE AGAIN, IF ORDERED.

69. (G) WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, SOME PLA LEADERS PRIVATELY DO NOT FULLY SUPPORT THE CONSERVATIVE COALITION. HOWEVER, THEY MAINTAIN AN APPEARANCE OF SUPPORT EITHER OUT OF LOYALTY TO DENG OR A PRAGMATIC ATTEMPT TO ASSURE THEIR PERSONAL SURVIVAL. WHEN DENG PASSES FROM THE SCENE, DIVISIONS WILL SURFACE AS THE PLA PARTICIPATES IN THE SUCCESSION STRUGGLE. THE STRONG CORPORATE IDENTITY OF THE MILITARY, ALONG WITH LARGER NATIONAL SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS, WILL PROBABLY ENSURE THAT THE SUCCESSION STRUGGLE REMAINS PEACEFUL. STILL, THE POSSIBILITY OF MILITARY POSTURING IN SUPPORT OF PARTICULAR INDIVIDUALS CANNOT BE DISCOUNTED.

70. (G) RECENT EVENTS WILL ACCELERATE CHANGE IN THE PLA. HIGH-LEVEL MILITARY LEADERS ARE PROBABLY JUST AS DIVIDED OVER COMPETING VISIONS OF CHINA'S FUTURE AS ARE THEIR CIVILIANS. THIS REASON, THE CHARACTER OF THE PLA LEADERSHIP WILL EVOLVE IN A MANNER THAT ROUGHLY PARALLELS CHANGES AMONG PARTY AND GOVERNMENT LEADERS.

71. (G) IN THE COMING MONTHS, THE PLA WILL ADDRESS SUCH PROBLEMS
AS THE LACK OF DISCIPLINE AND RELIABILITY IDENTIFIED DURING THE
RECENT CRISIS. MOREOVER, IT WILL SEEK TO RESTORE ITS IMAGE AS THE
PEOPLE'S ARMY. WE EXPECT SOME SENIOR-LEVEL RETIREMENTS, A
RESHUFFLING OF KEY ASSIGNMENTS, PERHAPS SOME COURTS-MARTIAL, AND
POSSIBLY EVEN THE RELOCATION OF MAJOR UNITS TO DIFFERENT PARTS OF
CHINA. WE ARE BEGINNING TO GET REPORTING THAT INDICATES THE PURGE
IN THE MILITARY MAY HAVE BEGUN. ARRESTS HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN THE
GENERAL STAFF AND GENERAL LOGISTICS DEPARTMENTS AND OVER 40 MID-
LEVEL OFFICERS FROM BEIJING MR HEADQUARTERS AND THE 38TH ARMY ARE
REPORTED TO HAVE "DISAPPEARED."
72. (E) THE DEPLOYMENT OF UNITS FROM ALL 7 MILITARY REGIONS HAD
MANY CURRENT AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PLA AND THE DEFENSE OF
CHINA:

- BY DEPLOYING ONLY ELEMENTS OF GROUP ARMIES--UNITS OF
REGIMENTAL OR DIVISION SIZE--THE PLA DID NOT WEAKEN ITS BORDER
DEFENSES TO THE POINT THAT NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES MIGHT HAVE BEEN
TEMPTED TO CONDUCT HOSTILE ACTION AGAINST CHINA.

- THE ACTUAL DEPLOYMENT OF UNITS FROM ALL OVER CHINA WAS
EXCELLENT NOBILIZATION TRAINING FOR THE GROUND TROOPS INVOLVED, THE
AIR FORCES IN SUPPORT, AND THE RAILROAD SERVICES. SUCH A SUCCESSFUL
SHORT NOTICE DEPLOYMENT WILL CERTAINLY PROVIDE THE PLA WITH MANY
LESSONS TO IMPROVE FUTURE OPERATIONS.

- THE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF TROOPS ON THE GROUND ALSO RESULTED
IN MANY LESSONS FOR OPERATIONS SECURITY; OPERATIONS IN URBAN AREAS;
COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE; AND LOGISTICS
SUPPORT.

- THE NEED FOR RIOT-CONTROL TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT WAS
HIGHLIGHTED. DECISIONS NEED TO BE MADE TO DELINEATE RESPONSIBILITY
FOR CONTROL OF CIVIL DISTURBANCES BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND THE
PEOPLE'S ARMED POLICE.

- IF UNITS REMAIN IN THE CAPITAL FOR THE PROJECTED 6-12 MONTHS,
THEM WILL NOT BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN TACTICAL PROFICIENCY LEVELS
COMPARABLE TO UNITS IN GARRISON.

- POLITICAL TRAINING WILL CONTINUE TO BE INCREASED.

- OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF MARTIAL LAW USED UNPROGRAMED FUNDS.
TO PAY FOR THE RESTORATION OF ORDER, BUDGETS SOMEWHERE MUST BE CUT.
CURRENTLY, WE DO NOT KNOW WHERE THOSE CUTS WILL BE MADE.

- PLA RECRUITMENT MAY BE EFFECTED. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE
CURRENT PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN TO REBUILD THE PLA'S IMAGE AS DEFENDER
OF THE PEOPLE WILL PROBABLY SIGNIFICANTLY IMPACT UPON THIS PROBLEM.
73. (E) ADDITIONALLY, THE PLA WILL FEEL OTHER EFFECTS FROM THE
CRACKDOWN BECAUSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL REACTION.
MANY MILITARY PRODUCTION AND PURCHASE PROGRAMS WITH WESTERN COUNTRIES ARE NOW ON INDEFINITE HOLD. THEREFORE, THE PLA MAY BE FORCED TO PLACE GREATER RELIANCE ON OTHER SOURCES FOR NEAR-TERM EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY REQUIREMENTS, INCLUDING COVERT MEANS OF ACQUISITION.

SOME NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES MAY NEGATIVELY REASSESS CHINA'S ROLE AS A REGIONAL FORCE FOR STABILITY AND ALTER PREVIOUS TRENDS FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS OR TRADE.

74. IN CONCLUSION, CHINA'S CRISIS IS FAR FROM OVER. PRESSING ECONOMIC ISSUES WILL CONTINUE TO PLAGUE THE LEADERSHIP. A TARNISHED INTERNATIONAL IMAGE NEEDS TO BE OVERCOME. ALWAYS LOOMING IS THE DEATH OF DENG AND THE SUCCESSION STRUGGLE THAT IS SURE TO FOLLOW.

ADMIN
(OVERALL REGRADE IS DECL OADR)

BT
#5715

SECRET