MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
The Secretary's Initial Meeting with Shevardnadze

TIME: 9:50 am to 1:00 pm, Thursday, April 21, 1988
PLACE: Foreign Ministry "Osobnyak," Moscow
SUBJECTS: Organizational questions; President's Moscow Program; Human Rights

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.
The Secretary
Gen. Powell
Amb. Ridgway
Mr. Parris (Notetaker)
Mr. Zarechnak (Interpreter)

U.S.S.R.
Shevardnadze
Dep For Min Bessmeretnykh
Amb. Karpov
Mr. Tarasenko (Notetaker)
Mr. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

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Initial One-on-One

[Attended on U.S. side by Powell, Parris, Zarechnak; on Soviet by Bessmertnykh, Tarasenko, Mamedov, Palezhchenko]

Shevardnadze welcomed the Secretary to Moscow, noting that their increasingly frequent meetings had now reached an important stage. There was less than a month before the President's visit to Moscow. The people of the U.S. and Soviet Union, and of the world, had become accustomed to such events’ being crowned by major achievements. The same expectations existed for the President's visit, which was natural, in view of the progress achieved in recent years.

The Secretary's visit assumed acute importance in the context of seizing the opportunity provided by the upcoming summit to conclude an agreement on reducing strategic arsenal by fifty percent, and to resolve certain other problems. The ministers' task was to answer the fundamental question as to whether this was possible. Perhaps neither side could provide an unequivocal answer. Everything depended on the positions the two sides would take in the negotiations about to begin. Just before the Secretary had arrived, Shevardnadze had been asked by reporters if he were optimistic. He had answered that it all depended on what the Secretary was bringing with him. So there were important questions which had to be clarified over the next few days.

If the ministers reached the conclusion that no START agreement would be possible by the summit, they would have to explain why. Shevardnadze was frankly
worried that, in such circumstances, there would be a temptation to resort to recriminations and mutual accusations. That would be unfortunate. The situation was not a simple one. Much work had been done. There had been a real breakthrough on the INF agreement, as well as on such regional questions as Afghanistan. It was important that both sides be seen as taking a responsible approach.

What, then, were the knots which needed to be untied. The two ministers, Shevardnadze recalled, had previewed them in Geneva the week before. Shevardnadze had said then that the U.S. had seen all the Soviet fall-back positions. Moscow could logically expect the U.S. to reciprocate. That was what he wanted to say.

The Secretary thanked Shevardnadze for his comments. As for strategic arms and defense and space, the Secretary thought it would be a good idea to put working groups to work at once. The best approach would probably be to take each issue in its turn to see what could be done. We had some additional ideas on ALCM which, if they proved agreeable to the Soviet side, might allow the issue to be resolved during the present visit. There was also work to do on defense and space, and we would welcome Soviet reactions to the ideas we had shared in Washington on sensors.

The Soviet side, the Secretary recalled, had suggested putting the Washington Summit Statement language on the ABM Treaty in a new agreement, to be accompanied by a protocol or other document in which issues which have arisen could be resolved. The key for the U.S. was to reach a meeting of the minds as to the meaning of any words which might be agreed to. We were prepared for that kind of an approach, and might have some additional ideas to put forward shortly. But we believed much could be accomplished while the Secretary was in Moscow.

The Secretary said much had been accomplished since the Washington ministerial in removing brackets from the verification protocols. A related problem was to get started on the actual exchange of data under the MOU. We were prepared to start that process that day in a general way.

In the area of SLCM's, the Secretary recalled that he had shared with Shevardnadze in Geneva his view that it would be difficult to reach full closure during the next month. The U.S. Navy was actively engaged on the problem. In the meantime, the Secretary urged that the Soviets seriously consider the declaratory approach the U.S. had earlier put forward.

So, the Secretary concluded, the U.S. side had come prepared to work on the issues, and to continue that process between now and the summit--and even after the summit if final agreement had not been reached by then. Every effort should nonetheless be made in the weeks ahead to get as far as possible. Both the President and General Secretary, the Secretary recalled, had said to each other and publicly that they wanted an agreement, but that it must be good, well thought out. All the information had to be
digested. As was the case with INF, we were breaking new ground. Both sides needed to be certain of what they were doing. We were gettin [sic] there, but it was not an easy process. So, the Secretary suggested, arms control and other groups should be set up without delay, and the ministers would of course have discussions of their own on these issues.

The Secretary added that he was also in a position to provide the President's response to the suggestions Shevardnadze had conveyed the week before in Geneva on the Moscow summit schedule.

Shevardnadze [sic] agreed that working groups could be set up along traditional lines, and suggested that consideration also be given to release of a joint statement at the conclusion of the Secretary's discussions. The Secretary said this posed no problem from the U.S. standpoint. He noted that the ministers should also consider what documents might be issued in connection with the Moscow summit. Shevardnadze said agreed [sic] that this was something which would need to be discussed, as would the question of a final meeting between the two ministers before the Moscow summit. The Secretary suggested that the issue be addressed the next day.

Prior to moving to the adjacent conference room to join their delegations, Shevardnadze informed the Secretary that Gorbachev would receive him at 11:00 the following day.

The one-on-one concluded at 10:18 am.

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Plenary Meeting

Following brief welcoming remarks, Shevardnadze announced that he and the Secretary had agreed that working groups, structured along the patterns which had been used for previous meetings, should get to work immediately.

In responding, The Secretary briefly reviewed the progress which had been achieved in each of the four main areas of the U.S.-Soviet agenda since he and Shevardnadze had first met in Helsinki in July 1985. The Secretary observed that it was this ability to successfully address and resolve difficult issues which ultimately determined the nature of the relationship between the two countries. As we approached the fourth U.S.-Soviet summit in three years, the two leaders would have behind them a solid string of accomplishments dating back to the Geneva summit. The Secretary was confident that the Moscow meeting would make its own contribution to the process, which had already imparted a greater sense of stability and promise to the relationship.

The plenary session concluded at 10:45, with the ministers and their senior advisors remaining in the large "White Room" of the Osobnyak.

President's Schedule
Shevardnadze suggested that the discussion begin with the President's Moscow schedule.

The Secretary indicated that he had conveyed to the President and Mrs. Reagan the suggestions Shevardnadze had provided the week before in Geneva. The President had found the Geneval [sic] Secretary's ideas helpful and impressive. With respect to the President's own schedule, the Secretary was authorized to accept the Soviet side's proposals, with one variation. Rather than return to Spaso House after the formal opening ceremony, the President would prefer to hold his initial one-on-one with Gorbachev immediately after the ceremony. During the one-on-one, the Secretary suggested, the two ministers and senior aides might meet separately to consider how to handle any last minute developments.

As for Mrs. Reagan's schedule, the Secretary continued, she appreciated the Soviet side's suggestions, but had not yet fully made up her mind with respect to her schedule. We would respond at a later date.

The Secretary pointed out that it might be useful later during his present visit to discuss such modalities as how the leaders' one-on-one meetings should be integrated with larger meetings. There would also be a need to talk about the size of larger sessions. On the whole, the Secretary felt, involving more than the group on his side of the table (Powell and Ridgway), plus such senior advisors to the President as Howard Baker and Frank Carlucci, tended to "make them go downhill."

Finally, the Secretary asked if Shevardnadze could clarify Gorbachev’s offer to host a “small private dinner” during the summit. Did the General Secretary have in mind simply the two leaders and their wives, or was a larger group contemplated? Either variant would be acceptable to the President.

Shevardnadze said that, while he would have to refer to Gorbachev the President's preference to hold the initial one-on-one immediately after the welcoming ceremony, he did not expect this to be a problem. As for the rest of the program, including the roles of the ministers and the composition of various groups, this would have to be considered. Shevardnadze was sure that adequate arrangements could be worked out. Shevardnadze felt it was "understood" that the President's and Gorbachev's main advisors should take participate [sic] in some meetings between the leaders; there would also be one-on-ones.

As for the private supper, Shevardnadze indicated that it could be assumed for planning purposes that what the General Secretary had in mind was the leaders and their wives, alone.

The Secretary said this was fine. He suggested that any joint statement issued after the ministers meeting should report that a final schedule for the President's visit had been worked out.
Shevardnadze said that, as for Mrs. Reagan’s program, the Soviet side would wait for a more definitive reply. The main thing was whether or not she would go to Leningrad, as that drove much of the rest of the First Lady's schedule.

**Human Rights**

The Secretary suggested that the ministers open the substantive part of their discussion with a review of human rights issues. He would then like to address the Middle East, so that Assistant Secretary Murphy, who had accompanied him to Moscow, could begin follow-up discussions with MFA Middle East Department Chief Polyakov.

Shevardnadze agreed, suggesting that arms control could in that case be dealt with in the evening session. He expressed some concern, however, over such a delay.

The Secretary clarified that he had in mind dealing initially only with the Middle East. Other regional issues could be dealt with later, after the ministers had begun their discussion of arms control.

Opening his presentation on human rights, the Secretary expressed satisfaction over the evolution of the two sides’ dialogue on human rights over the previous two and a half years. The dialogue had in a sense become a two-way street, with cooperative discussions under way. This expanding process represented an affirmation that human rights issues had become part of the texture of U.S.-Soviet relations. Progress on human rights, or the lack of it, had a relationship to what did or did not happen in other areas. In other words, progress in other areas, such as arms control or Afghanistan, while welcome, was no substitute for progress in human rights.

The U.S. was aware of the internal changes taking place in the Soviet Union under the rubrics of glasnost and perestroika. We realized that in the main these were a function of the Soviet leadership's having concluded that it was in the Soviet Union's interest to make these changes. Against that background, the Secretary wanted to comment on a number of areas where we hoped to see movement.

First, with respect to political prisoners, the Secretary recalled that the two ministers had had a long discussion during Shevardnadze's March visit to Washington. As the Secretary had promised, the U.S. had subsequently delivered to the MFA a list of some 300 prisoners. The list had been compiled by taking into account information provided by Soviet officials to Congressman Hoyer, in response to a request he had made a year before. Because records of such cases were not as yet open to the public in the Soviet Union, much of our information was based on secondary, rather than primary sources.

Expressing appreciation for the effort involved in reviewing the cases presented by Rep. Hoyer, the Secretary noted that the list we had provided was organized for the convenience of its Soviet reviewers. We hoped it would be possible to discuss with
Soviet officials the situation of the persons we had identified. Where persons were in prison simply for something they had written or said, or for unauthorized practice of their religion, we hoped they would be set free. The Soviet Union had not punished people for such activities for the past year or so, yet people were still in jail for having done something in the early 1988’s which would go unpunished today. Elimination of the political prisoner issue, the Secretary concluded, would be an important and positive step.

As for cases Shevardnadze had raised during the March ministerial--Berrigan, the Brazinkas family and Helen Woodson, they had been investigated in detail and the Soviet side had been given a full accounting. The U.S. was prepared to continue to investigate cases of concern to the Soviet side if we were provided with sufficient details. By way of example, the Secretary described in some detail the results of our investigation into the case of Helen Woodson, concluding by noting our disappointment that Soviet officials had misrepresented the information we had previously provided. He then briefly summarized the case of Nikolai and Svetlana Ogorodnikov, noting that discussion of convicted spies had no place in the two sides’ discussion of human rights.

The Secretary noted that the evolving discussions on human rights could be useful, if both sides took a responsible approach. But talk was not enough. There was a saying in Russian, "bol'she dyela, men'she slov." What was needed now was action to resolve difficult issues.

As an example, the Secretary noted that, when Soviet physicians requested permission to visit Leonard Peltier, the U.S. government had facilitated the visit, even though we did not agree with the Soviet side's characterization of him as a political prisoner. Several months later, an American organization sought to examine several Soviet political prisoners. Their appeal went unanswered. If the Soviet government endorsed the visit to Mr. Peltier, it must surely recognize the humanitarian principle on which that request was based.

Similarly, in their last discussion, Shevardnadze had raised the fate of Soviet nationals who had emigrated to the U.S. and claimed to have suffered harassment. While the U.S. was fully prepared to review such cases if the Soviet side provided the necessary details, Moscow had failed to take action on an initiative that might resolve some of these problems--a dual nationals agreement. The Secretary reiterated the U.S. side's willingness to explore this option.

On a more general level, the Secretary indicated that the U.S. would welcome more of the concrete steps which had taken place in several areas, such as emigration and political prisoners. The process was by no means unbroken, and we had recently seen some return to old practices, such as beatings and detentions. We hoped that this did not portend a reversal of the positive trends we had seen earlier. A retreat would attract more attention because of the expectations which had been generated by Soviet reforms. Expectations were the price of progress--an inescapable reality. Our main hope was to see
changes in Soviet laws and institutions, and in practices, which would bring the Soviet Union into compliance with its international obligations.

But, the Secretary emphasized, we also remained concerned about the fate of individuals. We were therefore disappointed that there had been no progress with regard to the seventeen persons the President had brought to Shevardnadze's attention the previous month, and which the Secretary had raised in February. These individuals exemplified the range of our concerns. Not all were seeking to emigrate; some sought only greater freedom of religious activity or political expression, or sought to monitor Soviet compliance with its international human rights obligations. Our list had been developed with care, and we strongly hoped the Soviet side would find it possible to act promptly and favorably on it. The Secretary expressed his hope that all of the cases we had raised would be solved by the time of the President's visit. With this in mind, he handed over a new copy of the list, with supplemental material on each of the cases.

On the issue of Jewish emigration, the Secretary made several points. He noted, first, that processing of applications for exit permits appeared to take longer than seemed justified. It almost seemed that the delays were the result of a policy to set a limit on the number of exit permits to be granted every month or quarter as a quota. If the processing were speeded up, the number of permits granted each month would obviously increase.

There also seemed to be a problem of persons who were denied exit permits on the grounds that they possessed government secrets. But many such individuals had not done secret work for a decade or more; it did not stand to reason that they had information which was still secret. Within that group were also persons who were seriously ill. Finally, there was a problem of parents having the right to veto the emigration of their grown children. In many such cases, there seemed to be no logical reason why the parents should have the right to interfere with the decisions of their adult children, many of whom are married and have children of their own.

Finally, the Secretary continued, in the year of the Millenium [sic], the U.S. hoped that the Soviet Union would follow through on its commitment to expand religious freedom. One of the most dramatic gestures of such reform would be the release of the scores of remaining religious prisoners of all faiths. Some of these individuals were included on the list we had provided the MFA the month before, some were repeated on the list the Secretary had just handed over. But as symbolic and important a gesture as that would be, it should be accompanied by reform in laws and practices. The Secretary thus expressed the hope that Moscow would consider: elimination of requirements for religious groups to register with the government; repeal of anti-religious articles in the criminal code; legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church; legalization of religious education outside the home; increased access to religious books and ritual objects.

The Secretary noted that, during their last conversation, he had raised with Shevardnadze our disappointment with the performance of the Soviet delegation at the
Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting. Religious freedom was omne [sic] area where the Soviet delegation had retreated from earlier expressions of flexibility. They were now seeking to insert loopholes in the draft text which deprived it of all force.

On a more general plane, the Secretary expressed puzzlement by the Soviet delegation in Vienna's behaviour [sic]. The Vienna meeting was an important one, and both sides seemed to be committed to ending it on an early and successful basis. But that required a balanced outcome. The problem was that the Soviet delegation was not prepared to go as far in its statements as what the Soviet leadership was saying in Moscow. Nor did it square with our private discussions with Shevardnadze and Gorbachev. It was as if the Soviet delegation were taking positions from an earlier era.

The U.S., the Secretary said, was ready to work as quickly as possible to bring about a good result in Vienna. We had never imposed any artificial obstacles to progress and did not intend to do so. But we did intend to see further progress in the humanitarian sphere, and it was important that the results of the Vienna meeting improve on previous CSCE meetings. This meant that the Soviet Union would have to move considerably further than it had so far in the negotiation of the Vienna concluding document.

The Secretary noted that, in addition to working towards significant results on the human rights side, the U.S. was prepared to work constructively on the appropriate means of starting new security talks. We believed that ensuring the autonomy of the new conventional stability talks, within the framework of the CSCE process, was central to their ultimate success. Thus, the U.S. shared with the Soviet Union a common goal in a timely and satisfactory conclusion in Vienna. We were nonetheless prepared to remain at the negotiating table as long as it took to achieve a balanced, substantive result.

The Secretary concluded his presentation by expressing frustration that, given the important changes underway in the Soviet Union, Moscow was failing to take the critical steps necessary to convince its own people and the world that those changes would endure and would strengthen respect for human rights. He urged that the Vienna meeting be brought into the picture so that it could be concluded promptly and successfully.

Shevardnadze prefaced his reply by noting that "We have a hard delegation" in Vienna. We tell them one thing, Shevardnadze said, "They do something different." There had, however, been some changes recently.

More generally, Shevardnadze thought it well that the U.S.-Soviet dialogue was no longer just a discussion of problem areas. Many questions were being resolved, both with respect to individuals and broader questions. Progress was taking place without creating problems in other areas. A good working relationship was developing, with the ministers addressing the fundamental problems and experts getting into more detailed discussions. A stage had been reached where the experts were increasingly in a position
to provide specific recommendations to ministers. The task now was to make the dialogue which had been established more productive.

Shevardnadze briefly reviewed with satisfaction cooperative activities already underway in various areas--exchanges between scholars, legal experts, parliamentarians; visits by unofficial U.S. groups, including psychiatrists. In the latter context, Shevardnadze noted that there had been no U.S. answer to Moscow's proposal for government to government exchanges on psychiatry. The Soviet side continued to reject unfounded allegations and accusations which had been made against the Soviet Union in this area, but improvements had been made. Moscow wanted to remove this issue from the agenda. The Secretary said this would be welcome.

Shevardnadze noted that the Soviet side also remained interested in exchanging information on legislation relevant to human rights and humanitarian affairs, and had handed over some initial materials on the subject during the March ministerial. Moscow also remained interested in discussions on combating [sic] terrorism--an issue the ministers might address later in more detail.

Shevardnadze reminded the Secretary that the Soviet side had also raised the question of Nazi war criminals in March. Since then, there had been some signs of a more constructive 3.S. [sic] approach. The Soviet side had voted in favor of a U.S. initiative on the subject before the UNHCR. There had also been consultation between the Department of Justice and the Soviet Procuracy. Shevardnadze called for continued cooperation in this important area, and appealed more generally for closer cooperation for U.S. and Soviet delegations to international bodies dealing with human rights, including the Vienna CSCE Follow-up meeting. In this regard, Shevardnadze noted that the Soviet side had on prior occasions expressed displeasure with the performance of the U.S. delegation.

The Secretary recalled that, during the final phase of the Stockholm CDE meeting, the two ministers had played an important role in bringing about a positive result. There was no reason the Vienna meeting could not have ended six months earlier. The ingredients were available; the ministers ought to provide a push. If there were some prospect of completing the meeting by the time of the Moscow summit, it could be a very constructive factor. A new round was just getting underway in Vienna. It would be a good thing for all concerned if we could bring the meeting to a satisfactory conclusion. Both sides had endorsed that goal; they ought to do what they could to bring it about.

Shevardnadze said he was well informed about the situation in Vienna. He thought it would be possible to find a solution to the humanitarian and economic issues under discussion there. There were also some prospects on "language." The more difficult issues related to conventional weapons--something Shevardnadze hoped to discuss in more detail later in the conversation.
Noting the Secretary's reference to a "two-way street" in the two sides' discussion of human rights, Shevardnadze expressed satisfaction that the U.S. now had a more realistic understanding of the need for such a relationship. In that connection, the Foreign Minister wished to raise a number of specific issues.

First, he recalled that Moscow had previously urged the U.S. to adhere to international human rights covenants which could provide the basis for bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the field. The Soviet side was disappointed that the U.S. had taken no action, even though many in Congress had endorsed the idea. Instead, Asst. Sec. Schifter had indicated on behalf of the Administration that it could not support the idea of ratifying the covenants in question. So, Shevardnadze quipped, the U.S. had complaints about Soviet human rights spokesmen, the Soviet side had its complaints about Schifter.

Another outstanding issue was visas for trader union leaders and for members of the Soviet creative intelligentsia. It was unfair of the U.S. to deny visas in such cases.

Yet another area where there had been no adequate U.S. response was terrorism. The Soviet public had a right to complain that the U.S. seemed to provide a haven for terrorists--the Brazinskases family. The case had become more acute in the wake of a March hijacking attempt in the Soviet Union, which had revived public recollections of the U.S. refusal to allow the Brazinskases' extradition.

Shevardnadze recalled that he had given the Secretary a list of political prisoners in the U.S. during an earlier meeting. As yet there had been no adequate response. The Soviet side was aware of the U.S. position that only those who had been convicted of criminal offenses were imprisoned in American jails, but Moscow still had doubts on this score. Shevardnadze was aware, for example, of persons who had been jailed for espousing Puerto Rican independence. U.S. representatives had expressed skepticism that all "political prisoners" in the Soviet Union were criminals; the Soviet side was similarly skeptical of U.S. claims.

At the same time, Shevardnadze said, the Soviet side was not unaware of certain positive steps taken by the U.S. Moscow, for example, had appealed for more humane treatment of anti-war protesters. Subsequently, the sentences of some protesters had been reduced from 15 to 5 years. Perhaps there was no relationship to the Soviet appeal, but this was still a positive step. But Moscow remained concerned about such issues as the imposition of the death sentence for minors. Shevardnadze was aware of U.S. arguments on this point, but found them unconvincing.

The Foreign Minister said he was also aware from contacts with U.S. and other Jewish leaders of concern that the aggressive tactics of certain Jewish circles in the U.S. on behalf of Soviet Jewry were in fact stirring up anti-semitic feelings in the Soviet Union. Shevardnadze could confirm that, while the phenomenon was limited, there was
validity to such concerns, which should be taken into consideration by the U.S. government. He emphasized that he was reflecting the views of sober-minded members of the U.S. Jewish community, a factor which gave food for thought.

For its part the Soviet side had sought to take into account concerns which had been raised by the U.S. Moscow could, for example, have turned a deaf ear to U.S. appeals on behalf of Soviet citizens who claimed U.S. citizenship. Instead, and despite the fact that the Soviet Union did not recognize dual nationality, the Soviet side had taken a different approach. It was hoped that the U.S. would respond in kind to the issues raised by the Soviet Union.

Specifically, Shevardnadze wanted to raise the case of Virginia Lynch—a U.S. citizen who had written Shevardnadze to seek his assistance in protecting the rights of her family. Shevardnadze had not personally been able to look into the case, as, he suspected, the Secretary was unable personally to become familiar with the particulars of the cases he raised with Shevardnadze. But he hoped the Secretary could look into the matter and, if the case were well-founded, encourage steps to resolve the problem.

On a more general level, Shevardnadze said he believed the role of the ministers' experts on human rights should be to provide their chiefs with solid, accurate information which could lead to practical results. In this regard, Shevardnadze had to say that the figure of 300 political prisoners provided by the U.S. was way out of line. In fact, there were just a few people in this category. The U.S. embassy should know better what was happening in this area. No one in the Soviet Union would believe the U.S. numbers if they were made public.

Shevardnadze recalled how the ministers' early discussions of human rights issues had been highly contentious, with accusations and recriminations. Now there was a qualitatively new situation. But often the lists provided by the U.S. included, for example, people who had been released ten years before. Shevardnadze raised the point because, once figures got into the public domain, they took on lives of their own. He reiterated that the U.S. Embassy should be more careful in compiling its lists. If they were well founded it was one thing; it was in neither side's interest that they be groundless.

The Secretary replied that the U.S. was quite prepared to go through the lists it had provided the Soviet side to validate our information. As to specific cases raised by the Soviet side, Asst. Sec. Schifter would be providing detailed response; the Secretary had singled out a few only as illustrations. The Secretary asked Shevardnadze directly what action could be expected on the seventeen specific names he and the President had raised in recent meetings.

Shevardnadze answered that it was difficult to provide an answer at the moment. He assured the Secretary that any lists he or the President provided were carefully studied by the Soviet side. Many had been resolved. But Shevardnadze could not answer the
Secretary’s specific question at that time. Perhaps he would be say [sic] later during the Secretary's visit which cases could and could not be resolved.

After a brief discussion of how to use the afternoon session, the Secretary asked Powell to comment on the status of the INF Treaty ratification process, and specifically the issue of whether "futuristic" weapons were banned under the Treaty. Powell briefly noted that the Senate committees examining the Treaty had now reported it out favorably, and acknowledged [sic] that the issue the Secretary had alluded to had come up. The letter Shevardnadze had provided the week before on the subject had been useful in documenting the two sides' common understanding that "weapons" systems associated with the ranges covered by the Treaty were banned. It was possible that further clarification would be necessary as consultations with the Senate leadership on this point progressed. It was not clear at this point whether the Senate would insist on amending the Treaty to deal with the issue, or whether some clarification short of that would be adequate.

Once the question were resolved, and Powell was convinced it would be, the only remaining issue was one to which the Soviet side was not a party, having to do with future interpretation of treaties. Powell felt that the process would take another two weeks to be completed, after which the Senate would briefly recess. The Treaty would probably go to the Senate floor about May 9. The Secretary noted that a recent 393-7 House vote, while it had no legal effect, gave some sense of the underlying support the Treaty had come to enjoy.

Shevardnadze said he understood that the "futuristic" weapons question the Secretary had raised in Geneva was important. He felt he had answered the question in Geneva, but had subsequently felt a written reply might be useful with the Senate. If the U.S. needed anything more, the Soviet side was "at its disposal."

The Secretary said the key was to nail down that the Treaty applied to weapons systems.

The meeting ended without further substantive discussion.

[Source: Freedom of Information Act request to the U.S. Department of State]