CUBAN CONTINGENCIES

1. General Considerations

A. U.S. Objectives: 4 Possible Courses

In the event Cuba should engage in further significant military intervention, U.S. actions would have to be geared to some reasonably clear objectives. Obviously, our aims will be determined in part by the situation confronting us.

The following are among the general objectives we might choose:

1. Deterrence

A series of signals that manifest our intention to take action, military, economic or political against Cuba. The scenario might extend for several weeks or months and could be linked to a specific set of demands on the Cubans and Soviets. It would have to be predicated on a willingness to take some action if the deterrence failed.

2. Pressures to Cease and Desist

If Cuban actions had already clearly been taken we could mount counter actions proclaimed as forcing them to cease their action and withdraw or pay a severe price for continuing. (These actions, for example, could be implemented under the present circumstances of Cuban involvement in Angola.)

3. Interdiction of Cuban Action Under Way

Specific actions designed to interfere with or weaken Cuban capabilities to continue an operation they had begun.

4. Retaliation

Designed either as a one time action or a more prolonged series of steps to make the Cubans pay a price for their policy rather than actually preventing them from carrying out a course of action.

There would probably be some overlapping of objectives. Deterrence could lead to interdiction or retaliation. Some actions would involve a number of objectives: deterrence, pressure to withdraw, and retaliation for provocation.
B. Soviet Dimension

Soviet-Cuban ties are an interwoven fabric of economic dependence, ideological interaction, and geo-political partnership, with the Soviets providing the commercial, military, financial goods and technology in return for Cuba's communist orthodoxy and support in the Third World. Cuba, however, is not subject to ultimate Soviet military discipline as are the Eastern Europeans and its dependency is of a more elastic economic nature. However, Soviet leverage over Cuban adventures in military intervention is nearly absolute. Thus, we can assume that if the Cubans embark on a military adventure they have some degree of Soviet guarantee of support.

In short, confronting Cuba--the weaker partner--is an obvious step toward confronting the USSR.

In the US-Soviet understanding of 1962 between Kennedy and Krushchev, our non-invasion pledge was given in return for withdrawal of Soviet missiles under UN verification. Failure of the Cubans to permit the UN supervision renders the US pledge technically inoperative. However, in 1970, the Soviets indicated they regarded the understanding as still in force, and President Nixon, in effect, reaffirmed it by declaring that the Soviets would be violating it if they sent nuclear submarines to Cuba thus implying the agreement has provided a useful lever to us in restricting use by the Soviet Union of Cuban bases for military purposes. It is clear that nullification of it by the US through employment of armed forces against Cuba would represent a major challenge to the USSR's international prestige and a threat to its doctrine of irreversibility. Since the loss of Cuba would not necessarily set in motion a domino process as the Soviets feared would occur with Hungary in 1956, there is probably a limit to how far the Cubans would go in risking conflict with the US over Cuba.

Cuban relations with the Peoples Republic of China have steadily deteriorated as their relationship with the Soviets became closer. The Angola affair, therefore, was uncomfortable to the PRC which would welcome a humiliation of Castro. The PRC would therefore probably support the US measures to deter or retaliate against further Cuban adventures, but its support is likely to be passive or, at best, quietly supportive.
There are a number of measures of mounting seriousness which the US could take to impress the Soviets of the need to exert restraint on Cuba, ranging from postponing low substance exchanges and high visibility contacts, delaying opening of the US Consulate in Kiev and the Soviet Consulate in New York, to pulling back from planning of bilateral high-substance contacts, ceasing licenses for computers, delaying additional grain purchases, and discouraging private US economic projects. Finally, we could break off SALT and MBFR negotiations and terminate grain sales.

Conversely, we could deliberately choose not to take action against Soviet-American relations as an effort to localize our confrontation with Cuba. Thus, continuing with grain sales, or SALT, etc., could signal that we had limited objectives -- forcing a Cuban retreat rather than inflicting a defeat on the USSR.

C. The Special Problem of Guantanamo

The US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba creates special circumstances which both strengthen and weaken our position with regard to the measures available to us. Its geographical position surrounded by a ring of hills makes it extremely vulnerable to attack. At the moment there are slightly under 3,000 military personnel there and about 4,000 dependents. The base is lightly defended. Therefore, any US action that might lead to a confrontation with Cuba might have to be preceded by evacuation of dependents and nonessential personnel and reinforcement of the defense force. Moreover, an adequate defense of Guantanamo would require seizure of key terrain located outside the base perimeter. The reinforcement necessary, by four Marine battalions (600 men) and occupation of adjacent terrain would in itself generate a crisis atmosphere.

Thus the base provides tactical opportunities to demonstrate the seriousness of our purpose, for example, by adjusting the size of our force there.

D. The Problem of Provocation

There is no precise threshold which would determine our response to a Cuban provocation. The Threshold would obviously be low in the case of a Cuban action directed against the US or our territories (Puerto
Rico); higher in the Caribbean area (Guyana or Jamaica) and elsewhere in the hemisphere where the Rio Pact applies. In Latin America, intervention has been characterized less by support of revolutionary movement than by direct approaches to specific governments, (i.e., Guyana and Jamaica) involvement is extended from economic advisers to military training, first in Cuba and then in the nation concerned, infiltration into the power apparatus of the target nation and eventually perhaps the stationing of Cuban troops.

Cuban provocation in Africa would present special problems. Cuban military intervention there can follow a continuum of actions from training of insurgents to shipments of small arms, use of advisers, commitment of military support personnel, small contingents of combat troops, or a large-scale commitment of military forces. Moreover, the beginning steps toward Cuban action in Africa which could result in commitment of combat troops in operations within Rhodesia have already been taken. Up to 100 Cuban advisers have been sent to Mozambique and are providing military training to Rhodesian insurgents. The current intelligence judgment is that it is likely that within six months the Cubans will be heavily involved in supporting the insurgents in Mozambique and some military personnel will be in combat with insurgents inside Rhodesia. The Latin America Cubans are training Guyana defense force elements while building ties with the Jamaican security and intelligence apparatus. There is some possibility that the Cubans will attempt to involve Guyana troops in southern Africa.

--- In sum, there is a good chance the US will be confronted by an ambiguous situation, in which Cuban intervention is not clearly established.

--- There is also the contingency that Cuba will not be directly involved, but a flow of Soviet supplies, plus Cuban training amounts to a major indirect intervention—but an ambiguous situation.

--- These ambiguities could be particularly troublesome if we are to marshal domestic and Congressional support for counteraction.
II. Cuban Strength and Vulnerability

A. Military on the Island

The Cuban Army has an estimated strength of 160,000 of which 60,000 are reservists. These personnel are well trained and equipped and provide the major element of combat strength. They are concentrated around population centers of Havana and Holguin/Santiago de Cuba in the east. An additional 228,000 personnel are in police, security and other paramilitary organizations. The primary vulnerability derives from disposition of units.

The Cuban Navy consists of 9,200 men and 100 craft, mostly of Soviet origin. It is primarily a coastal patrol defense force with only a limited offensive capability. Heavily dependent upon servicing from Cuba’s three primary naval bases, the Navy is not equipped for, nor experienced with, prolonged operations at sea.

The primary strength of the Cuban air force is its estimated 180 jet fighter aircraft of which 105 are the modern MIG 21/FISHBED-L. These are based at three principle military air fields; refueling and servicing facilities at secondary air fields are considerably more limited. Cuban fighter pilots are experienced in ground control interception and Cuba’s network of ground control facilities extends into each of the air defense zones (West, Central and East). Cubans have no known in-flight refueling capability. Missile and jet fuel reserves in Cuba are unknown. Soviet pilots work with the Cuban Air Force.

Cuba also possesses substantial amounts of conventional air defense artillery weapons.

Cuba is vulnerable from the sea approaches in all directions. The U.S. naval base at Guantanamo provides a limited military presence for U.S. forces on the eastern end of the island. There are
2,000 Soviet military advisors in Cuba working with all three Cuban services. A Soviet-operated facility in the Havanna area gives Cuban forces a good SIGINT capability.

B. Logistic Position of the Military

The primary vulnerability of the Cuban armed forces lies in its total dependence upon the Soviet Union and Soviet bloc countries for all POL, military equipment, spare parts, and ammunition supplies. At present all POL and repair parts are brought in by ship to the major Cuban ports. Most equipment enters the port of Mariel. While repair parts could be supplied by air, air supply of POL would present a more difficult problem.

C. The Economy

The Cuban economy is characterized by the dominance of the sugar monoculture and the heavy dependence upon international trade in Cuba which is as large as its total gross national product. One-third of the food supply is imported. Virtually all capital goods, and a substantial share of raw materials and intermediate goods and all energy needs, are met by imports. Much of this is supplied by the Soviet Union which takes 60 percent of Cuba's exports and supplies 50 percent of its imports, including virtually all its petroleum and 60 percent of its foodstuffs. Trade with the non-communist world accounts for 36 percent of Cuba's total trade, largely with Western Europe, Japan and Canada. Cuban imports from non-communist countries have tripled since 1973 to the point where half of its manufactures and raw materials, 40 percent of its machinery and equipment, and 33 percent of its foodstuffs come from the West. Argentina and Spain have extended substantial credit lines to Cuba. A number of Western European countries have very small assistance programs with it.

Cuba's foreign trade is carried on almost exclusively by ocean traffic, 95 percent of which is in foreign ships and three-quarters communist. Two-thirds of the tonnage is petroleum. Cuba is served by seven airlines besides its own, three are communist and three are Western. Aeroflot flies an average of one flight a day. Cuba has one major international airport and ten others capable of handling larger modern planes. It is estimated that a Soviet airlift could deliver at best 4 percent of Cuba's total imports and 6 percent of its petroleum, and this capacity would quickly deteriorate.
D. Political

Castro is greatly concerned with his prestige and influence in Latin America and the Third World. One of Cuba's main foreign policy objectives has been to normalize relations with the countries of this hemisphere. There are growing signs that for the first time in recent years Castro is encountering obstacles to this policy and has paid some diplomatic cost for the Angolan venture. The Chiefs of States' meeting which was to be held in Panama next June was cancelled because Castro's presence was unacceptable to a number of them. Cuba has been criticized directly and indirectly by many Latin American leaders in public and its relations have deteriorated with a number of them.

An important gauge of the success of Castro's southern African ventures will be the way they are treated at the forthcoming Non-Aligned Summit Conference in Sri Lanka this August. The Cubans will work for an endorsement of their Angola action. A number of countries will be working against that, like Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, but the key will lie with the African states. The more moderate ones which are more directly involved in the Rhodesia situation may be able to prevail over their more radical colleagues to prevent an endorsement. A call for non-intervention seems less likely.

Western Europe, Japan, and Canada are important to Cuba because the achievement of the goals of its five-year economic plan is not possible without credits from them as well as Spain and Argentina. While these countries consider their trade with Cuba to be of importance to them, further substantial Cuban intervention might provide a basis to consider restricting their trade and credit with Cuba.
III. Courses of Action

A. Preventive Actions

1. Description: General Objective

This option seeks to influence Cuban behavior to prevent Cuban intervention elsewhere in the world. It would also provide a possible justification for Cuba to bring its troops back home.

2. Major Steps

The principal action is the permanent establishment of increased US force presence in the Caribbean. Prior to that, however, there are short-term operations of a non-combat nature available to increase Cuban perception of threat.

b. Reinforce forces at Guantanamo and evacuate dependents. (Would require one C-130 squadron, one battalion of Marines, and one Marine attack squadron. A minimum of 36 hours for air lift would be required, or 7-8 days for surface lifting. Would disrupt LANTCOM forces and affect our commitment to NATO.)

c. Engage in electronic warfare by jamming communications, navigation aids, etc. (Would require CINCLANT electronic warfare assets, support aircraft and equipment from CINCPAC and CINCSAC, and Air National Guard aircraft.)
e. Temporary increase in force presence in the Caribbean. (Deploy Carrier Task Group and service ships to the Caribbean. Requires 6 to 7 days).

f. Permanent reposturing of forces:

(1) Announcement of a unified command headquartered in Puerto Rico (no forces required, effective immediately).

(2) Reopening of Ramey Air Force Base in Puerto Rico; rebasing of a Tactical Fighter Wing at Ramey; rebasing an Army infantry brigade or equivalent Marine unit at Ramey; basing a destroyer squadron at Roosevelt Roads; creating an Inter-American training establishment. (Reopening of the base would take six to nine months as would repositioning a destroyer squadron at Roosevelt Roads. Other repositioning would follow reopening of the base. Cost for reopening base would be under $50 million, for establishing the destroyer squadron an estimated $70 million, and for repositioning of other forces estimated at $10 million each.)


5. Implications. Forces rebased would still be available to meet NATO commitments. This option would not foreclose other military or diplomatic options and would raise the cost of Cuban intervention in Latin America. On the negative side, this option would increase the probability of a US-Cuban "incident" and would involve expensive repositioning of military forces of otherwise limited military value. Latin American adherence to the principle of non-intervention would militate against statements of support for the US action and could result in some statements of opposition. Certain elements in Puerto Rico could be expected to express vocal opposition to repositioning US military forces in Puerto Rico.
6. Expected Results. If successful, Castro would refrain from intervention elsewhere in the world and would withdraw his troops from Africa to defend Cuba against the increased threat.

7. Risks. Could stimulate threats or action against the vulnerable Guantanamo facility. Could stimulate vocal criticism and action by nationalist elements in Puerto Rico. Could stimulate exile organizations to initiate actual paramilitary operations against Cuba.

B. Military Options -- All options entail a risk of provoking Cuban reprisal against Guantanamo Base. All options assume reinforcement of the Base and evacuation of dependents and required notification to Congress under the War Powers Act.

Possible Soviet Military Responses

A force of 30 to 50 surface combatants and 10 to 20 submarines could be deployed to Cuba within 15 days. As few as six to eight surface escorts could provide continuous escort of the Soviet/Pact merchant ships that arrive in Cuba each day.

There is the possibility that Soviet piloted MIGs would be engaging US aircraft. MIG forces could engage ships or aircraft at distances of 500 NM with minimum reaction time.

Pressure on Guantanamo By Cuba

The Cubans could apply heavy pressure on the Guantanamo Naval Base. The current plan, previously discussed, can defend against the regular Cuban army. If Cuba ordered mobilization, by M+30 they could have 700,000 men under arms.


The majority of the military forces allocated to CINCLANT for planning by the JCS are committed in support of the Cuban contingency options.

All scheduled training and exercises, such as those with NATO in the Atlantic or Latin America, would be cancelled. There would be immediate and serious disruption of ship and aircraft overhaul.
It is not anticipated that there would be an initial impact on the SIXTH Fleet. No ships or Marines currently serving with the SIXTH Fleet would be involved in Cuban operations.

Amphibious task force units and Marines of the SEVENTH Fleet are earmarked to support the Cuban contingency operations and the drawdown on CINCPAC Forces would severely limit CINCPAC's flexibility to respond to contingency plans for operations in the Western Pacific.

The forces earmarked for the Cuban contingency are in large part the same forces that would be required for any US involvement in the Middle East.

The execution of the Cuban contingency would involve a substantial portion of the Tactical Air Force of AFLANT, and the Infantry Forces of ARLANT.

Possible Adverse Outcome of Any Options

- Cuba decides to use force to drive the US military force out of Guantanamo.

- Soviet ships do not honor the blockade/quarantine leading to seizure or sinking of ships.

- Soviets provide naval escort for shipping to Cuba.

- Soviets/Cubans attempt to by-pass a maritime quarantine/blockade by utilizing air transport.

1. QUARANTINE: SELECTED WAR MATERIEL

   a. **Objective**: To stop all war materiel leaving Cuba on Cuban merchant ships.

   b. **Major Steps**: Announcement by the President; notice to worldwide shipping; institution of measures to search and seize or divert Cuban ships (or aircraft) designated by CINCLANT.

   c. **Forces Required**: From the Atlantic Fleet two carrier task groups with appropriate escorts, 18 destroyers, 9 guided missile frigates, 1 cruiser, 8 nuclear attack submarines, 3 minesweepers and
service ships as required. From AFLANT seven tactical fighter squadrons plus additional squadrons on call, tactical reconnaissance forces and tactical electronic warfare aircraft and support forces. From CINCAD one fighter interceptor squadron and electronic warfare aircraft. Mobilization of 2500 personnel involved.

d. Timing: 144 hours with some advance notice. Some reconnaissance could be provided within 12 hours.

e. Implications: Would constitute direct US military pressure on Cuba; would affect US military forces and contingency planning worldwide; would not preclude departure of Cuban troops and equipment by air.

f. Expected Results: Would be ineffective in halting the flow of war materiel if the Soviets provided alternative maritime or air transportation. Would have only a limited deterrent or punitive effect on Cuba at a cost as high as that of establishing a full blockade, but would be politically humiliating.

g. Risk: There would also be some risk of a direct confrontation between US and Soviet military forces at sea. The Soviets could deploy 30-50 surface combatants to the Caribbean area within 15 days; as few as six to eight surface escorts could provide continuous escort of the Soviet/Pact merchant ships that arrive daily in Cuba.

2. QUARANTINE: POL IMPORTS

a. Objective: To establish a maritime quarantine on oil and oil products entering Cuba. All incoming tankers would be intercepted and directed to non-Cuban ports.

b. Major Steps: Declaration of a quarantine by the President; and surveillance, intercept, inspection, and diversion of tankers designated by CINCLANT.

c. Forces: Same as for No. 1 above: 2 carrier task groups, 7 tactical fighter squadrons, etc;

d. Timing: 144 hours, with 48 hours advance warning.

e. Implications: Intercept of approximately one Soviet tanker per day, with obvious implications for US-Soviet confrontation.
f. **Expected Results**: Would have an immediate impact on the Cuban economy and military capability (Cuba maintains an estimated 30-day POL reserve which could be extended by 60 to 90 days through austerity measures); could force Cuba to halt intervention activities.

g. **Risk**: Immediate risk of direct US-Soviet military confrontation at sea; action against Guantanamo; possible air attacks against US forces.

3. **BLOCKADE**

   a. **Objective**: To establish a maritime blockade of Cuba to prevent the import or export of all materiel except food and medicine.

   b. **Major Steps**: Declaration by the President; detention or diversion of any ship or aircraft attempting to enter the blockade area. Offensive action against any attack or threat against US blockade units.

   c. **Forces Required**: Same as for 1 and 2 above: 2 carrier task groups, etc.

   d. **Timing**: Blockade can begin after 144 hours, provided there is 48 hours advance warning.

   e. **Implications**: Involve turning back large numbers of Soviet and free world nation merchant ships; ships over 30 days including ships from non-communist countries;

   f. **Expected Results**: Would halt all ships entering and leaving Cuba with an immediate impact on all sectors of the Cuban economy and on military capability; could force Cuba to halt its intervention activities.

   g. **Risks**: Confrontation with the USSR; in addition to raising legal-political conflicts with other nations shipping to Cuba.

4. **MINING OF PORTS**

   a. **Objective**: To mine selected (10) Cuban harbors to prevent reinforcement of the Cuban military and to deny the use of ports for maritime shipping for approximately a 90-day period.
b. **Major Steps:** Establishment of air superiority in the area, including possible interdiction of some airfields and suppression of local SAM and AA weapons; conduct of mining operation by naval and marine aircraft.

c. **Forces Required:** From CINCLANT one or two carrier task groups and appropriate escort plus marine aircraft as available. 520 mines.

d. **Timing:** 96 or 144 hours.

e. **Implications:** Between 70 to 90 mine delivery sorties, plus 70-90 additional sorties for suppression; loss of one or two aircraft could be expected.

f. **Expected Results:** Would close mined ports and effect a total blockade for a limited time.

g. **Risk:** High risk of military clashes during the mining possibly involving Soviet personnel. Some risk of Soviet reprisal worldwide.

5. **PUNITIVE STRIKE: SELECTED TARGETS**

a. **Objective:** To destroy selected Cuban military and military-related targets in response to specific acts of Cuban aggression.

b. **Major Steps:** Mounting of air strikes against selected targets: a SAM site, radar installations, major military installations, missile boat bases, or Cuban missile boats at sea; airfields;

c. **Forces Required:** From CINCLANT one to seven fighter squadrons depending on targets selected, reconnaissance elements, one fighter interceptor squadron, one or two carrier task groups and additional aircraft and support.

d. **Timing:** From 30-96 to 96-144 hours, depending upon the target.

e. **Implications:** The Cuban targets are all located within populated and heavily defended areas. There would be losses of US aircraft and personnel.
f. **Expected Results:** Would render the selected target ineffective and demonstrate US retaliatory intentions to counter Cuban actions of intervention.

g. **Risk:** Risk of Soviet reprisal action elsewhere in the world. A high risk of direct US-Soviet military confrontations during strike operations.

### Air Blockade/Quarantine

The problem of air transits to and from Cuba in flying troops and critical war materials is common for either a quarantine or blockade. Neither the Cubans nor Soviets are capable of defeating an oil quarantine or total blockade by shifting to aerial resupply. The Cubans have the capability to support personnel and light logistic requirements by air. In addition, the Soviets have the capability to support Cuba with transport of over-size cargo in airlifts up to 80 tons. This could provide substantial military and economic support to Cuba by air. If an aerial quarantine or blockade is established, the following procedure would be utilized.

- Aircraft entering the zone will be intercepted and given radio instructions to proceed to a suitable airport and land.

- If these signals are ignored and upon specific authorization, the interceptor will fire a warning signal in such a manner that the target aircraft is not endangered.

- If the target aircraft continues to ignore warning signals, it will be shot down on specific order of the control center designated by CINCLANT. No interceptor will attack without specific instructions.

- For a quarantine only, suspect aircraft will be designated by CINCLANT and only these will be intercepted.

The interdiction of Cuban airfields that are capable of supporting large aircraft would prevent such air movements; however, this should be considered as a direct action against Cuban territory. In this instance, the requirements and implications of the punitive strikes would apply.
C. Political and Economic Pressures

The most effective political and economic pressures would be those that involve concerted action with the major European and Latin American countries, primarily because the US alone has little economic leverage, and because in the event of a serious crisis US counteraction would be strengthened if we moved as a result of a strong support in the hemisphere, or at least with the support of the NATO countries.

Thus, a major political objective is to lay the groundwork through various consultative mechanisms, and bilaterally, for taking action in the future;

-- In the event of quarantine or blockade, for example, an OAS support resolution would be a crucial point -- but probably exceedingly difficult to obtain over an African, as opposed to a Latin American issue.

-- Since US action also risks a clash with the USSR, a firm supporting position from NATO would also strengthen our hand;

-- Moreover, any attempt to restrict non-communist shipping would require that all major non-communist shipping countries voluntarily respect our action -- regardless of any international-legal implications; this would involve, among others, ships under Cypriot, Somalia and Yugoslav flags.

As far as economic sanctions are concerned, by far the most effective would be those that were adopted by Latin America, Europe and Japan. Cuban trade with non-communist countries is growing, even though Cuban trade is still dominated by the USSR.

-- Cuban trade with non-communist countries accounted for 36% of trade in 1975, including about one-half of Cuba's manufactured and raw materials; Japan, West Germany, Spain and France were the largest non-communist suppliers accounting for one quarter of total Cuban imports;

-- Longer term economic pressures could also be exerted by suspension of credits to Cuba from non-communist countries.
C. Political Actions

1) Measures Already Taken To Signal a Tougher Policy.

Against Cuba; we have:

-- tightened-up visa issuance for visits by Cuban religious, scientific and cultural figures to the US;

-- adhered rigidly to a 20% ceiling on US components in issuing Treasury licenses for trade by US subsidiaries with Cuba;

-- informed the Japanese and British that the August 21 announcement terminating third country sanctions will not be implemented to permit imports of stainless steel products containing Cuban nickel.

Against the USSR; we have:

-- put off a limited number of high visibility contacts and exchanges.

Other Measures We Could Take Now

Against Cuba:

-- reconfine the travel of Cuban UN diplomats to a radius of 25 miles from the center of New York City. This would be a symbol of the deterioration of US-Cuban bilateral relations, cut-down Cuban lobbying activities on Capitol Hill, and hamper Cuban intelligence gathering. This could be implemented by a note from USUN to the Cuban UN Mission.
-- Reactivate USIA "Con Cuba" broadcasts from Florida. These were terminated in 1974 for cost-effective reasons but were interpreted as a gesture toward Cuba.

-- Develop a strategy for the Sri Lanka Non-Aligned Summit Meeting in August, mobilizing our friends to block any endorsement of Cuban help to the MPLA. We should begin with the Saudis, Iranians, and friendly Africans and Latin Americans to determine whether some condemnation of "intervention" can be proposed.

-- Mobilize US Public and Congressional Opinion—encourage congressional resolutions against Cuban intervention and expand our efforts with the press on background, not public.

-- Diplomatic Offensive. The Secretary could send letters to his colleagues in all NATO countries and Japan, plus Sweden and Spain on the threat of further Cuban military adventures in Africa. Similar messages oriented toward this hemisphere could go to Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, Costa Rica, and perhaps Argentina, Trinidad-Tobago, Guatemala and Peru.

-- Send a State Department official to visit Caribbean countries to brief them on Cuban intervention.

Other Measures We Could Take Now Against the USSR:

-- Postpone additional low-substance contacts and exchanges;

-- Delay further moves to open the American Consulate in Kiev and the Soviet Consulate in New York.

-- Delay further negotiations on chancery construction in Washington and Moscow.
-- Adopt an overtly standoffish or negative attitude toward future bilateral high substance contacts (i.e. the promised bilateral consultations on the Middle East and on weapons of mass destruction.)

2) Deterrent Measures Should Evidence Appear That Cuba Is Preparing To Use Regular Forces Elsewhere In Africa:

   a) Bilateral Approaches to Cuba and the USSR

   We could send bilateral messages to Castro and Brezhnev stating that we have evidence that Cuban regular forces are about to be employed in Africa and that carrying out such a step would have grave consequences including the imposition of a quarantine to prevent the shipment from Cuba of military manpower or equipment.

   b) U.N. - We could raise the issue of Cuban intervention in an African country in the United Nations as a violation of the UN Charter and as a threat to peace.

   The chances of success of this kind of initiative would be conditioned by the nature and place of the Cuban involvement. Any effort to censure Cuba for action in support of liberation movements in either the Namibian or Rhodesian case would have practically no chance of succeeding. If the Cuban intervention were to be in the Spanish Sahara or in some other part of Africa where there were contending points of view among the African countries, the result could be different, particularly if a government from the area involved takes the initiative.
Alternatively to asking for formal UN action, we could send a letter to the President of the Security Council--for circulation to all members--which cited Cuban actions and expressed our concern at their implications for peace and security. It would invite a response by Cuba, but could set the stage for any future formal action we might decide to take, if Cuba proceeded to send its regular forces into another African country.

c) NATO. We could brief the NATO Council in Brussels about imminent Cuban Military intervention in another African country and on the measures we intend to take and call for parallel and supportive action by our allies. (Parallel bilateral approaches to Japan and Spain should be made.)

France, following its tradition, might raise procedural objections to discussing sanctions against a country outside the NATO area. But many NATO countries have greater economic interests in Africa than we do and would respond individually if not collectively.

d) EC 9. Encourage the EC (through its current President Luxembourg) to issue a statement expressing concern over any further foreign intervention by Cuba with Soviet support.

The EC issued a similar statement on February 23 regarding foreign intervention in South Africa and a new statement could be pinpointed at Cuban intervention with Soviet backing.

e) Public Posture. It is essential that the application of graduated pressures on Cuba and the USSR have broad public and Congressional support. This will require increased Administration lobbying with Congress.
and public disclosure of some, but not all of
the measures as we go along.

We should continue to hit the points we
already have been making publicly regarding
the implications for world order and peace of
further Soviet-Cuban interventions. We would
attempt to overcome the prevalent editorial
skepticism regarding our ability to apply
meaningful pressure on the Soviet Union and
China.

We should further make it clear that we
are not reverting to the shenanigans of the early 1960's and are not violating any
international agreements in applying
pressures on Cuba; e.g. we should repudiate
illegal Cuban exile activity as required by
the 1973 US-Cuban Hijacking Agreement. This
will do much to reassure a Congress and public
which were shaken by the disclosures of
Congressional investigations of activities
mounted against Cuba in a different era.

f) Relationship of Political and
Economic to Military Options

The initiation of military measures,
not risking imminent involvement in hostilities,
would lend credibility to the political and
economic measures at the stage of threatened
Cuban intervention in another African country.
Such military measures would include:

-- Increase military presence in Guantanamo
Bay and in the Southeastern US.

-- Engage in electronic warfare.
--- Selective DEFCON (defense condition) increase in U.S. force readiness.

--- Conduct harassment exercises against Cuban ships and aircraft.

3) Retaliatory Measures If Cuba Sends Its Regular Armed Forces Into Another African Country

Following the high-level public warnings and despite the deterrent measures we would have already taken, nothing short of a quarantine of Cuba would probably have much impact on Castro if he decides, with Soviet backing, to send his armed forces into another African country. If a quarantine were imposed, political moves at the UN, in NATO, or bilaterally with Castro and the Soviets would be largely directed at gaining international support, managing the crisis and bringing it to an end. If we decided to impose a quarantine, and preparatory to it, the following measures should be taken:

a) Bilateral. Send an ultimatum to Castro and to Brezhnev stating that unless Cuban armed forces were withdrawn from the African country involved within two weeks, we would institute a quarantine of Cuba, to prevent the shipment by sea or by air, to or from Cuba of manpower or military equipment. Castro cannot be relied on not to leak such an ultimatum. It therefore might be more prudent to make it only to the USSR. In either case we can expect an angry response and a period of high international tension.

Alternatively, we could send a Presidential message to Brezhnev stating that if he cannot persuade Castro to withdraw his forces from Africa, we would be obligated to terminate grain shipments to the USSR.
b) UN. Raise the issue of Cuban intervention in Africa in the United Nations as a violation of the U.N. Charter and as a threat to the peace if we had not already done so as a deterrent.

c) NATO. We could seek an Extraordinary Meeting of the NATO Council attended by Foreign Ministers to address the issue. Without revealing any bilateral approaches to the Cubans or Soviets, we would state that we are considering severe sanctions against Cuba, possibly including a quarantine, and call for support.

d) Public Posture. We should undertake consultations with the Congressional leadership and key senators and members of Congress. An address by the President to the Nation, explaining the threat to world order and peace by the latest Cuban adventure.

4) Measures Against Cuba If It Sends Regular Troops To Intervene In Hostilities or Civil Strife In The Western Hemisphere.

There are four soft spots in the Caribbean and Latin America:

-- Belize, where a newly independent government might feel threatened by Guatemalan invasion, and call for help from Castro;

-- Guyana, where the Government which is already under Castro's sway, might call for troops from Cuba to counter-act alleged or real threats along its Brazilian and Venezuelan borders;

-- Jamaica, where the left-leaning Government might ask for Cuban armed assistance in the event that civil unrest turns into civil war; and
-- Panama, where Cuban assistance might be solicited if guerrilla war erupts over protracted delay in the Canal negotiations.

This paper does not address possible covert or semi-covert assistance to insurgents of the classic export-of-revolution type.

If Cuban troops are invited by a duly constituted government, the provisions of the Rio Treaty would not provide for the application of sanctions unless the situation was adjudged under Article 6 as endangering the "peace of America" which "affected" the "integrity of the territory or the sovereignty ... of any American state."

a) Bilateral. We could inform any government we think is about to invite Cuban regular troops to bolster its rule that we would regard this as a hostile act and would result in an embargo on trade with that country. Since we are the major trading partner of all these countries, this would be no idle threat and it is unlikely the Soviets would step into the breach again as they did for Cuba.

b) Rio Treaty. Seek agreement by parties to the Rio Treaty that Cuban military intervention is endangering the peace of America. Impose sanctions calling for terminating trade relations, diplomatic ties and so forth.

c) Public Posture. Although there would be more public and Congressional support for action against Cuban troops in a Western Hemisphere country than against Cuban intervention in Rhodesia or Namibia, we would still have an uphill battle to secure public and Congressional support for the use of US armed forces unless collective action was agreed upon under the Rio Treaty.
d) Relationship to Military Options.
These would be the same as for deterrent and retaliatory measures.

D. Economic Sanctions

1) The U.S. economic leverage against Cuba is very limited. The U.S. began restricting trade with Cuba on October 19, 1960 and the restrictions remain in force. U.S. trade with Cuba is virtually nil; that of US subsidiaries is marginal; and Cuba gets practically no funding from international organizations of which the US is a member.

Occasionally small shipments of medical supplies unavailable elsewhere than the US and contraceptives have been licensed. Gift parcels containing food, clothing and medicine under $100 in value to individual Cubans totaled $8,000,000 in the period January 1, 1975 to April 13, 1976. Prohibiting these humanitarian exceptions would do minimal damage to the Cuban economy and would leave us vulnerable to the distracting public charge that we were focusing on the wrong target.

There are therefore no additional useful economic measures which we can institute now.

2) Measures Should Evidence Appear that Cuba is Preparing to Use Regular Forces Elsewhere in Africa:

   a) Non-Communist Trade and Credits

      -- We should seek to persuade Cuba's Western and Japanese trading partners to restrict trade and credits. 40 percent of Cuba's imports originate in non-Communist countries. Cuba also has access to over $3 billion in credits, most of which has not yet been drawn upon.
-- We should persuade a number of countries (UK, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Canada and France) to terminate their assistance programs to Cuba.

b) The Soviet Union

-- We should stop the processing of licenses for all sales of computers and other technology to the Soviet Union by US firms.

-- We should advise the US business community that the US Government does not favor long-term economic projects as well as short and medium term credits to the Soviet Union. Should Western countries restrict their trade with Cuba, the Soviet Union would make up the reduction in imports. This measure would constitute both a signal and handicap to the Soviet Union.

3) Should the Cubans actually Employ their Forces in Rhodesia or Elsewhere in Africa:

There are no purely economic measures available which we have not already considered or which would not involve undesired confrontations with friendly countries. The reimposition of third country restrictions at this stage would cause minimal damage to the Cuban economy but would involve us in frictions with such countries as Canada, causing the disadvantages to outweigh any advantages.

4) Should the Cubans Intervene in the Western Hemisphere:

a) The OAS

-- We could raise the issue in the OAS to secure the re-imposition of economic sanctions against Cuba.
b) Bilateral

-- We could consider re-imposing our third country restrictions against trade with Cuba. Governments which would oppose such actions in a situation affecting Africa would likely to be more sympathetic in the event of Cuban intervention in this hemisphere. Such measures, nevertheless, could cause difficulties for some American subsidiaries in countries neutral or sympathetic to Cuba.

c) The Soviet Union

-- We could forestall possible Soviet purchases of additional grain before October 1.