MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: The Possibility of a Soviet Strike Against Chinese Nuclear Facilities

Soviet Embassy Second Secretary Davydov brought up the idea of a Soviet attack on Chinese nuclear facilities in a Washington luncheon conversation with a Department officer on August 18. I am enclosing the memorandum of conversation which details the rationale for such a move which he adduced in asking what the United States reaction might be.

Davydov's conversation was unusual for the length of the argument that he presented for such a Soviet course of action. None of the other occasional references to the idea in talks with Soviets which have come to our attention have spelled out such a justification.

-- In late March or early April Kosygin's son-in-law Gvishiani and Professor Artsimovich who were visiting in Boston reportedly said that the USSR would have to destroy Communist China's nuclear arsenal. They seemed to be soliciting the reaction of the American to whom they were speaking.

-- Italian Communist Rossana Rossanda has claimed that, in July, the Italian Communist leadership received a message from Moscow asking how the Italians would react if, in self-defense, the Soviet Union were forced to make a preventive strike against Chinese missile and atomic installations. On the basis of past experience, Rossanda is not to be taken too literally as a reporter, and a more accurate version of her information may be contained in a Finnish Communist account of the consultations in Moscow at the World Communist Conference in June.
According to this report, a Soviet leader then asserted that the USSR had a capability to deal China an immediate mortal blow (presumably more than just a strike at nuclear facilities), but did not wish to do something so "un-Leninist," except as an extreme defensive measure.

-- In June the science editor of Izvestia's Sunday supplement asked an American Embassy officer in Moscow what the American reaction to a possible Soviet attack (nature of the blow not specified) on China might be. The same Russian has avoided the subject more recently, and in response to the American's latest query two weeks ago, the editor merely said that the USSR was trying to better its relations with China. In July Sidney Liu of Newsweek was asked by Delyusin of the Soviet Institute of Asian and African Affairs what he thought the Chinese popular reaction would be to a major Soviet attack on China (the nature of the attack was not otherwise defined in the report).

-- A Soviet communication to foreign Communist parties in early August left an impression of great concern over the future of Sino-Soviet relations, but neither of the two accounts of the message that we have indicates that it discussed such specific courses of action as a strike against Chinese nuclear facilities.

-- Finally, the most recent Soviet statement on the subject was by Southeast Asia Chief Kapitsa of the Foreign Ministry who insisted to a Canadian newsmen that a Soviet strike against Chinese nuclear targets was "unthinkable" and that the very idea was an invention of the Western press.

It is extremely unlikely that Davydov would be privy to top-level Soviet discussions on this matter, much less any decisions taken. Rather, it is likely that he has been given the job of getting as much information as he can on American attitudes on the China issue, and his questioning about the strike hypothesis was in the context of trying to elicit discussion of American views of Sino-Soviet relations. The idea of a strike against Chinese nuclear targets is one which has been mentioned in the United States press and talked about among diplomats and newsmen in Washington. Moreover, Davydov had been asked—at a meeting with Congressional interns a few days before the above cited luncheon—what he thought

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the United States attitude ought to be in the event of a Sino-Soviet war, and thus would have had occasion to have thought through some of the argumentation he used in the memorandum.

What emerges clearly from the foregoing evidence—as well as from Soviet leaders' speeches, from Moscow's propaganda, and from clandestine source reports on Soviet diplomatic anxieties—is an obvious sense of Soviet concern over troubles with China and of great interest in how others view Sino-Soviet tensions. What remains doubtful is whether the Soviets have ordered their officials systematically to canvass for reactions to a specific potential course of action—attack on Chinese nuclear targets. Nevertheless, the Department has considered the possibility that Davydov's conversation might have been the first move in such a probing operation, and, with that in view, has alerted key American posts abroad to be certain to report analogous conversations. The only response so far was from the American Embassy in Rome. A Soviet First Secretary told Italian officials he foresaw new and more serious incidents; he was not reported to have sought reactions and there was no reference in the report to the idea of a strike against Chinese nuclear facilities.

In the absence of a cluster of such reports in a relatively short time, it would appear that Davydov's recent conversation, as well as the remarks in Boston five months ago, are curiosities rather than signals. It is certain that Moscow remains preoccupied with its Chinese problem, and the Kremlin is probably reviewing all of its options. Thus the possibility of a Soviet strike at Chinese nuclear facilities cannot be ruled out. Nevertheless, my advisers and I do not believe such a move to be probable. The Soviets would have to weigh the risk of triggering an all-out war with China, a war for which the Soviets are not likely to believe themselves yet well prepared despite their buildup since 1965. Moreover, they would not be sure of getting the entire inventory of Chinese bombs, and would in any case face the prospect that the Chinese would most likely rebuild their nuclear arsenal with renewed determination.

The National Intelligence Estimate of August 12, 1969 on the Sino-Soviet dispute notes that a conventional air strike aimed at destroying China's missile and nuclear
facilities might be the most attractive military option available to Moscow, if the Soviets believed that they could do this without getting involved in a prolonged and full-scale war. The National Intelligence Estimate did not think it likely that the Kremlin would reach this conclusion, but felt that there was some chance that it would. Considering all of the military, political, economic, foreign policy, and ideological implications of any such Soviet attack, the Department's analysts judge that the chances of this particular course of action are still substantially less than fifty-fifty and that Sino-Soviet conflict, if it does occur, might more likely result from escalation of border clashes. That assessment seems reasonable to me.

William F. Rogers

Enclosure:

Memorandum of conversation
(SECRET/SENSITIVE).

Clearances: INR - Mr. Denney
INR/DDR - Mr. Mark
INR/RSE - Mr. Kerst
INR/REA - Mr. Platt
EUR/sov - Mr. Wise
EUR - Mr. Swan
EA - Mr. Green

INR/RSE:RBaz:ew 8-29-69

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August 30, 1969

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM: EA - Marshall Green

SUBJECT: Memorandum for the President reference the Possibility of a Soviet Strike Against Nuclear Facilities  ACTION MEMORANDUM

In response to your request I am transmitting a Memorandum for the President, which summarizes the most recent information we have received on the possibility of a Soviet pre-emptive strike against China’s nuclear installations and our assessment of its likelihood. While we do not rule out the possibility, we judge that this particular military course is “substantially less than fifty-fifty” and that escalation of border clashes is more likely.

Recommendation:

That you sign the attached Memorandum to the President.

Attachments:

Memorandum for the President.

EA/RGDavis x-29296 8/30/69
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: August 18, 1969


PARTICIPANTS: Boris N. Davydov, Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy William L. Stearman, Special Assistant for North Vietnam, INR/REA

COPIES TO: EA - Mr. Green
- Mr. Sullivan
EA/ACA - Mr. Kreisberg
EUR - Mr. Swank
EUR/SOV - Mr. Buchanan
INR/OD (2)

INR/EX (3)
INR/RSA - Mr. Kerst
INR/REA (3)
AmEmbassy Moscow - Mr. Pratt
AmConsul Hong Kong

The reported conversation was during lunch at the Hotel America (Beef and Bird Restaurant) in Washington on August 18, 1969. Davydov, whom I have known for several years, was the host. Expectedly, he began the conversation with questions on our Vietnam policy, but quickly changed the subject to China with a rather startling line of questioning.

China

Davydov introduced this subject by asking about our intentions towards China. Specifically, he wanted to know if recent US moves to improve relations with the CPR were aimed at an ultimate Sino-American collusion against the USSR. I assured him that this was not the case and that the modest steps we are taking to improve relations with China should certainly not be interpreted this way. I told him that his knowledge of both the US and China ought really to rule out, in his mind, any serious possibility of such collusion. Davydov had posed this question in a previous conversation; so it was no surprise. His next question, however, was totally unexpected and has not, to my knowledge, ever been raised by the Soviets with any other US officials.

Davydov asked point blank what the US would do if the Soviet Union attacked and destroyed China's nuclear installations. I replied by asking him if he really meant this to be a serious question. He assured me that he was completely serious and went on to elaborate. He said, in essence, that two objectives would be served by destroying China's nuclear capability. First, the Chinese nuclear threat would be eliminated for decades. Second, such a
blow would so weaken and discredit the "Mao clique" that dissident senior officers and Party cadres could gain ascendency in Peking. He pointed out that the Cultural Revolution proved there was a great deal of internal dissent in China and that there was widespread dissatisfaction with the policies of Mao and Lin Piao. (He later added that basic changes could only be made by people in the upper levels of the Army and Party and not by any regional revolt of minority groups or "tribesmen.") He then rephrased his original question by asking: "What would the US do if Peking called for US assistance in the event Chinese nuclear installations were attacked by us? Wouldn't the US try to take advantage of this situation?"

I replied that I was obviously in no position to predict exactly what the US would do in such a hypothetical contingency, but added that one could count on two things. One, the US would view any outbreak of major hostilities between the USSR and China with considerable concern as no one could predict the consequences. Two, the US would most certainly want to keep out of any such conflict. Davydov insisted that a strike against the nuclear facilities would not affect the US and there was nothing to fear from this; furthermore, he believed that this would not cause the Chinese to attack the Soviet Union because they would fear a more massive Soviet attack in retaliation and because Mao's position would be weakened by this blow.

At this point I asked Davydov whether he thought Chinese nuclear capability could ever come close to that of the Soviet Union in the foreseeable future. He answered that in the not too distant future this capability could become a serious threat to the Soviet Union. He reminded me that there was a time when the US seriously doubted the ability of the Soviet Union to catch up with it in the nuclear field and look what happened.

He again sought to elicit information on how we envisage the development of US-Soviet relations. I told him that, at the present pace, it might be some time before these relations reached the present formal level of Soviet-Chinese relations. After all, these two countries still maintain diplomatic relations and, malgré tout, recently concluded an agreement on river navigation. Davydov said that the maintenance of embassies in the respective capitals wasn't that significant and that Chinese behavior during the recent river navigation talks had been curious. At one point the Chinese broke off the talks without explanation and then resumed them a day later.

I asked him about the significance of the most recent border clashes, and he explained that this encounter with a "mob of peasants" on the Sinkiang border had nothing to do with the Soviet transportation network and could not be related to Chinese nuclear installations in Sinkiang. In general he felt that all of these border clashes were provoked by the Chinese to detract attention from internal problems. He said that Chinese border guards had been provoking their Soviet counterparts since 1963 when there were even instances
of the Chinese biting Soviet guards. The Demansky Island "provocation" was the last straw as far as the Soviets were concerned, and the Chinese had to be shown that they couldn't continue to get away with these acts. He inferred that there was a certain advantage to the Soviet Union in these provocations by saying that he actually feared the day when the Chinese began putting on a reasonable, peaceful front behind which they could quietly continue increasing their nuclear strength without raising any alarm.

Coming back to US reaction to the destruction of Chinese nuclear installations, Davydov asked if the US wouldn't really welcome this move since Chinese nuclear weapons could threaten it too; furthermore, the US was supposed to oppose the spread of nuclear weapons. I answered that while we very much favor limiting the number of nuclear powers through the NPT, an attack on Chinese nuclear installations was quite another thing altogether.

Vietnam

Davydov said he felt that the "other side" was interested in a ceasefire and that their very presence in Paris inferred this. I indicated that this was interesting and asked under what conditions they would want a ceasefire. He replied that they would probably want a tacit ceasefire which, at a minimum, would require the rapid and complete withdrawal of US forces and hopefully would also include our agreement to a coalition government. I told him I didn't find this prospect very attractive and that he must know our position well enough to realize that this is unacceptable. He then asked why we hadn't resumed private talks in Paris since these have produced more in the past than the public sessions. I told him that more important than the form of the talks is the willingness of the other side to match our concessions with some concessions of their own. So far, I added, this willingness has been absent.

I then asked Davydov whether or not the Soviet Union was really interested in helping the US achieve an equitable settlement of the war. He replied that there were certain advantages to the Soviet Union in having a war going on near China. On the other hand, the US, as "everybody" agrees, has lost the war, and the Soviet Union is interested in letting the US withdraw from Vietnam in a manner which will not leave it bitter and angry. He went on to say that President Nixon must have a great desire to be in office on the country's 200th anniversary and would make any concession in respect to Vietnam necessary to get re-elected in 1972. I told him that he was sadly mistaken to believe that the President's Vietnam policy was primarily tailored to get him re-elected; furthermore, even if it were he would lose more than he gained by making concessions which would result in a betrayal of South Vietnam and in a vain expenditure of so many American lives and resources.

Most of the rest of the conversation on Vietnam consisted of familiar arguments which hardly merit inclusion in this memorandum. Davydov's parting remarks on this subject were to the effect that once the Soviet Union has
fulfilled its obligation toward its North Vietnamese ally, it will have little interest in Southeast Asia which is too remote, unlike the warm, more comfortable Mediterranean area.

SALT

When asked why the Soviets were delaying the beginning of SALT, Davydov explained that they were ready for these talks under the last administration, but the present administration had them postponed. Now the Soviets were doing the same thing as "a kind of diplomatic nonsense." In addition to this, however, the Soviet side is concerned about this administration's "package" approach to the talks and does not want them tied to political issues. He added that Moscow believes the US is sufficiently interested in these talks to divorce them from other matters; so, he was optimistic that they would begin before too long.

Laos

In the discussion on Vietnam Davydov pointed out that the Soviet Union is living up to its obligations in Laos. I replied that unless one were reasonably sure the Soviets were doing all they could to persuade Hanoi to withdraw North Vietnamese Army troops from Laos, one has to question his statement. He indicated that there were limits to Soviet influence in Hanoi, but he did not say that any attempts were being made to get Hanoi to respect the Laos agreements.