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SINO-SOVIE ST BORDER REMAINS UNEASY
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Neither Moscow nor Peking appears ready to back down on the issue of the disputed island in the Ussuri River. An engagement on 15 March may have involved more men than the initial clash but was not as bloody. There have been artillery exchanges since, with casualties, if any, unreported. Soviet reconnaissance flights along the border remain at a high level and both sides have probably moved reinforcements to the immediate area of the island. There is no evidence, however, that either is planning to escalate the level of conflict or widen it to other disputed areas.

Although the circumstances around the dispute remain unclear, it appears from available evidence that the Chinese triggered the initial clash. Peking may have chosen a site to which it believes its legal claim is strong. Chinese propaganda since the encounters last weekend has emphasized Peking's contention that the island is "Chinese territory according to international law," because it lies on China's side of the river's main channel. The Chinese have chided Moscow for its failure to disclose fully its legal claim. Moscow has claimed that maps appended to the treaty of 1850, which set the present boundaries, show the island as Soviet territory, but has not yet produced such maps. Peking has published a map which seems to back its claim.

The Soviets have apparently controlled—or at least strongly patrolled—the island since the initial clash. The engagement on 15 March was probably a Chinese effort to contest that presence. The island is likely to remain a scene of conflict until both sides retire from it and leave it unoccupied—apparently the normal state of numerous disputed islands in the Amur and Ussuri Rivers. The Soviets, however, have charged that the Chinese had occupied the island in preparation for the incident on 2 March, and they may believe that it is now necessary to maintain a show of strength in the island area to demonstrate that they cannot be intimidated. When the ice breaks in the spring thaw, normally about mid-April, the matter of control may become academic. Most of the island will probably be under water.

The Soviets probably exaggerated instances of Chinese obstructions at border crossing points for several days following the incident. Soviet ambassadors made a concerted effort to buttress Moscow's version of the original
incident by calling on government and foreign ministry heads around the world between 10 and 13 March. This effort was apparently an attempt to emphasize the gravity Moscow attributed to the affair and to stress Russian innocence. By charging the Chinese with irresponsibility and expansionism, Moscow may also have hoped to deter the recognition or expanded relations with China that several of the governments have been contemplating.