The DCI Historical Series

The History of SIGINT in the Central Intelligence Agency, 1947-70

Volume I
DCI HISTORICAL SERIES

DCI-4

THE HISTORY OF SIGINT
IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 1947-70
VOLUME I

by

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HISTORICAL STAFF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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A Note on Classification

The overall subject matter of this history requires that it be For purposes of quotation or subsequent sanitization, individual parts of the history may be treated as follows:

- Volume I and Volume II...
- Volume III............
- Volume IV.............
- Special Supplement.....

*TOP SECRET*
Acknowledgment

This history of SIGINT in the CIA is a recapitulation and interpretation of events during the past quarter century and the people who caused, participated in, or were affected by them. Many people are mentioned, but the work would not be complete unless tribute were paid to the "SIGINT professionals" who worked on the staff of the CIA SIGINT Officer, Huntington D. Sheldon -- some of them for many years. Volume IV, Appendix C, contains a list of members of the [ ] staff. In particular, the work of [ ] who was the first member of the staff in 1946, should be noted. Her foresight in establishing and controlling the SIGINT files from 1946 until her retirement in 1967 made the writing of this history a far easier task than it would have been otherwise.
Foreword

The CIA SIGINT Officer,* like Janus, the Roman doorpost god, has faced in two directions -- toward the inside of the house and toward the outside. He was responsible for insuring the growth and security of COMINT, as it was then known, inside the budding Agency. He was also responsible for participating in the COMINT community outside.

This history, then, will reflect events not only within the CIA but also in the broad SIGINT world beyond. The CIA SIGINT Officer, as the SIGINT Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), was, because of the DCI's governmental intelligence role, concerned with the total SIGINT terrain. As the governmental SIGINT empire grew, so did the DCI's concern. Through the years, several panels of businessmen and scientists have been convoked by

* On 30 April 1962 the COMINT (Communications Intelligence) and ELINT (Electronics Intelligence) communities were integrated and the term SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) applied to the new community. The term CIA COMINT Officer was officially changed to CIA SIGINT Officer on 28 May 1962. (For a list of senior CIA SIGINT Officers, see Appendix A.)

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the DCI or the Department of Defense to study and make recommendations concerning the government’s SIGINT activities. The impact of these studies varied. Those which buttressed an already dominant governmental view such as the Brownell Committee resulted in action. Those which espoused a minority viewpoint generally resulted in only minor changes. Eventually the cost of the COMINT and ELINT efforts became so enormous and the processes so complex that both the Secretary of Defense and the DCI had misgivings about the value of the product compared with its cost, so from time to time outsiders were called in to advise what to do about the SIGINT empire.

The history of SIGINT in CIA is, however, far more than just a history of the SIGINT Officer and his staff. While the SIGINT Officer acted as a catalyst and a control point, the primary work in CIA with SIGINT and for SIGINT was undertaken by the substantive intelligence offices on the one hand and the operating collection offices of CIA on the other. To understand SIGINT in CIA, therefore, the history of these offices must be read in conjunction with
this history. In particular, the histories of the Deputy Director for Intelligence, the Office of Current Intelligence, the Office of ELINT, and of DDP, and the Office of Communications are heavily concerned with SIGINT.
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Volume I

I. Beginnings (1941-46)

A. The Spirit of the Times

With the following words of President Truman, the Central Intelligence Group was born on 22 January 1946 into a cold and hostile bureaucratic world:

It is my desire and I hereby direct that all federal foreign intelligence activities be planned, developed and coordinated so as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security.1/*

Before the President's desire became a reality, twelve years elapsed. Not until 15 September 1958,** when the United States Intelligence Board was established with the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) as Chairman, did Communications Intelligence (COMINT) activities come under the aegis of the DCI.

The leadership of the US Army and US Navy communications intelligence organizations in particular took a rather dim view of the new Central

* For serially numbered source references, see Appendix D.

** See the chronology, Appendix C.
Intelligence Group (CIG), which in their minds was the bar sinister offspring of the defunct Office of Strategic Services (OSS).

To sense the tenor of these times it is necessary to understand the nature and spirit of the COMINT empire that had grown up during World War II. The combined US-UK COMINT operation of World War II was perhaps the most successful large-scale intelligence operation in history. At its peak, almost 20,000 Americans were involved in intercepting and decoding German and Japanese military traffic. At times, up to 80 percent of the German military "Enigma" cipher machine traffic used by both the German army and navy as their principal cryptographic device was decrypted by the United States and the United Kingdom. Additionally, much of the traffic sent via the German high-echelon teletype cipher machines was read. This gave the Allies an excellent window not only into German operational plans but also into their strategic policies as well. It played a decisive factor in the US counteroffensive against German submarine attacks on Atlantic shipping, in the defense of Britain against bombing.
and in the ground warfare in Europe from D Day on 6 June 1944, when the Allies invaded France, until VE Day, 8 May 1945.

The COMINT effort against Japan was similarly successful. The 1946 Pearl Harbor Report made public some of these successes and revealed that Japanese diplomatic communications were being deciphered by the United States even prior to US entry into World War II. In the early years of the war after the Pearl Harbor disaster depleted our Pacific fleet, COMINT was vital in neutralizing Japanese naval superiority. As US Naval forces were rebuilt, COMINT continued to be the "eyes and ears of the fleet" enabling us to concentrate limited forces at strategic times in the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean.

Thus, US military authorities were jealous and proud of the intelligence source which had provided them this support. They were fully aware that COMINT success depended on a thin thread of security which if broken could immediately cause changes in enemy codes and ciphers and loss of the information. They were reluctant to share COMINT secrets even
within the military sphere much less with a non-
military governmental organization.

B. How the Office of Strategic Services Was Kept
Out of COMINT

The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was
considered a definite outsider by the Army and Navy
COMINT authorities. Throughout the war the military
had successfully resisted OSS attempts to obtain
military COMINT product, and this attitude persisted
at the time of the creation of CIG. Even as far
back as 6 July 1942, the Joint Chiefs of Staff --
Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, US
Fleet, and General George C. Marshall, Chief of
Staff -- stated:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of
the opinion that, in the interests of
maximum security and efficiency, crypt-
analytical activities should be limited
to the Army, the Navy, and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.

At present, small cryptanalytical
units exist in the offices of the
Director of Censorship, the Federal
Communications Commission, and the
Director of Strategic Services. It
is also possible that other offices
have installed or are contemplating
cryptanalytical units.2/
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, as a consequence, wrote a memorandum to the Director of the Budget dated 8 July 1942:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUDGET:

I am enclosing a copy of a memorandum received today from the Chief of Staff and the Commander in Chief of the US Fleet. I agree with them. Will you please have the proper instructions issued discontinuing the cryptanalytical units in the offices of the Director of Censorship, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Strategic Services. If you are aware of any other agencies having services of this character, will you please have those discontinued also.

F.D.R.3/

The Joint Chiefs were motivated at the time by the need for absolute secrecy with respect to the capability to read German and Japanese military communications in order to keep their treasured source from drying up.

Thus, six months after Pearl Harbor they succeeded in obtaining exclusive rights to COMINT production by the most effective possible Presidential device -- a directive from the Bureau of the Budget cutting off the funds devoted to this purpose in all
other governmental agencies. The OSS shortly after the beginning of the war was thus prohibited from engaging in communications intelligence. Additionally, and even more important, it was kept from getting the results of communications intelligence except in rare instances. As a matter of fact, OSS people in London had access through the British to COMINT for purposes of OSS operational support, whereas their access in Washington was practically nil.

An incident later in the war which served to exacerbate the situation was the Lisbon episode wherein the OSS was accused by the US military of undertaking uncoordinated "pinch operations" to steal codes in Lisbon which the United States had already broken by cryptanalytic means. This caused the Japanese to change this particular cryptographic system called "JMA" and dried up the source for a period. During this period the United States undertook the landing on Kiska Island and found that the Japanese had already moved out. Some time later, when the system was again broken, back messages were read which told about Japanese plans for leaving Kiska.
C. The Big Game -- Army Versus Navy

During the early part of World War II, the Army cryptanalytic effort and the similar Navy effort operated with considerable rivalry and independence. The Navy concentrated primarily on the Japanese and German naval problems, whereas the Army cryptanalytic effort worked not only on German and Japanese military ciphers but also on the diplomatic ciphers of all the countries of the world. One exception was the Japanese diplomatic cipher machine (the "Purple Machine") which was decrypted on alternate days by the Army and Navy, each wanting credit for the valuable information.

The independence of the two COMINT organizations, although bridged by liaison officers, resulted in both missed opportunities and duplicated efforts, and it became apparent to the officers of the Army and Navy concerned with the communications intelligence that more direct coordination between Army and Navy communications intelligence activities was required.4/

On 10 March 1945, the Chief of Staff, US Army, and the Commander in Chief, US Fleet, created the
Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board (ANCIB) and a subordinate working committee known as the Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Coordinating Committee (ANCICC). On 18 August 1945, General George C. Marshall, War Department Chief of Staff, sent a memorandum to the Chief of Naval Operations. 5/ This memorandum recognized that the termination of hostilities would cause a reduction in Army and Navy signal intelligence activities, as practically all Japanese army, navy, air, and shipping coded communications would cease, much as all German coded communications terminated at the end of the German war. The memorandum went on to say that the United States Navy and Army signal intelligence agreements and commitments as well as with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Strategic Services, Treasury, and the Federal Communications Commission, would require reexamination and readjustment in the light of the post-hostilities situation.

This memorandum sparked an internecine bureaucratic struggle between the Army and the Navy which waxed and waned on and off for seven years.

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until the creation of the National Security Agency (NSA) in 1952. At times the strife was open and frontal. Mostly it was paramilitary, behind the scenes. In 1947 the creation of a third force, the United States Air Force, rather than pouring oil on the waters, created a new and powerful bureaucratic weather front that kept the climate from stabilizing until even long after the NSA was well established.

Three basic factors combined to cause periodic recurrences of the squall: the problem was technically a complex one to coordinate, even with the best of good will from all sides; normal service rivalries were augmented by strong personality differences; and essentially different doctrines on the use of COMINT existed in the different services.

The Navy had little technical experience in working with diplomatic ciphers since it had concentrated primarily on Japanese and German naval ciphers. Retraining the Navy cryptanalysts would take time. The Army "enfant terrible" at the time was Colonel Carter W. Clarke, Assistant Deputy G-2. Clarke, a powerful and vocal personality, was in -9-
favor of combining the Navy and Army COMINT organi-
izations. The Navy viewed Clarke's proposals as an
effort to take over the whole show, which it was.
The major wedge between the two, however, was
neither personalities, nor even policies, both of
which change with time, but rather a basic difference
in philosophy.6/ The Army believed that all phases
of COMINT processing were so interrelated that they
could properly be worked only in close proximity to
one another. The Army favored physical consoli-
dation (at Arlington Hall Station -- the Army Head-
quarters) of all cryptanalytic activities.

The Navy (and later the Air Force) were afraid
that a consolidated organization would be unable to
give adequate support to operational commanders.
The Navy also felt that the overall COMINT problem
was so large that it should be broken into parts.
The great mobility of Naval forces, the rapid
changes in the operational situation over wide areas,
and the high security of operational and technical
communications employed by foreign naval forces re-
quired that Naval COMINT be produced at a high-level
Naval processing center, which could respond

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immediately to swiftly changing operational require-
ments.

Both the Army and the Navy recognized the need to coordinate their intercept, cryptographic, and cryptanalytic activities under some kind of joint direction. They disagreed on what kind. The Navy was not about to move its physical facilities at OP-20-G on Nebraska Avenue in Washington over to the Army Security Agency Headquarters in Arlington, Virginia. The senior officers of both services were adamant. Admiral King and General Marshall, in the latter half of 1945, exchanged several memoro-
randums without obtaining agreement.

Finally, on 2 January 1946, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Chief of Staff, US Army, sent a memo-
randum to the Commander in Chief of the US Fleet, Admiral Chester Nimitz, saying he had "come to the conclusion we should make a fresh start on this en-
tire subject."7/ Eisenhower agreed with Nimitz that this step need not await the final result of the study being made by the State-War-Navy Committee on the formation of a Central Intelligence Agency and that there must be a complete and free exchange
between our Army and Navy of everything pertaining to communications intelligence.

Admiral Nimitz replied to General Eisenhower in a similar conciliatory tone, and the State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board (STANCIB) once again started to work on the problem. After additional pulling and tugging, STANCIB on 22 April 1946 approved a plan creating the Coordinator of Joint Operations (CJO), outlining his duties and responsibilities, and appointing the Chief of the Army Security Agency, Colonel Harold G. Hayes, as the first CJO.

D.
The United States and the United Kingdom started working together in the field of communications intelligence early in World War II. The first approaches were made gingerly, the United States providing a few cryptanalytic recoveries that they had made on a problem and the British countering with the few additional recoveries which they had made. The principal US contribution to the potpourri was the brilliant cryptanalytic feat of breaking the Japanese diplomatic cipher. The British, on the other hand, had been successful on European diplomatic ciphers and, more important, had the capability to read the German military "Enigma" cipher machine. This cipher machine was a German version of the original "Enigma" cipher machine principle used by several countries. The German version had plugs to change daily the input and output letters to the cipher machine by means of a "stecker" board. The Germans considered this cipher machine absolutely unbreakable and used it for the bulk of their navy and army communications. Prior to World War II, unknown to the Germans, the Polish cryptanalytic
organization had devised a system to break the German "Enigma." This system they called the "Bombe."
The "Bombe" was a battery of 10 to 20 high-speed Enigma machines hooked in tandem. These matched an intercepted cipher message against 10 to 20 letters of assumed plain text underlying the cipher message.* Each day, when a given communications net was broken into, all the messages in the net could be read. When the Germans overran Poland, the Poles made the secret of the "Bombe" available to the French intelligence service. The British later obtained it from the French.

As the United States entered the war, the British informed the United States of their capabilities against the "Enigma" and the early tentative exchanges of COMINT information became more and more

* The "Bombe" worked by deciphering the message at every possible machine setting at a high speed through all 17,576 permutations of any given three-wheel group until it reached the proper setting where it deciphered all of the underlying plain text. Some Polish cryptanalytic genius devised a simple cross-wiring system called the "Reciprocal Board" which, when used in connection with the "Bombe," removed the effect of the German "stecker."

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open and frequent. Liaison officers were exchanged, and later several score US Army and Navy cryptanalysts and intelligence analysts were sent to work at Bletchley Park, an hour's train ride north of London, which was the location of the British Government Code and Cipher School, the cover name of the British COMINT organization.

The British and the US cryptanalysts during this period developed mutual respect and trust and made many enduring friendships, as is natural among scientists, particularly those who shared and developed technical secrets which played such a vital role in the survival of their two countries.
E. COMINT Codewords

1. Origins

COMINT has always had a special codeword. At the beginning of World War II the codeword was "MAGIC." The codeword "ULTRA" was used.
to designate COMINT activities or products received from reading codes and ciphers. The code-
word "ULTRA" covered the most fruitful and prolific COMINT product ever to be produced. However, the
Pearl Harbor Inquiry compromised the word "ULTRA" as denoting the product of communications intelli-
gence, so the State-Army-Navy Communications Intel-
ligence Board agreed that it should be changed. Accordingly, the
word "ULTRA" was replaced by the word "CREAM" effective 0001 GMT, on 15 March 1946.8/

2. The Philosophy Underlying the Codeword
3. Special Codewords
F. Recapping

Thus COMINT was in existence long before CIA was established -- a system, a society unto itself, with its own hierarchy, its own troops, and even its

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own secret passwords -- an international, global empire richly fabled with stories of its glorious past and still ruled by the mandarins whose genius had brought it to the apex of its power.

Into this milieu was born CIA.
II. COMINT Comes to CIA

A. First Steps

COMINT played no part in the first six months of CIA's life, January to June 1946, a period which was devoted to creating a new organization, recruiting personnel, and finding quarters. This was the directorship of Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, USNR, 23 January 1946 to 10 June 1946.

When Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg USA (AAF), Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, became Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) on 10 June 1946, COMINT quickly became a factor in the life of the young Agency. At the time General Vandenberg became DCI, he was the Army representative on and Chairman of the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB). He was thus accredited to the COMINT community and brought with him to CIA COMINT know-how and prestige.

Less than one month after he became DCI, he received an invitation from the Senior Member of the USCIB, Major General S. J. Chamberlain,
stating that USCIB had recommended and the Military Chiefs of Staff, the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, and had approved requesting the DCI to become a member of USCIB.

The Department of State had been a member of the USCIB only for seven months, and the FBI was even more of a Johnny-come-lately, having joined the board only a few weeks earlier.

B. Inside CIA -- COMINT Beginnings

As was perhaps natural, as well as symbolic, one of the first Agency actions of General Vandenberg in the COMINT area had to do with security. He had his executive issue a memorandum on 26 August 1946 to the Security Officer, CIG, and Acting Assistant Director, Office of Research and Evaluation, establishing regulations for security and dissemination of communications intelligence, instructing them to follow the War Department regulations in this regard and requesting them to submit a minimum list of personnel who would require special indoctrination to
C. Advisory Council

1. The People

General Vandenberg saw the need for a full-time COMINT advisor and controller on his immediate staff, and on 16 August assigned the responsibility to

Chief, Advisory Council
In the next 22 years the position was held by only four incumbents.*

On 1 December 1950, at the time of General Smith's reorganization of the Agency, the Advisory Council was disestablished and its functions were combined with those of the former General Division of ORE into the Office of Special Services, to consolidate responsibility for additional special intelligence functions, including the publication of a daily special intelligence
On 15 January, the title, OSS, was changed to the Office of Current Intelligence.

After about a year and a half, Douglass again left the Agency, to be succeeded on 12 July 1952 by Huntington D. Sheldon, both as Assistant Director, OCI, and as the Director's senior staff officer for COMINT matters. Mr. Sheldon exercised the latter responsibility for almost 18 years, carrying it with him through various senior assignments until 1 November 1969, shortly before his retirement.** Mr. Sheldon was succeeded as SIGINT Officer by Edward W. Proctor, * Douglass had served as Acting Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from 2 March to 11 July 1946, and as one of two deputies to the Assistant Director, Office of Special Operations, from 22 July to September 1946.

** Mr. Sheldon retired on 9 January 1970.
who assumed the responsibility in addition to his other duties as Assistant DDI.

2. The Job

On 6 October 1947 the DCI designated Finnegan, Chief of the Advisory Council, to represent "the Director of Central Intelligence in all matters relating to Communications Intelligence, including collection, security and dissemination of intelligence derived therefrom." In this capacity Finnegan was "authorized and directed":

1. To maintain liaison with all USCIB agencies and any other organizations of the Federal Government whose operations were "related to COMINT matters."

2. To keep the Director and Deputy Director informed of significant trends in the communications intelligence effort in other agencies.

3. To transmit CIA requirements "from COMINT sources" to USCIB agencies.

4. To support these agencies by providing them with information in the possession of CIA.

5. To control the receipt, security, utilization, and dissemination of communications intelligence by CIA, in accordance with USCIB policy and directives.
(6) To maintain lists of authorized CIA recipients of communications intelligence, based on recommendations of Assistant Directors and Staff Section Chiefs, in accordance with the need to know.

(7) To sit as CIA member of the US Communications Intelligence Coordinating Committee (USCICC) and to represent the DCI on USCIB when necessary.

(8) To designate CIA representation on subcommittees of USCICC.13/ Through the years the Director has continued to have such a representative. In the early period he worked to obtain access for CIA to COMINT produced by the military services and represented the Director on COMINT matters in the USCIB structure. The organizational location of the Director's COMINT Officer, as noted above, has changed over the years, although the incumbent has tended more and more to be a very senior Agency officer in one of the intelligence-producing directorates. Originally known as the Director's COMINT Officer, the title of the position was changed on 28 May 1962, a month after the combination of the USIB COMINT and ELINT Committees,
to "CIA SIGINT officer."* The COMINT and SIGINT Officers have been supported by a deputy who has in turn been the chief of a support staff, known variously, but from November 1955 until its dissolution on 2 February 1970, as the SPINT (Special Intelligence) Staff.**

D. Military Reaction to CIG -- Fear and Hope

As is perhaps natural when a rival organization is created in government, different echelons have different reactions to the new contender. The topmost echelon in the military supported the CIG. The next military echelon saw it as a potential rival. The lower echelons hoped that the new organization might assist them in solving their considerable problems. An interesting episode demonstrating this latter viewpoint is portrayed

* For the discussion of these events see Vol III, Chapters II - III.

** was deputy to the COMINT (and later SIGINT) Officer from June 1947, with two interludes, until his own reassignment on 2 February 1970.
in a memorandum for the DCI dated June 1946 from Colonel J. A. Michela, Executive Director, Military Intelligence Division, G-2, War Department, General Staff. At this time the COMINT organizations of the military were reaching their lowest ebb insofar as personnel and funds were concerned. Post-World War II cutbacks had decimated the ranks of COMINT organizations, and the COMINT product that they produced was of primary interest to the Department of State and to the budding CIG, since it consisted of information obtained from reading diplomatic summaries.

The Michela memorandum asked the DCI to "request higher authority to issue immediate directives suspending all reductions in all US intelligence agencies until 1 January 1947 or until such time as CIG is capable of fulfilling its mission." Colonel Michela stated that the manpower board had authorized the Army Security Agency (ASA) only 2,838 civilian personnel but the budget which had been assigned was sufficient only for 1,675. This letter enclosed a letter from
Colonel Harold G. Hayes, Chief, ASA, which stated that, among other results, expansion of the crypt-analytic effort on the Russian problem would be impossible and that intelligence would be curtailed.

He added that this recent agreement in number of foreign systems was to have been transferred to the Navy. Approximately 100 specialists were to have been transferred from this agency to the Navy to carry on these assignments. This agency has been advised that the Navy will not have sufficient funds to pay the personnel who will be transferred and as such the Navy will not be able to perform these missions.

The letter also contains a litany of other disasters that would befall the ASA.

The DCI was of no mind to prevent the budgetary ax from falling, even if he could. The dire predictions as to the demise of the COMINT effort did not take place. As the ASA and its Navy counterpart were forced to tighten their belts, they managed to retain the muscle of their effort despite the cries of agony over the impending operation.

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Lean years ensued. Salaries and morale were low both at the ASA and at the Naval Security Group (NSG) and remained so for many years. During this period, the CIG received a stream of job applications from unhappy ASA and NSG personnel. The CIG was besieged by so many jobseekers that an informal agreement was worked out whereby the CIG would not hire personnel from the cryptologic agencies without an approval from the front office of these organizations. During this period, the CIG pay scale was at least one grade higher—-a condition which prevailed for almost 10 years, until General Ralph J. Canine became Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) and raised the NSA pay scale.

E. The "Magic Summary"

During World War II, in addition to their almost unbelievable success with enemy military ciphers, the United States and the United Kingdom read (and exchanged) the diplomatic ciphers of many countries. Military decrypts during much of the war were printed only in seven copies, and diplomatic decrypts were even more tightly held. The
ASA did all the US work on diplomatic traffic, and G-2 published daily the cream of the information in a black-covered book entitled the Diplomatic Summary or, as it was familiarly known, the "Magic Summary." "MAGIC" was the apt cover name applied to COMINT at the time.

When USCIB was searching for a USCIB publication for briefing senior governmental officials, the Diplomatic Summary was a natural selection, since it contained important information obtained from the cryptanalysis of the diplomatic communications of

On 31 July 1946, the Diplomatic Summary was made an official publication of the United States Communications Intelligence Board to be signed by the Chairman of the Board.15/ At the present time (1970) the State Department still publishes a "Black Book" which has black covers like the ones on the original "Magic Summary." This was the first publication of its kind ever issued by USCIB. It thus predates by some years national estimates and Watch Committee reports.
USCIB itself determined the distribution of the document, sending one to the White House, keeping 17 within the War Department, and giving two to CIA, four to the Army Air Forces, three to the State Department, and six to the Navy. The distribution list gives a significant picture of the intelligence power structure at the time. The War Department got the lion's share of the copies and the DCI received only two.

The USCIB publication process did not function without friction. The War Department complained that the State Department had failed to furnish collateral information, as agreed, toward improving the quality of the Diplomatic Summary and finally
succeeded in persuading State to use some non-COMINT information for footnoting purposes when pertinent to the story. The Diplomatic Summary nevertheless remained essentially a communications intelligence rather than an all-source document.

The first CIA representative on the Diplomatic Summary Editorial Board of USCIB was Mr. Frederick A. Voigt, who assumed this responsibility early in May 1947, after the CIG request to have a man on the board had been approved by USCIB. At that time, the group was housed in the Pentagon, Room 2 C 836, and the Chief Editor was Mr. Willard C. Matthias.* The CIG appointed Voigt to the job, not so much to assist in the general editorial work as to learn what use was being made of the material and to determine how the CIG eventually could get the material for itself. A couple of months after the CIG started participating on the board, USCIB approved passing the chief editorship to the Department of State; and some months later, the entire staff moved over to State Department.

* Matthias later came to CIG and is presently (1970) a member of the Board of National Estimates.
F. The "Intelligence Community" - Class of '47

As the CIG Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE) began to grow in 1947, it became obvious that the "Magic Summary" was inadequate as the sole COMINT input to the ORE intelligence production process. A study was undertaken by Voigt at the direction of the Deputy Assistant Director, ORE, Captain A. H. McCollum, USN.17/ This study reviewed the use of COMINT by the other departments. In the light of the well over 100,000 people cleared for COMINT throughout the US Government today (1970), the minuscule number of people engaged in COMINT evaluation in June 1947 is rather startling.

In the War Department, COMINT material was processed only in the Special Research Branch (SRB), Intelligence Division (ID), War Department General Staff. This branch consisted of four persons (including one typist) who scanned COMINT material for inclusion in their subject files, which were visited by cleared personnel from the various geographic and functional branches of ID. No notes could be taken by these personnel. In the Navy Department all COMINT material was processed in OP-322-Y Office
of Naval Intelligence. Out of the total Table of Organization (T/O) of approximately 30 persons, only two or three were engaged in the production of intelligence from COMINT. In CIG/ORE, 35 substantive persons were cleared, but only 11 were regular readers of the Diplomatic Summary, and 24 were occasional readers. In addition, a cleared individual in CIG/OSO was orally kept aware of COMINT matters pertaining to the operations by the CIG representative on the Diplomatic Summary Board of Editors. "All told, approximately 44 persons in the member agencies in USCIB are fully occupied with the evaluation and production of intelligence from COMINT material."18/

On 7 July 1947 the Assistant Director, ORE, recommended to the DCI the establishment in ORE of a ten-man COMINT organization with the cover name of "General Division."19/ This was subsequently approved, with Knight W. McMahan as Chief. COMINT of interest to CIG at the time in addition to the diplomatic traffic was also obtained from was the cover name applied to Russian
traffic which was just beginning to be productive and which later became a major source of COMINT on the USSR.

G. CIA Struggles to Get COMINT

With the creation of the General Division, CIG became more than ever dissatisfied with the "Magic Summary" as its sole window into COMINT.

A draft was prepared for Admiral Hillenkoetter's signature to USCIB requesting that CIA receive in addition to the Diplomatic Summary the following COMINT series: (1) diplomatic series, (2) attache series, (3) armed forces series, (4) internal governmental series, (5) illicit clandestine series, (6) police and security series, (7) summary series of the above, (8) various Russian series. CIA was willing to continue to visit the Pentagon to scan the "X series" and other sensitive series and to request individual items from these if necessary. 20/ The proposed draft met with the approval of the State Department and Navy USCIB members. The Army member, however, stated that he would vote against -- 39 --
approval because CIG already had full access to the
Diplomatic Summary through reading the material in
the Pentagon and the proposal would establish a
duplicate file of COMINT material in CIG and thus
increase security risks.21/

Despite the adamant refusal of the G-2, the
DCI on 3 October 1947, in a memorandum to the Di-
rector of Intelligence, WDGS, and the Director of
Naval Intelligence, referenced his responsibilities
under the National Security Act of 1947 and stated:

It is considered vitally necessary
to the effective discharge of the re-
sponsibilities under the National Se-
curity Act that the Central Intelli-
gen Agency be furnished with copies
of all communications intelligence
bulletins and decrypted messages
produced by the Army Security Agency
and CSAW (the Navy COMINT Group) to
the extent determined by this agency
without restrictions.22/

Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval In-
telligence, on 21 October 1947 concurred that it
was essential for CIA to carry out its mission.23/
The Army, however, never replied to the DCI request.

On 9 April 1948 the Assistant Director, Reports
and Estimates, CIA, Theodore Babbitt, again requested
the DCI to press for action at the "earliest possible moment" on the problem of COMINT bulletins and of ORE access to Arlington Hall.24/ In the interim the alarm over the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in March 1948 gave ORE an unusually opportunity to request immediate action on the matter of COMINT bulletins. Another memorandum was sent by the DCI to the Army G-2, General Chamberlin. Still no reply was received.

At the very time that the G-2 was continuing to resist, Colonel Carter W. Clarke, Army Deputy Director of Intelligence, wrote a letter to the DCI concerning "analysis of propaganda" in which he stated that the Army had need for a "complete analysis" and that "if the CIA is unable to furnish such complete analysis, the Intelligence Division will perforce be required to perform this function."25/ The DCI acknowledgment in a memorandum to the Director of Intelligence, US Army, again requested that "the necessary action be taken to include CIA on all COMINT distribution lists and daily delivery schedules as requested in DCI memorandum of 3 October 1947."26/
Finally, on 14 April 1948, after six months of recalcitrance, the Army capitulated. General Chamberlin in a letter to the DCI stated that "the raw decodes are now and have for many months been made available in the Special Research Branch in the Intelligence Division" where properly indoctrinated CIA personnel would read them. Therefore, the request contained in the subject memorandum concerned only the physical delivery of these raw decodes directly to the office of Central Intelligence.

The Department of the Army, he said, would no longer oppose the DCI request for delivery of the raw decodes to the CIA, provided this action was concurred in by USCIB and parallel action was taken by the Department of the Navy.\textsuperscript{27/}

H. USCIB Approves CIA Receipt of Raw COMINT Data

The matter was submitted to USCIB on 21 April 1948 and approved six days later. After a year of repeated official requests, CIA finally had obtained access along with the Army and the Navy to the COMINT product.\textsuperscript{28/}

Although the Army gave in on passing "raw decodes to CIA," they still kept the fence around
their operation as far as liaison was concerned.

On 29 April 1948, General Chamberlin told the DCI:

It is believed you will agree that since this office is receiving all material here to have made available to your personnel for scanning at Special Research Branch, ID, GSUSA, the expedient under which this scanning was formerly accomplished no longer appears necessary and should be discontinued. However, no change is contemplated at present; and the arrangement permitting Captain Finnegan and Mr. Collins (your staff) to visit Arlington Hall Station for the purpose of consulting and effecting coordination on COMINT matters of a technical nature ... all other requests for information or intelligence, nontechnical in nature, will be made available through the Special Research Branch, ID, USA. 29/

From this point forward, CIA had access to the bulk of the COMINT product with the exception of certain sensitive series of General Division, ORE, was responsible for reading these special series in the Pentagon and often jogged from his office in temporary Que Building near the Lincoln Memorial over to the Pentagon as part of his personal fitness program in order to read restricted series still retained by G-2 as its private domain. In October 1948, CIA again made an approach to G-2 to obtain the restricted series.
on a loan basis, and several months later this was accomplished. 30/ Thus, by the end of 1948, CIA at last had full access to COMINT -- then the most important basic raw material of intelligence.

The acquisition of COMINT provided bone and sinew for the growing intelligence competence of the young Agency. While the political struggle to obtain COMINT had been going on, CIA had developed internal strength and competence by acquiring a cadre of bright young people and had developed its external relations through two series of negotiations. First, through arrangements with the Atomic Energy Commission, CIA acquired the primary community responsibility for atomic energy intelligence for which COMINT was a key input. This later became a keystone in the arch of intelligence competence which CIA was to build. Through another series of negotiations, the CIA Office of Special Operations established a COMINT Joint Counterintelligence Center (JCIC) which initially was located at the Naval Communications Annex at Nebraska Avenue, Washington, D. C., but was later moved to CIA.
I. COMINT and Atomic Energy Intelligence

The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) membership in USCIB was a bit of an anomaly. How the AEC got into the intelligence business is an interesting story — the outline of which will be sketched here.

The Manhattan District Engineers were extremely interested while they were developing the US atomic bomb in what other countries were doing in the same area. They were reluctant, for security reasons, to express their intelligence requirements through normal military intelligence channels; so, they set up their own intelligence shop. The War Department, Office of the Chief of Engineers, on 22 April 1944, assigned responsibility for Manhattan District Intelligence to Lieutenant Colonel W. D. Parsons, US Engineers Office, P. O. Box E., Oak Ridge, Tennessee.31/

Hiroshima revealed to the world one year later, on 6 August 1945, US possession of the atomic bomb. The requirement for absolute secrecy was thus relaxed. Two years were to elapse, however, before the somewhat ostrich-like attitude of the AEC was changed by outside pressures, and atomic energy intelligence requirements were issued through normal channels.32/
The Department of the Army, G-2, had asked AEC what
should be done about a collection request on uranium
sources CIG
also had intelligence requirements for atomic energy
information which it was discussing with the AEC.
Colonel L. E. Seman, Corps of Engineers, finally
wrote from his office in Room 712 of the War Depart-
ment, on 20 March 1947, a memorandum to the Atomic
Energy Commission saying: "A new orientation is
necessary due to cessation of war with the former
enemy nations," and requesting that new intelligence
requirements be issued.33/

In the spring of 1947, CIA started negotiations
with the Atomic Energy Commission. In May 1947 Rear
Admiral Louis L. Strauss of the AEC wrote DCI
Hillenkoetter:

This is in pursuance to our in-
formal luncheon conversation the other
day and your kind letter of May 8 ....
You asked me to let you have an outline
of the kind of information which the
AEC would like to have supplied to it
by your organization, and I have pre-
pared the following as a temporary
guide:34/

The Strauss letter was used by the DCI as a
basis for a full-blown discussion within the
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Intelligence Advisory Board (IAB) of the best way to cooperate in collecting atomic energy intelligence. In the interim, Chairman David E. Lilienthal of the AEC requested former CIG Director Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers to write a staff study "to determine the intelligence requirements of the Atomic Energy Commission and the type of organization appropriate to that end." This study was forwarded to the National Intelligence Authority in July 1947 and resulted in the Atomic Energy Commission becoming a permanent member of the Intelligence Advisory Board. The memorandum effecting this was signed by G. C. Marshall, Secretary of State; Kenneth C. Royall, Secretary of War; James Forrestal, Secretary of Navy; and William D. Leahy, representative of the President. Thus the invitation to the AEC to join the intelligence community carried more VIP signatures than those invitations issued to the original members of the IAB.

Despite the high-level invitation, the IAB welcome mat was not out for the AEC. DCI Hillenkoetter had to pressure the three services for more
than six months to get them to agree to create a Joint Atomic Energy Committee (JAEC) under the IAB to deal with atomic energy matters. While Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, was willing to go along rather early in the game, Major General S. J. Chamberlin, USA, Director of Intelligence, War Department General Staff (WDGS), refused to go along until the Air Force, which had just been created, was allowed to sign as an independent entity.\textsuperscript{38} The Air Force had responsibilities of its own for collection of atomic debris and was hesitant to join the club. Finally, however, Brigadier General C. P. Cabell, USAF, Acting Director of Intelligence, agreed that such a committee "is considered reasonable and desirable,"\textsuperscript{39} and a joint agreement for establishment of a Nuclear Energy Special Intelligence Committee was signed on 31 December 1947.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{38} USCIB was even less hospitable than the IAB; not only was the welcome mat not out, but USCIB didn't even have a candle in the window -- much less the door open.\textsuperscript{41} USCIB met on 27 February 1948, for its 29th meeting chaired by General
Chamberlin and decided to deny access to raw COMINT to the Atomic Energy Commission. USCIB was willing, however, to let the DCI provide finished intelligence to the AEC on a limited basis.42/ The USCIB also suggested that now that this problem had been decided by them, that the DCI call an Intelligence Advisory Committee (formerly Intelligence Advisory Board - until September 1947) meeting of the same people, with their other hats on, to consider the entire problem and include the USCIB decision in its solution.

The Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) met and on 5 March 1948 agreed that the AEC could receive intelligence based on COMINT provided that the COMINT source was sufficiently concealed as to "warrant removal of any COMINT classification of the end product." The AEC was disappointed but agreed that if they could have a Dr. W. P. Colby fully cleared and given access to all COMINT, they would accept the USCIB decision.43/ The AEC then informed Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper, Chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, in response to his query, that although
they could not answer his question as to the earliest date at which any foreign nation might have an atomic bomb that Dr. Colby was going to head up the AEC intelligence activities and concentrate on this question.\footnote{44/}

The political maneuvering finally ended, and CIA became the focal point for atomic energy intelligence -- one of the most important intelligence problems of the period.

The IAC during the spring and summer of 1949 was concerned with trying to improve US intelligence on this subject and making the best estimates possible on the basis of scanty information. Army, Navy, and Air Force COMINT easily had their budgets expanded to
improve intelligence on this subject, and CIA explored every possible resource within its capability.46/ The explosion of the Russian atomic bomb, on 23 September 1949, ended the speculation as to when the event would happen.

An interesting sideline was a visit by the CIA analysts to the COMINT shop in Arlington Hall six days after the event was announced by President Truman.47/

Arlington Hall had decided not to publish this information and ruled that critical information should, for an indefinite period, be passed to the CIA through frequent CIA visits to "the Hall."

J. The Joint Counterintelligence Center

The earliest breakthrough for CIA in obtaining —51—
unrestricted access to raw COMINT information came about in March 1947, before USCIB approval was given for CIA to receive COMINT on its premises.

The Chief, CIA Office of Special Operations (OSO), Colonel Dabney, and his special assistant for COMINT, accompanied by undertook discussions with the Chief of Counterintelligence Operations in the War Department, Gil Jacobus, and his counterpart in the Navy, Lieutenant Commander Fred Weldon, about starting a central counterintelligence file based on communications intelligence.48/

The proposal was received enthusiastically by the service intelligence chiefs and a Joint Counterintelligence Center (JCIC) was established in April 1947 at the Naval Communications Annex at Nebraska Avenue. It was understood from the beginning that eventually the Center would move to CIG.

The Center was a useful cooperative venture from the start. By the end of the first year of operation, more than 85,000 items were carded -- two-thirds of the information coming from COMINT.49/ While the rest of CIA was struggling to obtain and

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learn how to use COMINT, the Counterintelligence Center was a going operation with complete access to even the most sensitive COMINT information. In particular, good information was available from COMINT giving a good insight into the espionage activities of these countries.

Just two years after the Center was established at the Navy, DCI Hillenkoetter proposed formalizing the Joint Counterintelligence Center "under the operational control of CIA."\(^51/\) The Navy tried to

\(^{53}\)

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seize the initiative from the DCI and keep control of the Center by calling a meeting within the Center at the Navy Annex and inviting Admiral Hillenkoetter, J. Edgar Hoover, Park Armstrong of State, General Erwin of the Army, General Cabell of the Air Force, and General Carroll of the Army to attend on 30 May 1949.52/ Representatives rather than principals attended the meeting -- except for the DCI who personally appeared at the meeting in order to show the CIA flag and keep the pressure on for CIA control of the Center.

The maneuver was effective; and some three months later, in August 1949, the Center was moved from the Navy to the CIA COMINT area in Quo Building. The Navy remained unhappy after the move. In December, Commander Rufus L. Taylor* who at the time was Chief, OP-322-Y, wrote a letter to Captain Finnegan, Chief of the Advisory Council, CIA,

* "Rufe" Taylor had earlier (1946) been Acting Chief, Advisory Council, in CIA. He later served as Executive Secretary USCIB (1952-55) and as Deputy Director, Central Intelligence (1966-69).
complaining that he was "frankly disappointed with the results of the move" because no charter had been written and CIA had neither put additional personnel in the Center nor integrated CIA operational files into the Center to the extent that Taylor had anticipated. The Chief, OSO, William K. Harvey, attempted to mollify Commander Taylor to some degree but stated that:

I wish to point out again that Commander Taylor's request is of such a nature that it is difficult for us to honor it in OSO and still be consistent with our accepted principles of counterespionage operations and controls.

The Navy continued, however, to provide a person to the Center for the next year, but the Center became more and more a creature of OSO. In September 1951, Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, the Acting Assistant Director of OSO, requested that it be moved from the Office of Current Intelligence COMINT area in Que Building to the OSO area in L Building. The request met with initial resistance by Kingman Douglass, but he eventually acquiesced and the Center was moved several months later.
After OSO got full control of the Center, the Army again raised the question of where was the charter that had been promised for such a long time. Finally, in January 1952, Richard Helms, Acting Assistant Director Special Operations, forwarded to the Deputy Director of Plans a proposed charter which was submitted to the USCIB and received its approval at the 79th meeting on 12 September 1952. The FBI was invited at the time to join the Center but declined in a brief memorandum from Mr. John Edgar Hoover which stated, "The FBI does not desire to participate."

The Joint Counterintelligence Center remained "on the books" as a community venture, but as time went on and the Center became more and more of a CIA support file, the services lost interest and eventually stopped participating in it.
III. The USCIB Magna Charta -- National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 9

A. How It Came About

Late in 1947, the United States Communications Intelligence Coordinating Committee (USCICC -- the operating body of USCIB) was drafting a proposed legislative bill (S-1019) which it was attempting to get through Congress. This bill, which imposed legal penalties for the unauthorized disclosure of COMINT information, contained the phrases "unauthorized persons" and "communications activities." An argument developed in USCICC concerning the propriety of these phrases inasmuch as there was no governmentwide definition of these terms and the USCIB itself did not have a clear charter to require the elements of the government to comply with USCIB mandates. Colonel Harold G. Hayes, Chairman of USCICC, proposed to USCIB that a charter be drawn up for approval by the President.

Work began on the charter in December 1947, and on 1 July 1948 National Security Council
Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No. 9 came into force. During these months CIA fought its first major battle in the political trenches along the Potomac. Secretary of Defense Forrestal in a \textit{deus ex machina} maneuver forced the decision in favor of CIA against the protests of his subordinates. However, CIA did not win the battle; no one did.

B. Draft and Counterdraft

The first draft considered at the 25th meeting of USCIB on 19 December 1947 consisted of a proposed presidential executive order and a proposed USCIB charter. The executive order was keyed to Section II of the National Security Act of 1947.\textsuperscript{58/} This section pertained to the Department of Defense and thus would cause USCIB to function as a creature of Defense.

The second draft considered by USCIB when it met in the CIA area, North Interior Building, on 19 December surfaced, as an added angle, a fight going (then and ever since) between the new national military establishment and the services.\textsuperscript{59/} The "services' version" would make USCIB a joint board
of State, Army, Navy, Air Force, and CIA. The Department of Defense version made it a joint board of State, the National Military Establishment, and CIA. The meeting also brought out the basic struggle that was to go on for five years over how much authority to give USCIB. The Army and the Air Force had doubts that a USCIB was necessary at all, and if one were created they wanted to be sure that it had little or no coordinating authority over their activities. CIG, Navy, and State wanted a strong USCIB.

The chasm between these views was so deep that the dispute was raised an echelon. Rear Admiral E. E. Stone chaired an ad hoc committee to draft a suggested executive order and charter for USCIB consideration.60/ This draft evaded the issue of subordination of the board and compromised the issue of power of the board in favor of the Navy view.61/ This draft was considered at the 27th meeting of USCIB, at which meeting the board readily agreed to a State Department suggestion that USCIB report to the Under Secretary of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At its next meeting on 3 February, USCIB
considered a clean draft -- a paper which was approved by all including the DCI and which contained a proposed executive order from the President putting USCIB under the Under Secretary of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), limiting communications intelligence activities to those departments or agencies represented on the board, and making the measures and policies of the board applicable to all departments and agencies of the government.62/

C. Forrestal Makes DCI "The Boss"

Service members started staffing the proposal up through the chain of command which reached Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, on 13 February 1948. He wrote a memorandum to the Secretaries of the three services pulling the rug out completely from under the USCIB paper.63/ He said,

There is no need for an executive order in view of the very clear provisions of the National Security Act ... and especially in view of the language of Section 102 of the Act which deals with the Central Intelligence Agency, I feel that the objects desired can more appropriately be accomplished by means of a Central Intelligence Agency Directive ... since the Central Intelligence Agency by Section 102, was established under the National Security...
Council ... If this is done, the National Security Council will itself constitute a group which can resolve any matters which are not decided at a lower level.

A copy of this memorandum was sent to the Secretary of State and DCI Hillenkoetter. It closed with an interesting sentence which the DCI copy shows was an afterthought, since it is typed in a different typescript:

I also suggest that this would be an appropriate matter for consideration by the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Committee which is to examine the operations of CIA. Signed, Forrestal.64/

D. CIA Takes the Offensive

CIA up to this point had played a passive role. It had acquiesced to the military members' proposal that US communications intelligence activities should remain completely in the military domain. The Forrestal decision, however, spurred the Agency to action. A new draft was prepared by CIA for National Security Council (NSC) consideration along the new lines suggested to the DCI by Forrestal.65/ This draft put the USCIB charter in the form of a National Security Council Intelligence
Directive (NSCID) instead of an executive order.

It established the USCIB under the NSC

... to effect the authoritative coordination and unified direction of Communication Intelligence activities of the Government and to advise the Director of Central Intelligence in matters relating to protection of the sources of such intelligence in those matters in the field of Communication Intelligence for which he is now or may hereafter be made responsible.66/

Within four days after receiving this draft, the Navy member of the USCIB wrote the DCI saying the preamble to the proposed Directive quoted above "could be interpreted to mean that USCIB will be placed under the CIA and that access to the National Security Council would be via the Director of Central Intelligence."67/ The DCI capitulated and the wording was changed. It was to take another four years and a new DCI before this element of the DCI's authority in the intelligence community was to be partially achieved.

Since the charter was now to be issued as an NSCID, the matter fell to the jurisdiction of the Intelligence Advisory Committee rather than the USCIB; so, a special meeting of the IAC was called
on 1 April 1948 to consider the proposed NSCID on COMINT which Secretary Forrestal had requested the DCI to prepare.68/ At this meeting it was established that USCIB would report directly to the NSC and "act for the NSC." In this matter, USCIB was to be completely unlike the IAC, which advised the DCI and reported to the NSC through the DCI. In USCIB the DCI was to be just a member, to act through USCIB but to exercise no direct control over COMINT activities. Finally, the COMINT NSCID would state that all other NSCID's and DCID's "shall be construed as nonapplicable to COMINT ... unless the NSC has made its Directive specifically applicable to COMINT."

The IAC then referred the new version to USCIB where changes were made which further curtailed the DCI's role, and a proposed NSCID was forwarded on 18 May to the Executive Secretary of the NSC by the DCI.69/ The Executive Secretary of the NSC, Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, intercepted the directive and returned it to the DCI with a request for further consideration by the IAC. Souers balked at making the DCI merely a member of the USCIB, which would report independently and directly to

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the NSC. 70/ He also questioned whether the directive could be made applicable to all departments and agencies of the executive branch.

The DCI forwarded the correspondence of the Executive Secretary of the NSC to USCIB, withdrew his concurrence to the former proposal, and requested the views of the members on a voting slip. 71/ This caused a flap. The military members refused to reply. The DCI then regretted "any misunderstanding that might have arisen" from utilizing USCIB voting slip procedures and requested that "immediately following the 32nd USCIB meeting to be held on 11 June 1948 the board members remain and sit as the IAC to consider the matter." 72/

The DCI was thus placed in a tenuous position. He was caught between his superiors, his peers, and his subordinates, in a position made more precarious by considerations of protocol. To make matters worse, his one ally, the Department of State, broke ranks and on 7 June sent him a paper "reviewing USCIB charter developments and setting forth the position of the Department of State." 73/ This paper lectured the DCI on the value of
communications intelligence and the necessity of keeping this source under control of the military. The State Department stood firmly against Admiral Souers' proposals and the version of the charter as unanimously accepted by USCIB and the IAC and forwarded to the NSC.

The DCI, faced with a mutiny, went back again to the Executive Secretary of the NSC with a split paper containing the DCI version and the version supported by the rest of the IAC.74/ The matter thus came unresolved before the NSC. The DCI version followed the instructions received from Souers and established USCIB "to advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence in effecting the authoritative coordination with COMINT." In the DCI version, he, not USCIB, would act "for the National Security Council."

The National Security Council at its 14th meeting considered the two versions and supported the majority IAC/USCIB version as opposed to that put forward by the DCI.75/

This action vindicated Admiral Hillenkoetter's earlier judgment concerning the political art of
the possible versus Admiral Souers' charge to the
DCI to try to get the NSC to make the DCI a COMINT
czar. Souers' admonition to the DCI was not sup-
ported by the NSC.

E. A House Built on Sand

NSCID No. 9 was issued 1 July 1948.*76/ Thus
was created the COMINT minotaur, half man/half bull,
to wander around the Washington labyrinth for five
years.

It was the best that could be done at the
time. From the first, all sides were unhappy with
it. The military strongly suspected that CIA would
use it as a power base to obtain control of COMINT.
CIA was unhappy because NSCID No. 9 failed to es-
tablish a strong USCIB. The document was virtually
emasculated inasmuch as it was the subject of a
number of compromises and the product of many au-
thors. USCIB was so weak that it could not only
not harm its members, it could not even help them.
Although it was given responsibility for

* See Volume IV, General Appendixes.

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"authoritative coordination," the service members so feared the new setup that they immediately set out to vitiate this basic purpose by creating an Armed Forces Security Agency responsible to the Joint Chiefs rather than to USCIB.

The second major objective of NSCID No. 9, "to advise the Director of Central Intelligence in those matters in the field of communications intelligence for which he is responsible," was also vitiated. The document itself insured that the DCI was not responsible for any communications intelligence matters unless the NSC itself so directed, and the military were not about to let the NSC so direct.

NSCID No. 9 created an exclusive COMINT club which non-COMINT intelligence authorities could not enter. The DCI was a non-COMINT intelligence authority. Directives issued by him did not apply to COMINT. The Gordian knot had been tied around COMINT, a knot not even to be hacked at until NSCID No. 9 was rewritten in 1952 as a concomitant of the Brownell Committee recommendations, and not to be cut until 1958, when the USCIB and the IAC were
amalgamated into a single United States Intelligence Board.
IV. Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA)

Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, after he brought about the subordination of USICB to the NSC instead of to the JCS, gave terms of reference in July 1948 to the Secretaries of the three services for the creation of an Armed Forces Security Agency.77/

A. An Inauspicious Start

Major General A. R. Bowling of the Army, Rear Admiral E. E. Stone of the Navy, and Major General C. P. Cabell of the Air Force were appointed to work with Mr. Robert Blum of the Secretary's office and to draw up a charter for the new organization. The committee was instructed to "take into consideration the requirements of the State Department and the CIA on questions in which they have an interest and, if appropriate, to consult with them."78/

In early September 1948, Admiral Hillenkoetter, the DCI, asked to have his representatives, Captain Joseph Finnegan, USN, and
participate with the Defense committee working on the problem. After a month, the Defense chairman of the committee, Admiral Stone, replied saying that the first meeting of his ad hoc group would take place in three days.79/ The very next day he phoned Captain Finnegan saying that he was forced to withdraw the invitation extended by him to CIA and State to attend the meetings of his committee ... in view of the strong stand of the Department of the Army in opposing the participation in any manner by CIA and State.80/

B. Forrestal's USCIB Is Stymied

For four months the committee debated. In January 1949, Mr. Robert Blum forwarded the results to the DCI and State.81/ The military had reverted to their earlier pre-USCIB positions and were squabbling among themselves to such an extent that they could not even agree whether there should be one joint COMINT shop or three "coordinated" shops. Above all, they were completely unwilling to permit the new USCIB to have any hand on the COMINT reins.
The DCI replied to the Secretary of Defense concerning the two principal phases of the report, the proposed creation of a new board called the "Armed Forces Communications Intelligence Board" (AFCIB) and the "Armed Forces Security Agency," stating that "a number of functions assigned to the proposed AFCIB are in direct conflict with the functions of USCIB as defined by NSCID No. 9." He added that the creation of the proposed board would result in an increased service control, to the detriment of the other interested departments, over a problem which is essentially governmental rather than of sole service interest. The DCI continued:

The CIA and the Department of State need full COMINT support today as much as the armed services needed it in war. In fact, 75 percent of the current production is from diplomatic and economic sources and of primary interest to the CIA and the Department of State. The creation of AFCIB with such broad power would give hegemony to a major source of intelligence which, in the national interest, should daily be operating increasingly to service those departments and agencies charged with prosecuting the cold war.
Admiral Hillenkoetter thus threw down the gauntlet and the battle between the USCIB and AFCIB was on, a battle that lasted for three years until 1952, when the next DCI convoked the Brownell Committee and sounded the death knell of AFSA.

The Department of State replied to the Secretary of Defense in a similar vein in a letter signed by W. Park Armstrong, Jr., who was Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

On 3 March 1949, Secretary of Defense Forrestal resigned, "worn out by his futile efforts to bring about the unification of the armed services."\textsuperscript{83} Forrestal had led the COMINT horse to water but he couldn't make it drink. He was succeeded by Louis A. Johnson on 28 March.

C. Secretary Louis Johnson Creates AFSA Under the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Two weeks after he took office, the new Secretary of Defense sent a letter to Admiral Hillenkoetter on 20 May 1949 saying:

We have on this date established with the approval of the President and on advice of the War Council a unified cryptologic organization --

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Approved for Release: 2013/07/18
the Armed Forces Security Agency . . . .
The Joint Chiefs of Staff . . . will
exercise general direction control
and authority . . . . Within the Agency
there will be established the Armed
Forces Communications Intelligence
Advisory Council . . . . This directive
and its implementation will not inter-
ference with the functions of the United
States Communications Intelligence
Board established by NSCID No. 9.84/

The DCI replied that he was "gratified by the
assurance" that the new AFSA would not interfere
with the functions of the USCIB because NSCID No. 9
"specifically involves statutory responsibilities
laid upon the CIA by the National Security Act of
1947."85/ He added that his attention had been
called to a further directive regarding the COMINT
structure being considered by the Joint Intelligence
Committee of the Department of Defense and requested
a copy.86/ Secretary Johnson replied that the
"current considerations" by the JCS were merely for
developing a Defense Department position which would
be forwarded to the USCIB if it involved organiza-
tions outside the national military establishment.87/

On the same date, 2 June 1949, that Louis
Johnson turned down the direct request of the DCI
for the document, he sent the document to USCIB
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itself as an attachment to a reply to an earlier
USCIB letter on the subject of the atomic energy
program of the USSR.88/

This provided the CIA and State a handle to
raise the subject at the regular USCIB meeting on
17 June. This meeting was a "Donnybrook" with
nose-to-nose confrontation between the military and
the nonmilitary members. After the meeting, the
DCI informed the Secretary of Defense89/ that "in
the meeting of the Board it became evident that the
National Military Establishment members are unable
satisfactorily to clarify the issues." The letter
forwarded the detailed listing of the issues and
requested that the Secretary of Defense "consider
these problems with a view to resolving them in
order that the present confusion between the re-
sponsibilities and the authority of USCIB and AFSA
may be liquidated."

A reply was never received from the Secretary
of Defense. Thus the DCI and USCIB lost the first
round.

Admiral Earl E. Stone was appointed the first
director of the new Armed Forces Security Agency
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and proceeded with the difficult task of trying to make the Army and the Navy work in harness. CIA and the Department of State through membership in USCIB continued to levy intelligence requirements on the new organization via the USCIB intelligence committee mechanism. USCIB, however, as an "authoritative coordinator" of COMINT was totally ineffective.
V. David and Goliath

While the DCI had been deeply involved in the Washington political COMINT scene with the USCIB Charter, followed by the creation of the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA), the Central Intelligence Agency at home had been quietly going about the building of its technical competence and a sound and smoothly working organization. In November 1949, less than six months after the creation of AFSA, there was established in CIA a COMINT organization known as the "Special Research Center."

A. Special Research Center

From the beginning of COMINT in CIA, the Chief, Advisory Council, Joseph Finnegan, Captain, USN, considered that it would be unwise to create a command line COMINT organization in the Agency independent from, and competing with, the rest of the Agency offices such as had been done in the Army and the Navy. It was decided rather to feed COMINT into the existing Agency structure in a secure and controlled manner to leaven the established
activities and responsibilities of these offices. The individual offices of CIA were responsible through their assistant directors for the substantive content of intelligence they produced or operations they undertook. The first Chief of the Advisory Council was responsible for controlling and protecting the acquisition, production, dissemination, and utilization of all COMINT within CIA as well as of the physical and personnel security of all phases of COMINT.90/ He carefully refrained, however, from stepping into the substantive intelligence role.

The diverse variety of activities undertaken by CIA as well as the many-faceted types of intelligence received from COMINT required a special organization if the full value of the source were to be utilized by the various offices of CIA.

On 30 June 1949 the Chief, Advisory Council recommended to the DCI the establishment of a Special Research Center to consist of a federation of special groups assigned from ORE, OSI, OCD, OO, OSO, and OPC according to a presently approved T/O under a Chief
who would be assisted by a staff assigned by the Chief, Advisory Council.

Although Captain Finnegan had assured the Director that "The Statement of Functions of the Center ... has received the concurrence of all Assistant Directors involved," when the DCI passed the recommendation to the Executive, Captain C. L. Winecoff, USN, on 2 August, it was with the instruction that comments be obtained from the offices concerned. At the behest of [iden] the Management Officer [iden] a senior member of the management staff, walked the memorandum through the offices of five Assistant Directors on 3 August and obtained their concurrences without significant dissent. A month later, on 2 September, Captain Winecoff approved the revised statement of functions for the Advisory Council, with an expanded T/O to cover its administration of the Special Research Center. Finally, Captain Finnegan informed the Assistant Directors of ORE, OSI, OSO, and OPC on

* Later [iden] of the CIA Historical Staff.

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8 November, that "there has been established under the policy control of the Chief, Advisory Council, a Special Research Center (SRC) for Communications Intelligence. Present location of the SRC is 2161 Q Bldg." The Chief of the Center was to coordinate the activities of the groups assigned to the Center from the six interested offices, control their liaison with other government organizations, ensure the security of COMINT in the Center, indoctrinate and train personnel in the Center in COMINT, and be the channel for CIA assistance to AFSA.

Under the Chief of the Center was established an Information Control Division and an Assessment and Requirements Division. The former division operated the teletype communications and courier routes to and from the Center and maintained reading and situation rooms. The latter division established, for the first time outside the military, an independent assessment system on the value of communications intelligence. Additionally, it prepared periodic and long-range intelligence interest and priority lists. The key personnel involved in the early years of the Center operation included
among others. These personnel, as time went on, left the Special Research Center for other jobs in the Agency and carried with them their COMINT know-how and expertise to strengthen the offices to which they went. During these early formative years, they did yeoman work in training large numbers of CIA personnel regarding the technical strengths and weaknesses of the COMINT sources.

On 2 November 1949, Admiral Hillenkoetter notified the State Department, AFSA, Army, Navy, and Air Force Directors of Intelligence of the establishment of the CIA Special Research Center and apprised them of its functions and invited them "to maintain COMINT liaison with the SRC through the Chief, Advisory Council, for any assistance it may be able to provide in research and evaluation, or in securing selected COMINT material."92/ Exactly one month later, the military services proposed the creation of a similar governmentwide Center to function under JCS control. This center was intended to absorb and replace the CIA Special
Research Center. The battle between CIA David and the military Goliath was on.

B. CONSIDO

At the 47th meeting of USCIB on 2 December 1949, the United States Air Force presented on behalf of the three services a proposal to create a "consolidated Special Information Dissemination Office" (CONSIDO). The services had been working on the establishment of a single intelligence organization to handle COMINT ever since the creation of AFSA in May 1949. They envisaged such an organization would be the only one in the government allowed to receive COMINT and that it would function under the JCS. "CONSIDO was established," said the proposed Secretary of Defense directive,

in order to provide for placing under one authority the conduct of evaluation and collation of the product of the Armed Forces Security Agency and for the maintenance of liaison between AFSA and the intelligence staffs of the military departments, the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation... CONSIDO will operate under the direction and control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.94/

CIA and the Department of State were invited to have
analysts in the organization. They would, however, have no control of the organization other than through a priority system by which USCIB would express its priority views on nonmilitary matters. Military matters were considered to be outside of USCIB and the prerogative of the military departments.

At the USCIB meeting which was chaired by Major General C. P. Cabell (since it was the Air Force turn to be Chairman in the rotating system used by USCIB), the Department of State member, Mr. Park Armstrong, indicated that the matter would require "considerable study" and asked that the discussion be deferred until a later date.95/

The CIA staff worked vigorously through the Christmas holidays on the proposal and prepared a memorandum for USCIB members which was signed by Admiral Hillenkoetter on 12 January 1950.96/ The memorandum began, "The proposed CONSIDO ... adversely involves matters of vital interest to the Central Intelligence Agency ... I am compelled by my statutory responsibilities so to advise the Secretary of Defense." It continued, "It is my opinion that

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AFSA and a proposed CONSIDO are derogations of the responsibilities, authority, and functions of USCIB ... . The Central Intelligence Agency already has a current facility performing most of the functions proposed for CONSIDO." The DCI went on to state that he had no objection to an Armed Forces Information Dissemination Office but he wanted no part of any CONSIDO which functioned under the JCS and purported to be the sole COMINT intelligence office of the government.

The 48th USCIB meeting held on 13 January 1950 discussed the CIA paper, and a paper was handed out at the meeting by State which reiterated the view put forth by CIA.97/ This meeting created an ad hoc committee, chaired by Mr. T. Achilles Polyzoïdes of State, to consider the matter. This committee proved the undoing of CONSIDO. A split soon developed in the committee among the services themselves over command and control of the CONSIDO operation, and for four months the wrangling went on. Navy was unwilling to give up control over dissemination to CONSIDO.98/ The FBI was unwilling to give up control of its personnel assigned to the
organization. The Army wanted its man (General Carter W. Clarke) to be Director. The Army and Navy welcomed JCS control, whereas all other USCIB members preferred USCIB control. After considering the matter several times, the USCIB on 14 July 1950 removed the item from the agenda. CONSIDO was dead. The CIA Special Research Center continued on. David had won the first round.
VI. The Brownell Committee

The Brownell Committee was established on 28 December 1951 at the direction of the President to make a survey of the communications intelligence activities of the government. The findings of this committee had greater impact on COMINT activities than any similar study before or since. The reasons for this impact were twofold. First, the Director of Central Intelligence, Walter Bedell Smith; the Secretary of State, Dean G. Acheson; and the Secretary of Defense, Robert A. Lovett, were strong-willed personalities who were determined to see some action. Second, the responsible military operational COMINT authorities were tired of the inefficiency and internecine infighting among the services that had gone on for some three years. All parties were therefore anxious for a change.

A. Milieu

The events of the past three years had been traumatic.
COMINT had not predicted the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950, but it did become the keystone of US operational planning after the United States entered the conflict on 30 June 1950. In the early part of the Korean War, COMINT provided the US commanders with a first-rate picture of North Korean plans and capabilities; and, although the North Koreans gradually tightened up communications security, COMINT remained the principal source of intelligence for three years until 27 July 1953, when the armistice was signed at Panmunjom.

B. **Impact**

The Brownell Committee Report thus came at a propitious time and produced major results, viz., the creation of the National Security Agency (NSA) and the revision of the governmental COMINT structure through a completely new National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 9 (NSCID No. 9). Even so, COMINT remained an independent intelligence empire, separate from the rest of the intelligence community, and functioning under the Secretary of Defense.
The DCI was given another hat. Under his old hat he was the "czar" of the non-COMINT intelligence community and Chairman of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, which was subordinate to him. Under his new hat he was also made permanent Chairman of the USCIB. This latter hat bestowed more prestige than authority, since control still really rested with the Secretary of Defense who was made the "executive agent" for US COMINT activities.

C. How the Brownell Committee Came About

When General Walter Bedell Smith became DCI on 7 October 1950, one of the earliest problems to come to his attention was the difficulty then current in the government's communications intelligence operation.

US forces had entered the Korean conflict three months earlier. The atmosphere of bickering among the services, CIA, and State, that had prevailed for the past three years, was beginning to change to a war-team spirit. The bureaucratic structure, however, designed under divisiveness, precluded pulling together. USCIB and AFSA were
both ineffective. The COMINT effort was at a low ebb.

Adding to the gloom was the COMINT security problem.

The treason of Whittaker Chambers, Allan Nunn May, the atomic spies, and especially Judith Coplan in the Department of Justice, gave evidence of Russian penetration of our most closely guarded secrets. COMINT suspected that it, too, was penetrated. Even more, it could feel the penetration; but it couldn't find it. 102/

Thus Smith came on the intelligence stage at a critical time, and he came with the "proper connections." President Truman made General Eisenhower's old Chief of Staff and confidant, General Walter Bedell Smith -- a man of personality, power, and prestige -- his Director of Central Intelligence.

On the recommendation of William Jackson, Smith persuaded Kingman Douglass to come back to
CIA from his New York investment firm to assist him for a couple of years. Douglass had been in air intelligence in London during World War II and had helped in reorganizing OSS. Douglass took over the functions performed by Dr. Horace D. ("Pete") Craig, who had served briefly in the latter part of 1950 as Chief of the Advisory Council and even more briefly as Assistant Director of the successor component, the Office of Special Services, from 1 December 1950.* General Smith named Douglass to succeed Craig as Assistant Director of OSS on 4 January 1951. Eleven days later, on 15 January, Smith renamed OSS the Office of Current Intelligence, with Douglass as AD. Douglass retained the responsibility of being the CIA COMINT Officer and thus had two hats. Under one hat, he was responsible for producing current intelligence; and under the other, he was responsible for advising the DCI on COMINT community matters and for controlling COMINT within the Agency.

Kingman Douglass immediately undertook a study of community COMINT problems and on 20 October 1951

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* See Chapter II, C, above.

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sent a memorandum to the DCI stating: "There is an urgent need for a fresh look at the entire communications intelligence picture." The study resulted in a letter to the National Security Council from Smith stating: "The DCI herewith advises the National Security Council that he is gravely concerned as to the security and effectiveness with which the Communications Intelligence activities of the Government are being conducted." 104/

James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, on 13 December 1951 advised the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense that the President had approved the survey. 105/

Within two weeks a letter signed by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State, naming the addressees as members of an ad hoc committee, was sent to Mr. George A. Brownell, Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Brigadier General John Magruder, USA (Ret.), and Mr. William H. Jackson. 106/ Within the next few months a small staff was selected headed by Mr. Benjamin Shute.
D. The Report

The committee met during the spring and summer of 1952 and had formal interviews with 43 witnesses and a large number of informal conferences with other individuals. On 13 June 1952 the committee submitted its report to the Secretaries of Defense and State.107/

The report was a masterpiece of its kind.

It was broken into five parts:

I. A Brief History of the Communications Intelligence in the United States

II. The Value of Communications Intelligence

III. The Present Organization


V. Conclusions and Recommendations -- recommendations as to changes in the organization below, within, and above the AFSA level

The Committee conclusions and recommendations changed the course of history insofar as US COMINT was concerned. They noted the vital importance to national defense of COMINT, particularly in times
of war. They also noted the present lack of success in the COMINT field compared with what "we had had up to 1946." They brought out the point that in place of the Army and Navy organizations that existed in World War II, there now were four COMINT organizations, since Air Force and AFSA had been added. AFSA had no authority over the service units, each of which was independent. The Committee recommended strongly that AFSA should be made the keystone of the COMINT organization, that its director should serve for longer than two years, and that he should be military rather than civilian. They recommended also that the Department of Defense should be the executive agent of the government to manage COMINT, that AFSA should be abolished, and USCIB substantially changed. With respect to USCIB they recommended that the DCI should be chairman and that representatives of Defense, State, FBI, and AFSA should be the members. They also recommended that the Director of AFSA should report to the USCIB orally or in writing regarding any new major policy or program.108/
These recommendations were accepted by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the DCI except for one major point. The three military services were kept on the USCIB as members rather than being represented by a single member of the Department of Defense.\[^{109}\] To insure that there would be no slippage in the implementation of these recommendations, General John Magruder was appointed by the Secretary of Defense as his personal representative and board member.

The Brownell Report was submitted on 13 June 1952, within six months -- a record in Washington.\[^{110}\]
It became "the law of the land" when the revised NSCID No. 9 was completed.

The report of the Brownell Committee was an earthquake that not only shook the governmental COMINT structure; it toppled it. It changed USCIB; it changed the responsibilities of the DCI; it revised the role of the military services; and it led to the creation of the National Security Agency on 4 November 1952.
E. USCIB Acts

In the fall of 1952 the United States Communications Intelligence Board under the chairmanship of Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith started to implement the recommendations of the Brownell Committee. It had taken over six months of squabbling to draft the original NSCID No. 9 in 1948. Now within a period of weeks, NSCID No. 9 was completely rewritten by USCIB in accordance with the Brownell recommendations and issued on 29 December 1952.*

In the new NSCID No. 9, communications intelligence activities were made a national responsibility. A Special Committee of the NSC for COMINT was created, consisting of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense who "with the assistance of the DCI" were to establish policies governing COMINT. The Department of Defense was designated as the executive agent of the government for the production of COMINT. USCIB was reconstituted as

* See Volume IV, General Appendixes.

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a body under the Special Committee consisting of
the DCI, as Chairman, and representatives of State,
Defense, the FBI, NSA, the services, and CIA. Re-
commendations of USCIB were binding on the Secretary
of Defense. The Director of NSA was placed under
the direction of the Secretary of Defense but was
charged with making reports to the board from time
to time, as requested. The board was charged with
coordinating COMINT, formulating policies concerning
COMINT relations with foreign governments, and es-
establishing intelligence requirements for NSA and
security standards and practices for all departments.

The NSCID incorporated a Directive to the
Secretary of Defense establishing the COMINT mission
of the NSA "to provide an effective unified organ-
ization and control of the communications intelli-
gence activities of the United States."[11] The
Director of NSA (DIRNSA) was to be of three star
rank and to serve for four years and was given the
power to issue mandatory instructions to the mili-
tary services subject only to appeal to the Secret-
tary of Defense. He was also charged with pre-
scribing requisite security regulations for elements
under his operational or technical control, including inspections if necessary. The DIRNSA could, at his discretion, delegate direct operational control to field commanders; otherwise, all COMINT activities were under his control. The Director was given a civilian deputy to ensure the effective employment of available human and scientific resources. Nothing in the directive was to contravene the responsibilities of the individual departments for the evaluation and dissemination of finished intelligence based on COMINT. Finally, the directive recognized that:

the special nature of COMINT activities requires that they be treated in all respects as being outside the framework of other or general intelligence activities. Orders, Directives, policies, or recommendations of any authority of the Executive Branch ... shall not be applicable to COMINT activities, unless specifically so stated and issued by competent authority represented on the Board. Other NSC Intelligence Directives to the DCI and related implementing Directives issued by the DCI shall be construed as nonapplicable to COMINT activities unless the NSC has made its Directive specifically applicable to COMINT.112/
F. The Community "Carries On"

The intelligence community set about with good will and with vigor to implement the new NSCID No. 9. Changes as drastic as these did not come about easily. In particular, the military services had difficulty in knuckling under to the Director of NSA. At the 80th meeting of USCIB on 28 November 1952, Major General R. J. Canine sat for the first time with his new hat as the Director of the National Security Agency replacing that of Director of AFSA.

The role of the DCI was somewhat strengthened, in that he was made permanent Chairman of USCIB. The Brownell Committee had considered and rejected recommendations that COMINT activities be put under a civilian rather than a military structure. COMINT remained, therefore, as an empire unto itself functioning outside of the Intelligence Advisory Committee structure and reporting to the Special Committee of the National Security Council directly rather than through the DCI.
G. Huntington D. Sheldon

The month after the Brownell Committee completed its report (June 1952), Kingman Douglass, having completed his government stint for Smith, returned to his business and was replaced by Mr. Huntington D. Sheldon (12 July).

What the Brownell Report did in a short time for the COMINT community as a whole, Huntington D. Sheldon did over many years for COMINT in CIA. Douglass had known Sheldon in London during World War II when they were both on the Air Intelligence Staff, and he recruited Sheldon to come to Washington to replace him. Sheldon stayed on as a career intelligence officer. His impact on the Central Intelligence Agency and on the intelligence community during the 18 years from 1952 to 1970 was great. An able administrator and a seasoned intelligence officer, he filled three senior governmental intelligence positions simultaneously during much of his career. As Assistant Director of Current Intelligence (AD/CI), he was responsible for the intelligence provided to Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy on a daily basis. He built the Office of
Current Intelligence during his ten years of stewardship from 1952 to 1962 into a team of intelligence experts who were respected throughout the government.

In his capacity as AD/CI, Mr. Sheldon inherited responsibility for the operation of the Special Center. On 15 September 1958 he was designated CIA COMINT Officer, to (1) advise and assist the Director in formulating, implementing, and coordinating COMINT policies; (2) coordinate the CIA COMINT program; (3) provide centralized guidance for the conduct of CIA COMINT activities; and (4) act for the DCI in COMINT matters as appropriate.113/

In May 1954 he was instrumental in the reconstitution by the IAC of the Watch Committee under CIA chairmanship, and in July of the same year of the activation of the National Indications Center (NIC) by Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 1/2. The Center was housed originally in Que Building within Sheldon's Office of Current Intelligence and later moved to special quarters in the basement of the Pentagon. The NIC staff supported the Chairman of the USIB Watch Committee, a job filled by the Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence. When Lieutenant General Charles P.
Cabell, USAF, retired as Deputy DCI in January 1962,
Sheldon was designated chairman of the USIB Watch
Committee, a position which he held for eight years
until his retirement on 9 January 1970.

From April 1962 to November 1963 Sheldon
served as Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence
(DDI), prior to becoming Special Assistant to the
Deputy Director for Research (DDR). (This office
title was changed to Deputy Director for Science
and Technology (DD/S&T) in August 1963.) Some time
after Sheldon transferred to the DDR, his Special
Intelligence Staff which supported him as CIA SIGINT
Officer* was also transferred from the Office of
the Deputy Director for Intelligence to the Office
of the DD/S&T. The Special Intelligence Staff
(SPINT) under Sheldon remained attached to the
DD/S&T "for rations and quarters" for eight years
until 1970. It was disbanded as a staff on

* On 8 June 1962, following the consolidation of
the USIB subcommittees for COMINT and ELINT, his
status was changed from CIA COMINT to CIA SIGINT
Officer effective 28 May.
2 February 1970, and its functions were reabsorbed by the DDI Information Requirements Staff. The mantle of the SIGINT Officer had been assumed on 1 November 1969 by Mr. Edward Proctor, Assistant to the DDI Deputy Chief, SPINT, became Mr. Proctor's Special SIGINT Advisor.

The Special Intelligence Staff was thus closely associated with Sheldon in the direction of COMINT and later SIGINT during much of his Agency career.
Appendix A

CIA SIGINT Officers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer and Title</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Captain Thomas F. Cullen, USNR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief, Advisory Council</td>
<td>16 Aug 46</td>
<td>13 Dec 46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander Rufus L. Taylor, USN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acting Chief, Advisory Council</td>
<td>13 Dec 46</td>
<td>9 Jan 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acting Chief, Advisory Council</td>
<td>9 Jan 47</td>
<td>6 May 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain Joseph Finnegan, USN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief, Advisory Council</td>
<td>6 May 47</td>
<td>7 Aug 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horace A. Craig</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief, Advisory Council</td>
<td>9 Oct 50</td>
<td>1 Dec 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Director, Office of Special Services</td>
<td>1 Dec 50</td>
<td>4 Jan 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingman Douglass</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Director, OSS</td>
<td>4 Jan 51</td>
<td>15 Jan 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Director, Office of Current Intelligence</td>
<td>15 Jan 51</td>
<td>11 Jul 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huntington D. Sheldon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Director, OCI</td>
<td>12 Jul 52</td>
<td>23 Apr 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant DDI</td>
<td>23 Apr 62</td>
<td>4 Nov 63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA COMINT Officer</td>
<td>31 Oct 58</td>
<td>28 May 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA SIGINT Officer</td>
<td>28 May 62</td>
<td>1 Nov 69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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#### Chronology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CIA</th>
<th>Intelligence Community</th>
<th>World Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1945</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Mar</td>
<td>ANCIB established</td>
<td>6 Aug Hiroshima</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Dec</td>
<td>ANCIB becomes STANCIB with addition of Dept of State</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1946</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22 Jan President Truman creates CIG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Jan Rear Adm. Sidney W. Souers, USNR, appointed DCI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Jun Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, USA (AAF), becomes DCI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Jul CIG Advisory Council established for COMINT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Jun STANCIB becomes USCIB; FBI becomes member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Jul CIG becomes member of USCIB; DCI Vandenberg elected Chairman</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
16 Aug Capt. Thomas F. Cullen, USNR, appointed Chief, Advisory Council

Nov USCIB authorizes CIG to receive two copies of COMINT Diplomatic Summary

16 Dec Cmdr. Rufus L. Taylor, USN, appointed Acting Chief, Advisory Council

9 Jan appointed Acting Chief, Advisory Council

3 Mar CIG sends editor to Diplomatic Summary Staff

Apr Joint Counter-Intelligence Center started at Nebraska Ave. Navy Installation by CIG

1 May Rear Adm. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, USN, becomes DCI

Apr ASA starts processing Russian at Pentagon with seven people
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CIA</th>
<th>Intelligence Community</th>
<th>World Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 May Capt. Joseph Finnegan, USN, appointed Chief, Advisory Council</td>
<td>1947 (Contd)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 May Of 50 indoctrinated persons in CIG, only 11 regularly see COMINT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Apr USCIB approves dissemination of COMINT to CIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>1 Apr USSR interferes with traffic between Berlin and West Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26 Jun US launches Berlin airlift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Jul NSCID No. 9 reconstitutes USCIB under NSC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>19 Oct Polygraph made requirement for all CIA COMINT'ers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Intelligence Community</td>
<td>World Events</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1948 (Cont)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov US CIB Directive No. 1 establishes Intelligence Committee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1949</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>28 Mar Louis-Johnson succeeds Forrestal as Secretary of Defense</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25 Apr German Federal Rep established in Bonn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 May Berlin Blockade lifted</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20 May AFSA created by JCS 2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jul Joint Counterintelligence Center moved to CIA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sep Arlington Hall suspects security leak</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
23 Sep USSR atom bomb announced

1 Oct Chinese People's Republic proclaimed in Peking

7 Oct German Democratic Republic (GDR) established in Soviet Zone

2 Nov DCI announces to Directors of Intelligence for IAC Agencies and AFSA the establishment of the Special Research Center under the Chief, Advisory Council

2 Dec CONSIDO considered by USCIB

1950

Mar Judith Coplon convicted of espionage
CIA

Intelligence Community

World Events

1950 (Contd)

20 Jun USCIB 8/25 approves CIA

25 Jun North Korea invade South Korea

30 Jun US ground forces enter conflict in Korea

14 Jul USCIB kills CONSIDO proposal

Sep Gen. George C. Marshall succeeds Johnson as Secretary of Defense

7 Oct Lt. Gen. Walter B. Smith sworn in as DCI

9 Oct Horace S. Craig appointed Chief, Advisory Council
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CIA</th>
<th>Intelligence Community</th>
<th>World Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov CIA sends personnel to work at AFSA on Russian</td>
<td>Dec AFSA strength 5,000 people</td>
<td>26 Nov Chinese cross the Yalu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Dec Advisory Council disestablished; functions transferred to proposed Office of Special Services; former Chief, Advisory Council designated Assistant Director, OSS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Jan Kingman Douglass named AD/SS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Jan OSS renamed Office of Current Intelligence; Douglass continues as AD</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TOP SECRET

World Events

8 Sep US signs peace and security treaties with Japan

Intelligence Community

Aug Gen. Ralph J. Canine becomes director of NSA

CIA

1951

28 Dec Brownell Committee establishes to survey COMINT activities of the US Government

13 Jun Brownell Committee report submitted

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111
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 Jul</td>
<td>Huntington D. Sheldon replaces Douglass as AD/CI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Nov</td>
<td>NSA replaces AFSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Dec</td>
<td>NSCID No. 9 revised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Jan</td>
<td>Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower becomes President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Mar</td>
<td>Stalin dies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Jul</td>
<td>Korean Armistice signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Aug</td>
<td>USSR H-Bomb exploded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Sep</td>
<td>Khrushchev named First Secretary Communist Party USSR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
May H. Marshall Chadwell, AD/SI, named CIA ELINT Staff Officer (ESO)

11 May National Indications Center established by DCID 1/2 to be located in Q Building

19 May US and Pakistan signed defense agreement

3 Jun USCIB approves plan to provide US cipher equipment to NATO

20 Jul Dr. Otto John defected GDR

25 Feb Nasser takes over Egypt
Nov Digging of Berlin Tunnel started
5 Nov Land Panel recommends (U-2)
24 Nov President Eisenhower approves

May Berlin Tunnel becomes operational

16 May NSCID No. 17 issued as ELINT charter

14 May Warsaw Pact signed
18-23 Jul Four power summit conference in Geneva
Sep West Germany and USSR establish diplomatic rela
23 Apr Berlin Tunnel discovered

Jun First U-2 flights over USSR

26 Jul Egypt nationalizes Suez Canal

23-24 Oct Revolt in Budapest

29 Oct Israel invades Egypt
26 Aug USSR announces successful ICBM test flight

Fall NSA starts contract for Russian linguists

Fall NSA assigned responsibility for CRITICOM Net

4 Oct USSR launches Sputnik satellite

24 Oct President's Board of Consultants recommends that USCIB and IAC be merged; DCI does not approve because USCIB/IAC members disagree
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CIA</th>
<th>Intelligence Community</th>
<th>World Events</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>1957 (Contd)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov NSA moves to Ft. Meade</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov NSA starts civilian operator program</td>
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<td>1958</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jan Baker Panel dampens hope of solving high-level Soviet ciphers</td>
<td>31 Jan US orbits Explorer</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feb NSA global communications automated</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Mar CIBD No. 17 establishes ELINT Committee under USCIB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13 Mar By direction of President Eisenhower, NSC Action 1873(f) combines USCIB and IAC</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15 Jul US marines ordered Beirut to protect independence of Lebanon</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Intelligence Community</td>
<td>World Events</td>
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<tr>
<td>------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Sep Sheldon designated</td>
<td>15 Sep NSCID No. 6 establishes USIB, replacing USCIB and IAC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA COMINT Officer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23 Sep First USIB meeting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct ELINT Committee established under USIB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan Castro takes over</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuban Government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr Work starts on COMINT Objectives List</td>
<td>Sep Khrushchev visits US</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan USIB requests</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMINT Committee to review the US program</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Intelligence Community</td>
<td>World Events</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1960 (Contd)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar Project gets under way</td>
<td>Mar COMINT Requirements List (&quot;400 List&quot;) completed</td>
<td>13 Feb First French nuclear device detonated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>NSA employees Martin and Mitchell defect to USSR</td>
<td>1 May U-2 shot down over USSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>KH-I flies</td>
<td>11 Jul USSR downs US RB-4 plane over Barents Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>USIB approves 400-item COMINT Requirements List</td>
<td>Aug USSR recalls technicians from China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>3 Jan US breaks diplomatic relations with Cuba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17 Apr Bay of Pigs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Intelligence Community</td>
<td>World Events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Sep NIC established</td>
<td>Aug DIA charter issued</td>
<td>1 May Castro declares Cuba a socialist nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct CIA moves to new Headquarters Bldg.</td>
<td>12-18 Aug GDR erects Berlin wall</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Nov John A. McCone succeeds Dulles as DCI</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>10 Feb Khrushchev proposes 18-nation disarmament conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Feb Richard Bissell resigns as DDP, effective 17 Feb</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Feb Herbert Scoville named DDR, effective 19 Feb</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
World Events

18 Mar Franco-Algerian ceasefire agreement

Intelligence Community

1962 (Contd)

30 Mar Sheldon leaves OCTO to become Acting DDI

31 Apr COMINT Committee combined with ELINT Committee; new SIGINT Committee chaired by Gen. Samford at first meeting in May

CIA

23 Apr Sheldon named Assistant DDI

28 May Sheldon named CIA SIGINT Officer

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CIA</th>
<th>Intelligence Community</th>
<th>World Events</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1962 (Contd)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

30 Jul Office of ELINT established in DDR, under

22 Oct President Kennedy announces Soviet missiles in Cuba

1963

14 Jan De Gaulle vetoes British membership in Common Market

May Penkovsky trial and execution

10 Jun Collection Guidance Staff established

30 Jun Philby granted asylum in USSR

23 Jul NSA spy Jack E. Dunlap commits suicide

5 Aug DDR becomes DD/S&T
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CIA</th>
<th>Intelligence Community</th>
<th>World Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 Nov Sheldon named Special Assistant to DD/S&amp;T, continues as CIA SIGINT Officer</td>
<td>1963 (Contd)</td>
<td>30 Aug Washington-Moscow &quot;hot line&quot; activated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Jul SPINT transferred from DDI to DD/S&amp;T</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Nov President Diem assassinated in South Vietnam coup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22 Nov President Kennedy assassinated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Feb US increases strength in Vietnam from 75,000 to 125,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2-4 Aug Tonkin Gulf incident</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
12 Feb Sheldon succeeds Gen. Samford as Chairman of SIGINT Committee

28 Apr Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr. USN (Ret), becomes DCI

10 Aug NSAM No. 337 directs reduction of US dependence on SIGINT bases in

Sep OSP (satellites) separated from OSA (planes)

15 Oct Khrushchev deposed in USSR

16 Oct Communist China reports first successful test of nuclear device

28 Apr US intervenes in Dominican Revolution

30 Sep Communist coup in Indonesia aborted
1 Jul France withdraws armed forces from NATO
5-10 Jun Six-day Arab-Israeli war
23 Jan USS Pueblo captured

1966
21 Jan Intelligence Subcommittee established
30 Jun Richard Helms becomes DCT

1967
Jul-Aug. Eaton Panel named to review national SIGINT effort

1968
30 Aug SIGINT Organization Study Group (OSG) reports on SIGINT in CIA
CIA

Intelligence Community

World Events

1968 (Contd)

30 Jan Tet offensive in South Vietnam

31 Mar President Johnson restricts bombing of North Vietnam

May National Intelligence Resources Board established

10 May Opening of Paris peace negotiations between US and North Vietnam

16 Aug Eaton reports to DCI

20-21 Aug Soviet troops invade Czechoslovakia

15 Apr North Korea downs unarmed US reconnaissance plane

1969
1 Nov Edward W. Proctor named CIA SIGINT Officer in addition to duties as ADDI

12 Jan SPINT Staff abolished, effective 2 Feb

28 Apr De Gaulle resigns as President of France

8 Jun President Nixon initiates withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam

3 Sep Ho Chi Minh, President of North Vietnam, dies

1969 (Contd)

1970
The DCI Historical Series

The History of SIGINT in the
Central Intelligence Agency, 1947-70

Volume II
DCI HISTORICAL SERIES
DCI-4

The History of SIGINT
In the Central Intelligence Agency, 1947-70
Volume II

by

October 1971

Edward W. Proctor
CIA SIGINT Officer

Historical Staff
Central Intelligence Agency

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DCI HISTORICAL SERIES
DCI-4

THE HISTORY OF SIGINT
IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 1947-70
VOLUME II

by

October 1971

Edward W. Proctor
CIA SIGINT Officer

HISTORICAL STAFF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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Volume II

I. The Dark Ages

The early 1950's were the dark ages for communications intelligence. Intelligence officers who had been accustomed to providing solid information not only on the capabilities but also on the intentions of the enemy during World War II were reduced to providing the government with "estimates" based on frail fragments of information rather than factual foreknowledge. The ciphers of China as she crossed the Yalu in November 1950

The communications of our threatening adversary, Russia, effectively cut off other sources of intelligence.

Early in the decade, the Brownell Committee addressed itself to straightening out the bureaucratic disarray of the multiple US COMINT efforts. The seed of service unification planted by Secretary of Defense James Forrestal five years earlier
was put to harvest by Brownell and resulted in the National Security Agency (NSA) in November 1952.

A. Director of the National Security Agency

The Director of the National Security Agency (DIRNSA) was charged with making the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force pull in harness as a COMINT team -- a formidable task, and one which was to come about only gradually during the next decade. The first driver of the team was a fortunate choice, the Director of AFSA, Lieutenant General Ralph J. Canine, who served as Director of the NSA from its creation on 4 November 1952 to November 1956. Canine was a go-getter with a brassy, effective, no-nonsense style. During the almost five years of his tenure, he raised the morale, the calibre, and the competence of NSA personnel and in 1956 moved NSA from jammed, inadequate quarters at Arlington Hall into efficient, new quarters at Fort Meade. He vastly improved the timeliness and effectiveness of communications intelligence in support of military operations by decentralizing COMINT processing from Washington to overseas field posts and through the years raised the National Security - 2 -
Agency from a second-rate to a first-rate organization. These changes were gradual and hard to come by, however, and this chapter is the story of his travails rather than his triumphs.

Despite the organizational and administrative improvements made by Canine, NSA remained unable to fulfill its number one objective.

B. A Taste of Honey

During World War II, COMINT made tremendous contributions to the allied victories. The air battle over Britain, the desert war in Africa, and the naval war in the Pacific were fought with foreknowledge of enemy intentions. Nearly all German and Japanese military systems were read on a continuing basis. Additionally, throughout the war, almost complete knowledge of axis diplomatic correspondence was available to allied governmental leaders giving the long-range strategic plans of the axis' powers.

At the end of the war, the German and Japanese military material ceased to exist. United
States cryptanalytic efforts were then directed principally at Russian communications. Many of

COMINT organization concentrated on this problem and vastly expanded its interception and processing activities. This enabled the United States for a period of some 20 years to stay on top of Russian [activity. This intelligence

- 4 -
window provided the major capability with respect to for this entire period.
C. The October Surveys

Some two
dozen of the best cryptanalytic technicians

A year later, in October 1951, after 12 months of hard work, the same people met again. After a month of study, they made specific recommendations calling for additional computers and personnel to work on the complex problems of intercept and cryptanalysis. In 1952 the Director of AFSA, in order to get a non-technical point of view, had the subject reviewed by the AFSA "Special Communications Advisory Group" (SCAG), chaired by Howard T. Engstrom of RCA.5/ They concluded that "there is a clear-cut promise of successful solution".

The SCAG also recommended that a senior civilian technical director be appointed directly under the Director of AFSA. It also stated that "a careful revision of personnel policy is needed to attract and keep personnel."6/ Noting that AFSA had not taken advantage of outside

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developments in machine and basic research, the group concluded that the effort devoted to the problem was entirely inadequate.

These SCAG recommendations were reiterated several months later by the Brownell Committee, which severely criticized AFSA's personnel policies because technically competent civilians were second-class citizens and administration and control of NSA was in the hands of military personnel who more often than not were inexperienced in the cryptanalytic field.7/

D. The Need for Strategic Warning

The pressures on intelligence for information on China and on Russia were great. When the Chinese crossed the Yalu into the Korean War on 26 November 1950, five months to the day after the North Korean invasion of South Korea, the US COMINT capability against China was

* 1971. - 8 -
Since the first Russian atomic explosion in September 1949, the Russians had been building up their stockpile of weapons. The Russian hydrogen bomb test on 12 August 1953 shook the whole world figuratively as well as literally. The Russian Long Range Air Force, charged with delivery of these weapons, was building up at a rapid rate.
The US need for strategic warning of a possible Russian attack was paramount. According to the 1953 Robertson Report on the potentialities of COMINT for strategic warning,

A surprise atomic attack on the United States would result in carnage, devastation, psychological shock, and curtailment of our retaliatory ability on a scale difficult to estimate or even to comprehend in terms of any previous experience.10/

A Defense Department report by General Bull on the same subject considered "the payoff so great as to warrant any possible attack on the problem, regardless of its cost, funds, and manpower."11/

E. Order-of-Battle: US Versus USSR

This was the "bomber gap" period of American history. The Russians were estimated in 1953 to have an atomic stockpile of approximately 120 weapons which would increase to about 300 by 1955, not including thermonuclear types.12/ In 1953 the Soviet Long Range Air Force was estimated to have about 1,000 medium propeller driven bombers of the TU-4 type (similar to -10-
the US B-29), capable of reaching all targets in the United States on a one-way mission. The 1953 estimate assumed that the USSR would replace the TU-4 with a medium jet and that there might already be a prototype of a heavy turboprop bomber. In May of 1955 it was estimated that the USSR would have by the middle of that year 1160 TU-4's, 200 TU-16 medium jet bombers, and 40 heavy bombers (20 jet, 20 turboprop), the latter capable of two-way missions against the United States with atomic weapons. The Soviet Union was thus believed to have a capability to launch an effective large-scale atomic air attack against all major targets within the United States, including densely populated areas, industrial centers, and military bases.

Against this threat, the United States in 1953, through its network of 71 radars, had only a 30-minute warning capability against aircraft. The US Air Defense Command had 53 interceptor squadrons (25 aircraft per squadron) with fixed forward firing aircraft guns -- 15 percent of which had all-weather capability. A total of 57 AAA battalions equipped with 90 mm. and 120 mm. weapons were deployed to assist in the defense of 22 critical targets in the United States.
The US defense posture in 1953 was pretty grim. Not until two years later were the intercept squadrons equipped with collision course fired rockets and NIKE guided missiles, and not until 1956 was the early-warning radar extended across northern Canada. These measures increased the warning time to two hours and the kill probability to approximately 50 percent under all-weather conditions. The cost for these improvements was more than $40 billion, and almost 200,000 full-time active service personnel were involved.16/

The need for strategic warning during this period was thus overwhelming, and to the military planners cost was a secondary consideration.
The need to obtain strategic warning for the defense of the United States was thus a number-one priority. Even after the early success had dried up, hope for future results remained strong in the COMINT community.
F. **COMINT in the Doldrums**

The total COMINT effort expanded considerably from 1950 to 1953, and then to 1954. However, the rapid expansion resulted in many inefficiencies. The operators were short-term military enlisted personnel and were poorly trained. The intercept of traffic suffered a needless setback because of poor NSA planning.

At Arlington Hall in 1954, the COMINT effort on the USSR was devoted to cryptanalysis, to traffic analysis, and to processing.\(^{21}\) The pressure on NSA from the services was to change this ratio in favor of traffic analysis in order to...
produce current tactical intelligence. CIA was pressuring NSA to increase work and, likewise, to improve the Russian effort by improving the quality of personnel. NSA civilian pay grades were very low. Of the people in the Production Division (PROD) at NSA, which processed all intelligence-producing traffic, there was only one GS-15; and there were no super-grades at the beginning of 1954.22/ The PROD organization, which was charged with cryptanalysis, was unwieldy and bewildering, with line and staff functions crossing each other. Military men held three-fourths of the key jobs although three-fourths of the personnel in the divisions were civilian. Both civilian and military morale was low.

The US COMINT effort was in the doldrums, dead in the water, and the intelligence community started whistling louder and louder for the wind needed to get the ship once again underway.
II.

A. CIA Pressure on NSA

was the shibboleth of the mid-1950's shouted loud and often by the entire intelligence community, but loudest of all by CIA. The basic responsibility of the DCI with respect to the NSA became the subject of a major study within CIA and for high-level discussions between CIA and the Pentagon.

Deputy G-2, Brigadier General Carter W. Clarke, opposing the DCI pressure in the matter, wrote Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., CIA Inspector General, in April 1954: "It would seem to me that the Director himself could be absolved of all blame in the event a crisis arose in NSA."23/ The Chief, SPIINT, Edmund H. Kelly, commenting to Sheldon on the letter, in a masterpiece of understatement said: "You may wish to inform the Inspector General that we are not in accord with General Clarke's conclusion."24/

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At Sheldon's request, SPINT had in preparation, prior to receipt of the Clarke letter, a major study on the subject of NSA and the DCI's responsibilities. This study advised the DCI that "An all-out US effort has not been made by NSA," and whereas NSA's

It also stated that the entire personnel situation of NSA was still bad and noted that the new NSA civilian Deputy, Mr. A. B. Clark, the retiring Vice President of Bell Laboratories, was serving only part-time at NSA and had no authority over cryptanalysis.26/

A principal factor in the CIA pressure on NSA was the presence in CIA of a former NSA senior officer had left NSA shortly after Canine took charge because of personal differences arising out of Canine's policy of rotating key personnel at NSA. In World War II and in the postwar period had been in charge of the Army's cryptanalytic effort. When Canine arbitrarily shifted from this job to a job in Communications

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Security quit. William K. Harvey, at the time Chief of the Clandestine Service in CIA, hired to replace himself in April 1952 stayed with CIA for six years, returning to NSA in June 1958 after Canine retired. During this period as Chief of [redacted] made a major contribution to the Agency's work in integrating CIA COMINT and covert activities. Although head and hands were at the service of CIA during this whole period, much to CIA's advantage, his heart remained back in the field of his youth -- cryptanalysis. More than anyone else in CIA [redacted] was the gadfly who persuaded DCI Dulles that old outfit, NSA, was not working hard enough on the [redacted] problem.

* See Chapter V, below.

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This letter came about as a result of the Clark Task Force on Intelligence Activities which functioned under the Hoover Commission on organization of the Executive Branch of the government.28/ Recommendation II of Part I of this report had stated

that the Director NSA be given clear-cut Directives which will enable him to make much greater and continuing

USCIB in considering this recommendation commented.
This resulted in the preparation by the SPINT staff of the above letter which was cleared by the DCI and forwarded to the Secretaries of State and Defense for signature and transmission back to the DCI.  

C. The Erskine Exchange

About this time (December 1955), General Graves B. Erskine, USMC, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations), addressed a letter to the Secretaries of the military services, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the DCI, and DIRNSA.  

"Three years have passed since the present national COMINT organization was established under the revised National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 9 which in turn reflected the bulk of the findings of the Brownell Committee," said Erskine. "The Department of Defense would welcome your frank views at this time as to any improvements that could be made in the rational COMINT mechanism . . . ."

Erskine's letter took the lid off the community kettle which had been boiling briskly with discontent. The Secretary of Navy, C. S. Thomas, led off with a litany of complaints:

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Adequate technical information is not presently being furnished ... The large volume of intelligence information and its wide dissemination among US and foreign intercept stations is undesirable. From the standpoint of security, it overloads the communications system ... The assignment of the problem exclusively to the Air Force may cause serious difficulties to the Navy ... NSA frequently includes comments and interpretations which give the material the appearance of finished intelligence ... cause confusion as to the validity ... 32/

The Assistant Secretary to the Army, George H. Roderick, likewise expressed Army unhappiness over NSA's lack of success in spite of the high priority assigned to this objective and the large increases in personnel and funds provided to NSA since 1952. 33/

He added that NSA had increasingly published and disseminated reports in Army's field of the responsibility which involved evaluation and interpretation of information and were clearly intelligence. Such reports were frequently in error or in conflict with interpretations of intelligence elements of the Army. Traffic intelligence was frequently incomplete and erroneous. Supporting evidence was withheld by NSA on the basis that it was technical information.
The Air Force chose not to reply since it was in essence running its own COMINT shop, quite independent of NSA, at Brooks Air Force Base in Texas. The Air Force was the one holdout of the three services that did not knuckle under to the NSA domination as recommended by the Brownell Committee. The Air Force argued the need for dispersal of facilities in case of atomic attack. With this as an excuse, the Air Force had obtained funds and established a large and independent COMINT organization to support the Strategic Air Command (SAC). SAC, on 24-hour airborne alert, needed direct intelligence support wholly within the Air Force and could not depend on NSA to provide the needed intelligence rapidly, according to the Air Force. No major attempts were made either within Defense or by CIA to curb Air Force independence, as it was recognized that their case had considerable merit.

D. DCI -- We Want the

The DCI reply was prepared by with the assistance of his staff officer, Mr. Fred Griffin, who had followed from NSA when
I have become increasingly concerned in recent years over the fact that we have not yet been able to exploit

began Allen Dulles's letter to the Secretary of Defense on 23 March 1956.

I for one would be willing to suffer a substantial cut in our current COMINT receipts if such a measure promised, however remotely, an eventual yield

It is my belief that we have no choice but to proceed

and to procure and apply to them, from wherever they may be found, those resources and talents which are needed for a systematic and sustained attack.

The DCI went on to offer his assistance and support in recruiting a civilian Deputy for NSA whose primary responsibility would be

He closed indicating that this memorandum was a partial reply to the Erskine letter.

Erskine answered the DCI stating:

The Department of Defense shares the concern expressed in your memorandum.
he added.

I must disassociate myself from your conclusion that the COMINT community at large is not prepared to accept a reduction in the present volume of COMINT information ... . I am not aware that either USCIB or the individual consumers have addressed themselves to this question ... . I am so convinced of the correctness of this position that as Director of Central Intelligence I shall exert every possible effort to ensure that the intelligence community does not lose sight of the vital importance of ... our main COMINT mission.
was presented to USCIB by

DIRNSA in August 1956 \(^38\)/ and was supported by a special briefing for senior officials in the Pentagon by General Erskine as to how it was proposed to carry out the project. Erskine also announced the appointment of Dr. Howard T. Engstrom, RCA, as the new NSA Deputy for Research and Development, effective 20 August 1956.39/ Erskine also took this occasion to state that when General Samford moved from Vice Director of NSA to Director, NSA, on General Canine's statutory retirement, that the Vice Director's post would be filled by a civilian. Later, Dr. Louis Tordella was chosen for this post and has held it since that time.

Boost toward becoming Number One in the computer field and later supported the IBM development of many new devices.
The Department of Defense (DOD) fanfare --
that was underway and all would be well --
failed to quiet the voices of those who wanted the

Within DOD a senior committee had been studying NSA and was about to report even as was conceived and announced. This was the Robertson Committee.

F. The Robertson Survey of NSA

Dr. H. P. Robertson was designated Chairman of the Department of Defense Scientific Advisory Board in December 1956. In this capacity, he chaired a DOD committee studying the managerial and technical problems of NSA. Robertson had previous experience as a COMINT consultant. He had been a CIA consultant since June 1946, an NSA consultant since 1952, and in 1953 chaired an NSA panel on the potential of COMINT for strategic warning. At that time he was professor of physics at the California Institute of Technology.

The Robertson Committee in 1956 studied the NSA work on the Russian problem in the context of
the overall NSA effort, which at that time cost __________ a year in addition to the __________ allotted to the military service COMINT organizations.41/ The report noted that NSA had __________ personnel, __________ of whom were civilian; and the total SIGINT effort included about __________ intercept positions located at __________ different sites, of which __________ were overseas.42/

The findings of the Robertson Committee were made available to the DCI in September 1957 and served to convince him even more than the Erskine episode and __________ that the "problem" was so important that consideration should be given to it not only within the Department of Defense but at the highest governmental level as well. Accordingly, in the fall of 1957, the DCI raised the subject with the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities chaired by Dr. James Killian.43/ Action by Dr. Killian's board resulted in a Presidential letter dated 3 May 1957 establishing under the Science Advisory Committee, Office of Defense Mobilization, a panel of scientists headed by Dr. W. O. Baker of Bell Telephone Laboratories.44/
G. The Baker Panel Investigates the Problem

The Baker Panel studied the problem for several months and forwarded its recommendations to the President through the Special NSC Committee for COMINT early in 1958.45/ The Panel had one major impact. Up to this time the various groups investigating the problem had indicated that success was possible -- perhaps not today, but maybe tomorrow. The Baker panel for the first time put a damper on this optimism. The panel also sought to calm the intelligence community's pressure on NSA to do more on the problem. "The overriding priority assigned should be relaxed. The intellectual problem is much too refractory to yield to administrative pressure," said the panel.46/ The panel also stated flatly that "no national strategy should be based on the hope or expectation."

The panel did not recommend abandoning the effort, however, but stated that "We should, nevertheless, continue the most vigorous attack. Only thus can we possibly..."
hope which may occur in times of emergency. 47/

to these findings, the panel made two recommendations which turned out to be abortive. First, they recommended that control of ELINT processing and analysis be assigned to NSA. 48/ When this was considered by the Special NSC Committee for COMINT on 10 February 1958, the ELINT item was deferred. 49/ Second, the panel suggested that an independent research organization be created outside of NSA similar to the Los Alamos organization which was used to develop the US atomic bomb. 50/

This suggestion met a visceral and immediate negation on the part of the Department of Defense, CIA, and even NSA; and nothing ever came of it.

After the Baker Panel, community pressure on NSA began to relax. As the years went on to increase as to whether the all the

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funds being devoted to it
the cover-name given to the entire Russian problem at the time.\textsuperscript{53} CIG was highly interested in the potential of this source and in the success of this group, even at this early date, and initially gave to ASA for this project a list of qualified personnel who had applied for jobs with CIA.

The project was held very closely by the Army, so much so that this project was set up at the Pentagon rather than at Arlington Hall Station where a new group of this nature would be noticed. The Army did not even make \underline{intercepts} available to the Department of State in the early days. The volume of material rapidly increased. Practical problems of handling it soon caused security restrictions \underline{to be relaxed}, even within G-2 at the Pentagon; and the traffic was made available to the G-2 military section, Special Research Branch, where cleared personnel from the Eurasian Intelligence Branch had
CIA in 1948 was the principal intelligence agency exploiting this traffic to produce finished intelligence.

Throughout this entire period, CIA was "the" consumer and pushed AFSA to increase production. In this regard, DCI Hillenkoetter together with other USCIB members met with Chief of Staff General McNarney on 6 July 1949 to try to obtain additional AFSA funds to process Russian. They were turned down by McNarney because the military was reducing civilian personnel quotas by 50 percent. A year later, in 1950, CIA made arrangements to send as many as 100 of its own intelligence analysts to AFSA to assist in processing the material.

By 1951 the Soviet problem was in

AFSA-246, retained of these after primary scanning, and published approximately items each month while utilizing.

TOP SECRET

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Of the people at AFSA in 1950 working on technical production worked on Soviet communications, and of these on the scanning and processing of At the time, AFSA estimated they were intercepting available. By early 1952 the AFSA section on Russian had expanded to about people. This group was scanning about messages intercepted each month and publishing some items per month from this amount.

D. Cloud on the Horizon
A report made to USCTB in July 1951 by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, stated:

During the past two years it is important to note that quite frequently shortly after the publication of an excellent COMINT report.
Despite these evidences of Soviet penetration of the United States intelligence community, the security leak was never found. The cloud that had appeared on the intelligence horizon in 1949 gave indications of eventually blotting out the sun in the fall of 1952.

A G-2 report to USCIB in 1951 stated "It would be physically of the messages". This was soon to be proven one of the more fallible estimates of the decade.
E. The Becker-Canine Agreement

CIA was unhappy with what it considered cursory processing of this huge volume of material. NSA
Additionally, there was a tremendous amount of unpublished material in the NSA files and a large backlog of reports. After preliminary staff level CIA-NSA negotiations in 1953, Loftus E. Becker, Deputy Director for Intelligence, and General Canine, Director, NSA, entered into an agreement whereby CIA would augment the effort with its own analysts.
A. The Other Fellow's COMINT

There was a wide chasm of distrust during World War II between OSS and the Army and Navy COMINT services. The CIG inherited from OSS this somewhat sticky situation as well as the governmental responsibility for running espionage operations and conducting liaison with foreign intelligence services.
* The Communications Division was transferred from the Executive for Personnel and Administration to OSO on 1 July 1947.
One of the more dramatic operations and one of the few which came to public attention was the Berlin Tunnel. During 1954 and 1955, the tunnel, 6 feet in diameter and approximately 2,000 feet long, was dug surreptitiously from the American sector of Berlin into the Soviet sector of Berlin. A special warehouse was built on the American side and filled with dirt from this tunnel to conceal it from prying eyes across the border. At the far end of the tunnel a complex sophisticated wiretap was made on three armored underground cables, two of which were used both by the Soviet and by the East German governments and one of which was used exclusively by the Soviets.
Almost 300 separate circuits were monitored from May 1955, when the wiretap of these three cables was completed, until April 1956. The tap was at this time discovered by a Soviet maintenance crew who were apparently investigating trouble on the cables caused by an unprecedented amount of rain which caused shorts.
The material contained some cipher messages but consisted mostly of plain-text teletype messages and telephone conversations. Bill Harvey, Chief of Station who was running the digging end of the operation, and Chief who was running the translating and processing end in persuaded DCI Dulles that the plain-text material should, for security reasons, be processed by CIA rather than by NSA, much to the chagrin of the latter. NSA considered COMINT processing to be their exclusive bailiwick and feared might be a CIA move to set up a rival COMINT shop which would compete with NSA.

The problem poisoned CIA-NSA relations for a couple of years. Finally, after the tunnel

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was discovered and the source was "blown," DCI Dulles was persuaded to clarify CIA's legal right

A definitive letter from the DCI to DIRNSA establishing this right was prepared and, after being cleared by Dulles with the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, delivery to DIRNSA was delayed by Dulles until Canine (who felt strongly about) was replaced by General Samford. The letter was then dispatched on 9 February 1957 after Dulles made sure Samford had seen the draft and indicated no objection.

Allen Dulles held the DCI "big stick" lightly and was loath to use it -- a stick which was but a small branch when he first grasped it but which grew in size and in weight as the stature of the DCI kept increasing during his tenure.

After [illegible] was all over, he said if he had another such operation, he would let NSA rather than CIA do the Washington processing of the take, despite
CIA's legal right to do so, in view of the bad blood caused between the two agencies.

C. COMINT Direct Support for CIA Operations
VI. CIA Intercept

The Office of Special Operations was the first element in CIA to have direct access to COMINT through its participation (April 1947) in the Joint Counterintelligence Center (JCIC). The center as time went on provided the training ground for OSO personnel to become familiar with the kinds of information that could be obtained from COMINT to support their operations.
The CIA Office of Communications thus has through its COMINT organization, provided important support throughout the 20 years of its singularly successful operations not only to CIA covert operations but also to the national intelligence effort.

F. COMMO and DDP Teamwork

The CIA intercept effort under the Office of Communications in the very beginning worked in harness with the DDP. This was in contrast to the CIA overseas ELINT intercept operation run by the Office of ELINT (OEL), DD/S&T. This latter relationship resulted frequently in friction between the two offices.

The reason that the Clandestine Service got along well with COMMO whereas it did not with OEL was due in some measure to personality differences but primarily to varying operational philosophies. COMMO had long experience working as a support function to the Clandestine Service overseas and had a tradition of providing service. OEL, on
the other hand, was not a service organization and wanted to run the ELINT operations overseas itself rather than as a service support organization to the Clandestine Service. The Clandestine Service, being the principal CIA overseas office, with responsibility for all overseas operations, thus frequently found itself in conflict with an office which wanted to have direct overseas operational control of its total technical operation.

Not that frictions did not develop between COMMO and [redacted] but generally these were minor. Early in the operation, a basic agreement was worked out [redacted] COMMO and NSA, delineating the functions and responsibilities of each. In effect, COMMO was given responsibility for the operational and technical control of CIA COMINT intercept projects [redacted] was given tasking control and responsibility for working with the DDP area divisions. NSA was to provide technical backup and receive all the product of these operations. This arrangement worked well through the years and is a principal reason for the smooth functioning of the COMINT operation.

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VII. One Plus One Equals One

The merger of the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) and the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) in March of 1958 into a new board called the "United States Intelligence Board" (USIB) would not have come about for years had the decision been left to the intelligence community itself.

A. Don't Rock the Boat

The USCIB was in 1957 quite happy with its modus operandi, and its Chairman, DCI Dulles, was not by nature one to rock the boat, particularly when he was able more or less to chart its course. He did this, however, as a navigator rather than as a captain; for he was not the boss of the USCIB but merely its nonvoting Chairman. The chain of command above the USCIB actually bypassed the DCI and terminated in a Special Committee of the National Security Council (NSC) consisting of the Secretaries of State and Defense. The military services were very jealous of this direct USCIB relationship to
the Special Committee and considered the IAC to be a junior board compared with the USCIB. DCI Allen Dulles, however, had no fear that USCIB would set an independent sail, even though it did not report directly to him, since in the final analysis his brother, John Foster Dulles, was, as Secretary of State, fifty percent of the NSC Special Committee to which USCIB reported.

B. Killian Rocks the Boat

A force outside of the United States intelligence community, therefore, had to be brought to bear even to suggest that the USCIB and IAC should be merged. The President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (known at the time as the "Killian Committee" after its Chairman, James A. Killian) was such a force. Just as the Brownell Committee five years earlier had made recommendations which led to the creation of the National Security Agency and caused a major shakeup in the US COMINT organization, so the Killian Committee in its Recommendation No. 2 to the President on 24 October 1957 threw the stone that started an
avalanche which drastically changed the way of doing business in the entire intelligence community.

Recommendation No. 2 read:

That in order to achieve a better integration of our national intelligence resources (1) the policy, coordinating and supervisory responsibilities presently being discharged separately by the USCIB and IAC be vested in a single Board (to be known as the USIB) established at the present level of the USCIB, with appropriate membership, under the chairmanship of the Director of Central Intelligence and responsible directly to the National Security Council, (2) the operation of the National Indications Center be made the direct responsibility of the new Board, and (3) the remaining functions of the USCIB and IAC (and their subcommittees) be redistributed on the advice of the Special Comint Committee and the Director of Central Intelligence respectively.\(^{131}\)

Mr. James S. Lay, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, forwarded the recommendation to the DCI stating that "before the President takes action on this recommendation, he requests that you consult with the USCIB and the IAC and furnish your views."\(^{132}\)
C. USCIB Versus Killian

The reaction of the military members was extremely negative, as could have been predicted. In a USCIB meeting of 8 November 1957, even the Chairman, Mr. Dulles, in introducing the subject of the merger stated that his first reaction was not favorable.133/ He appointed General Lucian K. Truscott of his staff to meet privately with each member of the board prior to a joint IAC-USCIB meeting on the subject.134/ Truscott's discussions with the members put on record their strong opposition to a single combined board.

D. The Truscott Memorandum

In a memorandum to the members of USCIB and IAC dated 6 January 1958, General Truscott reviewed his discussions with the community and listed the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed merger, favoring the former over the latter.135/ The principal advantages included probable improved stature of the intelligence community, possible improvement in intelligence product and attention paid to intelligence product by governmental policy levels, more
effective community support for budget, simplification of the intelligence community's structure, cross-fertilization of ideas, and improved overall intelligence coordination. The principal disadvantages included impairment of security for special intelligence, undesirability of combining dissimilar functions, and different policy responsibilities.

Truscott concluded by saying two lines of action were open to the DCI:

One, nonconcurring in the recommendation of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (this, he said, "clearly should be supported by the most cogent reasons").

Two, concurring in the recommendation that a task force be established to develop detailed plans.

E. Army Spearheads the Counterattack

The USCIB members' views ran the gamut on the merger. The Army and the Navy, whose oxen were being gored, since they owned the major COMINT assets, were adamant against the merger.

Major General Robert A. Schow, Assistant Chief of Staff, Army Intelligence, wrote the keynote memorandum on 21 January 1958 opposing the President's
Board of Consultants' proposal for the merger of the IAC and the USCIB. Schow, several years earlier, had served as Chief of the Clandestine Service in CIA (18 March 1949 - 15 February 1951), and he was highly regarded throughout the intelligence community.

"It is the considered judgment of the Army," said Schow, "that a merger of the USCIB and the IAC would have an adverse effect on the national security and would impede the effective conduct of both US COMINT operations and the production of national intelligence." Schow used the arguments of tradition, security, and efficiency in buttressing his position. "US COMINT activities must be compartmented and treated in all respects as being outside the framework of other intelligence activities," he stated.

The Brownell Committee had reaffirmed this idea and incorporated it into NSCID No. 9 which established the Special Committee of NSC for COMINT matters. USCIB acted for and under the Special Committee of NSC to govern COMINT activities which by definition "do not include the production and dissemination of finished intelligence." The IAC, on the other hand,
was directly concerned with the production of intelligence by the terms of NSCID No. 1 and NSCID No. 4. It was charged with approving National Intelligence Estimates and had cognizance over the production and dissemination of all finished intelligence including COMINT and ELINT. The IAC was, therefore, an altogether different kind of organization from the USCIB.

Schow stated that a merger of USCIB and IAC would break down compartmentation of COMINT activities and increase the total number of individuals cleared for COMINT; it would fail to achieve economy or eliminate conflicting decisions; and it would result in heterogeneous agendas of meetings and consequently slow down action.137/

F. USCIB Goes on Record

The United States Communications Intelligence Board sat in full panoply on 22 January 1958 for its 146th meeting to consider whether it should be abolished.138/ The Chairman, Mr. Dulles, stated that he was very open minded on this proposal, that although his first impression of the merger recommendation
had been "somewhat negative," he had been attracted by some of the arguments in favor of it. On the question of the proposed merger, he said USCIB should consider the best way to build up the intelligence community. The members of the USCIB were then invited to comment. General Graves B. Erskine, the Defense member, thought that more study should be given to the proposal. General John A. Samford, the NSA member, stated that he could see no real advantage in a change. General Millard Lewis, speaking for the Air Force, stated that he could see no "substantial advantage to be gained by a merger." Admiral Frost stated that the advantages listed are of "doubtful value," and he felt that little would be gained by such a merger. The Atomic Energy Commission representative, Charles Reichardt, felt that the benefits to the AEC would be greater under the proposed IAC-USCIB merger. General Richard Collins, the JCS representative, stated he could not agree in principle to the merger "before a thorough study has been made."

General Schow, speaking for the Army, opposed the
merger and emphasized that USCIB would lose its identity in the merger and its present stature would be damaged not only in the United States but internationally. He added that "the functions of the two boards are distinct, and a merger would impede the effective conduct of both US COMINT operations and the product of national intelligence." The State Department representative, Mr. Cumming, stated that he had initially opposed the merger but now favored it. Mr. Sheldon, the CIA representative, stated that CIA believes it "to be in the best interest of the community to concur on the recommendation for a merger of IAC and USCIB." General Cabell, speaking as the CIA IAC representative, took a somewhat different viewpoint from that put forth by Sheldon, who was speaking as the CIA USCIB member. Cabell stated that he would like to see the merger given a trial, but since he sensed a deep-seated opposition to the merger he would recommend that the merger not be made at this time.

After additional deliberations, the USCIB recommended that the DCI reply to the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities.
"reflect the views of the members of IAC and USCIB and conclude that IAC and USCIB believe that a merger of IAC and USCIB is not desirable at this time."
A footnote to the decision read: "This item was considered jointly by IAC and USCIB, and these minutes reflect the joint IAC-USCIB discussion and decision."

G. Dulles Agrees with USCIB

This argumentation supported what was essentially DCI Dulles's basic feeling on the matter, and as a consequence he replied to the National Security Council on 29 January 1958 that it was his own conclusion that while there was much to recommend a merger, and it might eventually be desirable, it should not be directed at that time but should be deferred until the community had an opportunity to work with the new National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCID's) which had been just recently revised.139/

The matter was referred to the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities. This Board held to its original recommendation,
stuck by its guns, suggested the intelligence community get on with the merger, and report back to the NSC within six months.140/

H. "Ike" and Killian Kill USCIB

The matter was then referred to President Eisenhower on 12 March 1958, the day before the NSC meeting scheduled to consider the revision of the National Security Council Intelligence Directive.141/

The President decided the problem "in camera" prior to the NSC meeting and ordered that a single group be established to assist and advise the Director of Central Intelligence in discharging his responsibility for the coordination of all operations concerned with both special and other forms of intelligence which together constitute the foreign intelligence effort of the United States; such single group to be assigned the policy, coordinating, and supervisory responsibilities presently assigned to the United States Communications Intelligence Board and the Intelligence Advisory Committee (the remaining functions of USCIB and the IAC to be redistributed to appropriate subcommittees.)142/

The President also directed that a draft NSCID be submitted to carry out this recommendation within six months. This decision was incorporated as
Paragraph F of NSC Action No. 1873 when the NSC met on 13 March 1958.\textsuperscript{143/}

Thus President Eisenhower himself ended the independent USCIB dynasty that had existed since World War II. The arguments of the US military were of no avail, and a decision against them was made by their former military commander, now Commander in Chief.
VIII. The Millenium

The decision of President Eisenhower on 12 March 1958 to accept the recommendation of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board over that of the DCI's Intelligence Advisory Committee resulted in the creation of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB). The era of communications intelligence independence came to an end. The former USCIB, which up to that time was directly responsible not to the DCI but to the Special Committee of the National Security Council for COMINT (the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense), was ordered to be amalgamated with the Intelligence Advisory Committee which functioned under the Director of Central Intelligence.

A six-month gestation period was to elapse from the 13 March date of its conception until 15 September 1958, when the new NSCID's No. 1 and No. 6 were issued establishing COMINT as part of the responsibilities of the USIB. During this period a considerable amount of pulling and tugging took place with drafts and counterdrafts being worked
over at length by drafting groups representing the
different organizations. General Charles P. Cabell,
Deputy DCI, assumed the role of lion tamer in this
menagerie and cracked the whip until he finally per-
suaded the several kings of beasts to sit properly
on their pedestals. This was no mean task.

A. A Law Unto Itself No Longer

COMINT up to this time had been a law unto
itself: The former COMINT charter NSCID No. 9 had
stated:

The special nature of COMINT activ-
ities requires that they be treated
in all respects as being outside the
framework of other or general intelli-
gence activities. Orders, directives,
policies, or recommendations of any
authority of the Executive Branch
relating to the collection, production,
security, handling, dissemination, or
utilization of intelligence, and/or
classified material, shall not be ap-
licable to COMINT activities, unless
specifically so stated and issued by
competent departmental or agency
authority represented on the Board.
Other National Security Council Intel-
ligence Directives to the Director of
Central Intelligence and related im-
plementing directives issued by the
Director of Central Intelligence shall
be construed as nonapplicable to COMINT
activities, unless the National Security
Council has made its directive specifi-
cally applicable to COMINT.
Cabell decided that now was the time to establish once and for all the superior position of the DCI in COMINT as well as in the entire intelligence community. As the drafting proceeded, it was decided to establish in NSCID No. 1 the basic relationship of the DCI to the community and to include in this directive the essential elements of the charter of the new board. It was also decided to separate out those unique communications intelligence responsibilities of the old USCIB and put them in a separate directive. There was to be no doubt that the DCI and the new board had complete jurisdiction over communications intelligence, and the COMINT lion was to be bearded in his own den. Communications intelligence was no longer to be of a special nature outside the framework of other intelligence. For this reason the new NSCID No. 1 rather than the specialized COMINT NSCID No. 6 was designed to contain the basic relationship between the DCI and the board in all intelligence matters, COMINT included. The new NSCID charged the DCI to "coordinate the foreign intelligence activities of the United States ... . Such coordination shall include both special - 94 -
and other forms of intelligence." The new board also was to report to the DCI directly to "advise and assist 'him' as he may require." It was charged, among other things, to "make recommendations on foreign intelligence matters ... including particularly recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on intelligence matters within the jurisdiction of the Director of the National Security Agency."146/

B. Complexities of USCIB Decision Making

The decision-making process of the board also was changed. Back in 1948, when NSCID No. 9 was first written, decisions of the board were "based on the principle of unanimity, which shall be a prerequisite for matters within the purview of the Board, except that the Chairman shall be elected by a majority vote."147/ In those early years it was difficult for the members to agree on anything -- even who should be Chairman.

In 1952, when NSCID No. 9 was rewritten, decisions of the board on matters not affecting NSA were binding if "adopted by the unanimous vote of
the members of the Board. Recommendations approved only by a majority had to be referred to the Special Committee of the NSC. On matters affecting NSA, the board would reach a decision by a majority vote. The DCI as Chairman would have no vote, although the CIA member did. Dissents to the majority opinion were referred to the Special Committee and no action was taken if this dissent involved NSA until the appeal had gone through the Secretary of Defense to the Special Committee and had been resolved. In case the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense disagreed, the appeal was "taken directly to the President."

The mutual suspicions and lack of trust of this earlier era resulted in language even at the NSCID level protecting the rights and prerogatives of the individual departments. The passage of time had calmed these waters. The new NSCID No. 1 used the phrase "the intelligence community," and, in a footnote to Paragraph 2a of the document, named the members of the community. The concept of "community," nurtured early in his regime by Mr. Dulles, had progressed from concept to reality. The stature of the DCI had grown with it so that the decision—
making process established in the new NSCID No. 1
was able to read:

The United States Intelligence Board
shall reach its decisions by agree-
ment. When the Chairman determines
that a given position on a matter
under consideration represents the
consensus of the Board, it shall be
considered as agreed unless a dis-
senting member requests that the
issue be referred to the National
Security Council.152/

NSCID No. 6 was titled "Communications Intel-
ligence and Electronics Intelligence." Paragraph 1
of this directive established forcibly and clearly
that these activities were now a part of the intel-
ligence community. Paragraph 1 stated, "COMINT and
ELINT and their associated activities shall be treat-
ed as being within the framework of general intelli-
gence activities ... ."153/ COMINT was thus no long-
er an independent empire. Further, ELINT activities
were raised to the same jurisdictional level as COMINT
activities. However, precaution was taken so that
"Special COMINT security standards and procedures
generally shall not apply to ELINT and ELINT activi-
ties."154/ ELINT was added to the mission of the
National Security Agency which was charged "to

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provide an effective, unified organization and con-
trol of the 1. COMINT, 2. ELINT intercept and proc-
essing activities of the United States."155/ Pro-
vision was made, as in the previous NSCID No. 9, for
NSA to delegate COMINT and ELINT responsibilities
to the services and to CIA when DIRNSA determined
this desirable for direct support of their operations.156/

Those portions of the former NSCID No. 9 which
pertained to the SIGINT (COMINT and ELINT) activities
of the Secretary of Defense, NSA, and the military
departments; as well as to the DCI responsibility
for SIGINT arrangements with foreign governments,
were put in NSCID No. 6. The other more generalized
authorities of the old NSCID No. 9 were transferred
to NSCID No. 1.

C. Influence

Additionally, the new NSCID No. 6 reflected
the squabble that had taken place between CIA and
NSA over the Berlin Tunnel operation by es-
tablishing CIA's right not only to collect but also
to process such material in the future. Paragraph
8b of NSCID No. 6 addressed this problem: "Other
provisions of this Directive are not applicable to those intercept and processing activities (other than cryptanalysis) under the authority of NSCID No. 5." NSCID No. 5 was the charter for CIA clandestine activities; and this paragraph exempted CIA type activities from normal COMINT activities which functioned under the Director, NSA.

Thus began the millenium, the reign of the DCI and USIB -- King Arthur and his court. The dawn had already started to break on the black night of intelligence two years earlier with the CIA-sponsored U-2 flights over Russia. The intelligence blackout was coming to an end. The role of COMINT in this era was reduced to that of handmaiden. PHOTINT, photographic intelligence, was usurping the princely role played in prior years by COMINT. COMINT remained important, however, in giving guidance to PHOTINT to spot places where important activity was taking place which needed to be photographed.

PHOTINT, however, answered the $64 missile question of the time, which gave hard evidence as to the precise location, the type and

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number of missiles and planes, and details of the installations. The eye of the camera was replacing the ear of COMINT as the key intelligence sensor.
Volume II

Appendix A
The DCI Historical Series

The History of SIGINT in the Central Intelligence Agency, 1947-70

Volume III
The History of SIGINT in the Central Intelligence Agency, 1947-70
Volume III

by

October 1971

Edward W. Proctor
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Historical Staff
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A Note on Classification

The overall subject matter of this history requires that it be handled via control systems. For purposes of quotation or subsequent sanitization, individual parts of the history may be treated as follows:

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The History of SIGINT in the Central Intelligence Agency, 1947-70

Volume III

I. ELINT

The Central Intelligence Agency and in particular its Deputy Director, General Charles P. Cabell, played a decisive role in raising Electronics Intelligence (ELINT) operations to the national level and in putting CIA into the ELINT business. In addition to the key political and policy role played by CIA, the Agency through the years has made important contributions to US knowledge of through CIA-sponsored signals intercept and analysis operations.

A. Cabell -- Father of ELINT

The father of ELINT in CIA was General Charles Pearre Cabell, USAF, who was Deputy Director under Allen Welsh Dulles from 23 April 1953 to 31 January
1962. General Cabell was an old hand in the intelligence business, having been a member of the USCIB even before the Central Intelligence Group was invited to join USCIB and chairing the USCIB during its early years when DCI Hillenkoetter was just a member of the Board.

Cabell’s Air Force background helped him to appreciate the importance of ELINT to the Air Force in particular and to the other services as well. ELINT was the technical source that listened to the enemy radars and determined how powerful they were, where they were, and whether or not the United States Air Force could evade them or knock them out. A precise order-of-battle of the Russian radar net was absolutely necessary for the US Strategic Air Command (SAC) attack plan. In the mid-1950’s, as US bomber forces increased and went on a 24-hour airborne alert, the need for good intelligence increased more than ever.

The early and mid-1950’s was the period of the intelligence blackout compared to the intelligence successes of World War II. US communications intelligence was
A large ELINT capability was thus acquired by the Air Force during the 1950's. To a lesser extent the US Navy and Army also needed to listen to radar and other electronic signals being put out by enemy forces which opposed them. As the size of the three military ELINT organizations grew, money invested in the equipment and training of personnel became considerable. Airborne intercept operations in particular were expensive because of the cost of the aircraft and the special configuration required to install ELINT and COMINT equipment. Airplanes, however, were able to hear signals from farther
inside the Iron Curtain than ground stations and thus were an important part of the total system.

C. NSA Battles Services Over ELINT

In 1952 when the Brownell Committee did the basic study on the COMINT organization of the government, ELINT was a relatively insignificant operation; and the Brownell Committee did not address the problem as to whether or not ELINT, like COMINT, should be controlled by a single national authority. As the National Security Agency, created as a result of the Brownell Committee, grew in size and power, it served more and more to antagonize the three military services -- primarily because they resisted coming under the control of a national authority and desired their own independence. However, the law was the law, and General Canine, Director, NSA, insofar as he could, tried to consolidate his authority over service communications intelligence activities. National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No. 9 was the COMINT Magna Charta. Initially written in 1948, and completely rewritten in 1952, the Directive did not even contain the word "ELINT."
The military services, as their ELINT organizations grew, resisted strenuously any suggestion that the National Security Agency should be given authority over their ELINT activities similar to the authority it had over their COMINT activities.

There was a basic similarity between COMINT and ELINT intercept operations, and both using electronic listening devices similar in many respects but covering different radio frequencies. The military services, however, insisted that their ELINT intercept operations be independent from COMINT and not covered by the hated COMINT codeword which had become the symbol of NSA control.

D. NSCID No. 17, the ELINT Magna Charta

By 1955, the cost and size of the ELINT operation had increased so much that some type of national authority cognizance was required. The United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) did not have the right name to assume control over ELINT, but it did have the know-how. Therefore, USCIB undertook to have its charter (but not its
name) expanded by the National Security Council so that it would have cognizance of ELINT.1/* On 16 May 1955, NSCID No. 17, "Electronic Intelligence" (ELINT), was issued charging the USCIB in addition to its authority and responsibility, as defined in NSCID No. 9, and operating under the procedures established under Paragraph 1(f) of that Directive, shall be the national policy body for ELINT.2/

By basing its procedures on Paragraph 1(f) of NSCID No. 9, the ELINT authority of the board was deliberately limited. This paragraph made board decisions binding on all departments of the government only when adopted by unanimous vote. The ELINT'ers thus retained their fierce independence not only from NSA but even from the board itself insofar as their departmental operations were concerned.

NSCID No. 17 established a Technical Processing Center administered by the Department of Defense, staffed by Defense and CIA personnel, and independent of NSA.3/ The NSCID also gave CIA, as well as the

* For serially numbered source references, see Appendix A.

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Department of Defense, responsibilities for ELINT collection activity. The NSC Directive was primarily the work of General Cabell, who believed that US ELINT activities required an independence from COMINT activities if they were to grow and thrive. He was aware that most of the "old COMINT hands" in the intelligence community were not sufficiently sympathetic or understanding towards ELINT as an intelligence source. He therefore was the prime mover in causing the special NSCID to be written for ELINT. Cabell thus enabled ELINT to become an "organized religion" in its own right to the jubilation of its devotees.

E. "ELINT Inhouse"

Within CIA, too, General Cabell established ELINT as an independent entity. He gave the Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence, H. Marshall Chadwell, an additional hat entitled "Agency ELINT Staff Officer" (ESO) in May 1954. Chadwell soon appointed his Deputy, to the ELINT Staff Officer job as a primary responsibility, and he held it from August 1955 to July 1957, when he was succeeded by James Sears.
became the ESO in August 1958, and he has been responsible for Agency ELINT programs from that date to the present (1971) except for a one-year period from August 1960 to June 1961 when the ESO job was held by

Despite its new responsibilities for ELINT under NSCID No. 17, the two USCIB subcommittees concerned with COMINT/ELINT failed, in Cabell’s view, to bring about a vigorous ELINT program. The USCIB Security Committee was concerned by charter with COMINT security, a complex field in its own right. The USCIB Intelligence Committee was charged with establishing requirements and reviewing the product of NSA. Since the ELINT produced by NSA at that time consisted primarily of

it was not an active concern of this Committee. After almost three years of little or no ELINT action on the part of the USCIB, General Cabell proposed establishing a specialized USCIB Committee for ELINT. As a result, USIBELCOM was established by USCIB on 3 March 1958. 5/ This committee was given the rather nebulous job of
being "generally cognizant of the status of various ELINT programs" as well as formulating national ELINT policy, national ELINT objectives, and recommending arrangements with foreign governments on ELINT matters. The committee was also to recommend policy in relation to the National Technical Processing Center.

This rather vague charter was short-lived. USCIB's concern with the charter of the ELINT committee was at the time far overshadowed by concern over its own charter and even its own existence. Only 10 days after USCIB approved the ELINT charter, the National Security Council on 13 March 1958 abolished USCIB and directed that it and the IAC be combined into a single board.

F. NSCID No. 6 -- NSA and ELINT

A feverish period of activity on the part of drafting staffs of the two boards resulted in the issuance on 15 September 1958 of NSCID No. 1, establishing the new United States Intelligence Board, and NSCID No. 6, giving the Board responsibility for COMINT and ELINT activities. At last ELINT had
arrived and was equal to its big brother, COMINT, in that both were considered equally in the new directive. This new directive also sounded the death knell of the independent National ELINT Processing Center and gave the Director of NSA "operational and technical control" of "all COMINT and ELINT intercept and processing activities of the United States."9/ The independent control of the military services over ELINT collection and processing thus followed the pattern established earlier by COMINT, when it was placed under the National Security Agency.

This came about through an interesting coincidence. ELINT had become so expensive and so important that the Baker Panel in 1957–58, which was convoked as a result of DCI pressure to study the problem, also was exposed by NSA to the NSA-versus-military-services ELINT controversy. The panel ended up recommending that the ELINT activities of the government be placed under NSA — a recommendation which covered a subject outside of their initial charter.10/

When the President on 10 February 1958 approved the Baker Panel recommendations on improving the
effort on the problem, he did not approve the recommendation that NSA be given more ELINT authority but rather directed that a special study would be made of the problem. This special study was made under USIB auspices and was chaired by CIA representative General Philip G. Strong. The Strong Committee supported the Baker Panel recommendations that ELINT activities be placed under the National Security Agency.11/ Accordingly, when NSCID No. 6 was drafted in the summer of 1958 to replace NSCID No. 9 (COMINT) and NSCID No. 17 (ELINT), this responsibility was included. The ELINT National Technical Processing Center was thereafter transferred to NSA at Fort Meade, Maryland, from its location at the Naval Security Station on Nebraska Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. The next spring, in March 1959, the Department of Defense issued an ELINT Directive (S 3115.2) officially assigning ELINT responsibilities to NSA.12/

The earlier pattern of NSA's COMINT relations repeated itself in ELINT. Just as the COMINT community had earlier blamed NSA for failing to fulfill its COMINT role adequately, so the ELINT
community for the next few years berated NSA on ELINT. NSA was slow in processing the massive volume of raw ELINT data that was being collected by various sensors and dumped on NSA to process into finished ELINT product -- data which defined the signal parameters of various radars and other emitters. More than that, the military services started to hide most of their ELINT assets from NSA under the cover of Electronic Warfare (EW). Responsibility for EW belonged to the individual services, not to NSA. Thus the paragraphs of NSCID No. 6 which gave the Director of NSA control of "all ... ELINT intercept and processing of the United States" were never really carried out. The military services (and CIA to a lesser extent) did not recognize the NSA ELINT authority. Ten years after the words were written, they remained just words. This was brought out clearly in 1968 in the Eaton Panel study and is discussed in Chapter VII.

G. **Telemetry/ELINT**

A period of intense argument concerning what signals constituted ELINT took place during the 1950's.
The issue came to a head over telemetry.

Was telemetry ELINT, or COMINT, or was it neither? The argument raged vociferously during the closing years of the decade. If it was neither, it fell outside of NSA's responsibility. If it was COMINT, it had to be protected with a codeword. If it was ELINT, would it receive enough protection if it did not have a special security category similar to that of COMINT? Information from telemetry was a key input to intelligence on Russian missile capability. If the Russians found out we were getting this information, would they not encipher it, thus denying it to us? These questions were argued with more political than intellectual fervor by all parties. A clean resolution was never achieved.

The volume of telemetry increased. The October 1957 launching of Sputnik was followed by many Russian satellites -- all of them spewing forth telemetry, which required miles of magnetic tape for US intercept stations to record. NSA within a few years was up to its ears in tape -- so much so that the haystack obscured the intelligence needle.
When the Office of ELINT (OEL) was established on 30 July 1962 by Agency Notice HN 1-23 under the jurisdiction of the Deputy Director for Research (DDR), with [Name Redacted] as the Assistant Director for ELINT, it was given responsibility for Agency ELINT activities subject to policy guidance from Mr. Huntington D. Sheldon, by that time the Agency SIGINT Officer. Clandestine agent operations and liaison with foreign intelligence services

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remained under direct control of the Deputy Director for Plans (DDP). This dual responsibility for overseas ELINT operations caused friction between (in DDP) and OEL (in DD/S&T) from the beginning.

The Office of ELINT pulled together in CIA functions that had previously been performed by the Office of Scientific Intelligence (DDI), the Office of Communications (DDS), and (DDP). R & D responsibilities were later transferred from the Office of Special Activities (DD/S&T). OEL expanded rapidly to approximately people within a year. Vigorous pursuit of its responsibilities, particularly in the overseas collection field, frequently caused friction between OEL and the DDP which had basic responsibility for CIA overseas operations.

The SIGINT Officer often was called in to adjudicate disputes between these jurisdictions which arose out of the similar overseas responsibilities of the two organizations and from the personalities involved, who were intensively pursuing their overlapping charters. The role of the SIGINT Officer in these cases was to make Solomon-like decisions supporting the technical know-how and enthusiasm of the Office.
of ELINT, yet insuring that the experience and political sophistication of the senior service, the DDP, was a decisive element in the decision.

ELINT in CIA thus followed a completely different growth pattern from that of COMINT. Early in the history of the Agency the COMINT Officer decided that his role was more properly a staff function to encourage the development of COMINT and its use by the line offices of the Agency rather than the creation of a separate Office of COMINT. This decision was dictated by the nature of COMINT, which produced information from communications dealing with every subject under the sun. Intelligence from communications was thus of interest to most CIA components.

ELINT, on the other hand, was a highly specialized source producing intelligence on foreign electronic hardware. The technical expertise for ELINT operations did not exist in the DDP, the CIA office responsible for overseas collection operations. Likewise, top management in the DDP had minimal in-depth scientific background or desire to undertake ELINT operations themselves.
John A. McCone created the Directorate for Research in February 1962 (changed to DD/S&T in August 1963). Five months later, when the Office of ELINT was formed, he placed it in the scientific atmosphere of the new directorate rather than in the DDP. This decision gave ELINT far more policy support than it would have had in the DDP but it sowed basic seeds of conflict between the two jurisdictions that still exist. At one time, Bill Harvey, Chief (DDP), remarked: "ELINT is the only five-letter dirty word in the English language"; OEL feelings toward were in a similar vein.

Despite the troubles, however, or perhaps because of them, the CIA ELINT operation flourished and contributed importantly to national intelligence.
II. The Two-Committees Period

The impact on COMINT and ELINT of the establishment of the United States Intelligence Board on 15 September 1958, was immediate both within CIA and within the intelligence community. Within the CIA the status of the COMINT Officer was changed. Formerly he had functioned, in one respect, at the same level as the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence in that both men were CIA representatives on the two senior governmental intelligence boards. With the demise of USCIB, the COMINT Officer no longer held this job. General Cabell was the CIA member on the new USIB.

In the intelligence community SIGINT responsibility, as it was becoming known, was now divided into two committees: the USIB COMINT Committee, chaired by T. Achilles Polyzoides from the Department of State; and the USIB ELINT Committee, chaired by Colonel Charles P. Richman, USAF. The parent organizations of the two chairmen were a determining factor in their selection. The Department of State chairmanship of the COMINT Committee, it was hoped,
would give more emphasis to nonmilitary COMINT problems and lead the COMINT Committee to deal increasingly with substantive intelligence problems as well as policy problems. The choice of the Air Force to chair the ELINT Committee was in recognition of the dominant position of the Air Force in the ELINT field. Both Polyzoides and Richman were able chairmen with long experience in each of their two specialties.

A. COMINT Committee

The COMINT Committee started off with great vigor. The first meeting of the Committee in the Director's Conference Room, Administration Building, CIA, on 1 October 1958 was attended by T. Achilles Polyzoides, State; Colonel L. G. Lansdale, Dept. of Defense; NSA; Barnard A. Wells, FBI; Charles D. Reichardt, AEC; CIA; John F. O'Gara, Army; Captain William M. Stevens, Navy; Colonel William F. Scott, Air Force; Colonel Monte Cone, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Colonel Charles M. Townsend, Secretary.18/ The COMINT Committee met weekly and during the first year tackled a variety of problems. Within a short time, the
COMINT Committee charter, DCID 6/1, was drafted.

1. SIGINT Agreement
2. **Other Third-Party Matters**
4. The COMINT Objectives List

One of the more important steps taken by the committee during this period came about as the result of a CIA member's proposal in April 1959 (USIB-CC-9.3/14) to update the COMINT Objectives List in the light of current needs and conditions.25/

The CIA played a major role in designing this List and Ray Russell of the SPINT Staff designed an original COMINT Objectives List system.26/ This system keyed COMINT objectives to national objectives, taking into consideration the peculiarities of the COMINT source. COMINT had a high potential of providing intelligence on some
intelligence targets and practically zero potential on others, depending on the type of intelligence objective and our ability to read given target communications.

CIA did most of the work on the COMINT Objectives List "in-house" and then tried it out on the other members of the community. The CIA List acted as a catalyst on the committee and resulted in an ad hoc committee which took a completely different and radical approach to requirements priorities. After considerable wrangling, an attempt was made to place in absolute priority order some 410 COMINT requirements. This work was completed in April 1960, thus ending a year of feverish activity in the COMINT requirements sphere.27/

After this exercise, the requirements people were rather exhausted and the subject lay semidormant for three years until raised once again under General Samford's chairmanship of the Committee.

5. NSA COMINT/ELINT Program

The NSA COMINT/ELINT program budget during these years was presented in its tentative form to the two committees for consideration. The presentation
was more pro forma than practical as the committee did little except note the budget and make broad recommendations as to its effectiveness. (The NSA budget was so complex and technical that no outside authority had the competence to review it until some years later -- a special staff was established in 1963 in the Office of the Secretary of Defense under John O'Gara with the full-time responsibility of reviewing the SIGINT budgets of NSA and the military services.)

An illustration of the type of impact which the committee could and did have on NSA as a result of these presentations occurred as a result of the 1959 budget presentation.

At a joint meeting of the COMINT and ELINT Committees held on 22 October 1959, Dr. Louis W. Tordella, Vice Director of NSA, and Mr. Francis A. Raven, together with [redacted] made a presentation to the committees of the NSA budget. Growing out of this, and because of SIGINT Committee recommendations, NSA shifted emphasis to deploy more resources.
An illustration of the indirect impact of these NSA budget presentations was the NSA request for Russian linguistic assistance. NSA went over the proposed NSA effort on this target in detail stating in November 1959 that one of the major problems was a need for more Russian linguists.

The CIA member of the committee undertook to pull together the various linguistic assets available through the intelligence community that could be provided to assist NSA in this problem. 30

B.

The CIA Berlin Tunnel wiretap in 1955-56 produced large quantities of Russian telephone

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conversations. Processing intercepted written Russian messages was difficult enough but processing voice transcriptions required almost native Russian skills.
C. ELINT Committee

The ELINT Committee started off life under the auspices of USCIB on 3 April 1958 and held five meetings from that time until October, by which time USCIB was absorbed into USIB.43/ During its five meetings under its first parentage, the ELINT Committee started to revise the national ELINT objectives with the CIA member doing most of the work.44/ The committee also struggled with its charter and with studying what to do about the ELINT matters that had been suggested for further attention by the USCIB ELINT Task Force chaired by General Philip G. Strong of CIA. The details of this period are covered more fully above in Chapter I, Section F, of this volume.

The ELINT Committee met approximately once a month. As time went on, more and more of these meetings were joint meetings held with the COMINT Committee.

The committee also concerned itself with a charge from USIB to study the security aspects of telemetry signals. At the 31st meeting, on ~ 36 ~
26 May 1960, Madison E. Mitchell, Office of the Secretary of Defense, became Chairman replacing Charles P. Richman, USAF. Mitchell remained chairman of the committee until the committee ceased to exist, when it and the COMINT Committee were combined into the SIGINT Committee on 30 April 1962. One of the highlights of this period was the committee review of the NSA ELINT program in June of 1960.
During the years that Mitchell was chairman of the committee, the number of joint meetings with the COMINT Committee increased, so that by the time the two committees were combined, joint meetings were a regular feature -- some 24 having been held. These meetings were primarily concerned with SIGINT.

At its meeting on 23 May 1961, USIB discussed the advisability of combining the COMINT and ELINT Committees, in view of their similar responsibilities and in recognition of the fact that NSA was now the primary recipient of the guidance of both committees. On 25 July, USIB finally agreed that the COMINT and ELINT Committees should be merged, and it was understood that the chairman of USIB
would consult with the members regarding the chair-
manship of the Committee and submit recommendations
for consideration at an early board meeting. Nothing
happened for nine months, during which period McCon
replaced Dulles as DCI on 29 November 1961. The
search for a chairman of the combined committee was
given new impetus by McCon; and it was suggested
by Sheldon that Lieutenant General John A. Samford,
USAF, Retired, who had just completed his tour as
Director of NSA, might accept the job. Samford was
approached and agreed. In May 1962 he conducted the
first meeting of the new USIB SIGINT Committee in
the USIB Conference Room, Headquarters, CIA.51/

* On 8 June 1962 Sheldon's designation was changed
from CIA COMINT to CIA SIGINT Officer, effective
28 May [HN 20-51].
III. The SIGINT Committee

A. SIGINT Committee Chairman

The appointment of the ex-Director of the NSA to be the Chairman of the new USIB SIGINT Committee in May 1962 provided prestige and status hitherto unthought of to this committee of USIB. Prior to this, Lieutenant General John A. Samford, USAF, Retired, the Director of NSA, a three star general, titular commander of almost 60,000 COMINT/ELINT troops, and master of a budget of $dollars, was considered a cut above the Chairman of a USIB Committee as far as government hierarchy went. The fact that he accepted the job as Chairman of the new SIGINT Committee indicates the level in government to which the prestige of this committee had risen during the years Dulles chaired USIB -- a chair just recently occupied by John McConne.

Samford was an unusual man. More of a pedant than a pilot, more of a philosopher than a fighter, he was a man who understood and loved the SIGINT
business. Having been the Director of NSA (DIRNSA), he knew well the problems of trying to carry out the DIRNSA’s decisions down through a command chain staffed by NSA old-line, school-tie, closely knit SIGINT bureaucrats. He hoped that in his new capacity he might improve the relationship between NSA and the rest of the intelligence community as well as achieve some of the goals he had established as DIRNSA.

Samford came on the scene at a time when bureaucratic infighting in the SIGINT Committee was at a relatively low ebb due in no small measure to his policies while DIRNSA. The word "SIGINT" (in lieu of COMINT/ELINT) on the masthead of the new Committee was an indication of this. Although this word had been used by the British for COMINT as far back as World War II, the United States was unwilling to accept it. In the mid-1950's, NSA proposed that the United States adopt the British terminology, only to run into a stone wall on the part of the US military services who opposed it on the grounds that this would tend to give NSA a "leg up" on adding ELINT to their COMINT responsibilities. So the term "SIGINT" did not come officially into

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US jargon until after USIB was created in 1958, at which time NSA was given nominal jurisdiction over both COMINT and ELINT.

B. SIGINT Requirements and Evaluations

General Samford served as SIGINT Committee Chairman for almost three years -- from May 1962 to February 1965. Two types of actions dominated the committee during this period. The first type, self-generated by Samford, dealt with the relationship between NSA and the intelligence community; the second type consisted of policy formulations for US governmental SIGINT relations with foreign countries.

Samford was a prolific writer and wrote several philosophical papers proposing various methods of expressing intelligence priorities in formats that would be most useful to the NSA. The ideas in these papers failed to strike a spark in the committee at the time because of the somewhat abstruse "Samfordese" prose in which they were couched. Three years later, however, many of Samford's ideas were "reinvented," and changed circumstances enabled
them to come to fruition. Among other things, Samford proposed that USIB requirements be keyed to the SIGINT subelements used by the Department of Defense for the combined cryptographic program. NSA rejected the idea on the grounds that it would be very time consuming and difficult. Samford also urged a massive evaluation exercise of the total SIGINT product put out by NSA and the military services. He had Mr. John F. O'Gara, who was responsible in the Department of Defense for staffing the NSA annual budget exercise, appear before the SIGINT Committee in September 1962 to help sell the committee on the usefulness of such a program.54/ This evaluation was undertaken and was keyed to the combined cryptographic program (CCP) subelements. The CCP system divided the total NSA budget into 60 categories.55/

The remaining subelements were concerned with administration and support costs. These administrative subelements absorbed
Work was also undertaken on a new requirements system, and on 14 June 1963 a new SIGINT priorities requirements paper was submitted to the USIB. This action is covered more fully in Chapter V, "The Requirements Game."

C. SIGINT Foreign Policy
This was submitted by CIA on 2 August 1963 at the
40th SIGINT Committee meeting and forwarded to USIB.77/

General Samford concluded his chairmanship of
the SIGINT Committee in January 1965, at which time
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Huntington D. Sheldon, the CIA SIGINT Officer, took on this job in addition to his other duties as Assistant DD/S&T, Chairman of the USIB Watch Committee, and CIA SIGINT Officer.
The DCI Historical Series

The History of SIGINT in the
Central Intelligence Agency, 1947-70

Volume IV General Appendixes
IV. Sheldon's SIGINT Committee

A dramatic change in leadership style took place when Huntington D. Sheldon took over the Chair of the USIB SIGINT Committee at its 80th meeting on 12 February 1965.79/ Sheldon was patrician, and more than a bit autocratic, and by his personality he dominated the SIGINT Committee. Sheldon used the SIGINT Committee as a formal mechanism to approve work done by groups outside of the committee rather than as a medium for the exchange or generation of ideas. Unlike General Samford, who drafted his own papers, Sheldon picked people in whom he had confidence and assigned them the responsibility to do the drafting. He had a tendency to compartment his staffers one from the other and wanted to feel the pressure of events pushing up to him from the separate staffs.

Sheldon's modus operandi resulted in the establishment of the SIGINT Overhead Reconnaissance Subcommittee (SORS) under Ernest J. Zelmer,80/ the Intelligence Guidance Subcommittee (IGS) under
TOP SECRET

81/ a pilot ELINT Evaluation under
82/ and a SIGINT Evaluation Sub-
committee under DIA's Lieutenant Colonel Henry
Howells.83/ Work on a variety of other problems
including third-party countries, Project
and security problems was assigned primarily to
his own SPINT staff.

Sheldon attempted initially to have more
senior representatives from each of the USIB agen-
cies attend the committee meetings. He was success-
ful for a few months, but soon the professional
SIGINT'ers, who had represented their departments
in SIGINT matters for years, again filled the chairs
around the table. This came about because of the
kind of business handled by the SIGINT Committee.
This committee was the senior governmental-level
technical group. It turned complex technical
problems into policy but it did not have the final
say on policy. This was the province of USIB.
SIGINT Committee members, therefore, had to have
considerable technical knowledge in the SIGINT
business to understand the intricate problems and
to convert them into nontechnical policy papers.
that could be understood at a senior level. Thus its personnel tended to be technicians rather than politicians.

A. Third-Party Matters

Under Sheldon, the SIGINT Committee considered a number of important third-party matters.

1. US SIGINT Bases
TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2013/07/18
2. Other Third-Party Matters
B. SIGINT Guidance to NSA: The Intelligence Guidance Subcommittee*

Ever since the original creation of the USCIB in 1946, the board had assumed that one of its principal responsibilities was to provide intelligence guidance for US SIGINT activities. As the board evolved through the years, this function was assigned

* The subject of SIGINT guidance to NSA is covered more fully in the chapter titled "The Requirements Game" (Chapter V, below). At this point, the role played by Sheldon will be recounted.
to its subordinate elements and finally to the SIGINT Committee as one of its principal responsibilities. When DCI John McConne established on 9 September 1963 in his immediate office a Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation (NIPE), he gave his office an overall responsibility that encompassed, among other things, SIGINT evaluation and guidance. The relationship between this office and Mr. Sheldon, the CIA SIGINT Officer, was uneasy at first but quickly settled down to a close working arrangement due in no small manner to the personality of Mr. John A. Bross, Deputy DCI, NIPE, and his ability to work with senior officers in the intelligence community, including Sheldon.

The NIPE staff of the DCI had undertaken to validate COMINT requirements during the latter half of 1964 independently of a parallel action going on in the SIGINT Committee under General Samford.\textsuperscript{116}/ At the time Sheldon took over the SIGINT Committee in February 1965, both groups were still working on the problem. The NIPE group didn't finish its work until almost a year later, on 20 January 1966, when
its report was considered by USIB. USIB prior to taking any action asked the SIGINT Committee for its views as to whether or not it could assume the tasks proposed by the NIPE report.117/ The committee agreed that it could, and Sheldon announced that [ ] of the D/DCI/NIPE staff had been designated chairman of the proposed new Intelligence Guidance Subcommittee (IGS) as a full-time assignment.118/ By this action the SIGINT Committee undertook to have the IGS complete the first annual review by 1 August 1966 and to furnish recommendations to USIB by mid-March 1966.

The travails and tribulations of the IGS in getting underway and completing its task are covered.
elsewhere in this history.* During the next four years the IGS worked full-time assiduously in developing a highly detailed list of requirements for guiding NSA.

C. SIGINT Satellites

An important Sheldon accomplishment was the SIGINT Overhead Reconnaissance Subcommittee (SORS), established effective 1 July 1967. Responsibility for this area was transferred by USIB from the USIB Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) to the USIB SIGINT Committee. This responsibility included establishing (1) collection requirements for, (2) processing requirements for, and (3) evaluation of SIGINT reconnaissance by satellite, aircraft, or other vehicle, over denied areas. 120/ Excluded was SIGINT reconnaissance in direct support of combat forces or by aircraft flying peripheral photo flights on the edges of the Iron Curtain.

1. Aerial Eyes

A recapitulation of SIGINT satellites is in order at this point. Intelligence satellites looked

* See Chapter V, below.
before they listened -- photo satellites preceded SIGINT satellites. "Sky spying" was a vintage concept in CIA starting in the mid-1950's when balloons were lofted over Russia carrying cameras and leaflets and reaching a climax when the prolific U-2 photo aircraft was flying high out of reach of Russian Mig fighters. After the 1 May 1960 shootdown by a Russian surface-to-air missile of Gary Powers' U-2

President Eisenhower decided to "standdown" further U-2 flights over the USSR. This decision was made easier because he knew that shortly the photographic satellite would be flown. Four months later, in August 1960, the first US photographic satellite obtained pictures of the USSR. The spy in the sky had come of age. The first pictures were not very good -- certainly not as clear as the U-2 pictures. However, the system worked; and KH-1 was a success. "KH" for "KEYHOLE" was the codeword assigned to the photo satellite project. Following the KH-1, technical developments and modifications carried through a series of KH's until, at the end of the decade, satellite photography had become the principal US
intelligence tool in denied areas. It provided routine surveillance through regular detailed photography of known target installations. This gave US policymakers highly reliable intelligence on the status of Russian missile sites and airfields as well as on other targets at a time when this was critical to US policymaking. As clarity and scale improved, detailed photography became available of objects and equipment enabling an evaluation of their technical characteristics thus opening up a new important source of intelligence.121/

SIGINT acted as handmaiden to PHOTINT, Photographic Intelligence. Through SIGINT, potential targets for photographic coverage were spotted.
2. Aerial Ears

Although the initial intelligence satellites were photographic, they were soon followed by ELINT satellites. The earliest of these was targeted against Russian radars. There was a need to locate radars precisely in the interior of the USSR so that the US Strategic Air Command could draw up its attack plans to avoid the radars or to jam them. As we gradually progressed from a US/USSR bomber stalemate to a missile stalemate, it became necessary to know the location and types of antimissile radars deep in the USSR. The only way this information could be gathered was by ELINT satellites. A series of these sponsored by the Navy in the mid-1960's produced vast quantities of data on Russian radars—so much so in fact that the high cost of this intelligence overkill caused national-level budgetary reactions, with CIA in the forefront of the intelligence community pushing for a reduction of this effort.
3. **COMINT Satellites**

COMINT satellites did not come into existence until the end of the 1960's.
4. **COMOR (USIB Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance)**

Satellites had been used to collect ELINT since June 1960. USIB control over these activities sponsored by the military services was exercised through COMOR and was a bit tenuous to say the least.

The COMOR Committee of USIB had initially been set up to provide guidance for satellite photography.

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When satellites started to collect ELINT, the acquisition of this data by satellite was also assigned to COMOR rather than to the SIGINT Committee. After Sheldon became Chairman of the SIGINT Committee, he arranged to have this responsibility transferred from COMOR to the SIGINT Committee.124/*

5. SORS (SIGINT Overhead Reconnaissance Subcommittee)

In July 1967 the SIGINT Committee created a permanent subcommittee known as SORS,125/ with the power to act for the parent committee in reconnaissance matters involving requirements, processing, evaluation, security, and coordination of overhead reconnaissance activities. The empowering of this subcommittee "to act for" the SIGINT Committee gave it a unique position, and the subcommittee, chaired by Ernest J. Zellmer, CIA, with Donald E. Haller, as Executive Secretary, CIA, became a major factor in the intelligence community.

The relationship between CIA, NSA, and the National Reconnaissance Organization (NRO) had always

* Page 72, above.
been a bit sticky. Zellmer's subcommittee moved in where angels had feared to tread and established a reputation for forthrightness, vigor, and accomplishment.

SORS studied in detail the requirement and provided guidance to the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) with respect to launching the satellites and collecting ELINT information, and to NSA with respect to establishing priorities for processing the information collected.
at their installations. The Committee revised
basic ELINT and telemetry requirements and established
long-range objectives for satellite collection in
these fields.

After two years as Chairman of SORS, Zellmer
left CIA and was replaced by Dr. Charles W. Cooke
on 1 November 1969.

D. ELINT Evaluation

Another major project was a computer approach
to ELINT evaluation. The Department of Defense
"National ELINT Plan," approved on 8 February 1966,
stated that "The SIGINT Committee will propose an
evaluation program" for ELINT. In October 1966
this matter was raised by CIA in the SIGINT Commit-
tee. The Department of Defense considered ELINT to
be primarily its own bailiwick and was reluctant
to have the SIGINT Committee enter too deeply into
this field. CIA kept pressing the matter, and in
March 1967 DIA and CIA undertook to draft an approach.
Out of this, an ELINT evaluation working group chaired
by was assigned the
task of developing a model for ELINT evaluation based

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on an examination of ELINT in the first quarter of 1968. This project was completed and presented to the SIGINT Committee in May 1969 and became the basis for further discussions within the Department of Defense without resulting in any firm recommendations on the part of the SIGINT Committee.133/

E. Project
F. The Role of COMINT in Vietnam

Good COMINT in the Vietnamese war was much harder to come by than in the Korean war. The North Vietnamese, who were very security conscious, used low-powered radios which carried only short distances.

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Nevertheless, SIGINT was of tactical value to our military commanders.
The role of CIA SIGINT in Vietnam was secondary.

At the Washington level, the DDI found COMINT useful as an input into current analyses and estimates of the situation, but it provided scant strategic insight into North Vietnam’s plans or intentions.

G. Other Subjects

Other subjects considered by the SIGINT Committee during the Sheldon period included establish-
V. The Requirements Game

A. Overview

Ever since the end of World War II, the intelligence community has been trying to devise the best way to guide the elephantine COMINT production organization.

Some have questioned whether this massive, hydra-headed organization could be guided -- even if it were amenable to receiving guidance, which is a moot point in itself.

This subject of guidance for the national COMINT effort is of particular interest today and is being treated integrally as a chapter by itself spanning the period 1947-70. Throughout this total timespan, CIA has provided community leadership in attempting to develop new and better ways of providing guidance to the NSA and assessing the responsiveness of NSA to this guidance.

The SPINT staff under the CIA SIGINT Officer was for 18 years the group in CIA responsible for establishing and levying COMINT requirements on NSA.

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In June 1963 the CIA Collection Guidance Staff (CSG) was created and made responsible for all intelligence requirements, including COMINT.

CIA interests in this problem culminated in January 1966 in the assignment of a senior officer exclusively to the COMINT requirements business. At that time the USIB SIGINT Committee established the Intelligence Guidance Subcommittee (IGS) to take a new approach to giving guidance to NSA.

The Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation (NIPE) was made Chairman of the IGS and undertook the job on a full-time basis of devising and implementing a new COMINT intelligence guidance system.

B. The Philosophy of Requirements

During the past 25 years many different basic requirements philosophies have been adopted to control the collection of COMINT. In the early days, requirements were very single-minded. The idea at that time was to relate two scholarly disciplines.

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so that each would interact to benefit the other. Intelligence analysts with knowledge of world affairs and cryptanalysts with knowledge of codes and ciphers were brought together through the requirements mechanism to work as a team. In those days, requirements had no managerial or budgetary overtones but were simply an expression of what was needed by the intelligence analysts.

In the latter years, DCI John A. McCone made a fresh start when he and the Secretary of Defense agreed to try to use intelligence requirements as a device to contain the size and point the direction of the national COMINT effort. Today the COMINT requirements system is massive. It dominates the interdepartmental COMINT scene. How the present requirements oak grew from the acorn of 1947 is the story of this chapter.

C. The Six Periods

The period from 1947 to 1970 may be broken into six different segments as far as COMINT requirements are concerned. Each was dominated by completely different requirements philosophies. From 1947 to
1955 was the "Two Lists Period" during which there was a USCIB Requirements List and an AFSAC (Armed Forces Security Agency Council) Requirements List. The second period was the "Broad Brush" Period from 1955 to 1961. The COMINT Objectives List (COL) was the guidance expression of this period. The pendulum then swung to the "400 List" where the COMINT Requirements List (CRL) consisted of some 400 intelligence requirements listed in absolute priority order. This was succeeded in 1963 by the Samford period which produced the Priority COMINT Requirements List (PCRL). Finally, in 1966 the period began, culminating in the present requirements list consisting of almost 1,000 pages, issued in two large volumes and distributed in 350 copies.

D. The "Two Lists" Period, 1947-55

During World War II, COMINT requirements were simple, direct, and immediately effective. In the European theatre, control of COMINT intercept and processing was done from the British COMINT headquarters at Bletchley Park in England (GC and GS -- Government Code and Ciphers School). In the Pacific
theatre, control was effected from Pearl Harbor. Both of these control points were the principal processing centers familiar on a daily basis with every message decrypted and fully aware of the daily military operational situation. Washington COMINT operations provided strategic backup to these control points.

The end of the war changed this situation drastically. Military communications disappeared, and COMINT shifted its primary emphasis to international communications, with a secondary effort towards internal domestic communications of selected countries. The primary consumers of this COMINT product became the Department of State and the CIG rather than the military services. This situation did not last for long. The Russian-US détente was short-lived. The Berlin Blockade in April 1948 opened the cold war.
Under Admiral Souers, the CIG did not receive any COMINT intelligence. General Vandenberg, who succeeded Souers on 10 June 1946, was elected Chairman of the USCIB on 31 July, at which time the Board authorized the dissemination to CIA of two copies of the *Diplomatic Summary* -- a publication produced by the military containing generalized information based on COMINT. It was not until April 1948 that the USCIB, at its 30th meeting, approved arrangements for CIA to obtain original COMINT messages.144/

CIA learned quickly the value of COMINT, and nine months after it received its first COMINT translations directly from AFSA, a CIA representative, was to become the first Chairman of the newly created USCIB Intelligence Committee.

1. The USCIB Requirements List

In November 1948 USCIB decided to split the Intelligence and Security Committee into two separate committees -- the earlier Committee having been far more concerned with security matters than with intelligence matters.145/
The first order of business of the new Intelligence Committee was to establish a Monthly Intelligence Requirements List (MIRL). This list was to be used by the USCIB Coordinator of Joint Operations (CJO) "as a guide in expediting the procurement and processing of pertinent readable traffic." The list was quite simple. It had two sections. List A included subjects of immediate vital importance, and all messages bearing on these were to receive priority treatment. List B contained subjects under regional groupings without attempting to include all subjects of current interest.

The newly established Intelligence Committee created the Point-to-Point Subcommittee. This subcommittee provided direct guidance to AFSA on radio circuits. Each month this subcommittee established priorities for coverage of each of these radio circuits. The voting mechanism was interesting in that it reflected the competitive spirit of the times. Each of the six
members of the subcommittee (CIA, State, Army, Navy, Air Force, FBI) was allowed to rate an individual requirement for radio circuits from 1 to 5 points. If the item received 21 to 30 points it was top priority, 18 to 23 points second priority, and 12 to 17 points third priority.147/

The Point-to-Point Subcommittee continued to function until 1951. It finally was disbanded because of NSA resistance to detailed guidance by intelligence consumers of NSA intercept operations. The intelligence consumers then lost (and have never regained) their ability to apply intelligence requirements directly to intercept tasks.

2. The AFSAC List

A little background is necessary in order to understand the origin of the AFSAC List. As soon as USCIB was reconstituted by NSCID No. 9 under the National Security Council on 1 July 1948, the Armed Forces members began kicking against the goad imposed upon them by Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, when he placed COMINT activities under national rather than military control. While USCIB
Directive No. 1 was being drafted establishing the new USCIB structure -- a part of which was the USCIB Intelligence Committee -- the services were working at the same time on a new JCS Directive. The USCIB Directive was issued on 1 November 1948, and, seven months later on 20 May 1949, JCS Directive 2010 was issued, which placed AFSA "under the direction and control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff" and created an Armed Forces Security Agency Council (AFSAC) "to determine and coordinate joint cryptographic military requirements."\[^{148}\]

At just about the time the ink was getting dry on the first USCIB Intelligence Committee Requirements List, the military were establishing an independent requirements system under AFSAC. By this device they hoped to regain the control over military requirements which they felt they had lost by the creation of USCIB.

CIA and State were unable to understand why the military should feel they had "lost control" of the requirements. In CIA's view, we were still outsiders looking through the window at the military COMINT banquet without ever really being invited in.
Annual programming for intercept sites was still done completely by the military establishment through an Intercept and D/F Planning Committee which functioned under the military CJO. The services also controlled daily intercept targeting. Just about the time of the JCS issuance of Directive 2010, an AFSA report showed that of the COMINT targets of interest were Russian military communications, whose intercept was directly controlled not by USCIB but by the US military components. CIA/State priorities expressed through the USCIB system, therefore, actually applied only to the remaining

3. The Contest

The contest between the two lists continued until 1955. It became one of the major irritants in the relationship between CIA and AFSA and contributed to the DCI decision in 1951 to request the President to appoint a committee to study reorganization of the entire COMINT effort. This resulted in the creation of the Brownell Committee which is covered elsewhere in this history.*

* See Volume I, Chapter VI.
The USCIB Intelligence Committee, after a six-month trial of its first Requirements List, revised the system. A Recurrent Requirements List was established in August 1949 containing long-range requirements which seldom changed and a Monthly Intelligence Requirements List which contained only new items intended for coverage during the next month. This system continued for a year. Twelve monthly versions of the MIRL and three versions of the Recurrent List were published.

When it became the State Department's turn to chair the Intelligence Committee in June 1950, Mr. T. A. Polyzoides, the State member, proposed combining the two lists. Current Intelligence Requirements List No. 1 was issued for the period beginning July 1950. Mr. Robert P. Packard of the State Department became the chairman of the committee in September 1950 and became the CIA member a month later. About this time, CIA again raised a point it had made over a year before emphasizing the need for a separate requirements list applicable to Russian traffic. After some additional pressure by CIA, the committee
in January 1951 finally agreed to a separate list. The military members, however, insisted that this list be applicable only to the product produced by AFSA 246, a division responsible for processing Soviet traffic. The military did not want this list to apply to Soviet circuits, even though these circuits might contain intelligence bearing on the subject matter. Three months later a special steering committee was also created to provide direct guidance to AFSA 246. This was followed by committee approval of the CIA request that CIA and other members be officially charged with giving direct technical guidance to AFSA as long as it was in accordance with the USCIB Intelligence Requirements List. After all this bickering, the first issuance of the list appeared on 1 October 1951. Indicative of the friction between CIA and the military services at the time was the CIA proposal to change the coversheet of the Current Intelligence Requirements List to indicate that the list applied to military as well as nonmilitary requirements. The Committee Chairman,
Colonel Horace D. Neely, USAF, pigeonholed it after the CIA request made no headway.

4. The Big Evaluation

At this time the Intelligence Committee undertook the first major evaluation of the total COMINT product ever to be made as a community exercise and published the results in October 1951.156/
5. "Joint Reading Panel" Turndown

In October 1951 AFSA proposed creating a "Joint COMINT Reading Panel" at AFSA as a security measure to reduce the dissemination of intelligence outside of AFSA.\textsuperscript{158} CIA and State immediately viewed this as another move on the part of AFSA to block them from having full access to COMINT material. The

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proposal met with such a storm of opposition that it was quickly dropped.

6. The Marcy Letter

The contest of the two lists was coming to a head. In October 1952 the Chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Howard L. Shonting, Major, USAF, formally requested that the USCIB Coordinator provide APSA views on the adequacies of the then present requirements system. At the time there were three USCIB requirements lists: (1) Current Intelligence Requirements List, revised monthly; (2) Appendix to the CIRL, revised monthly; and (3) Soviet Priorities List, revised periodically.160/ A month later a reply was received from the Chief of Staff, AFSA, Colonel Alfred R. Marcy.161/ The Marcy reply brought the contest of the lists out into the open. "It is not clear," he said,
whether the USCIB Current Intelligence Requirements List (CIRL) applies only to nonmilitary traffic .... If the CIRL applies to all traffic it should be made clear that the Armed Forces Special Intelligence Priorities (AFSIP) List is solely a supplement to the CIRL serving to amplify the military items in the latter without affecting relative priorities.

He added that "As a practical matter, virtually every single AFSIP Requirement was covered in one form or another in the CIRL."

7. Brownell Committee Views on Requirements

The Marcy letter came at just about the same time as the Brownell Committee recommendations were being studied by the USCIB members, and undoubtedly Marcy's frankness was influenced by this fact. The Brownell Committee had pointed out the inadequacies and conflict existing in the COMINT requirements system. It noted that the USCIB Priorities List was decided by voting on chart-like forms expressing interest in terms of numerals 1-5. It stated that the requirements were

broadly phrased subject matter interests of the USCIB Intelligence consumers which do not attempt to pinpoint the type of information desired either by nationality of traffic or by links or frequencies.162/
The Brownell Committee stated that in most cases "These priorities are so broadly expressed as to be of little value to AFSA." The Current Intelligence Requirements List which the Brownell Committee found deficient was a document of some 22 pages issued monthly. The list consisted of a worldwide section and 14 major geographic sections covering areas from the USSR to Latin America. Each of these sections had three groupings of requirements: Priority A, Priority B, and Priority C. In an average month, only five to ten changes were made in the document.

USCIB studied the Brownell recommendations in the fall of 1952. This resulted in the demise of the AFSC and AFSA and the creation of the National Security Agency, 4 November 1952. The period of the two lists thus came to an end.

The Brownell Committee's criticism of the USCIB List also bore fruit. The USCIB Intelligence Committee created an ad hoc committee composed of CIA; Mr. Winkler, Army; Mr. Crimmins, State; Mr. David Clark, Air Force; and Commander Peter Belin, Navy. Senior NSA representatives assisted the committee.
Many months were devoted to creating a new requirements system, in the form of a USCIB Master List of Intelligence Objectives and Requirements, coupled with an appendix. This was superior in concept, in presentation, and in detail to any previous guidance furnished AFSA or NSA. It directed the efforts of consumer agencies and NSA toward specific priority goals and eliminated departmental lists which in the past diverted COMINT effort and created duplication. The Master List was designed to give basic guidance to the Director of NSA in planning and allocating resources. It was based upon the National Intelligence Objectives List (DCID 4/1 and DCID 4/2). COMINT objectives paralleling these national objectives were stated in priority order. The countries of the world were placed in two categories: (1) the Soviet Bloc and (2) the non-Soviet World, which was divided into five groups in order of priority. Intelligence requirements were keyed to all of these objectives. The appendix contained detailed information requirements related to the Master List.

The COMINT Committee in designing this system found that the National Intelligence Objectives needed...
to be updated and to be made less ambiguous and overlapping. These faults were not to be corrected, however, for some years. In addition to the formal guidance leveled by USCIB on NSA, NSA created three priority committees under the Director of NSA. Representatives of the intelligence consumers also sat on these committees. This was done in response to Paragraph 2h of NSCID 9 which directed the Director of NSA to "make provision for participation" by the intelligence consumers "in those offices of NSA where priorities of intercept and processing are finally planned." NSA created the General Priorities Committee, a Processing Priority Committee, and an Intercept Priorities Committee. This system worked moderately well for a number of years before it fell into disuse.

E. CIA Requirements Staff

Early in the period of the two lists, in November 1949, the CIA member of the USCIB Intelligence Committee was charged with drafting for the committee the paper on allocating research responsibilities for COMINT among the several intelligence agencies.
This eventually resulted in the assignment of intelligence responsibilities for COMINT research along departmental interest lines as follows: military intelligence to the Department of Defense intelligence agencies (G-2, ONI, A-2); political intelligence to the Department of State, Office of Intelligence and Research (OIR); economic intelligence to the CIA; scientific intelligence to the CIA and the three services. CIA's interests however were far broader than the specialities assigned to it. CIA was preparing all-source intelligence reports on a daily basis for the White House and was preparing national estimates in order to support senior policymakers of the government. In 1951, when Kingman Douglass was made the Assistant Director of the Office of Current Intelligence, responsibility for CIA COMINT matters was assigned to his office; and the Advisory Council, the COMINT staff established under DCI Hillenkoetter, was abolished. Shortly thereafter there was created within the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), under the control of the Chief of the Special Center an Assessments and Requirements Division. Initially it was
The Requirements Branch had two functions: 
(1) it was responsible for COMINT requirements and 
liason throughout all of CIA; and (2) it was re-
sponsible for all-source requirements for the Office 
of Current Intelligence. The Requirements Branch 
established CIA COMINT priorities for inclusion in 
the USCIB Master Requirements List. It also arranged 
for CIA liaison with NSA and the USCIB agencies. 
The Assessments Branch evaluated COMINT and other 
intelligence received by CIA and prepared reports 
analyzing trends in COMINT product.

Liaison between CIA and NSA increased rapidly 
at this time, and in 1951 a CIA Liaison Office was 
established at NSA on a full-time basis. This Liaison 
Office and the Requirements and Assessments Division 
worked in closest coordination. A relatively large 
volume of COMINT material was being put out by NSA 
at this time.

Separate reports were received in CIA each month from
NSA. These contained military, political, scientific, and economic information.

The Requirements and Assessments Division of OCI performed an important service to CIA and to the community for many years by producing statistical compilations and lists of COMINT produced by NSA for the benefit of the intelligence community. Additionally, the Assessments Branch had the only continuous evaluation system for COMINT in the community. The capability of this branch was brought into play in a 1951 USCIB-sponsored evaluation of COMINT. The Coordinator of Joint Operations (CJO) had requested each of the consumer agencies to undertake a detailed evaluation of COMINT products, and the CIA experience in this field was shared with the other intelligence agencies.

F. The "Broad Brush" Period, 1955-61

The "Broad Brush" period opened with a good product. The COMINT Objectives List forwarded by Allen W. Dulles, Chairman USCIB, to the Secretary of Defense in August 1955 was a well-thought-out and well-designed basic approach to providing broad
guidance to assist NSA in planning its overall COMINT program. It was divided into three parts as follows:

Tab A contained Continuing COMINT Objectives "which should constitute the mission of NSA." The objectives were designed to remain valid over a long period of time. Only 12 objectives were listed. The first five were concerned with the Soviet Bloc military threat. The sixth dealt with activities of

Under each of these twelve objectives were listed four or five specific COMINT requirements delineating the objectives. It was anticipated that the requirements would change from time to time.

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Tab B listed the COMINT sources which were expected to provide information pertinent to each COMINT requirement. The COMINT sources consisted of the specific organizations whose communications were COMINT targets.

In addition to Tabs A and B, which spelled out specifics, Tab C established principles and procedures for supplemental guidance. This guidance would be furnished by the individual members of USCIB and would provide amplifying details about the requirements. Each USCIB member appointed an accredited
representative to levy this guidance on NSA. Should this guidance result in significant changes by NSA, USCIB would be notified.

The forwarding letter from the DCI to the Secretary of Defense stated that the objectives were based upon the Priority National Objectives in DCID 4/4, the unique character of COMINT, and the value of COMINT in relation to other intelligence. The requirements acknowledged but did not cover the need for technical development and continuity which it was recognized that NSA must maintain. The letter also stated that "USCIB considers it imperative" for NSA to allocate COMINT resources to military commanders.

A key phrase in the forwarding letter in August 1955 was a recommendation that the Secretary of Defense "require the Director, NSA, to report to USCIB at least annually concerning his responsiveness to the requirements."

This request of USCIB was not honored. The Department of Defense had built a high fence between the USCIB and the Defense Department's managerial responsibilities for directing NSA and provided USCIB with only the generalities of its annual COMINT.
program, and this only after the Secretary of Defense had already approved it. Defense was willing to give details to the DCI or his staff but not to USCIB.

CIA was active in providing supplemental guidance to NSA. For example, during 1957 CIA levied 130 formal requirements on the NSA PROD Division.169/

In addition to the formal PROD requirements, teletypes were sent at the rate of about 12 per week to NSA covering all subjects and all areas. - 112 -
The COMINT Objectives List system remained in effect for more than five years. During this period, few changes were made in the list itself. The intelligence community exercised influence over the activities of NSA primarily through the Supplemental Guidance Mechanism. USCIB members, either individually or collectively, would request NSA to increase effort on targets of special interest leaving it to NSA to determine which targets, if any, were to be dropped. Since NSA was not receiving guidance on what targets to cut out, it began to clamor for either additional assets to cover the new targets or better guidance to determine which targets should be dropped. This resulted in a Directive to the COMINT Committee from USIB in January 1960.170/
G. The "Social Register -- The Top 400" Period, 1961-62

1. Tying Dollars to Requirements

USIB asked the COMINT Committee in January 1960 to study the total US COMINT program on a continuing basis so that USIB could review the program "including cost considerations but excluding budgetary formulation." Specifically, USIB charged the committee with designating areas of "increase or reduction in programmed effort" which were required. The phrase "including cost considerations" made the requirements exercise "for real." This was the first time that USIB aggressively associated costs with results in the COMINT business. The cost spiral had been rising and the value of the product had been diminishing. USIB thus gave its COMINT Committee a difficult, if not impossible, job. Because the exercise impinged heavily on NSA operations, an NSA man was nominated to head the committee.

2. Requirements Spelled Backwards

The COMINT Committee undertook a novel approach to the problem and listed some 400 individual requirements and priorities in relative order of importance.
The purpose of this total list was to identify problems of such low priority that assets could be diverted from them. In effect, the tail end of the list was far more important and more debated than the top of the list since in theory these end items would receive little or no COMINT coverage. This was the first time anything like this had been attempted, and the committee under the chairmanship of NSA, worked for five months.172/ The list, when published, met with ridicule, because the concept of trying to list in absolute priority order 400 intelligence subjects appeared stupid to persons not familiar with the real "name of the game." Nonetheless, the project was important and fruitful. Several major impacts on COMINT activities resulted from this compilation:

(1) For the first time, the Russian dropped in priority, and topped the list with six of the first eleven items. This shook up old-line types, but the list set the stage for reapportionment of COMINT assets in accordance with the shift in the Russian

(2) The Russian was raised to Priority 12. This was a major victory for CIA. The subject at the time was handled by NSA as though it were about number 200 in a list of 400.
CIA was aware of the fact that although the "battle of the list" had been won, the resultant shifts in COMINT effort would be hard to come by because the Army, Navy, and Air Force owned the intercept assets and NSA's control over these assets was often more theoretical than real. The Committee finished its work in August. NSA then commented in detail on the list, and in November 1960 USIB approved the 400-item COMINT Requirements List (CRL) with the understanding that it was an intermediate solution.173/

3. Origin of the "Optimum Program Concept"

Since this list was to be used as the basis for making reductions in the COMINT effort, a new concept arose to make the idea more palatable to NSA. This was the concept that NSA should prepare its program in two formats: one that took into account the dropping of the lower priority items, and another that would contain NSA's views on what would be necessary for "an optimum COMINT program." This charge to prepare an optimum program as well as a minimal program became a pattern which has more or less been followed since then.

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USIB had agreed that the new list would become effective in eight months, at the beginning of FY 1962. At the prodding of CIA, however, the CRL was made effective immediately in November 1960. CIA was anxious to have the list start bearing fruit in the next year's NSA program planning insofar as the major shifts in emphasis problems were concerned.

The committee immediately set to work after the CRL was approved on trying to devise a more satisfactory system of guidance. By March 1961 a Supplemental Guidance Mechanism enabling consumers to levy their individual requirements directly on NSA had been hammered out and approved by the committee, and work on devising a better system than the 400-item list was underway.174/

The CIA member at the COMINT Committee meeting during this period expressed the hope that any new basic guidance document would be manageable and that it would fall somewhere between the earlier COL, which was a long-range document requiring few changes annually, and the 400 list which was so detailed as to require constant change.
However, nothing happened. The effort of preparing the 400 List had drained the interest out of the community for any new requirements gambits. The "400 List" thus ruled alone and unchallenged for two years until after the COMINT Committee was amalgamated with the ELINT Committee on 30 April 1962 to form a new SIGINT Committee chaired by Lieutenant General John A. Samford, USAF.

H. The Samford Period, 1962–65

When General Samford retired on completion of his military service as Director of NSA, the Director of Central Intelligence, John McConé, at the suggestion of Huntington D. Sheldon, persuaded Samford to become the Chairman of the newly constituted USIB SIGINT Committee. Samford held this job from May 1962 into February 1965, chairing 79 meetings of the committee during this period.

General Samford was naturally interested in the relationship between the intelligence community and the NSA, having served many years of his military career on both sides of this relationship and climaxing his military career as Director of NSA.

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In his new job as Chairman of the SIGINT Committee, he became particularly challenged by the need to devise an effective requirements system so that the views of the intelligence community could be properly expressed by the community in terms that would be acceptable to, and easily interpreted by, NSA.

Samford inherited three requirements lists: (1) the "Broad Brush" COMINT List, designed five years earlier; (2) the COMINT Objectives List; and (3) the detailed "400 List," called the COMINT Requirements List. In addition, there was a draft ELINT Requirements List which had been worked on by the ELINT Committee.

A new ELINT Requirements List (ERL) was quickly produced in June 1963 under the chairmanship of Mr. [CIA.175/]. The ERL was more interesting as a historical document than a practical guide and represented a swing of the pendulum away from the earlier days when ELINT technical requirements were a law unto themselves without reference to higher National Intelligence Objectives. This earlier
trend was now superseded by a document that forced each requirement, no matter how technical, to be keyed to a Priority National Intelligence Objective (PNIO).

In this regard it resembled the five-year-old COMINT Objectives List which was similar in nature, although not quite as far-fetched.

Samford put aside this material and attempted to grind out a new list. He personally did a tremendous amount of work in trying to establish a logical relationship between broad national objectives and SIGINT requirements. Much of the work covered in earlier years was resurrected, rehashed, and re-gurgitated.

After considerable interest and work by the SIGINT Committee, most of whom were old hands who
had been through this many times before, the mountain brought forth its mouse -- a very tidy mouse notwithstanding. A year of work by a subcommittee chaired by CIA produced a document entitled the *Priority COMINT Requirements (PCR)*. The PCR consisted of 12 pages divided into four sections. In the first category, three PNIO's dealing with the Communist Bloc threat were quoted, and up to six COMINT requirements were keyed to each of these PNIO's. The COMINT requirements were the expressed statements of the kinds of COMINT that were available to satisfy the PNIO. The same system was applied to the second category. The third category listed some 70 requirements against which COMINT had capability. These were listed in priority order but were not keyed to a PNIO. The fourth category contained four intelligence requirements dealing with lower priority: targets in the Middle East and Africa, Latin America, and South Asia.

Again the pendulum had swung back to a simple, broad guidance statement -- a far cry from the "400 List." The *ad hoc* committee that forwarded this list to the SIGINT Committee recommended that it be
reissued annually and that work be started in addition to that on a five-year guidance list which would provide long-term requirements for NSA programming. The five-year list never materialized, and the PCR of June 1963 lasted until January 1966.

When General Samford retired in February 1965, Mr. Huntington D. Sheldon became Chairman of the SIGINT Committee, and some eleven months later in January 1966 the Intelligence Guidance Subcommittee (IGS) was created.

I. The 1966-70

The IGS was established by the SIGINT Committee at its 99th meeting, and of the DCI/NIFE Staff was appointed to be its full-time Chairman. A USIB Directive to the SIGINT Committee formed the basis for the new committee's work.177/ The basic charge to the SIGINT Committee by USIB included the "cost of COMINT in relation to the contribution of the product to intelligence" among seven criteria to be used in the development of intelligence guidance for COMINT programming. This "costing charge" became a major bone of contention
between NSA and the IGS, a problem which has not been completely settled even to this date (1971).

The IGS had a difficult time getting underway, and it was to be two years before its charter was finally approved. In the interim, however, much original work was accomplished. The committee immediately began a new approach to the requirements system. Under the aegis of Secretary Robert McNamara, the Department of Defense had developed a programming system for SIGINT activities called the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP). The CCP was divided into some 60 subelements, about half of which were primarily managerial. The other half were keyed to substantive areas of the world.

In 1964 [Chief of the CIA SIGINT Staff (SPINT)], negotiated with John O'Gara of DOD to represent CIA in the DOD review of the CCP. The following year, arrangements were made for [of the DCI/NIPE staff to represent the DCI in this annual DOD review prior to his appointment as Chairman, IGS.]

The IGS designed a compatible system whereby the intelligence requirements were directly keyed.
to the Department of Defense's CCP substantive subelements.

The original USIB charge to the SIGINT Committee had requested immediate study of four problems: (1) The formats devised for these problems became the basic format used by the subcommittee in its later approach to the total requirements problem. After some four years of work on these and other problems, the IGS completed the monumental work of applying the system to all of the substantive subelements of the CCP, totaling almost 1,000 pages of requirements.

The historical impact of this document cannot be assessed since at present (1971) we are too close to the event.
VI. The SIGINT Organization Study Group -- "Sausage"

At the end of 1966 the CIA SIGINT Officer, Huntington D. Sheldon, set up an ad hoc SIGINT Organization Study Group (SOSG) to examine what CIA was doing in SIGINT; who was doing it; why, and under what authority. SOSG soon became known as "Sausage" -- a phonetic nickname and an apt description of the problem. Total costs and manpower resources allocated to SIGINT in the Agency were to be determined and recommendations made on the best organization within CIA to accomplish existing objectives.

This study, the first of its kind, gives an excellent picture of CIA SIGINT involvement at the time. It came about because of pressures from the CIA Director of Planning, Programming and Budgeting (PPB), John M. Clarke, and because frictions between some of the CIA offices engaged in SIGINT (particularly between the Office of ELINT, OEL/DD/S&T, and the SIGINT Staff of the Clandestine Service) were increasing.

For several years, the CIA offices responsible for overseas intercept (COMMO and operations

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had been pressing for additional personnel. Twice in the previous years these increases had been initially granted only to be reduced or taken away prior to implementation.

The Agency Director of PPB was another factor. He found it difficult, in the annual CIA budget exercise, to validate the SIGINT objectives and budgets of the many CIA offices charged with responsibility for SIGINT; and he looked to the CIA SIGINT Officer for assistance in recommending to the DCI the proper size and allocation of the CIA SIGINT Budget.

By the end of 1966, these pressures caused the SIGINT Officer to undertake a study of the overall problem; and he established the SIGINT Organization Study Group.

On 30 August 1967, SOSG turned in its report, which contained an excellent summary of SIGINT activities in CIA.
A. Regulation 120

The SSGS was charged, in effect, with determining whether CIA Regulation 120 (1965 revision) should be revised. Regulation 120 was the COMINT bible within CIA and established the mission and functions for all SIGINT offices throughout the Agency.\textsuperscript{181} The regulation was initially written by a drafting team in 1952.
1. The CIA SIGINT Officer

Regulation 120 charged the CIA SIGINT Officer with advising, assisting, and, as appropriate, representing the DCI in SIGINT matters and with coordinating the CIA SIGINT program. Specifically, USIB matters, the CIA SIGINT budget, liaison with NSA, SIGINT evaluation, the COMINT security program, and SIGINT policy matters fell under his jurisdiction. He carried out these responsibilities by means of his SPINT Staff.182/

2. The Deputy Director for Plans (DDP)
3. Office of Communications, DDS

The Director of Communications, DDS, in addition to providing secure COMINT communications for the Agency was responsible through his Special Programs Staff for conducting CIA intercept activities.184/

4. The Information Requirements Staff, DDI

The SIGINT Group of this staff (IRS) was responsible for establishing CIA requirements for COMINT to be levied on NSA and for evaluating the COMINT received as a result of these requirements.185/

5. Central Reference Service, DDI

The Central Reference Service provided a central facility for the dissemination of COMINT and a central repository and retrieval service for published COMINT.186/

6. Office of ELINT, DD/S&T

The Director of ELINT was charged with establishing and coordinating the Agency ELINT program, including the collection and analysis of ELINT as well as research and development.187/
B. The SIGINT Organization Study Group

As noted above, the SIGINT Organization Study Group (SOSG) examined the mission and functions of all of these offices and made proposals for reorganizing the operations. The individuals in this group all had devoted most of their careers to SIGINT and had definite and different ideas of what the CIA SIGINT objectives should be and how best to obtain them. A consensus was impossible with this group. Accordingly, it was decided to present to the SIGINT Officer for decision the gamut of possible organizations -- running from a consolidation of all SIGINT functions within a single office, to leaving the organization exactly as it was. Five options were drawn up. The first and last options proposed integration into a single office of most SIGINT functions in the Agency. Option A would put these functions under the DD/S&T; Option E proposed that they be put under the DDP.

Option B was a proposal to put under OEL certain ELINT functions.
C was a proposal that the SIGINT Officer divest himself of his other responsibilities (which at the time included the USIB Watch Committee as well as responsibility as Assistant DD/S&T) and that he devote full time and attention to CIA SIGINT matters exclusively. Option D proposed continuation of the status quo with the addition of the creation of an Advisory Committee under the SIGINT Officer primarily to assist in the exchange of information between the various CIA SIGINT operations.

Options A and E were ruled out by the SIGINT Officer as being impractical at the time. SOSG, therefore, concentrated on presenting arguments for and against the remaining three options. The SIGINT Officer, after consideration of the matter, chose Option D viz., the status quo with the establishment of a SIGINT Advisory Committee of which he would be the Chairman. The SIGINT Organization Study Group turned out to be another one of those government paper exercises. The reason was that
while offices were unhappy with each other, they
were completely satisfied with themselves; and their
relations were not bad to warrant a corrective major
shakeup. Sheldon, who was a practitioner of the
possible and the last one to be interested in trig-
gering the confusion that would result from a major
reorganization of SIGINT when nobody really wanted
it, decided to "let the sleeping dog lie."\textsuperscript{188/}

The Advisory Committee to the SIGINT Officer
was formed but met only twice. After that, Sheldon
followed his regular method of operating directly
with each of the individual component chiefs con-
cerned. He had an excellent rapport with the DDP;
in fact, it was better with the DDP than it was with
the Office of ELINT, even though both he and the
Office of ELINT functioned under the DD/S&T. This
was true primarily because \underline{the}
Director of the Office of ELINT, found it to his
office's advantage to deal directly with the DD/S&T,
bypassing the SIGINT Officer for all practical pur-
poses; and Sheldon chose not to assert himself too
vigorously in the middle of this relationship.
VII. The Eaton Panel -- A Study of NSA SIGINT

No sooner had CIA finished and reviewed its own SIGINT activities, as recounted in the previous chapter on SOSG, than circumstances arose which caused the creation of a somewhat similar but far more extensive exercise to be undertaken under the aegis of the DCI and directed towards the NSA. In July of 1967 the President directed that a special study group be formed to review the national SIGINT effort. 189/ Again, as within CIA, budgetary pressures were the proximate cause of the exercise.

A. Origins

The national SIGINT budget had just passed An NSA request for another for FY 1969 was the straw that broke the camel's back. 190/ The Bureau of the Budget staff member charged with responsibility for NSA, Mr. William Mitchell, obtained support from his chief, Director of the Budget Charles L. Schultz, for a national-level review of SIGINT management and tried out a proposed staffing paper to this
effect on the DCI.\textsuperscript{191} The initial reaction to the
DCI and his staff was somewhat reserved, and on 23
June 1967 the DCI told Schultz, "I am troubled by
some of the reasons which are advanced in support
of the necessity of such a review." In particular,
he disagreed with the Schultz view of the relation-
ship between the NSA and the National Reconnaissance
Office (NRO) as well as some statements made in the
memorandum concerning "the development of CIA as a
SIGINT collection Agency."\textsuperscript{192} The Director stated
that, despite his reservations concerning the validity
of many of the statements in the Schultz proposal,
he did think that there were some basic issues which
might warrant a special committee if Schultz and
Secretary of Defense McNamara thought it desirable.
Two days prior to the DCI letter, on 21 June, Schultz
had written a memorandum for the President proposing
a national review of SIGINT management.\textsuperscript{193} When
Mr. Helms found out that this letter had gone forward
to the White House staff without his concurrence, he
called Bromley Smith at the White House. As a con-
sequence, Smith recalled the paper and sent it back
to Schultz telling him to make sure he had written
\textsuperscript{134}
concurrency from Helms and McNamara before he sent it to the White House again.194/

Walt Rostow then entered the act in an attempt to get a better coordinated paper before submitting it to the President and forwarded the Schultz memorandum to Clarke M. Clifford, Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.195/

Clifford stated that McNamara's complete support would be necessary for any such review and that it might be appropriate for the review to be undertaken by a group established by him.196/ When Rostow referred the matter to McNamara on 15 July, he stated, "I believe it should be done under the direction of Dick Helms (Dick could quite properly resent my direction of it and we don't need a totally outside group)."197/

Two days later, the President, when given the options for sponsorship of the committee, agreed with McNamara and with the Rostow recommendation: "I believe there is virtue in putting this matter in Dick's hands but we would need strong support from McNamara's people to assess the management as opposed to the pure intelligence aspects of NSA."198/
B. CIA Gets the Ball

Helms accepted the project and assigned responsibility for getting it going to Sheldon and to Bress. The original Schultz proposal had as possible members of the review committee: Thomas S. Gates, William O. Baker, Lieutenant General Andrew J. Goodpaster, George A. Brownell, Eugene G. Fubini, with alternatives: John A. McCon, General Omar Bradley, John J. McCloy, Edward Purcell, and Frank Pace. For a variety of reasons, the only one to end up on the committee from the original suggested group was Fubini. When Bress suggested that the group might be chaired by Mr. Frederick M. Eaton of the New York firm of Sherman & Sterling, the Director arranged to meet Eaton and afterwards agreed with Bress that Eaton should be Chairman.199/

In addition to Mr. Eaton, the full committee consisted of: General Lauris Norstad, Dr. Eugene Fubini, and Ambassador Livingston T. Merchant. Staff members assigned to assist the panel were:

General Richard Collins, Chief of Staff

Robert E. Hastings of CIA;

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Merchant, and Fubini." He forwarded a copy of the terms of reference which had been approved by the Secretary of Defense and Eaton.202/ These terms charged the Eaton Group "to conduct an objective appraisal of all significant management, policy, and operational aspects of present and future" US SIGINT activities to make them responsive to "possible national needs at minimum necessary cost."

C. Eaton Runs His Own Show

The first meeting was held on 5 September in the conference room of East Building on 23rd and C Streets, which had been turned over to the committee, which was expected to function for six months to a year.203/ The principals and the staff members started to work with a full head of steam.

Very early it became apparent that widely divergent views were held by the staff members, who were representing not just their personal views but the views of their organizations as well. As time went on, these views became cast in concrete rather than interwoven and melded.204/

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The NSA representative kept emphasizing the need for more authority for the Director of NSA, particularly in the ELINT field, in order to enable him to defend his position and resources against the military services. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) members had just the opposite viewpoint, citing the confidence gap that existed in regard to NSA as far as the military services were concerned, and their unwillingness to concede NSA any more authority. In fact, they felt the NSA had far too much authority already and wanted some of it taken away.

Eaton saw this dichotomy within his staff and, as he personally became more familiar with problems of the SIGINT community by listening directly to the leaders of the community, he tended to use his staff less and less. Eaton was a powerful personality who operated in a decidedly nongovernmental manner and dealt personally only with the senior echelons in State and Defense and with the DCI. He made his principal writer, instructed him to separate himself from the rest of the staff and draft papers solely under Eaton's guidance. Needless to say, this caused the staff members assigned to the - 139 -
project to find themselves under the gun from their own departments for failing to have their departmental views fully expressed to the Eaton Panel.205/

Finally, on 8 May 1968, Eaton surfaced a tentative draft report which he stated "has not been submitted to, or staffed out by, the men assigned to the group from the several departments and agencies."206/ Eaton used this draft as a trial balloon to get reactions as to the practicality of the subjects contained in it. The report noted that it was 15 years since the Brownell major study of the SIGINT business had taken place and that many developments had intervened, particularly in the ELINT area. The report was broken into twelve major sections:

I. National Intelligence Programming and Guidance

II. Resources Management

IIIa. ________________________________

IIIb. ________________________________

IIIc. COMINT and ELINT Satellites

IIIId. Overseas Bases

IIIe. Direct Support of Electronic Warfare

IIIh. Third Party Relations

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IIIi. The Role of the Cryptographic Community in Intelligence Production

IV. Administration

V. The Value of ELINT and COMINT

VI. The Future

D. Reactions to the 8 May Trial Balloon

The report elicited an immediate and varied response from the principal officers of the SIGINT community. Several of these responses were personally written by the Senior military officer responsible for SIGINT and are worthy of note because they contain the basic military and intelligence philosophies of the authors.

1. Army

The Chief of Staff, US Army, General Harold R. Johnson, said, "Over the past several years I have become increasingly concerned over a neglect of the intelligence function in the Army. These years have seen an enormous improvement in our firepower and a growing increase of tactical mobility. Our combat intelligence system has not kept pace, and we are unable to take full advantage of our firepower and mobility because of a lack of suitable
and timely intelligence.  

and many other members of the Army Intelligence and Security Command (AISC) concurred. Johnson went on to say that he had become convinced that the Army should depend for COMINT support on an integrated, unified national COMINT system provided that the system is designed and operated so that the imperative needs of the Army for combat intelligence are met. He saw no advantage in transferring ELINT responsibility to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) as recommended by the draft Eaton report, and he supported the proposal that an Assistant Secretary for Intelligence Management be established within the Department of Defense (DOD). He also commented regarding the report's recommendations on resource management that "There is a very real danger ... that information with an unavoidable institutional bias" will be used to support demands for increased resource allocations to the agency involved. "The result of this self-feeding is that a faulty allocation of resources can occur and erroneous estimates ensue." The classic historical example of such a mechanism at work was, he said, the supposed gap between the missile strength of the United States and the Soviet Union.
In addition to General Johnson's comments, Major General Charles J. Denholm, Commander of the Army Security Agency, made known his personal views.208/ "You point out that the authority of the DIRNSA has been eroded ... I do not agree. You may view it as not so much a question of authority being eroded as it is a matter of an authority not finding an object against which it can assert itself." Then Denholm pointed out that the services can always find shelter from NSA authority by withholding information, charging costs to other service programs, and the like. Denholm agreed with the Eaton report's view that ELINT is a "good part of the direct support resource needed by theater commanders." He said: "The Army planner who is considering an ELINT capability for an infantry battalion will look long and hard at the potential of ELINT when he realizes that in order to gain the capabilities, he may have to give up a recoilless rifle section." He supported the establishment of an Assistant Secretary of Intelligence Management to ensure that intelligence resources were not allowed to escape control and be dissipated under the masquerade of electronic warfare.

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2. **Joint Chiefs of Staff**

   General Earl G. Wheeler, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,\(^\text{209}\) stated:

   Your recognition of the very real need of the tactical commander to have immediately available to him those COMINT and ELINT assets required for the proper support of forces in the field is noteworthy.

   He supported the Eaton proposal to place ELINT under the management of DIA and was against creating in the Department of Defense an Assistant Secretary for Intelligence Management.

3. **CIA**

   The Deputy Director of CIA, Vice Admiral Rufus L. Taylor,\(^\text{210}\) opposed transfer of control of all ELINT activities to DIA as well as the recommendations affecting the structure and workings of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO):

   I cannot agree with your statements that lines of authority are blurred and that there is lack of understanding at all levels between NRO and NSA.

   He added

   I am perplexed by the reference in the report to the ________ and the proposal that CIA should have the status of a contractor to NSA or DIA.
He was also

surprised by the findings of the report that no attempt is made to relate information to the resources or sources which produced it .... It is my own view that the intelligence community has been devoting a very considerable amount of time and energy on doing just this, with rather impressive results.

4. NSA

The Director of the National Security Agency, Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter, stated

The special study group has identified the principal problem areas connected with the SIGINT activities of the US government.211/

He endorsed the conclusion that there is a need for an agreed statement of essential national intelligence purposes and objectives around which a national intelligence program can be built. He was "seriously concerned" that the findings failed to support the need for upgrading the authority of the DIRNSA. He stated:

It is my belief that management of the SIGINT effort by the Director, NSA, is the keystone of the most effective and economical SIGINT structure for the nation.

He was also concerned over the transfer of ELINT to DIA, the negative findings on Project the effort, and more detailed program

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guidance from the DCI and his staff in SIGINT resource management.

5. National Reconnaissance Office

Alexander H. Flax, the Director of NRO, wrote a letter to Eaton in which he took issue with a reference made to the "blurred lines of authority" in the DOD with respect to satellite SIGINT activities. "This is in distinct variance to the facts of the matter."212/ Attached to the Flax letter was a rather thick documentation supporting his argument. He opposed transfer of ELINT satellites to DIA and agreed that it was essential to measure the value of information against the cost of obtaining it.

6. DIA, Air Force, and Navy

Comments by the DIA, Navy, and Air Force principals took sides on the major recommendations of the Eaton Report paralleling their departmental positions without contributing any new personal ideas or arguments.

E. The Final Report

The replies received by Eaton were mostly substantive and useful in helping Eaton to determine

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what type of final report would be most useful. At this point, Eaton turned principally to J. J. Hitchcock to undertake redrafting of the 8 May report; and after some 18 redrafting attempts, accompanied by constant consultation with Eaton and the other members of the Panel, the final report evolved and was forwarded by Eaton to the DCI on 16 August 1968.213/
This version dealt with the comments received on the May draft, many of which were contradictory because they reflected departmental rather than national viewpoints:

The final report in summary stated that there was a need for a long-range intelligence plan; that guidance must be target-oriented and cost-related; that the creation of the National Intelligence Resources Board (NIRB) -- which was established shortly after the 8 May draft recommended it -- should be helpful in providing such a long-range plan and periodic guidance; that there was a need for a point of central review within the Department of Defense for COMINT and ELINT; that the authority of the Director of NSA over COMINT should be reaffirmed and that he should strengthen his programming staff by

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including more military representation; ELINT resources devoted to radar should be assigned to the services and that most of the remainder should be assigned to NSA except for satellite ELINT, which should remain with the National Reconnaissance Office, with tasking and processing of the satellites under NSA; overseas bases should be consolidated but not to the extent that we denied ourselves access to important areas of the world; third-party arrangements should be encouraged to offset the loss of overseas bases; no firm recommendations were made with respect to either.

F. Impact of the Eaton Report

Although the immediate impact of the Eaton Report was negligible, its longer term catalytic effect was considerable, in that its stepchildren, if not its direct offspring, made their mark on the government intelligence structure. The creation of the "National Intelligence Resources Board" under the DCI and the establishment of an Assistant for Intelligence under the Assistant Secretary of Defense were stepchildren of the Eaton Report. CIA

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had jumped the gun by creating the NIRB, which was an Eaton Panel idea, prior to the issuance of the final report. This took the steam out of much of the report because the community then waited to see what the NIRB would do in establishing national goals. As one of its first tasks, the NIRB studied the problem, which Eaton had pointed out took of the national SIGINT funds and produced little intelligence. The NIRB efforts in this were frustrated by an NSA counter ploy within the Department of Defense. A committee, known as the "Eachus Panel," was established; and it came up with conclusions completely different from the NIRB. This effectively stymied any action based on the NIRB recommendations.

Another recommendation of the Eaton Report, the establishment of an Assistant Secretary for Intelligence Management, lay dormant for nearly a year but ultimately inspired one of the main arguments, as the new Administration took over, for the establishment of an office for intelligence resource management in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In June 1969, Mr. Robert F. Froehlke took the post

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of Assistant Secretary of Defense, Administration, and promptly appointed an Assistant, Admiral Harold G. Bowen, for Intelligence. Mr. Froehlke thus represented DOD as one of the three members of NIRB.

With respect to the many other Eaton recommendations concerning changes in management within the Department of Defense, these mostly met with lack of enthusiasm at high levels (including the DCI and the Joint Chiefs) and were tabled.

The Eaton Panel failed to bring about any major changes in the SIGINT organization such as had resulted 15 years earlier from the Brownell Committee, although two prime recommendations for intelligence management of outside the SIGINT community, the NIRB and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, have been adopted in principle and have had some of the effects Mr. Eaton and his group sought.*

* It was not until 1970, two years after the Eaton Panel and six months after the period which this history covers, that the Fitzhugh study of the Department of Defense organization again recommended major reorganizations of intelligence management within the Department of Defense. Thus the seeds sown by the Eaton Panel appeared to be finally bearing fruit.
VIII. Communications Intelligence (COMINT) Security

This chapter covers the whole span of this history (1947-70) and reviews COMINT security in CIA and in the intelligence community insofar as it affected CIA.

A. A Sound Secure Craft

During World War II COMINT made a tremendous contribution to the allied victories because the COMINT community was able to keep its successes secret. The Battle of Britain, the invasion of Europe, the war in Africa, and the war throughout the Pacific were all fought to a large extent with prior knowledge of enemy capabilities and intentions attained through US-UK COMINT. The military communications of the Germans and the Japanese were deciphered on a continuing basis. The secret diplomatic communications of these and other countries were also an open book to the US Government.

As thousands of persons left the Army and Navy COMINT organizations at the end of World War II and carried with them secrets of our success,
COMINT authorities were greatly worried lest stories on "How I Helped Win the War of Cryptanalysis" would appear in the press. It was known from sad experience that such stories had a stimulating effect on foreign communications security organizations, causing them to review and tighten up their communications procedures making it more difficult for current US cryptanalysis. Fortunately, in the immediate post-war period, very few unauthorized stories by insiders concerning our COMINT successes made their way into print. Perhaps this can be attributed to the broad support of the total American public for the war.

Of course the Pearl Harbor investigation brought out into the open the fact that the US had been able to read Japanese diplomatic and naval codes but for some reason, the impact of this on other Communications Security (COMSEC) authorities was minimal.

At the end of the war, the German and Japanese communications ceased to exist. Even before the end of the war, the US COMINT authorities started turning their talents in other directions.
and began work on the Russian codes and ciphers. They hoped that they would be able to repeat, in some measure at least, the fantastic successes that they had had against the Germans and Japanese.

B. A Hole in the Hull

In the post-World War II period, the Communist star was ascendant. Communist sympathizers were present both in the United States and in the United Kingdom to provide a basis for Russian espionage operations. In the United States, the Rosenbergs stole for the Russians our most closely guarded secret -- the atomic bomb.

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Alger Hiss stole State Department secrets. Even the Department of Justice was penetrated by Judith Cuplon. The Russian bear became politically and militarily more and more bellicose. The Berlin Blockade in April 1948 set the world on edge, and the first Russian atomic explosion on 23 September 1949 caused people to hear the approaching hoofbeats of the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse.

C. Let's Legislate Security

The original United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) was established after World
War II as a result of Army and Navy efforts to obtain legislation to protect COMINT. During World War II, the United States had neither a national COMINT organization nor a law imposing penalties for the unauthorized disclosure of COMINT. During World War II, we had no known COMINT breaches; since then, despite the law and despite the organization, we have had many.

USCIB thus was an organization conceived in security and dedicated to the proposition that COMINT'ers were more equal than anybody. The first two subcommittees created by USCIB were a Security Committee and an Intelligence Committee. The former was far more active than the latter. This group drafted the initial public law pertaining to COMINT, which later became Title 18, Section 798, US Code, dated 31 October 1951.

* 13 June 1946.
D. COMINT Security in CIG

In May 1947, 15 months after President Truman created CIG, there were only persons in CIG indoctrinated for COMINT, and of these only saw COMINT codeword material.219/

In the beginning, the only COMINT received by CIG was contained in the intelligence summaries received from the State Department, the Army, and the Navy. CIA did not obtain approval of USCIB to receive COMINT directly until April 1948 after a long political struggle.

At the beginning of CIA in 1947, responsibility for COMINT security was assigned to the Chief of the Advisory Council,* under whom the basic CIA COMINT

* The functions of the Advisory Council were transferred on 1 December 1950 under CIA Regulation 70 to the newly proposed Office of Special Services, which became the Office of Current Intelligence on 15 January 1951. Kingman Douglass, AD/OCI, then assumed responsibility for COMINT security.
security philosophy was developed — a philosophy which has persisted since that time and has materially facilitated the growth and efficiency of the Agency. This philosophy was worked out together with the then Executive for Inspection and Security, Colonel Sheffield Edwards, whom CIG was fortunate to have as its Security Chief, and who molded the basic security policies of this Agency. He created a security atmosphere in the Agency that was professional and practical rather than bureaucratic and police-like. The Executive for Inspection and Security was responsible for arranging for the investigation and approving the basic TOP SECRET clearance of CIG personnel, and the Chief, Advisory Council, took over COMINT security responsibility from that point on. Initially, COMINT security was quite independent from Colonel Edwards. The COMINT Officer was responsible for both physical and operational security of COMINT and for determining the need-to-know of COMINT personnel. Mr. James Beard was assigned to the Advisory Council and functioned as its principal security officer during this period. An example
of the mutual support provided by the two offices was the initiation of the lie detector as a security tool in CIA. On 23 August 1948, Edwards obtained approval from DCI Hillenkoetter to initiate lie detector use as part of personnel security investigations on a volunteer basis.221/ The Advisory Council proposed to Edwards that the lie detector be made compulsory for all CIG personnel who were to be approved for access to COMINT, and on 19 October 1948 Edwards in a memorandum to the Chief, Advisory Council, arranged to accomplish this.222/ Thus, COMINT'ers were the first group in the Agency, and indeed in the whole intelligence structure, to regularly receive lie detector tests. This practice was not initiated in other departments on a regular basis until many years later. At the time, it was an innovation and considered an imposition and invasion of personal liberty by some senior levels in the Agency. However, the Advisory Council stuck by its guns and eventually the opposition waned. As far as the Chief, Advisory Council, was concerned, the polygraph was a godsend in that it enabled him to feel more comfortable about expanding COMINT clearances.
in the Agency as the need arose. USCIB had approved CIA getting COMINT only a few months earlier, and the number of people needed to handle the product was increasing.

Clearances in the Clandestine Service, however, were held to a minimum. The Chief, William K. Harvey, was responsible for recommending the "need-to-know" for OSO personnel. Harvey gave out COMINT clearances as though they were thousand dollar bills of his own money. He controlled COMINT in OSO like a duke ruling a medieval fiefdom -- on the basis of personal knowledge of each of his retainers. COMINT operations in the DDP during the early years were relatively few.
within OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) -- the office charged with political action; the sister office of OSO, which was charged with espionage.

As time went on, the Advisory Council authorized direct liaison between the covert offices and AFSA both for purposes of obtaining guidance from AFSA

The Chief, Advisory Council, maintained overall responsibility for the security of these operations but the immediate operational decisions were made by the Chief of OSO.

E. COMINT Clearances Mushroom

The size of the COMINT organization in the community and in CIA was relatively small prior to the 25 June 1950 invasion of South Korea by the North Koreans.
The Korean War caused a massive increase in the size of the US military establishment and a corresponding increase in the COMINT organization. From that point on, COMINT clearances continued to grow at a rapid rate that has continued to the present.

This vast expansion in clearances over the years made it impossible to guarantee personnel security. There were just too many people cleared to be sure of every one of them. CIA, so far as is known, has never had a defection from its COMINT-cleared personnel. Perhaps the polygraph has contributed in no small measure to this phenomenon.
F. The Traitors

Outside of CIA, there have been several serious defections which have caused tragic damage to the COMINT effort. The list of traitors includes Burgess and McLean, the two British homosexuals who defected to Soviet Russia in 1951. These men had broad intelligence experience, much closer to home was the case of Joseph S. Peterson, an NSA employee, who in October 1954 was arrested for making available US COMINT secrets to his wartime coworker. Six years later, Martin and Mitchell, again two homosexuals, left NSA via Mexico City and Cuba and ended up in Russia. On 6 September 1960 these two told the press that NSA had broken the codes of more than half of the world's nations.
Martin had worked two and one-half years and Mitchell had worked three years at NSA. While these two were not directly familiar with US successes against Russian problems since they worked in the non-Russian area, security breaches on our capability on Russian communications occurred from another source -- a source which through the years has caused the entire intelligence community much agony -- namely, stories given to the US press by US officials who, for one reason or another, in attempting to achieve what they think are legitimate political or budgetary assists from the press, do irreparable damage to intelligence sources. Three years later, on the 23rd of July 1963, two other traitors in the SIGINT business were uncovered -- one by suicide and the other by flight. Jack Dunlap, a sergeant at NSA, on this date committed suicide by inhaling monoxide gas from one of the two Cadillacs he owned, along with a Jaguar sports car. Dunlap had been working for the Russians for months, passing to them material he obtained at NSA. On the same day, the Russians chose to surface Victor Hamilton, an ex-NSA employee, by publishing his letter in the Soviet newspaper Izvestia in which
he identified himself as a former
expert on the Near East Sector in the
office designated ALLO at NSA. The
duties of my colleagues in ALLO in-
cluded the study in breaking of mili-
tary ciphers ... including those between
the United Arab Republic Embassies in
Europe and the UAR government in Cairo.

Hamilton had worked for nearly five years at NSA
prior to his defection.

The list of defectors was still not ended.
The Russians had under their control Sergeant Robert
L. Johnson, who had worked for them for 12 years --
from February 1953 until his prostitute wife cracked
up and informed on him in December 1964. For one
period in this long bondage -- namely, from November
1962 to May 1963 -- Johnson worked for the Armed
Forces Courier Service (ARFCOS) at Orly Field in
Paris. During these seven months he made available
a dozen or so envelopes each weekend to a Russian
photographic team. These would be opened, photo-
graphed, and resealed by the Russians. The opera-
tion went on undetected by the United States, and
during this period between 500 and 2,000 documents
were made available to the Russians. There were
4,000 NSA documents in the Orly vaults during this
time, and almost 200 CIA finished intelligence studies including weekly bulletins and topical reports of a scientific and political nature. The State Department COMINT Diplomatic Summary was also available there. Through this operation the Soviets had access to information on the US-European war plans called "The SIOP" (Single Integrated Operational Plan) including the identity of Soviet targets, the attack plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and US knowledge of Soviet atomic energy and weapons facilities, industrial complexes, and order of battle. Additionally, as far as COMINT was concerned, the extent and success of the US worldwide SIGINT effort was contained in the daily US intelligence summaries on military and political developments around the world.223/

The tragedy of this successful Soviet operation was great.

Of far less importance but still a matter which concerned USIB and the intelligence community at the time was the 1965 publication of an excellent book on cryptanalysis by David Kahn. Efforts were made to no avail to persuade Kahn and the Macmillan Publishing Company to suppress parts of the book that Kahn had
based on interviews he had had with two World War II Navy COMINT "old hands," Captain Wesley K. Wright, USN, Retired, and Captain Thomas H. Dyer, USN, Retired.

G. The USS Pueblo

The greatest single SIGINT compromise to occur was the loss on 23 January 1968 of the SIGINT ship Pueblo when it was boarded by the North Koreans off the coast of Wonsan. The Pueblo (commissioned as AGER-2 in mid-1967) departed the Sasebo Naval Base on 10 January 1968 on her first SIGINT collection patrol off the coast of North Korea. The ship was under the control of, and on an intelligence mission assigned by, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CICPACFLT). The CIA had no requirement for the mission and no part in its planning. The operation was conceived and controlled by US Navy intelligence authorities in the Pacific. The ship was to intercept communications and electronics signals in the Sea of Japan off the coast of North Korea in response to purely military intelligence requirements. The Pueblo arrived on station off the coast on 12 January 1968.
and conducted intelligence surveillance in this area under radio silence until she was captured on 23 January 1968.224/

Subsequent to the capture, the crew of the *Pueblo* was detained for a period of 11 months in North Korean detention camps. During this period the North Koreans conducted intensive interrogations of the communications technicians assigned to duty on board the ship. On 23 December 1968, the crew was released to US authorities. During the period 26 December 1968 through 10 January 1969, these crew members were given an intelligence debriefing in order to assist in the assessment of the cryptologic-cryptographic damage incurred as a result of the *Pueblo* capture.

This investigation brought out that the *Pueblo* compromise provided the "enemy" with a major US SIGINT facility including its associated technical COMINT and ELINT equipment and materials. All but a small percentage of the operational intelligence messages which provided
the detailed background information -- fell into North Korean hands. Nearly all the equipment aboard the vessel, including four different types of crypto machines, was captured intact or in a condition which could be reconstructed.

The operational intelligence messages contained a complete picture of US SIGINT capabilities in the Pacific and Southeast Asian areas. These messages together with other documents provided a broad overview of US SIGINT and other intelligence activities throughout the world.

The Pueblo incident resulted in the most comprehensive single compromise of classified material in the history of US intelligence.

H. Finis

After all of these security disasters, the wonder is that any COMINT is produced at all.

Perhaps, though one hopes to the contrary, the span of this history has encompassed the rise and fall of the COMINT empire.

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DCI HISTORICAL SERIES
DCI-4

The History of SIGINT
in the Central Intelligence Agency, 1947-70
Volume IV
General Appendixes

by

October 1971

Edward W. Proctor
CIA SIGINT Officer

Historical Staff
Central Intelligence Agency

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A Note on Classification

The overall subject matter of this history requires that it be handled via [ ] control systems. For purposes of quotation or subsequent sanitization, individual parts of the history may be treated as follows:

Volume I and Volume II...
Volume III............
Volume IV............
Special Supplement.....
The History of SIGINT
in the Central Intelligence Agency, 1947-70

Volume IV

General Appendixes

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B. Secretaries of United States Communications Intelligence Board/United States Intelligence Board

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E. Mission and Functions of CIA SIGINT Officer, Revised, 12 April 1968 - CIA Regulation HR 1-2d

F. Mission and Functions of Advisory Council

G. NSCID No. 9, 1 July 1948

H. NSCID No. 9 (Revised), 29 December 1952

I. NSCID No. 17, 16 May 1955

J. NSCID No. 6 (New Series), 15 September 1958

K. NSCID No. 1 (New Series), 4 March 1964

L. 

M. Total Numbers of CIA COMINT Cleared Persons, by Year: 1950-70
N. Maps

1. SIGINT Resources (Western Hemisphere), 31 March 1970

2. SIGINT Resources (Europe, Africa, Middle East), 31 March 1970

3. SIGINT Resources (Far East), 31 March 1970
Appendix A

Chairmen of
United States Communications Intelligence Board/
United States Intelligence Board

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Appendix A

Chairmen of
United States Communications Intelligence Board/
United States Intelligence Board

CIG  Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, USA (AAF)
     USCIB, 15 October 1946 – 10 July 1947

Army Major General Samuel J. Chamberlain, USA
     USCIB, 10 July 1947 – 27 April 1948

Navy Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, USN
     USCIB, 27 April 1948 – 1 April 1949

USAF Major General Charles P. Cabell, USAF
     USCIB, 1 April 1949 – 14 April 1950

State Mr. W. Park Armstrong
     USCIB, 14 April 1950 – 13 April 1951

CIA General Walter B. Smith, USA
     USCIB, 13 April 1951 – 9 February 1953

CIA Mr. Allen W. Dulles
     USCIB, 9 February 1953 – 15 September 1958
     USIB, 15 September 1958 – 29 November 1961

CIA Mr. John Alex McCone
     USIB, 29 November 1961 – 28 April 1965

CIA Vice Admiral William Francis Raborn, Jr., USN (Ret.)
     USIB, 28 April 1965 – 30 June 1966

CIA Mr. Richard Helms
     USIB, 30 June 1966 –
Appendix B

Secretaries of
United States Communications Intelligence Board/
United States Intelligence Board
Appendix B

Secretaries of
United States Communications Intelligence Board/
United States Intelligence Board

Lieutenant C. T. R. Adams, USN
Captain Wason G. Campbell, Signal Corps
Secretaries, 15 October 1946

Captain J. E. Fitzpatrick, Signal Corps
Lieutenant C. T. R. Adams, USN
Secretaries, 10 July 1947

Lieutenant C. T. R. Adams, USN
Mr. Hamill D. Jones, S. Corps
Secretaries, 27 August 1948

Lieutenant Paul J. Karl, USN
Mr. Hamill D. Jones
Secretaries, 14 January 1949

Mr. Hamill D. Jones
Lieutenant James W. Pearson, USN
Secretaries, 14 April 1950

Mr. Hamill D. Jones
Lieutenant Donald G. Maize, USN
Secretaries, 24 March 1952

Mr. Hamill D. Jones
Acting Executive Secretary, 28 November 1952

Captain Rufus L. Taylor, USN
Lieutenant Commander Paul J. Karl, USN
Secretaries, 28 May 1953

Captain Rufus L. Taylor, USN
Executive Secretary, USCIB, 13 October 1953

TOP SECRET

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Mr. Hamill D. Jones
Acting Executive Secretary, USCIB, 10 June 1955

Captain Allyn Cole, USN
Executive Secretary, USCIB, 30 September 1955

Mr. John Heires
Executive Secretary, USIB, 15 September 1958

Mr. James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary, USIB, 23 May 1962
Appendix C

Names of Individuals

Who Served With the SPINT Staff
Appendix C

Names of Individuals
Who Served With the SPINT Staff
Appendix D

Chronology USCIB Intelligence Committee
Appendix D

Chronology USCIB Intelligence Committee

Nov 48  USCIB splits Committee on Intelligence and Security into two committees.

Dec 48  First meeting of new USCIB Intelligence Committee. Chairman: [Name] (CIA).

12 Jan 49  Second meeting in new State Building, Room 7258.

17 Jan 49  Committee argues over its charter. Military want charter to exclude responsibility for military targets.

25 Jan 49  First meeting of Point-to-Point Intelligence Subcommittee. Grady C. Frank (Army), chairman. CIA member.

17 Feb 49  Committee unable to resolve charter fight -- decides to operate without charter for six months.

26 Aug 49  Monthly Intelligence Requirements List split into two sections: Recurrent List and Monthly List.

1 Nov 49  CIA agrees to draft paper allocating responsibility for COMINT research among departments.

Dec 49  Monthly Intelligence Requirements List No. 12, Recurrent Intelligence Requirements List No. 2.

17 Mar 50  Admiral Stone, Coordinator Joint Operations, replies to Intelligence Committee request on status of COMINT effort against China.
30 Mar 50  FBI Director, J. Edgar Hoover, replies to USCIB Chairman Major General Charles P. Cabell appointing an FBI representative to the Intelligence Committee.

15 May 50  Commander John Holmes (Navy), Chairman, Point-to-Point Subcommittee.

16 Jun 50  USCIB authorizes INTCOM to establish requirements which up to now had been handled sub rosa because of agreement.

Mr. T. A. Polyzoides (State) becomes Chairman.

14 Jul 50  Twentieth meeting. Current Intelligence List and Recurrent Intelligence Lists recombined into a single list called "Current Intelligence Requirements List." CIRL No. 1 effective 15 Jul 50. USSR kept priority number despite Korean conflict priorities.

Sep 50  Robert F. Packard (State) becomes Chairman.

13 Sep 50  CIA pressures Intelligence Committee for revision of Requirements List dealing with Russian traffic.

Fall 50  US COMINT representatives meet in Washington to plan collaboration in case of hostilities.

6 Oct 50  becomes CIA member.

21 Dec 50  USCIB Coordinator Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone directs Intelligence Committee study on COMINT operations and COMINT security of selected foreign nations.
10 Jan 51  Committee finally agrees with CIA establishing separate Requirements List for processing Soviet traffic. This list applicable only to product of AFSA 246.

14 Mar 51  Committee creates long range Intelligence Interest List in addition to Current Intelligence Requirements List. Intelligence Advisory Committee models Requirements List after CIWL.

11 Apr 51  Thirty-second meeting. Special steering committee created to guide AFSA 246.

18 Apr 51  Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone, Chairman, Armed Forces Security Agency Council, sends letter to service intelligence chiefs informing results

22 May 51

13 Jun 51  Colonel Horace D. Neely (USAF) becomes Chairman.

Committee approves CIA request that it and other members be charged with giving direct technical assistance and guidance to AFSA in accordance with USCIB requirements.

9 Aug 51  CIA proposes changing cover sheet of the Current Intelligence Requirements List to indicate list applies to military as well as nonmilitary requirements.
21 Aug 51  Report on foreign COMINT organizations requested in December by Admiral Stone forwarded to USCIB.

Fall 51  Major General Ralph J. Canine, USCIB Coordinator, expresses appreciation to Committee for reporting on foreign COMINT organizations.

1 Oct 51  Committee forwards first overall evaluation of COMINT to Deputy Coordinator USCIB.

11 Oct 51  AFSA proposes creating a "Joint COMINT Reading Panel" at AFSA to cut down on dissemination outside of AFSA COMINT.

16 Oct 51  AFSA reports problems in satisfying Intelligence Committee requirements and notes "reliance on the producing activity rather than on intelligence agencies for determination of handling priority."

8 Nov 51  Committee requests AFSA to do special traffic analysis study on Soviet communications as a result of CIA interest.

15 Nov 51  Commander Peter Belin, USN, replaces Vice Commander R. L. Taylor, USN.

13 Mar 52  Committee approves Foreign Trade Requirements List by CIA.

26 Mar 52  

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Committee turns down AFSA proposal on Joint COMINT Reading Panel.

Howard L. Shontong, Major, USAF, becomes Chairman USCIB Intelligence Committee.

Intelligence Committee asks Coordinator USCIB whether present requirements method is adequate: A. Current Intelligence Requirements List revised monthly. B. Appendix to CIRL revised monthly. C. Soviet Priorities List revised periodically.

Colonel Alfred R. Marcy, Chief of Staff, AFSA, gives AFSA views on intelligence requirements.

Committee approves Special Requirements List for Soviet air communications intelligence information.

Special Committee appointed to design new USCIB requirements guide for National Security Agency (new name for AFSA).

H. C. Simmons, Lt. Col., USAF, becomes Chairman USCIB Intelligence Committee.

Sixtieth meeting of USCIB Intelligence Committee.

Army requests special INTCOM consideration of Soviet problems.
4 Dec 53  Committee establishes "principles for use in jamming and intercept operations." Committee considers recommendation of the Brownell Committee that a single alerting technique for crucial COMINT items be established. CIA to present a paper.

22 Dec 53
Revised, 12 April 1968 - CIA Regulation HR 1-2d
Mission and Functions of CIA SIGNOFF Officer.

Appendix E
4. MISSION: The Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for the review and evaluation of intelligence programs and the intelligence community as a whole, representing the Program Evaluation and Review Board.

5. CIA SIGHTS: The CIA SIGHTS shall:
   (a) Advise and assist, as appropriate, the Director of Central Intelligence in the formulation, implementation, and coordination of SIGHTS policies.
   (b) Coordinate the Establishment of SIGHTS programs under consideration of national SIGHTS policies.
   (c) Provide guidance to Agency Operating Officials on the implementation of SIGHTS policies.
   (d) Conduct the CIA SIGHTS with the National Security Agency and other USIB officials in the implementation of SIGHTS policy.
   (e) Advise the Director, in consultation with appropriate CIA components, on the implications of SIGHTS on the procurement, use, security, and control of SIGHTS security program.
   (f) Perform such other functions as the Director may direct.
1. Transmitted herewith are the recommended Statement of Functions and Table of Organization for the Advisory Council, including the Special Research Center.

2. Both the Statement of Functions and the Table of Organization are considered adequate for initial operation, with the understanding that as experience is gained from actual operations both will be improved, broadened or corrected.

3. Recommend approval.

Subject: Functions and Table of Organization for the Advisory Council

MEMORANDUM

Approved for release: 2013/07/18

Entry: 13

Date: 30 August 1949

[Signature]
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF, ADVISORY COUNCIL

Chief Planning and Director of the Director in the field of Special Intelligence

As the coordinating and planning officer for the Director in the field of Special Intelligence, the Office of the Chief, Advisory Council, is responsible for the coordination, production, dissemination, and utilization of all Special Intelligence within the Office of the Chief, Advisory Council.

1. Establishes and maintains liaison with all agencies outside CIA.
2. Establishes and maintains liaison for Special Intelligence with other agencies.
3. Represents the Director on Special Intelligence Boards and Committees.
4. Provides the formulation and implementation of policy relating to Special Intelligence.
5. Assures the compliance with Special Intelligence policy and the sharing of information.
6. Through liaison and inspection, keeps constantly informed of current and potential developments in Special Intelligence activities, including field activities.
7. Assures the compliance with Special Intelligence policy and the sharing of information.
8. Assures the compliance with Special Intelligence policy and the sharing of information.
9. Assures the compliance with Special Intelligence policy and the sharing of information.

Office of the Chief, Special Research Center

Under the direction of the Chief, Advisory Council:

1. Coordinates and directs the Special Intelligence activities of the groups assigned to the Center from the offices of CIA, DOD, OIC, or OIC.
2. Coordinates and directs the Special Intelligence activities of the groups assigned to the Center from the offices of CIA, DOD, OIC, or OIC.
6. Maintain a "clearing house" for Special Intelligence requirements from other agencies and ensure that either
type or memorandum.

7. Process Contingency requirements for collateral material.

The above is endorsed in:

APPROVED: SEP 8 1959

C.L. WINGROFF
Captain, USN
Executive

Chief, Advisory Council
National Security Council,

the Secretary of Defense before presenting it to the
Department, the Board shall present the problem to
among the Department heads of the National
Cabinet. Provided that, when an application is not present
the matter for resolution to the National Security
Board, when an application cannot be resolved, the board will promptly
when the chairperson shall be excused by majority vote.
that the chairperson shall be excused by majority vote.

4. Decisions of the board will be based on the
powers to act.

By at least one member, or attendance, with the necessary
department or agency will be represented at each meeting
the Tweet of Communications Intelligence, and each member
the board, or at least two.

The board, or at least two, will be represented, or at least two,
representative of the representative agencies.

2. The board will be composed of at least two
members from each of the participating departments or agencies:

3. The board shall also meet at least once a month,

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CONTENDENTIAL

5. Decisions and policies promulgated by the board

6. The special nature of communications intelligence as required by the

7. The board shall act for the National Security

8. Other National Security Council Intelligence

9. The board will perform such functions as may

10. The board shall leave the Internet administration

11. Activities to the member departments or agencies.

12. National Security Council Intelligence

13. As provided in paragraph 4, communications intelligence activities shall be

14. The board upon such directive, the proposed directive,

15. Decision to the collection, production, security, and management of

16. Authorities represented on the board,

17. So sacred and revered by the member departments and agencies,

18. Activities to the extent, extent of communications intelligence as

19. Activities as required by the Board of

20. Surveillance, or by the President, and shall be promulgated by

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22. In the exercise of responsibilities and authorities represented on

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25. Communications Intelligence activities are Council and any others

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c. "Communications Involving Activities of interest Sources in the conduct of the production of information from such Communications, for intelligence purposes, or for other purposes involved in the collection, Communication and expansion of these matters, and the security of the sources.

Communications Involving Board.

Communications Involving Authority and Responsibility of the United States Communications Intelligence Sources shall be communicated to the Communications Intelligence Board, in whole or in part, on communications produced by the study of foreign communications. "Communications Intelligence Involves the Sources of the material, political, significant or economic from a foreign country which may concern the communication and related materials, and the Communications Intelligence Board, after the investigation of the material, may require or require other actions or actions to be taken to this end, including the preparation of a report, and the submission of a report to the President."

A. Foreign Communications "include all communications that are not a matter of foreign intelligence."

12. Determinations, For purposes of this directive and subsequent directives of the Board, the relevant Communications Intelligence Board, the State-Party Communication Intelligence Network, and the relevant communications networks, including all currently effective decisions and policies,

COMBINED

Approved for Release: 2013/07/18
December 29, 1952

SECRET

Intelligence Board (NSICB)

1. Directive to the United States Communications Intelligence

COMMIT hereby authorizes and directs that:

The Special Committee of the National Security Council for

(COMMIT) information:

a. Further designates the Department of Defense as the Department of Defense

b. Designates the Secretaries of State and Defense

c. Authorizes the Secretaries and Officials

do. Designates the Secretaries of the executive agencies and officials

e. Stated that the communications intelligence

2. Presidential directive approved October 24, 1952, which

the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and to the

purposes of Section 101 and Section 102 of

Communications Intelligence


COP Y

SECRET

November 1, 1952

NSCID 9

Approved for Release: 2013/07/18

11:17:219
b. The Board shall be composed of the following members:

1. The Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be Chairman of the Board.
2. A representative of the Secretary of State.
3. A representative of the Secretary of Defense.
5. The Director of the National Security Agency (NSA).
6. A representative of the Department of the Army.
7. A representative of the Department of the Navy.

The Board shall have a staff headed by an executive secretary who shall be appointed by the Chairman with the approval of the majority of the Board.

c. It shall be the duty of the Board to advise and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, in accordance with the following procedure, with respect to any matter relating to communications intelligence which falls within the jurisdiction of the Director of NSA.

d. The Board shall reach its decision by a majority vote. Each member of the Board shall have one vote, except the representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and of the Central Intelligence Agency who shall each have two votes. The Chairman, as Chairman, shall have a tie-breaking vote.
will have no vote. In the event that the Board votes and reaches a decision, any dissenting member of the Board may appeal from such decision within 7 days to the Special Committee. If the Board votes but fails to reach a decision, any member of the Board may appeal within 7 days to the Special Committee. If either event the Special Committee shall review the matter, and its determination thereon shall be final. Appeals by the Director of NSA and/or the representative of the Military Departments shall only be filed with the approval of the Secretary of Defense.

(2) If any matter is voted on by the Board, but no decision is reached and any member files an appeal:

(a) a decision is reached in which the representative of the Secretary of Defense does not concur and files an appeal;

(b) a decision is reached in which the subject matter is taken with respect to the subject matter until the appeal is decided, provided that if the Secretary of Defense determines, after consultation with the Secretary of State, that the subject matter presents a problem of an emergency nature and requires immediate action, his decision shall govern, pending the result of the appeal. In such an emergency situation the appeal may be taken directly to the President.

(3) Recommendations of the Board adopted in accordance with the foregoing procedures shall be binding on the Secretary of Defense. Except on matters which have been voted on by the Board, the Director of NSA shall discharge his responsibilities in accordance with his own judgment, subject to the direction of the Secretary of Defense.
determine the own procedures.

The Board will meet monthly, or sooner at

The Call of the Chairman or any member, and shall

If necessary, quorum all, of the members of the Board, recommended approved by a

be present on all departments or agencies of the Governing Board, to transmit

the members described in Paragraph 2 above shall

recommendation of the Board, with respect to

Any recommendation of the Board with respect to


(3) To consider and make recommendations


(2) To initiate, to formulate policies


(1) To coordinate the communications

matter not falling within the jurisdiction of NSA.

2. It shall also be the duty of the Board as to

advance of their adoption by him.

Before any new major policy or program

is submitted to the Board, either orally or in writing, the

Director of NSA shall make such re-

SECRET INFORMATION

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

December 29, 1992

REvised

NSCID 9

2013/07/18

01175219
See Public Law 513, 87th Congress, 1952.

On January 1, 1952, the NSA was created as the directorate of the National Security Agency. The director of the intelligence community (DCI) had been the top intelligence official, and the director of central intelligence (DCI) had been the top intelligence official in the United States. The NSA was created to replace the DCI and to serve as the focal point for the collection and production of intelligence information. The NSA was charged with the responsibility of collecting, processing, and disseminating intelligence information to the various intelligence agencies and the President. The NSA was also charged with the responsibility of providing intelligence information to the President and the National Security Council. The NSA was also charged with the responsibility of providing intelligence information to the various intelligence agencies and the President.
Top Secret

Security Information

Approved for Release: 2013/01/11

December 29, 1952

Revised

NSC 9

TOP SECRET

1. The President's National Security Council shall provide for, through the National Security Council's Office, the coordination necessary to assure the implementation of policies and programs, including the national security strategy, as required by this National Security Directive. All policies and programs shall be consistent with the overall objectives of the national security strategy. The National Security Council's Office shall coordinate with the departments and agencies concerned to assure the effective implementation of the strategy. The National Security Council's Office shall also coordinate with the departments and agencies concerned to assure the effective implementation of the strategy. The National Security Council's Office shall also coordinate with the departments and agencies concerned to assure the effective implementation of the strategy. The National Security Council's Office shall also coordinate with the departments and agencies concerned to assure the effective implementation of the strategy.

2. The Director of Central Intelligence shall provide for, through the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, the coordination of programs and policies as required by this National Security Directive. All policies and programs shall be consistent with the overall objectives of the national security strategy. The Office of the Director of Central Intelligence shall coordinate with the departments and agencies concerned to assure the effective implementation of the strategy. The Office of the Director of Central Intelligence shall also coordinate with the departments and agencies concerned to assure the effective implementation of the strategy. The Office of the Director of Central Intelligence shall also coordinate with the departments and agencies concerned to assure the effective implementation of the strategy. The Office of the Director of Central Intelligence shall also coordinate with the departments and agencies concerned to assure the effective implementation of the strategy.
3. The special nature of COMINT activities requires that they be treated in all respects as being outside the framework of other or general intelligence activities. Orders, directives, policies, or recommendations of any authority of the Executive Branch relating to the collection, production, handling, dissemination, or utilization of intelligence, security, or classified material, shall not be applicable to COMINT activities, unless specifically so stated and issued by competent executive branch agency authority represented on the Board. Other National Security Council Intelligence Directives issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and related implementing directives issued by the Director of Central Intelligence, unless the National Security Council has made its directive specifically applicable to COMINT.

4. Nothing in this directive shall be construed to encroach upon or interfere with the unique responsibilities of the National Security Council in the field of internal security.
Appendix J

NSCID No. 6 (New Series), 15 September 1958
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTIVE NO. 6

COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONICS
INTELLIGENCE

(Effective 15 September 1958)

1. Communications Intelligence (COMINT) and Electronics Intelligence (ELINT) and the activities pertaining thereto (as defined in paragraph 8 of this directive) are national responsibilities whose importance to national security requires an organization and management which will:
   a. Exploit to the maximum the available resources in all participating departments and agencies to satisfy legitimate requirements for foreign intelligence relating to the national security, including those of the departments and agencies concerned;
   b. Provide for efficiency and economy in the use of technical resources; and
   c. Ensure the necessary degree of protection.

Therefore, pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the National Security Council authorizes and directs that COMINT and the COMINT activities of the United States, as well as ELINT and ELINT activities, shall be conducted as prescribed herein. COMINT and ELINT and their associated activities shall be treated as being within the framework of general intelligence activities except as otherwise established under this directive.

2. Only those departments or agencies represented on the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB) are authorized to engage in COMINT or ELINT activities and only in accordance with the provisions of this directive, except that only the Secretary of Defense shall exercise or delegate this authority within the Department of Defense.

3. Definitions

For the purpose of this directive, the terms "Communications Intelligence" or "COMINT" shall be construed to mean technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communications by other than the intended recipients.

COMINT activities shall be construed to mean those activities which produce COMINT by the interception and processing of foreign communications passed by radio, wire, or other electromagnetic means, with specific exception stated below, and by the processing of foreign encrypted communications, however transmitted. Interception comprises search, intercept, and direction finding. Processing comprises range estimation, transmitter/operator identification, signal analysis, traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, decryption, study of plain text, the fusion of these processes, and the reporting of results.

*This Directive supersedes NSCID No. 9, revised 29 December 1952, and NSCID No. 17, dated 10 May 1955.

Page 1 Revised 18 January 1961

Approved for Release: 2013/07/18
COMINT and COMINT activities as defined herein shall not include (a) any intercept and processing of unencrypted written communications, press and propaganda broadcasts, or (b) censorship.

ELINT activities are defined as the collection (observation and recording), and the technical processing for subsequent intelligence purposes, of information derived from foreign, non-communications, electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than atomic detonation or radioactive sources. ELINT is the technical and intelligence-information product of ELINT activities.

4. The United States Intelligence Board (USIB)
In addition to its responsibility as set forth in paragraph 2 of NSCID No. 1, the United States Intelligence Board shall:

a. Study, in connection with its responsibilities for communications intelligence security, the standards and practices of the departments and agencies in utilizing and protecting COMINT; and establish procedures whereby departments and agencies not members of the U.S. Intelligence Board are enabled to receive and utilize COMINT.

b. Determine the degree and type of security protection to be given COMINT activities through the protection of information about them or derived from them; taking into full account that different levels of sensitivity obtain and applying balanced judgment between the need for exploitation of the COMINT produced and the need to protect the specific producing activity or activities. Procedures for special handling will include treatment of the information in its initial stages and also as it may be included in finished intelligence.

c. Determine the degree and type of security protection to be given ELINT activities through the protection of information about them or derived from them. Special COMINT security standards and procedures generally shall not apply to ELINT and ELINT activities.

5. The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Defense is designated as executive agent of the Government for the conduct of COMINT and ELINT activities in accordance with the provisions of this directive and for the maintenance and operation of the National Security Agency.

a. The Secretary of Defense may determine, after consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence that a COMINT or ELINT matter forwarded by the U.S. Intelligence Board to the National Security Council for decision presents a problem of an emergency nature and requires immediate action. His action will be implemented and will govern, pending a decision by the National Security Council.

b. The responsibility to conduct those ELINT collection and processing activities which the Secretary of Defense determines are essential to provide direct support to commanders who plan and conduct military operations, will be delegated by the Secretary of Defense to those commanders, or to the cryptologic agencies which support them.
c. The Secretary of Defense may delegate in whole or part authority over the Director of NSA within his department as he sees fit.

6. The National Security Agency

a. The COMINT and ELINT missions of the National Security Agency (NSA) shall be to provide an effective unified organization and control of the (1) COMINT and (2) ELINT intercept and processing activities of the United States, to provide for integrated operational policies and procedures pertaining thereto and to produce COMINT information and ELINT information in accordance with objectives, requirements and priorities established by the U.S. Intelligence Board.

b. NSA shall be administered by a Director, designated by the Secretary of Defense after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose appointment shall be for a term of four years. The Director shall be a career commissioned officer of the armed services on active or reactivated status, and shall enjoy at least 3-star rank during the period of his incumbency. The Director shall have a civilian Deputy.

7. The Director, National Security Agency

a. The Director of NSA shall be responsible for accomplishing the mission of NSA. For this purpose all COMINT and ELINT intercept and processing activities of the United States are placed under his operational and technical control. When action by the Chiefs of the operating agencies of the Services or civilian departments or agencies is required, the Director shall normally issue instructions pertaining to COMINT and ELINT operations through them. However, because of the unique technical character of COMINT and ELINT operations, the Director is authorized to issue direct to any operating elements under his operational control task assignments and pertinent instructions which are within the capacity of such elements to accomplish. He shall also have direct access to, and direct communication with, any elements of the Service or civilian COMINT or ELINT agencies on any other matters of operational and technical control as may be necessary, and he is authorized to obtain such information and intelligence material from them as he may require. All instructions issued by the Director under the authority provided in this paragraph shall be mandatory, subject only to appeal to the Secretary of Defense by the Chief of Service or head of civilian department or agency concerned.

b. Specific responsibilities of the Director of NSA include the following:

   (1) Formulating necessary operational plans and policies.
   (2) Conducting research and development to meet the needs of NSA and the departments and agencies which are engaged in COMINT or ELINT activities; and coordinating the related research and development conducted by such departments and agencies.
   (3) Determining and submitting to the authorities responsible for logistic support for NSA, requirements together with specific recommendations as to what each of the responsible departments and agencies of the Government should supply.
(4) Within NSA's field of authorized operations prescribing requisite security regulations covering operating practices, including the transmission, handling and distribution of COMINT material within and among the COMINT elements under his operational or technical control; and exercising the necessary monitoring and supervisory control, including inspections if necessary, to ensure compliance with the regulations.

(5) Making such reports and furnishing such information from time to time to the Board, either orally or in writing, as the Board may request, and bringing to the attention of the Board either in such reports or otherwise any new major policies or programs in advance of their adoption by him.

(6) Except on matters which have been decided by the Board, the Director of NSA shall discharge his responsibilities in accordance with his own judgment, subject to the direction of the Secretary of Defense.

c. To the extent he deems feasible and in consonance with the aims of maximum over-all efficiency, economy, and effectiveness, the Director shall centralize or consolidate the performance of COMINT and ELINT functions for which he is responsible. It is recognized that the Armed Forces and other departments and agencies being served require direct COMINT and ELINT support of various kinds. In providing this support, operational control of specified COMINT and ELINT facilities and resources will at times be delegated by the Director, for such periods and for such tasks as are determined by him, to an appropriate agent. Each member department or agency is responsible for stating to the Director, NSA its requirements for direct support.

d. The Director shall make provision for participation by representatives of each of the Board members in those offices of NSA where the Director, NSA establishes priorities of intercept and processing.

e. It is the intent of this directive that NSA not engage in the production and dissemination of finished intelligence, as distinguished from intelligence information. The production and dissemination of finished intelligence are the responsibilities of departments and agencies other than NSA.

8. The Director of Central Intelligence

a. COMINT and ELINT arrangements with foreign governments shall be conducted in accordance with the policies established by USIB.

b. Other provisions of this directive are not applicable to those intercept and processing activities (other than cryptanalysis) undertaken under the authority of NSCID No. 5, whether by the Central
Intelligence Agency or by the military departments, which are specifically excepted by the Director of Central Intelligence. However, to the extent practicable, information pertaining to these activities and derived therefrom shall at all times be handled as to give suitable protection to related COMINT activities or COMINT activities in general. Material which may be collected under these circumstances and which otherwise would have been considered the product of COMINT or ELINT activities will be passed to the National Security Agency to the extent desired by the Director, NSA, as soon as special security requirements of the collector have been satisfied.

9. The Military Departments. The Military Departments shall be responsible for:

a. The establishment, maintenance, operation and administration of COMINT and ELINT intercept and processing facilities as authorized and directed by the Secretary of Defense.

b. The conduct of those intercept and processing activities (other than cryptanalysis) undertaken under the authority of NSCID No. 5 as specifically excepted from other provisions of this directive (NSCID No. 6) by the Director of Central Intelligence. However, to the extent practicable, information pertaining to these activities and derived therefrom shall at all times be handled as to give suitable protection to related COMINT activities or COMINT activities in general. Material which may be collected under these circumstances and which otherwise would have been considered the product of COMINT or ELINT activities will be passed to the National Security Agency to the extent desired by the Director, NSA, as soon as special security requirements of the collector have been satisfied.

c. The conduct, outside the scope of paragraphs 6 and 7 of this directive, of such search, intercept, direction finding, range estimation, and signal analysis of communications and non-communications electromagnetic radiations as must be undertaken to permit immediate operational use of the information in support of electronic measures and countermeasures and rescue operations.

10. The Federal Bureau of Investigation. Nothing in this directive shall be construed to encroach upon or interfere with the unique responsibilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the field of internal security, including such intercept and processing activities as may be undertaken by the FBI in connection with its functions.
Appendix K

NSCID No. 1 (New Series), 4 March 1964
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE

DIRECTIVE NO. 1

BASIC DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

(Revised 4 March 1961)

The intelligence effort of the United States is a national responsibility, and must be so organized and managed as to exploit to the maximum the available resources of the Government and to satisfy the intelligence requirements of the National Security Council and of the departments and agencies of the Government. For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security and pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:

1. **Over-all Coordination**

The Director of Central Intelligence shall coordinate the foreign intelligence activities of the United States in accordance with existing law and applicable National Security Council directives. Such coordination shall include both special and other forms of intelligence which together constitute the foreign intelligence activities of the United States.

2. **The United States Intelligence Board (USIB)**

a. To maintain the relationship necessary for a fully coordinated intelligence community, and to provide for a more effective integration of and guidance to the national intelligence effort, a United States Intelligence Board (USIB) is hereby established under the directives of the National Security Council and under the chairmanship of the Director of Central Intelligence. The Board shall advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence as he may require in the discharge of his statutory responsibilities and pursuant to paragraph 1 above. Subject to other established responsibilities under existing law and to the provisions of National Security Council directives, the Board shall also:

   (1) Establish policies and develop programs for the guidance of all departments and agencies concerned.

   (2) Establish appropriate intelligence objectives, requirements and priorities.

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2 The intelligence community includes the Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence components of the Departments of State, Defense (Defense Intelligence Agency, Army, Navy, and Air Force), National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Atomic Energy Commission. Other components of the departments and agencies of the Government are included to the extent of their agreed participation in regularly established interdepartmental intelligence activities.
(3) Review and report to the National Security Council on the overall foreign-intelligence effort as a whole.

(4) Make recommendations on foreign-intelligence matters to appropriate United States officials, including particularly recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on intelligence matters within the jurisdiction of the Director of the National Security Agency.

(5) Develop and review security standards and practices as they relate to the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.

(6) Formulate, as appropriate, policies with respect to arrangements with foreign governments on intelligence matters.

b. The membership of the U.S. Intelligence Board shall consist of the following:

(1) The Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman.

(2) The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.

(3) The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.

(4) The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.

(5) The Director, National Security Agency.


(7) A representative of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The Director of Central Intelligence, as Chairman, shall invite the chief of any other department or agency having functions related to the national security to sit with the U.S. Intelligence Board whenever matters within the purview of his department or agency are to be discussed.

c. The Board shall determine its own procedures and shall establish subordinate committees and working groups, as appropriate. It shall be provided with a Secretariat staff, which shall be under the direction of an Executive Secretary appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with the members of the Board.

d. The U.S. Intelligence Board shall reach its decisions by agreement. When the Chairman determines that a given position on a matter under consideration represents the consensus of the Board it shall be considered as agreed unless a dissenting member requests that the issue be referred to the National Security Council. Upon such request, the Director of Central Intelligence, as Chairman, shall refer the matter, together with the dissenting brief, to the National Security Council for decision.

Provided: That such appeals to the National Security Council by the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency or the Director, National Security Agency, shall be taken only after review by the Secretary of Defense.
Whenever matters of concern to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and/or the Atomic Energy Commission are referred to the National Security Council, the Attorney General and/or the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission respectively, shall sit with the Council. The Board may recommend through its Chairman that a sensitive intelligence matter requiring the attention of higher authority be dealt with by the Council in a restricted meeting, including only those officials who have substantive interest in the matter, or directly by the President.

e. Decisions and recommendations of the Board shall, as appropriate, be transmitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, as Chairman, to the departments or agencies concerned, or to the National Security Council when higher approval is required, or for information.

f. In making recommendations to the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security, the Director of Central Intelligence, as Chairman, shall transmit therewith a statement indicating the concurrence or non-concurring views of those members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concerned. Such recommendations when approved by the National Security Council shall, as appropriate, be issued as National Security Council Intelligence Directives or as other Council directives and, as applicable, shall be promulgated and implemented by the departments and agencies of the Government.

g. Decisions of the Board arrived at under the authority and procedures of this paragraph shall be binding, as applicable, on all departments and agencies of the Government.

3. The Director of Central Intelligence

a. The Director of Central Intelligence shall act for the National Security Council to provide for detailed implementation of National Security Council Intelligence Directives by issuing with the concurrence of the U.S. Intelligence Board such supplementary Director of Central Intelligence Directives as may be required (see par. 2d above). Such directives shall, as applicable, be promulgated and implemented within the normal command channels of the departments and agencies concerned.

b. Director of Central Intelligence Directives to be issued in accordance with the provisions of sub-paragraph a above shall include:

(1) General guidance and the establishment of specific priorities for the production of national and other intelligence and for collection and other activities in support thereof, including: (a) establishment of comprehensive National Intelligence Objectives generally applicable to foreign countries and areas; (b) identification from time to time, and on a current basis, of Priority National Intelligence Objectives with reference to specific countries and subjects; and (c) issuance of such comprehensive and priority objectives, for general intelligence guidance, and their formal transmission to the National Security Council.
(2) Establishment of policy, procedures, and practices for the maintenance, by the individual components of the intelligence community, of a continuing interchange of intelligence, intelligence information, and other information with utility for intelligence purposes.

(3) Establishment of policy, procedures, and practices for the production or procurement, by the individual components of the intelligence community within the limits of their capabilities, of such intelligence, intelligence information and other information with utility for intelligence purposes relating to the national security, as may be requested by one of the departments or agencies.

c. The Director of Central Intelligence, or representatives designated by him, in consultation with the head of the intelligence or other appropriate component of the department or agency concerned, shall make such surveys of departmental intelligence activities of the various departments and agencies as he may deem necessary in connection with his duty to advise the National Security Council and to coordinate the intelligence effort of the United States.

4. National Intelligence

a. National Intelligence is that intelligence which is required for the formulation of national security policy, concerns more than one department or agency, and transcends the exclusive competence of a single department or agency. The Director of Central Intelligence shall produce national intelligence with the support of the U.S. Intelligence Board. Intelligence so produced shall have the concurrence, as appropriate, of the members of the U.S. Intelligence Board or shall carry a statement of any substantially differing opinion of such a member or of the Intelligence Chief of a Military Department.

b. Departmental intelligence is that intelligence which any department or agency requires to execute its own mission.

c. Interdepartmental intelligence is integrated departmental intelligence which is required by departments and agencies of the Government for the execution of their missions, but which transcends the exclusive competence of a single department or agency to produce. The subcommittee structure of the U.S. Intelligence Board may be utilized for the production and dissemination of interdepartmental intelligence.

d. The Director of Central Intelligence shall disseminate national intelligence to the President, members of the National Security Council, as appropriate, members of the U.S. Intelligence Board and, subject to existing statutes, to such other components of the Government as the National Security Council may from time to time designate or the U.S. Intelligence Board may recommend. He is further authorized to disseminate national intelligence and interdepartmental intelli-

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3 By "produce" is meant "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security" as provided in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, Section 102 (d) (3).
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intelligence produced within the U.S. Intelligence Board structure on a strictly controlled basis to foreign governments and international bodies upon his determination, with the concurrence of the U.S. Intelligence Board, that such action would substantially promote the security of the United States: Provided, That such dissemination is consistent with existing statutes and Presidential policy including that reflected in international agreements; and provided further that any disclosure of FBI intelligence information shall be cleared with that agency prior to dissemination. Departmental intelligence and interdepartmental intelligence produced outside the U.S. Intelligence Board subcommittee structure may be disseminated in accordance with existing statutes and Presidential policy including that reflected in international agreements.

c. Whenever any member of the U.S. Intelligence Board obtains information which indicates an impending crisis situation which affects the security of the United States to such an extent that immediate action or decision by the President or the National Security Council may be required, he shall immediately transmit the information to the Director of Central Intelligence and the other members of the U.S. Intelligence Board as well as to the National Indications Center and to other officials or agencies as may be indicated by the circumstances. The Director of Central Intelligence shall, in consultation with the U.S. Intelligence Board, immediately prepare and disseminate as appropriate the national intelligence estimate of the situation, in accordance with the procedures outlined above.

5. Protection of Intelligence and of Intelligence Sources and Methods

The Director of Central Intelligence, with the assistance and support of the members of the U.S. Intelligence Board, shall ensure the development of policies and procedures for the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Each department and agency, however, shall remain responsible for the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods within its own organization. Each shall also establish appropriate internal policies and procedures to prevent the unauthorized disclosure from within that agency of intelligence information or activity. The Director of Central Intelligence shall call upon the departments and agencies, as appropriate, to investigate within their department or agency any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence or of intelligence sources or methods. A report of these investigations, including corrective measures taken or recommended within the departments and agencies involved, shall be transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence for review and such further action as may be appropriate, including reports to the National Security Council or the President.

6. Community Responsibilities

a. In implementation of, and in conformity with, approved National Security Council policy, the Director of Central Intelligence in con-
...tion with and supported by the other members of the U.S. Intelligence Board and by other appropriate offices, shall:

(a) Call upon the other departments and agencies as appropriate to ensure that on intelligence matters affecting the national security the intelligence community is supported by the full knowledge and technical talent available to or to the Government;

(2) Ensure that the pertinence, extent and quality of the available foreign intelligence and intelligence information relating to the national security is continually reviewed as a basis for improving the quality of intelligence and the correction of deficiencies;

(3) Take appropriate measures to facilitate the coordinated development of compatible referencing systems within the departments and agencies engaged in foreign intelligence activities. Central reference facilities as a service of common concern shall be provided by the Central Intelligence Agency and/or other departments and agencies, as appropriate; and

(4) Make arrangements with the departments and agencies for the assignment to, or exchange with, the Central Intelligence Agency of such experienced and qualified personnel as may be of advantage for advisory, operational, or other purposes. In order to facilitate the performance of their respective intelligence missions, the departments and agencies concerned shall, by agreement, provide each other with such mutual assistance as may be within their capabilities and as may be required in the interests of the intelligence community for reasons of economy, efficiency, or operational necessity. In this connection primary departmental interests shall be recognized and shall receive mutual cooperation and support.

b. In so far as practicable, in the fulfillment of their respective responsibilities for the production of intelligence, the several departments and agencies shall not duplicate the intelligence activities and research of other departments and agencies and shall make full use of existing capabilities of the other elements of the intelligence community.

c. The departments and agencies of the Government shall establish appropriate policies and procedures to control and limit undesirable publicity relating to intelligence activities.
Appendix L

Approved for Release: 2013/07/18
Appendix M

Total Numbers of CIA COMINT
Cleared Persons, by Year
1950-70
Appendix M

Total Numbers of CIA COMINT Cleared Persons, by Year
1950-70
Appendix N

Maps

1. SIGINT Resources (Western Hemisphere), 31 March 1970
2. SIGINT Resources (Europe, Africa, Middle East), 31 March 1970
3. SIGINT Resources (Far East), 31 March 1970
The DCI Historical Series

The History of SIGINT in the Central Intelligence Agency, 1947-70

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THE HISTORY OF SIGINT IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 1947-70
SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT

by

October 1971

EDWARD W. PROCTOR
CIA SIGINT Officer

HISTORICAL STAFF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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The dominant problem of the entire period covered by this history is Russian communications. The work on the problem began before the end of World War II on a small scale.
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