Issue 1: What further measures should the US undertake to support the political reconciliation process? And, how should the US approach the Somalia mandate renewal?

Interclan fighting is on the rise and the March 24 Nairobi agreement signed by Aideed and Ali Mahdi is unraveling. If this trend continues, political reconciliation will be impossible, and the UN will have to consider terminating the UNOSOM operation.

UNOSOM II mandates ends on May 31st. Regional and National Peace talks, scheduled in the Nairobi Accord for April 8 and 15, have slipped to May 15 and 30 respectively.

The best chance that the UN has of forcing the Somali factions into brokering a durable peace agreement rests on the threat of terminating all UN activities in Somalia, especially economic and administrative assistance. The faction leaders must be made to understand the UN's patience is wearing thin.

The possibility that we will recommend to the UN that the mandate not be extended if the factions do not conclude an agreement on new Somali national leadership by the end of May. Conversely, we have told them that if they succeed in this endeavor, we will recommend continued UN involvement to March of 1995. Acting SRSG Kouyaté has passed the same message.

Possible steps for putting further pressure on the Somali factions include:

- Send Ambassador [Name] or another envoy to the region to reinforce our warning about terminating the UN mandate;

- Provide Ambassador [Name] with a Presidential or SecState message;

- Issue a public declaration of our intent to recommend UNOSOM withdrawal from Somalia by some end date;

- Encourage troop contributors and other Security Council members to send similar warning signals to Somali factions;

- Suggest regional leaders to re-engage in the process and similar warning signals; and

- Recommend the UN make an early public statement of its intent to withdraw from Somalia if progress is not made.
Amb. Bogosian or Oakley or some other senior official could visit the region and key contributing states to build consensus and subsequently issue a coordinated threat to end UNOSOM and its associated aid programs.

One or more troop contributors will likely depart around 31 May. Their departure could trigger the withdrawal of all the other contingents. If the Somalis cannot achieve a workable peace, it is better for UNOSOM to withdraw as a conscious act of policy, in a planned and deliberate fashion. A withdrawal would demonstrate that peacekeeping is the responsibility of the conflicted parties as well as the UN.

Fact-finders recognize that a quick departure of UNOSOM would likely cause the country to return quickly to chaos. Public declarations by the UN or USG warning the factions leaders to perform by a certain date may increase the credibility of the threat. It will also prepare the public for the possibility that the UN may terminate UNOSOM soon. We must, however, be willing to treat any threat we issue.

Early termination of UNOSOM could result in a return of the conflict prior to the US involvement. In addition to the calamity that would mean for the Somali people, the US and the UN would be criticized for a wasted and costly intervention. African states would view the departure as yet another indication of the developed-world walking away from Africa. Keeping and then reducing future emergency humanitarian assistance in similar circumstances would suffer a setback.

The possibilities for dealing with the mandate as the renewal date of 31 May draws closer include:

--Renewal of the mandate for three or six months, depending on the extent of tangible progress;

--Termination on 31 May in the absence of significant political progress and restoration of order;

--A six week extension, combined with a statement of intent to review at that time with a view to terminating in the absence of significant progress;

--Either of the preceding two combined with a call by the UNSC for the SYG to develop an option for a limited residual force to protect a down sized political and humanitarian relief program.

Issue 2: What kind of security should the US Liaison Office (USLO) have after June 30?

Fifty US Marines are now protecting the USLO. Their departure is now scheduled for 30 June.

The Department of State has decided on a security arrangement for the period after the Marines depart. It calls for US
personnel to train a Somali diplomatic protection police to provide exterior security. The interior would be protected by 12 Marines and 6 security officers from the State Department. The Department of State requests that the fifty Marines be continued on until October or December, by which time the Somali force would have been recruited and trained. DOD has declined the request for extension.

Thus, the alternatives include:

--The State Department proposal outlined above;

--Having the Marines leave on schedule and requiring the State Department to contract for a private security service (with American or foreign personnel) for six months until the Somali force is trained;

--Seeking an exterior protection arrangement from a UNOSOM contingent, possibly involving direct or indirect compensation from the US;

--Closing USLO.

Were the State Department proposal to be adopted and the fifty Marines to be extended for six months, there is the additional question of what department would pay for their presence. Currently, DOD pays for most of the cost of the fifty Marines. The Department of State has declined to pay for the Marines, were their assignment to be extended.

Issue 3: UNOSOM assistance in an emergency evacuation scenario from Somalia, if so how?

UNOSOM has been putting together a plan in the field for an emergency evacuation since February. General Aboo, Ambassador Kouyate, and Kofi Annan have been working and coordinating with the UN's New York office to review this document in New York when it has been completed and reviewed by all the appropriate State and Defense. It is important to have an UN plan so that we can coordinate our own evacuation plans, since any emergency evacuation by the UN would have to be simultaneous US withdrawal.

While we have pressed the UN repeatedly for their plan, we have yet to see it. We have been told by Kouyate that it is a high priority, but it has not yet been sent to New York. We will continue in New York and Mogadishu to urge completion of the plan.

Without reviewing the UN plan and coordinating our plan with it, we risk US casualties in a chaotic mass evacuation scenario. That said, the UN may simply be incapable of such planning without US help. Offering US help in the planning process may encourage completion of the UN planning, however. The offer would beg the question of what role the US is prepared to play in assisting the UN evacuation beyond pulling out US nationals.
Administration lawyers believe that the Byrd Amendment does not allow US military assistance to the UN even in an evacuation scenario. Contract civilian air and sea lift are possible, but not with DOD funds. The law, however, could be changed in an emergency by Congress, through consultations, could allow the Administration to interpret the law to exclude emergency evacuation from the Byrd Amendment prohibitions. The President could also assert that the Byrd Amendment is an unconstitutional restriction on his authority.

Among the questions the Deputies should address are:

-- do we wish to give CENTCOM guidance to prepare a contingency plan for assisting the UN in an evacuation?

-- do we wish to preconsult with some Members of Congress on what they would view would be in case this contingency arose?

Issue 4: How should the US respond to the recent UN requests for personnel for the UNOSOM staff?

The UN has requested the US to fill several important positions on the UNOSOM staff: head of the Development Office, head of the Disarmament, Demining, and Demobilization (D-3) Division, section head of the Judicial Section of the Justice Division, and a political officer in the political division. The Development Office and the political officer are replacements.

The Development Office is a UNDP entity and will run the several hundred million dollar economic rehabilitation program. The D-3 Division, along with the police effort, is key to improving security and has yet to undertake any serious work beyond demining. The Judicial Section of the Justice Division is responsible for assisting in the selection, training and placement of judges, as well as reviewing and revising the penal code. The preceding three positions would be senior level advisors in the UNOSOM structure. The political officer would work as part of the political section. All four of these positions would allow the US and USLO important influence in UNOSOM without a great deal of visibility.
Without an influx of new personnel, UNOSOM will continue to fumble and fail to complete key tasks. Finding personnel for the UNOSOM staff has been a major UN weakness which has been repeatedly noted by every US visitor to Mogadishu. US personnel may not resolve UNOSOM's problem, but a US contribution will help and could encourage others. Given the US military disengagement, however, to what extent do we wish to remain engaged on the civilian side. If we are prepared in-principle to provide personnel for these positions, we may have to assign agencies responsibility for finding candidates to ensure assignments in a timely fashion.