This paper considers three options for bringing humanitarian assistance to the victims of the conflict in Rwanda. After describing the options, the paper assesses whether they meet or do not meet the guidelines in PDD 25, and then sets forth the resources available from the U.S. Note: In a letter to UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, OAU Secretary General Salim Salim said that his organization would not take the lead in providing forces for a peace operation in Rwanda.

Briefly, the options are:

1. A UN-proposed military operation based out of Kigali to assure the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Rwanda.

2. A cross-border military operation to secure zones in Rwanda to protect and care for those at risk.

3. A humanitarian operation, without the use of force, to assist Rwandan refugees in the border areas outside Rwanda.

I. The Kigali based option

The UN is proposing a UN peacekeeping operation based out of Kigali. UNAMIR Commander Dallaire is asking for a force of 5,000 to 8,000 troops, with a mandate to use force as necessary to assure delivery of humanitarian assistance and to protect persons in threatened enclaves, by, for example, breaking through roadblocks manned by hoodlums and disarming roving gangs. Dallaire believes this can be done under Chapter VI authority. He has requested 150 M-113 armored personnel carriers to protect his troops. The UN is asking for contributions to a special fund of $50-70 million. We estimate the total cost would be a minimum of $150-200 million per year to equip, transport and sustain these units.

II. The cross border option with force

The second option would be a military operation to
establish secure zones in Rwanda for the protection of persons at risk and for the delivery of humanitarian relief. Humanitarian assistance would be stored in neighboring countries and transported into the secure zones. The mission would defend the zones' perimeters against incursions and, within the zones, enforce security, disarm civilians and escort humanitarian assistance shipments. At the very least this would be a Chapter VI-Plus operation. Even if the Interim Government of Rwanda and the Rwanda Patriotic Front agree to the mission, the existence of renegade military units and civilian militia outside the control of Government authorities makes Rwanda a semi-permissive environment.

Based on known flows of refugees and displaced persons and the location of persons at risk, the zones should be set up on the Rwanda borders with Burundi, Tanzania, Zaire and Uganda, in that order. Each zone would require at least one combat-ready battalion with mechanized and armor capability, and with scout and combat air support. Larger zones with populations of over 200,000 refugees and displaced persons (such as the Burundi and Tanzanian borders) would probably require two combat-ready battalions. Each zone would require logistical and engineering support forces. The zones in Burundi and Tanzania would each likely require a logistics and engineering battalion.

The size of the force could range from 5,000 (for one to two zones) to 15,000 (for two to four zones). If this is an assessed operation, the cost would be a minimum of $85 million for the first six months for a 5,000-troop mission, and approximately $65 million for each subsequent six month period. That would translate into a minimum annual expense of $150-450 million depending on the number and size of the zones.

This option does not address the fate of the roughly 3,000 Rwandans taking shelter under UN protection in the Kigali stadium, nor of those in enclaves elsewhere in Rwanda.

III. The operation without force

In the third option, the UN and various NGO's would facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Rwandan refugees in neighboring countries and ensure that they have safe havens outside Rwanda. This would not involve the use of troops. The U.S. would probably provide airlift outside Rwanda on a reimbursable basis, as well as substantial funding.
The international community would see this option as nothing different from what is already being done. Support for this option would probably leave the U.S. isolated on the Security Council. This option, like option 2, also would not address the problem how to rescue those within Rwanda, including the people in the Kigali stadium and other enclaves.

Analysis of guidelines for U.S. decision to support

1. Whether UN involvement advances U.S. interests, and an international community of interest exists for dealing with the problem on a multilateral basis.

   -- For option 1, YES. The U.S. has a general interest in the maintenance of peace and stability in the region and a strong humanitarian interest. Both the UN Security Council and the OAU are exploring peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance options. Neighboring states, led by Tanzania and supported by the U.S., are pressing for a resumption of the Arusha peace talks.

   -- For option 2, the same.

   -- For option 3, the same.

2. Whether there is a threat to or breach of international peace and security, often of a regional character, defined as one or a combination of the following: (a) international aggression; (b) urgent humanitarian disaster coupled with violence; or (c) sudden interruption of established democracy or gross violation of human rights coupled with violence, or threat of violence.

   -- For option 1, YES. The killing of over 100,000 people over the past month, with many more continuing to be at risk, and the need for humanitarian assistance for up to 500,000 refugees and displaced persons, constitute a humanitarian disaster coupled with violence. The death of the Rwandan President and subsequent assassination of much of Rwanda's political opposition constituted a sudden and unexpected interruption of the democratic process. The wholesale slaughter of civilians constituted a gross violation of human rights coupled with violence and the threat
thereof.

-- For option 2, the same.

-- For option 3, the same.

3. Whether there are clear objectives and an understanding of where the mission fits on the spectrum between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

   -- For option 1, NOT YET. We have not seen a clearly developed concept. Those who have developed the idea believe that it could be a Chapter VI operation, but it is hard to see how it could remain that way in a civil war. A Kigali-based operation would likely require a Chapter VII mandate unless the warring sides were to acquiesce in the UN mission. Even then it would require a robust Chapter VI mandate, given the Interim Government's lack of command and control over renegade army units and extremist militias.

   -- For option 2, NOT YET. This is a possible U.S. proposed alternative to option 1, and, therefore, if we believe it preferable, we ourselves would need to develop the mission statement further, and define where on the peace operations spectrum it should fit. Since this force is designed to operate outside the area of maximum confrontation between the government and rebel forces, it would be less likely to provoke major confrontation with either side than option 1, and would be more likely, therefore, to operate within a Chapter VI mandate, albeit at the rougher end of the peacekeeping part of this spectrum.

   -- For option 3, NO. This would be neither peacekeeping nor peace enforcement. How the mission could operate without any force component is also unclear.

4. Whether, if UNAMIR is to remain a Chapter VI peacekeeping operation, a ceasefire is in place; or, if it is to become a Chapter VII peace enforcement operation, the threat to international peace and security is considered significant.

   -- For option 1, NO on Chapter VI. No ceasefire is in place, and, given the lack of command and control
exercised by the Interim Government over renegade military forces and Hutu militia, it is debatable how effective a ceasefire would be.

For option 1, YES on Chapter VII. A significant threat does exist to international peace and security. The refugee flows threaten to overwhelm resources in neighboring states. The violence in Rwanda also threatens to spill over into neighboring Burundi.

For option 2, NO on Chapter VI. No ceasefire is in place. Option 2 is designed to put forces in areas of minimum confrontation between the warring parties. The issue whether Chapter VI is applicable devolves, therefore, on whether each of the parties is prepared to accept a UN presence.

For option 2, YES on international significance.

For option 3, NO on the ceasefire.

5. Whether the means to accomplish the mission are available, including the forces, financing and a mandate appropriate to the mission.

For option 1, UNCLEAR. The availability of adequate numbers and quality of troops for this mission is questionable. Nigeria has offered a battalion, two other (unidentified) African battalions are said to be available and Dallaire believes Australia may be willing to provide at least 1,000 troops to UNAMIR. The UN and OAU are optimistic that sufficient forces can be found. Experience in Somalia suggests, however, that a Chapter VII operation would require a U.S. or Western European combat capability, which appears unlikely in Rwanda. Sufficient financing for a Chapter VII mission also is doubtful. It may be available for a Chapter VI mission. The UN Secretary General is attempting to set up a voluntary fund of at least $50-70 million. A hybrid of a voluntary fund and assessed contributions is possible in order to access money authorized for the existing assessment for UNAMIR. The U.S. theoretically could provide up to $173.3 million in DoD drawdown, PKO and CIPA
assistance. We also have up to $60 million in reallocation authority, although this will mean reducing or eliminating other programs.

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For option 2, MORE LIKELY. While this option may require at least as many forces as option 1, the military character is different and the quality of forces need not be so high.

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For option 3, N/A.

6. Whether the political, economic and humanitarian consequences of inaction by the international community have been weighed and are considered unacceptable.

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For option 1, YES. The international community clearly views what is happening in Rwanda as a humanitarian disaster of the highest magnitude and considers inaction to be unacceptable.

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For option 2, the same.

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For option 3, the same. But option 3 may be viewed as inaction.

7. Whether the operation's anticipated duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic guidelines for ending the operation.

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For option 1, NO. The duration of each is tied to a restoration of sufficient order in Rwanda to allow return of refugees and the absence of serious threat to humanitarian efforts. While criteria are clear enough, the time by which to meet them would be indeterminate.

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For option 2, the same.

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For option 3, the same.

PDD guidelines for U.S. participation

On the assumption that U.S. participation is highly unlikely, this paper does not consider the PDD guidelines for U.S. participation.
Resources available from the U.S.

The U.S. has the following resources available:

-- $75,000,000 FAA Sec. 506(a)(1) DoD drawdown
-- $75,000,000 FAA Sec. 506(a)(2) DoD drawdown
-- $10,000,000 Unspent UNAMIR CIPA
-- $13,000,000 Unspent Sec. 551 Haiti PKO account
-- $ 700,000 Unspent Sec. 552(c)(2) DoD drawdown

-- $173,700,000 Funds/Drawdown Authority Available
-- $15,000,000 Sec. 552(c)(1) reallocation authority
-- $45,000,000 Sec. 451(a)(1) reallocation authority

-- $60,000,000 Total reallocation authorized
-- $233,000,000 Total Funds/Drawdown/Reallocation

Attachments:

Security Assistance Voluntary Peacekeeping
Use of Foreign Assistance Authorities in FY 1994
Immigration, Migration and Refugee Assistance