MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Subject: Discussion Paper for the Deputies Committee on Peacekeeping Options in Rwanda

PDD-25 requires Deputies Committee-level approval of all U.S. votes in the United Nations Security Council to establish new peacekeeping operations. The Peacekeeping Core Group is to provide an analysis of the options to aid the Deputies in their decision.

The proposed expansion of the size and mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) changes the operation significantly enough to qualify in effect as a "new" mission. The attached discussion paper analyzes three proposals now before the Security Council in relation to the decision factors set out in PDD-25.

Your assistance in distributing the attached paper to all members of the Deputies Committee is appreciated.

Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

Attachment: Discussion Paper on Rwanda
This paper considers three options for bringing humanitarian assistance to the victims of the conflict in Rwanda. After describing the options, the paper assesses whether they meet or do not meet the guidelines in PDD 25, and then sets forth the resources available from the U.S. Note: In a letter to UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, OAU Secretary General Salim Salim said that his organization would not take the lead in providing forces for a peace operation in Rwanda.

Briefly, the options are:

1. A UN-proposed military operation based out of Kigali to assure the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Rwanda.

2. A cross-border military operation to secure zones in Rwanda to protect and care for those at risk.

3. A humanitarian operation, without the use of force, to assist Rwandan refugees in the border areas outside Rwanda.

I. The Kigali based option

The UN is proposing a UN peacekeeping operation based out of Kigali. UNAMIR Commander Dallaire is asking for a force of 5,500 troops, with a mandate to use force as necessary to assure delivery of humanitarian assistance and to protect persons in threatened enclaves, by, for example, breaking through roadblocks manned by hoodlums and disarming roving gangs. Dallaire believes this can be done under Chapter VI authority. He has requested 150 M-113 armored personnel carriers to protect his troops. The estimates the costs for the first six months of such an operation at $115 million.

II. The cross border option with force

The second option would be a military operation to
establish secure zones in Rwanda for the protection of persons at risk and for the delivery of humanitarian relief. Humanitarian assistance would be stored in neighboring countries and transported into the secure zones. The mission would defend the zones' perimeters against incursions and, within the zones, enforce security, disarm civilians and escort humanitarian assistance shipments. At the very least this would be a Chapter VI-Plus operation. Even if the Interim Government of Rwanda and the Rwanda Patriotic Front agree to the mission, the existence of renegade military units and civilian militia outside the control of Government authorities makes Rwanda a semi-permissive environment.

Based on known flows of refugees and displaced persons and the location of persons at risk, the zones should be set up on the Rwanda border with Burundi. The UN force would establish a secure zone inside Rwanda along the border with Burundi to protect refugees/displaced persons in most immediate danger and provide security for the delivery of humanitarian relief to those personnel. The force would deploy to Burundi, establish a base of operations in Burundi near the Rwandan border, conduct cross-border operations to secure and establish displaced persons camps within Rwanda, and provide continuous security for the operation of those camps. The force would establish security for UNHCR-run camps but not transport displaced persons to the camps. The force would also secure lines of communication and relief convoys in the zone.

Rules of engagement would clearly spell out the authority of the UN force commander to defend the humanitarian mission, to include UN forces, camps and displaced persons being protected.

The concept relies on the following assumptions:

[a] the current UNAMIR force would remain in Kigali to help negotiate a political settlement and provide the overall force commander;
[b] well trained, disciplined troops will be available for the mission;
[c] the UN has RPF/RGBF permission to establish the zone in Rwanda, and Burundi permission to establish base operations in, and allow logistic support of secure zone through, Burundi;
[d] UNHCR would run the camps, and the UN force would only provide security; and
[e] the UN and the NGOs would be responsible for transportation and distribution of humanitarian supplies into Rwanda, while the UN force would provide its own logistic support.

The UN force would debark in Burundi, establish a forward support base near the Rwandan border, and conduct operations to establish a secure zone for the displaced persons camps. About 6,000-6,500 UN force personnel per 100,000 refugees/displaced persons would be required.

This option does not address the fate of those in enclaves elsewhere in Rwanda. UNAMIR forces in Kigali would continue their responsibility for the safety of persons currently under their protection.

III. The operation without force

In the third option, the UN and various NGOs would facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Rwandan refugees in neighboring countries and ensure that they have safe havens outside Rwanda. This would not involve the use of troops. The U.S. would probably provide airlift outside Rwanda on a reimbursable basis, as well as substantial funding.

The international community would see this option as nothing different from what is already being done. Support for this option would probably leave the U.S. isolated on the Security Council. This option, like option 2, also would not address the problem how to rescue those within Rwanda, including the people in the Kigali stadium and other enclaves.

Analysis of guidelines for U.S. decision to support

1. Whether UN involvement advances U.S. interests, and an international community of interest exists for dealing with the problem on a multilateral basis.

   -- For option 1, YES. The U.S. has a general interest in the maintenance of peace and stability in the region and a strong humanitarian interest. Both the UN Security Council and the OAU are exploring peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance options. Neighboring states, led by Tanzania and supported by the U.S., are pressing for a resumption of the Arusha peace talks.
For option 2, the same.

For option 3, the same.

OSD agrees with State's assessment. However, we believe sending in 5,000-15,000 troops represents a commitment which may exceed the U.S.'s "general interest in the maintenance of peace and stability in the region."

2. Whether there is a threat to or breach of international peace and security, often of a regional character, defined as one or a combination of the following: (a) international aggression; (b) urgent humanitarian disaster coupled with violence; or (c) sudden interruption of established democracy or gross violation of human rights coupled with violence, or threat of violence.

For option 1, YES. The killing of over 100,000 people over the past month, with many more continuing to be at risk, and the need for humanitarian assistance for up to 500,000 refugees and displaced persons, constitute a humanitarian disaster coupled with violence. The death of the Rwandan President and subsequent assassination of much of Rwanda's political opposition constituted a sudden and unexpected interruption of the democratic process. The wholesale slaughter of civilians constituted a gross violation of human rights coupled with violence and the threat thereof.

For option 2, the same.

For option 3, the same.

3. Whether there are clear objectives and an understanding of where the mission fits on the spectrum between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

For option 1, NOT YET. We have not seen a clearly developed concept. Those who have developed the idea believe that it could be a Chapter VI operation, but it is hard to see how it could remain that way in a civil war. A Kigali-based operation would likely require a Chapter VII mandate unless the warring sides were to acquiesce in the UN mission. Even then it would require a robust Chapter VI mandate, given the
Interim Government's lack of command and control over renegade army units and extremist militias.

For option 2, NOT YET. This is a possible U.S. proposed alternative to option 1, and, therefore, if we believe it preferable, we ourselves would need to develop the mission statement further, and define where on the peace operations spectrum it should fit. Since this force is designed to operate outside the area of maximum confrontation between the government and rebel forces, it would be less likely to provoke major confrontation with either side than option 1, and would be more likely, therefore, to operate within a Chapter VI mandate, albeit at the rougher end of the peacekeeping part of this spectrum.

Joint Staff believes that the establishment of a protective zone would be very likely to provoke major confrontation with the Presidential Guard, militias and roving gangs intent on continued slaughter of moderate Hutus and Tutsis. Therefore, Chapter VII rules of engagement and mandate would likely be required.

For option 3, NO. This would be neither peacekeeping nor peace enforcement. How the mission could operate without any force component is also unclear.

OSD believes that both options 1 and 2 would be Chapter VII operations undertaken by African forces with robust rules of engagement, and that option 3 is not going to stop the killings.

4. Whether, if UNAMIR is to remain a Chapter VI peacekeeping operation, a cease-fire is in place; or, if it is to become a Chapter VII peace enforcement operation, the threat to international peace and security is considered significant.

For option 1, NO on Chapter VI. No cease-fire is in place, and, given the lack of command and control exercised by the Interim Government over renegade military forces and Hutu militia, it is debatable how effective a cease-fire would be.
For option 1, YES on Chapter VII. A significant threat does exist to international peace and security. The refugee flows threaten to overwhelm resources in neighboring states. The violence in Rwanda also threatens to spill over into neighboring Burundi.

For option 2, NO on Chapter VI. No cease-fire is in place. Option 2 is designed to put forces in areas of minimum confrontation between the warring parties. The issue whether Chapter VI is applicable devolves, therefore, on whether each of the parties is prepared to accept a UN presence.

Joint Staff believes that agreement of Rwandan government to cease-fire proposal could not necessarily be considered to constitute assent by Presidential Guard, hard-line Hutu militias, and roving gangs behind government lines, all of whom have been implicated in slaughter. To date, Government forces unable to control mass killings of Tutsis and moderate Hutu. Joint Staff position underscores Option 2 as probable Chapter VII operation, especially on Rwanda-Burundi border, where possibility of confrontation with Hutu extremists likely to be greatest.

For option 2, YES on international significance.

For option 3, NO on the cease-fire.

5. Whether the means to accomplish the mission are available, including the forces, financing and a mandate appropriate to the mission.

For option 1, UNCLEAR. The availability of adequate numbers and quality of troops for this mission is questionable. Nigeria has offered a battalion, and Zimbabwean and Ghanaian battalions are said to be available. The UN and OAU are optimistic that sufficient forces can be found. Experience in Somalia suggests, however, that a Chapter VII operation would require a U.S. or Western European combat capability, which appears unlikely in Rwanda. Sufficient financing for a Chapter VII mission also is doubtful.
It may be available for a Chapter VI mission. The UN Secretariat estimates a cost for the first six months of $115 million for this option. A hybrid of a voluntary fund and assessed contributions is possible in order to access money authorized for the existing assessment for UNAMIR. The U.S. theoretically could provide up to $173.3 million in DoD drawdown, PKO and CIPA assistance. We also have up to $60 million in reallocation authority, although this will mean reducing or eliminating other programs.

For option 2, MORE LIKELY. While this option may require at least as many forces as option 1, the military character is different and the quality of forces need not be so high.

Joint Staff believes just the opposite. Forces will be in peace enforcement role protecting displaced Tutsis and moderate Hutus from roving gang, militias, and Presidential Guard; will require clearing secure zones, searching and disarming (if necessary) displaced Rwandans allowed into camps, and then protecting those camps. Questions about how displaced Rwandans get to camps have yet to be answered. Any intent to have UN/OAU forces go out and bring back displaced Rwandans to camps will require operations in territory controlled by Rwandan government troops and possible direct confrontation with gangs, militias and Presidential Guard forces.

Moreover, assuming RPF remains true to stated intent of continuing Southward movement to punish "rogues" who have committed slaughter, expect Presidential Guard, militias and gangs to retreat in face of advance and attempt to seek refuge in UN-held camps. Significant possibility exists for PKO forces to conflict with either extremist Hutus, or with RPF should RPF believe extremists are seeking safe haven in camps.

Need to remain neutral under above situations will continuously challenge Option 2 forces. Therefore, quality and capability of troops performing mission must be as high as, if not higher than, those posited for Option 1.
OSD disagrees with State's analysis for options 1 and 2. We believe "NO" is the correct answer for both. While option 1 is almost a repeat of the Somalia experience and is therefore unlikely to generate much support, State presents a faulty argument for option 2 that may be misleading. State asserts that option 2 may require at least as many forces as option 1, but that the military character is different and the quality of forces need not be so high. We strongly disagree that forces charged with protection of displaced persons in only a "semi-permissive" environment (facing uncontrolled gangs, the Presidential Guard, and militias) do not need the training, equipment, or support that a force operating in a non-permissive environment requires. Furthermore, there is no evidence outside of Boutros-Ghali's optimism, that support, forces and equipment, can be marshaled for any large operation in Rwanda.

-- For option 3, N/A.

6. Whether the political, economic and humanitarian consequences of inaction by the international community have been weighed and are considered unacceptable.

-- For option 1, YES. The international community clearly views what is happening in Rwanda as a humanitarian disaster of the highest magnitude and considers inaction to be unacceptable.

-- For option 2, the same.

-- For option 3, the same. But option 3 may be viewed as inaction.

OSD agrees that inaction is unacceptable, however, we do not believe that our present activities (or option 3) are "inaction."
7. Whether the operation's anticipated duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic guidelines for ending the operation.

-- For option 1, NO. The duration of each is tied to a restoration of sufficient order in Rwanda to allow return of refugees and the absence of serious threat to humanitarian efforts. While criteria are clear enough, the time by which to meet them would be indeterminate.

-- For option 2, the same.

-- For option 3, the same.

PDD guidelines for U.S. participation

On the assumption that U.S. participation is highly unlikely, this paper does not consider the PDD guidelines for U.S. participation.

Resources available from the U.S.

The U.S. has the following resources available:

-- $75,000,000 FAA Sec. 506(a)(1) DoD drawdown
-- $75,000,000 FAA Sec. 506(a)(2) DoD drawdown
-- $10,000,000 Unspent UNAMIR CIPA
-- $13,000,000 Unspent Sec. 551 Haiti PKO account
-- $ 700,000 Unspent Sec. 552(c)(2) DoD drawdown
--$173,700,000 Funds/Drawdown Authority Available
-- $15,000,000 Sec. 552(c)(1) reallocation authority
-- $45,000,000 Sec. 451(a)(1) reallocation authority
-- $60,000,000 Total reallocation authorized
--$233,000,000 Total Funds/Drawdown/Reallocation