Establish Safe Havens Around Srebrenica and Other Bosnian Cities With the Use of Western Military Forces

The creation of UN safehavens in Bosnia--and in Srebrenica in particular--could reduce the number of civilian casualties and assist implementation of the Vance-Owen Plan, if it is approved. The forcible imposition of safehavens, however, would meet vociferous opposition from the Bosnian Serbs and almost certainly require a large infusion of Western forces.

-- A force much larger than the roughly 7,500 UN troops now in Bosnia would be needed to guarantee security, even assuming general compliance by all parties. An even larger force would be required in the event of general noncompliance. Monitoring of heavy weapons, or enlargement of the zones, would be essential to prevent combatants from shelling refugees in safehaven areas.

-- UN forces probably would need liberal rules of engagement to deter attacks by irregular forces. UN forces would need to be highly mobile--with armored vehicles and helicopters--and have heavy defensive equipment--such as antitank weapons and possibly air cover--to monitor and defend against attacks on safehavens.

-- Muslim hardliners almost certainly would attempt to mount military operations from the safehavens against Serb positions outside the zones. UN peacekeepers would find themselves in a crossfire as Serb forces retaliated. Extremists on all sides would deliberately target the UN forces.

-- The terrain around many potential safehavens, including Srebrenica, Gorazde, and Sarajevo, which are in mountainous areas with plenty of ground cover, also will complicate efforts to defend them against artillery and guerrilla attacks.

-- An arrangement to establish large safehavens in Bosnia would also be politically difficult to sell to the Muslims, who would be concerned that the creation of such zones would assist Serb ethnic cleansing operations by attracting Muslims from outside the safehavens.
The establishment of safe havens would endanger humanitarian relief operations in Bosnia—which are dependent on Serbian good will.

Moscow might agree to the establishment of safe havens in Bosnia for ethnic Muslims if no force were used to attain them. Even then, it probably would require detailed consultation on plans for such safe havens and would oppose them if they were viewed as a pretext for Western military intervention against the Bosnian Serbs. Unilateral action would strongly damage the West’s relations with Russia.