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29 May 95

COMMANDEIR HQ UNPROFOR DIRECTIVE 2/95

POST AIRSTRIKE GUIDANCE

1. I have written this paper to serve two purposes. The first to give you an idea of the debate that is going on about us. The second to direct your actions.

SITUATION

2. Air strikes on 25/26 May 95 were intended to reimpose the EZ and WCP regime which was breaking down. The objective has not been achieved.

Some 347 UN personnel are hostage or in isolated detachments and surrounded by the BSA.

Significant amounts of equipment and weapons have been taken.

There is no FOM for UNPROFOR in BSA territory.

3. The Bosnian Government see it in their interest to cooperate at present - but they could become so pressed by BSA activity that they demand to act in self defence and break the EZ and WCP regime themselves. Alternatively they could provoke such a situation.

4. UNPROFOR continues with a 'peacekeeping' mandate and deployment. Although those in the Enclaves, including Sarajevo, and in isolated detachments on Serb territory are vulnerable, and more part of the problem than the solution. UNPROFOR hold four BSA soldiers, and,

a. UNPROFOR no longer have a peacekeeping relationship with the BSA. (It has lost the consent of one of the parties).

b. UNPROFOR is very close to being an ally of the Bosnian Government (it is very nearly no longer impartial).

c. UNPROFOR has used force to enforce a mandate. (There is now potential for confusion between force being used in self defence and for enforcement).
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CONTEXT

5. There is an urgent need to establish the context of subsequent military activities. For in my judgement our circumstances have changed and whatever is said and done we cannot return to our previous position. The following questions need answering:

Are the UN prepared to continue to fight the USA? If so -

For what aim?

Within what political military strategy?

At whose direction?

With what forces and resources?

and

What is UNPROFOR’s role?

And if not -

What is the aim etc?

6. It is on the basis of the answers to these fundamental questions that all else follows. While they are being answered, we shall prepare ourselves on the assumption that the nations will be prepared to fight.

7. I have been directed, today 29 May 95, that the execution of the mandate is secondary to the security of UN personnel. The intention being to avoid loss of life. Mentioning positions for their own sake and unnecessary vulnerability to hostage taking. My interpretation of this directive is at paragraph 9b.

SHORT TERM

8. In the short term the objective is; To hold matters in balance while the essential political decisions are taken:

Raising force if necessary including CAS and Air Strikes as a last resort.

Seeking to establish and maintain links with Palc.

Maintaining as best as we can our position as Peacekeepers: endeavouring to fulfill our mandate.

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To this end:

a. Continue to keep track of the condition and whereabouts of the detainees.

b. Positions that can be reinforced, or it is practical to counter attack to recover, are not to be abandoned. Positions that are isolated in BSA territory and unable to be supported may be abandoned at the Superior Commanders discretion when they are threatened and in his judgement life or lives have or will be lost. Camps are not to be abandoned although people at risk can be moved to other locations. In any event, great care is to be taken that we are not surprised by the BSA using captured UN equipment.

c. Rear HQ, Sector SW, and Sector NE are to be prepared to receive reinforcements. Rear HQ is to take the lead in dealing with this matter. Sector SW is to continue to prepare a Battle Group, and to liaise and plan if necessary with Sector Sarajevo over the practicalities of extricating the French detachment encircled at the Rare WCP BP 7458.

d. We must continue to maintain pressure at all levels of the Bosnian Government to cooperate and not to escalate the situation.

10. Throughout this period of crisis it is most important that we hold our international force together and operate within the UN Chain of Command.

MEDIUM TERM

11. In the medium term we will need to re-establish some FOM. Hopefully as part of a greater strategy leading to a resolution.

a. Sector Sarajevo is to prepare;

1. A plan for opening a route Dobrinja - Butmir - Igman.

2. A plan to break-out on axis Sarajevo - Kiseljak to link with a break-in being conducted by Sector SW and with 5 ATAP in support.

b. Sector SW is to prepare to break-in to Sarajevo. The desired result assuming adequate forces and resources is that this should be done in such a way as to assist with opening the Airport, however, other more limited objectives are also to be considered.

c. Sector NE and Bihać Comd are to continue with the current mission.

d. Gorazde Force is to maintain its present position and to continue to deter by its presence attacks on the Safe Area.

12. The plans required above are to be complete in outline by 1 June, so that coordination can take place. My HQ will issue further guidance as required.

13. Civil Affairs are requested to develop the Dobrinja - Butmir plan with Sector Sarajevo with particular reference to the measures to be taken with both the Bosnian Government and the BSA.
LONG TERM

14. In the longer term I anticipate operations being developed in the first instance to resupply the Eastern Enclaves. The planning we have undertaken already to do this by air will be the basis of these operations.

DETAILED PLANNING AND COORDINATION

15. Once we have a clearer idea of the answers to the questions at paragraph 5 the mass of questions concerning C2, ROE, timings, location of reinforcement and so forth, can be answered.

SUMMARY

16. We must do all we can to hang together as a force, holding to our positions and mission, while endeavouring to hold matters in balance, and preparing for further more offensive tasks.

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Lt Gen
Comd HQ UNPROFOR