27 June 1995

Dear [Name],

Since I sent my directive to you on May 29th, and in spite of the release of the last of the hostages, the situation has become more complex and, in many ways, more difficult. On the one hand, we have reduced our exposure and, therefore, our vulnerability to actions by the Bosnian Serbs. On the other hand, we remain vulnerable in many respects to the will of the parties through their actions to restrict and limit our movement, to attack our positions and installations, and, in the case of the Bosnian Government, demands that we un-man certain of our positions, accompanied by threats to take them by force should we fall to un-man them. We have a right to defend ourselves against such attacks and threats; however, in the absence of a change of political will, we cannot expect the situation to improve significantly in the short to medium-term.

Even the arrival and eventual readiness of the Multi-national Brigade, while improving our ability to protect ourselves, does not substantially improve the present situation. In fact, in some respects, its arrival and eventual readiness for operations may raise, in certain quarters, expectations, even demands, for more robust action. We will have to be prepared to counter such expectations and demands. This Force must not become the vehicle through which we become engaged in peace enforcement. Rather, it should be seen as an additional vehicle for buying time for the peace process to unfold. The principal means for substantially improving the present impasse are developments in the political process which might allow the possibility of negotiations. However, the window of opportunity for the political negotiating process is short and may close in as little as three to four weeks. We will need to carefully consider and further develop in the immediate future our options beyond the point when the window of opportunity closes. I am now reviewing those options that we may be facing very soon, particularly access to Sarajevo (both ground and air) and UN presence in the Eastern Enclaves.

No matter how difficult, even frustrating, is the situation in which we find ourselves, we must resist the temptation, no matter how inviting, to use force except in self-defence. We both agree that this is and must remain a peace-keeping mission. In my view, the best way to assure that and to buy the necessary time for the negotiating process to mature is, for the present, to remain patient.

Humanitarian aid continues to be a high priority. UNHCR will continue to negotiate with authorities in Pale using the present plan. As far as the resupply of our own troops is concerned, for the moment, we can continue to resupply Sarajevo by
In view of the present circumstances around Sarajevo, it is impossible for me to stay in regular contact with the Bosnian authorities. I am grateful that you are able to do so and ask that you continue to actively pursue these contacts, which are so important.

I expect to meet again soon with Gen Mladic, at which time I will use the opportunity to emphasize, yet again, the importance of him giving assurances that essential humanitarian aid and resupply of our own troops be allowed to pass. At the same time, I intend to raise the matter of troop and UNMO rotation for the Eastern Enclaves.

Having reviewed again my directives of 29 May, I believe that they remain very much in keeping with the present situation, except of course for references to the hostage crisis, which has passed.

As always, I remain grateful for your assistance, understanding and support in these vital matters.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

Bernard Janvier
Lieutenant-General
Force Commander

Lieutenant-General Sir Rupert Smith
Commander UNPROFOR