OSD (C3I) Review of Defense Human Intelligence Activities

"An Alternative Approach to Meet the Department of Defense Human Resource Intelligence Demands of the 21st Century (U)"

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(U) This study was conducted in response to tasking from the Assistant Secretary of Defense [(Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) C3I]. SRA International, Inc. led the study, with assistance from the MITRE Corporation. The study team consisted of Lt. Gen. (Ret.) James R. Clapper (SRA), (SRA), (MITRE), and (SRA).

(U) The study team wishes to express its appreciation to the 425 plus personnel with whom we interacted and who contributed candid thoughts, ideas, and comments. Their contributions ensured that all the pertinent issues were raised as part of a collegial community dialogue.

(U) We are obliged to include a caveat about the numbers (i.e., manpower, dollars, etc.) in this report; we stopped collecting data for inclusion on 20 October 1999. Our goal was perfection. However, to the best of the study team's ability to research in conjunction with the efforts of individual experts in each organization, the numbers are accurate in terms of order of magnitude.

(U) After reviewing the many and varied sources of information (see Appendix 4), it was obvious to the study team that we would likely not be "plowing new ground" with regard to individual issues we identified. Many shortfalls in and concerns about Defense HUMINT — real and perceived — are generally well known. Our approach, therefore, was to take a broader, systemic look. The intent was to address the root causes of the entire "problem" vice dissecting individual symptoms.

(U) A word about the organization of the report is in order. The original concept for the study was a conventional but fulsome final report, i.e., beginning with description of the problem and proceeding through analysis to a final set of action items and specific recommendations. The action items, though presented individually, are in fact interrelated, and must be considered as such. The implementing recommendations are of necessity interdependent so as to address the systemic nature of the problem set. And, as indicated in the table of contents, this traditional approach constitutes roughly the first half of this study report.
INTRODUCTION

(U) Purpose: To provide OSD (C3I) a review of the full spectrum of human intelligence (HUMINT) activities conducted within the Department of Defense and to provide actionable recommendations as appropriate.

(U) Scope: The study encompasses all aspects of DOD HUMINT collection and associated activities and provides a systemic insight into Defense HUMINT activities. Included is the examination of other intelligence disciplines when and where they intersected with the operational aspects of HUMINT collection. Principally, this encompassed the joint employment of HUMINT and counterintelligence (CI) assets at the operational, i.e., unified command, and below level of engagement. At the specific request of the DIA Director, the Defense Intelligence Agency's counterintelligence assets and responsibilities were also included within the purview of this study.

(U) Objectives: The study team was given two principal objectives by the ASD/C3I:

1. (U) Provide recommendations that optimize the performance of DOD HUMINT in order to meet the demands posed by the use of military force in the 21st century.

2. (U) Engender partnership with the Defense HUMINT "stakeholders" on the purpose, direction, and capabilities of DOD HUMINT.

(U) Tasks: From this overarching guidance, the study team derived two principal tasks:

A. (U) Examine the posture and performance of DOD HUMINT and provide senior leadership a snapshot in time.

B. (U) Assess the capabilities and weaknesses of DOD HUMINT based on that snapshot and evaluate current overall performance.

(U) Methodology: The technical approach was designed to leverage the considerable breadth of the knowledge base within the DOD community and the in-depth expertise of the study team. The approach was three pronged:

- (U) The search and survey of existing documentation, i.e., policy guidance, previous studies, think pieces, articles, after action reports, IG findings, theses, etc. This led to the compilation and review of an extensive bibliography (200+ documents). Please see the critical bibliography at Appendix 4 for specific items of interest.
(U) Face-to-face dialogue with all levels of participants within the affected community of stakeholders. The study interacted with over 425 individuals representing the offices and institutions indicated below (Figure 1).

(U) An iterative round of individual briefings and discussion with the key principals was conducted. This was done to ensure that the study’s findings were thorough and accurate and, to the extent feasible, that the recommendations were open and known to all. The intent of this collegial give-and-take was to encourage commitment and facilitate acceptance, thereby promoting ownership by the “stakeholders,” or, more realistically, a majority of them.

(U) Appendix 2 provides a listing of the key principals who participated in this dialogue.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

[Mission:] The current mission of DOD HUMINT is principally to conduct the full spectrum of human intelligence collection operations in response to Unified Command, DOD, and national requirements. The conventional depiction of the operational spectrum of DOD HUMINT activities is represented by the activities portrayed in Figure 2.

OPERATIONAL SPECTRUM

[Figure 2]

SECRET
Findings: The study's review resulted in the sixteen major findings listed below. These are categorized into four general areas: Policy; People; Operations; and Support.

Policy

People
(U) **Action Items:** Based on the above findings, extensive review of previous research material, and dialogue with numerous "stakeholders," the study team determined there were 30 major action items requiring attention. Figure 3 below provides a summary overview of the action items.

(U) To address these major action items, the study postulates 75 recommendations, which are treated in depth in the Recommendations Section.
Figure 3

Alternative Approach:
### ASSESSMENT

1. (a)(4); (b)(6)
2. (b)(1), (b)(5)
3. (b)(1), (b)(5)
4. (b)(1), (b)(5)
5. (b)(1), (b)(5)
6. (b)(1), (b)(5)
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Policy
Pages 20-23
WITHHELD IN FULL
FOIA EXEMPTIONS (B)(1) and (B)(5)
RECOMMENDATIONS

OPRs

(U) Figure 12
Pages 25-54
WITHHELD IN FULL
FOIA EXEMPTIONS (B)(1) and (B)(5)
ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
Pages 56-63

WITHHELD IN FULL

FOIA EXEMPTIONS (B)(1) and (B)(5)
National Security Act of 1947
(As Amended)

Sec. 105 [50 U.S.C. 403-5]

(b) ... the Secretary of Defense shall ensure:
   (5) ... effective management of the Department of Defense human intelligence activities, including defense attachés
   (c) ... the Secretary of Defense ... may use such elements of the Department ... as may be appropriate for the execution of those functions, in addition to, or in lieu of, the elements identified in this section.

E.O. 12333: US Intelligence Activities

Paragraph 1.11 The Department of Defense. The Secretary of Defense shall ...

(a) Collect national foreign intelligence and be responsive to collection tasking by the Director of Central Intelligence;

(b) Collect, produce and disseminate military and military-related foreign intelligence and counterintelligence as required for execution of the Secretary’s responsibilities;

(c) Conduct programs and mission necessary to fulfill national, departmental and tactical foreign intelligence requirements;
Pages 65-72

WITHHELD IN FULL

FOIA EXEMPTIONS (B)(1) and (B)(5)
IMPLEMENTATION

PROJECTED TIMELINE

Figure 37
Pages 74-81
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FOIA EXEMPTIONS (B)(1) and (B)(5)
# APPENDIX 1

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PRINCIPALS

General Counsel, DIA

J-2 SOUTHCOM

Director of Air Force ISR, (Former)

Deputy Director, DIA

Clark, VADM Vernon E., Director, Joint Staff, (Former)

Director for Information Systems and Services, DIA

DASD(I)(Former), OSD(C3)

David, Dr. Ruth, Defense Science Board Member

Deputy Assistant, Chief of Staff, Intelligence, US Marine Corps

Deputy Director, Central Intelligence for Community Management

Deputy Director Defense HUMINT Service

Director of Operations, CIA (Former)

Chief of Staff, DIA

Vice J-2, JCS (former)

Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, USA

Director, Total Force and Production, OSD(C3)

Deputy Director for Intelligence Operations, DIA

Fry, VADM Scott A., Director for Operations, J-3, JCS

Fulford, LTG Carlton W. Jr., Director, Joint Staff, JCS

Deputy Director, Central Intelligence

Hamre, Dr. John J., Deputy Secretary of Defense

Director for Intelligence Operations, DIA

Director, NSA

Director, DIA (Former)

Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, USA

Deputy Director, NRO
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of this report is to provide an overview of the current state of the Intelligence Community (IC) and to highlight key challenges and opportunities for improvement. The IC is composed of numerous agencies, each with its own unique mission and responsibilities. The IC is guided by a number of guiding principles, including adherence to the rule of law, protection of civil liberties, and transparency. The IC is also subject to oversight by a number of congressional committees, which provide guidance and oversight on the IC's activities.

The IC is composed of several key components, including the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Each of these agencies has a unique role within the IC, and each is responsible for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence information.

In addition to the agencies within the IC, there are also several key personnel who play critical roles in the operation of the IC. These personnel include the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ASD/IS), and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

The DNI is responsible for providing leadership and direction to the IC, and for ensuring that the IC is operating in a coherent and effective manner. The ASD/IS is responsible for providing oversight and coordination of the IC's activities, and for ensuring that the IC is operating in a legal and ethical manner. The JCS is responsible for providing military advice and guidance to the President and the Secretary of Defense, and for ensuring that the IC is operating in a manner that is consistent with the military strategy of the country.
APPENDIX 3

GLOSSARY

(U) Agent – In intelligence usage, one who is authorized or instructed to obtain or to assist in obtaining information for intelligence or counterintelligence purposes.

(U) CCP - Consolidated Cryptological Program.

(U) Clandestine – An operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. A clandestine operation differs from a covert operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the operation rather than on concealment of identity of sponsor. In special operations, an activity may be both clandestine and covert and may focus equally on operational considerations and intelligence related activities.

(U) Counterintelligence – Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities.

(U) Counterintelligence Activities – The four functions of counterintelligence: operations; investigations; collection, and reporting; and analysis, production, and dissemination.

(U) Counterintelligence Collection – The systematic acquisition of information concerning espionage, sabotage, terrorism, other intelligence activities or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organization, or foreign persons which are directed against or threaten Department of Defense interests.

(U) Counterintelligence Investigations – Counterintelligence investigations establish the elements of proof for prosecution or administrative action. Counterintelligence investigations can provide a basis for or be developed from conducting counterintelligence operations. Counterintelligence investigations are conducted against individuals or groups suspected of committing acts of espionage, sabotage, sedition, subversion, terrorism, and other major security violations.

(U) Counterintelligence Production – The process of analyzing all-source information concerning espionage, or other multidiscipline intelligence collection threats, sabotage, terrorism, and other related threats to US military commanders, the Department of Defense, and the US Intelligence Community and developing it into a final product which is disseminated.
(U) **Cover** – The measures necessary to give protection to a person, plan, operation, formation, or installation from the enemy intelligence collection effort.

(U) **Covert Operations** – An operation that is so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. A covert operation differs from a clandestine operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of identity of sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation.

(U) **Collection** – The obtaining of information in any manner, including direct observation, liaison with official agencies, or solicitation from official, unofficial, or public sources.

(U) **Collection Management** – The process of converting intelligence requirements into collection requirements, establishing priorities, tasking or coordinating with appropriate collection sources or agencies, monitoring results and retasking, as required.

(U) **CMS** - Community Management Staff.

(U) **DOCEX** - Document Exploitation.

(U) **ECN** - Enhanced Clandestine Network.

(U) **FMA** - Foreign Material Acquisition.

(U) **GDIP** - General Defense Intelligence Program.

(U) **HUMINT** – Human Intelligence. A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources.

(U) **HOCNET** - HUMINT Operational Communications Network

(U) **HUMINT Support Element (HSE)** – Combatant Commands and Service DHS element responsible for coordinating arrangements for HUMINT collection.

(U) **Human Resources Intelligence** – The intelligence information derived from intelligence collection that uses human being as both sources and collectors, and where the human being is the primary collection instrument.
(U) **Joint Intelligence Doctrine**—Fundamental principles that guide the preparation of intelligence and the subsequent provision of intelligence to support military forces of two or more Services employed in coordinated action.

(U) **Intelligence**—The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas.

(U) **Intelligence Requirement**—Any subject, general or specific, upon which there is a need for the collection of information, or the production of intelligence.

(U) **NFIP**—National Foreign Intelligence Program

(U) **NOC**—Non-Official Cover.

(U) **Overt Operation**—An operation conducted openly, without concealment.

(U) **Source**—A person, thing, or activity from which intelligence information is obtained.

(U) **Special Mission Unit (SMU)**—A generic term to represent a group of operations and support personnel from designated organizations that is task-organized to perform highly classified activities.

(U) **Surveillance**—The systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means.

(U) **TAREX**—Target Exploitation Program.

(U) **TTP**—Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
APPENDIX 4
CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY
Pages 91-114

WITHHELD IN FULL

FOIA EXEMPTIONS (B)(1) and (B)(5)