
2. **ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION:** Office of the President

3. **NATURE OF MATERIAL:** 69-page report by a Special Study Group

4. **CLASSIFICATION:** TOP SECRET

5. **NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP:** Should have

6. **SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:**

As a complement to the Clarke Task Force study on CIA and the Intelligence Community being undertaken for the Hoover Commission, President Eisenhower asked the Doolittle panel to conduct a "comprehensive study" of the covert activities of the CIA, in particular those carried out under the terms of NSCID #5 and NSC 5412 of 15 March 1954, and to make to him recommendations for improving the conduct of these operations.

The President's request was dated 26 July 1954, and the final report is dated 30 September 1954. In this nine-week period, the Panel made its investigations, including an overseas trip to "representative stations" in Paris, Vienna, Rome, etc., and wrote its report. The report contains a total of 42 recommendations concerning personnel, security, coordination and operations, organization and administration and cost, the most significant of which are that the IG should be authorized to operate on an Agency-wide basis and investigate all activities, and that the Comptroller should be provided with more information so as to exercise better control over expenditures for covert projects. The report assures the President that everything is going quite well, and the CIA is doing a very good job in spite of the need for the improvements it suggests.

7. **DATE OF REQUEST:** Part II, No. 4, of 12 March 1975
request from Senate Select Committee
8. **RELEASING AUTHORITY**: White House

9. **DATE OF RELEASE**: 

10. **LOCATION OF FILE COPY**: USIB Ad Hoc Coordination Staff

11. **PROBLEM AREAS**: Appendix B (which lists names of 88 CIA personnel and 60 from other intelligence organizations who were consulted) will require review to determine whether any names should be deleted because of cover problems before the document could be released to the Committee.
I. Title and Date:
Final Report of Working Group on Organization and Activities, 6 April 1962, signed by Lyman B. Kirkpatrick. (Responsive to II,7 of Senate Select Committee request.)

II. Classification:
SECRET

III. Summary:
Part I deals primarily with the organization of the Central Intelligence Agency and reflects the unanimous views of the working group. The second part contains comments and recommendations on areas dealing with the work of the CIA and activities of the intelligence community in which the working group was either unable to agree or felt that considerably more study was needed before action was taken. Part I contains recommendations dealing with the organization of the DCI's office and each of the four Directorates. Among the recommendations are: (a) removing the Comptroller's office from the DD/S and having it report directly to the DCI; (b) combining the Audit Staff and the IG Staff; (c) creating an Executive Committee to review major activities and proposed major projects. In Part II the group, with the exception of Mr. Coyne, recommends the creation of a position for an Assistant to the DCI for Coordination and Intelligence Community Guidance and recommends further study of the proposal to merge OCI and ONE. Mr. Coyne's dissents are spelled out.

IV. Problem Areas:
1. The paper indicates that the working group reported orally to the DCI regarding relations with the White House. The content of this briefing is not indicated.
2. Several portions of Part II discuss relations with State Department—particularly in the matter of cover—as well as relations between State and the White House.
3. The document clearly reveals methods of general operations in the CIA and the community as of 1962. The discussion is sufficiently general, however, as to present no apparent problem as long as the classification is maintained.
MATERIAL FOR THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES


2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: National Security Agency

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: 15-page summary and 66-page report

4. CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET, "Codeword," Limited Distribution

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: Should have

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

The report is essentially a one-man study by Richard Bissell after he left CIA. It contains information on current and projected costs of cryptanalytic programs [redacted systems and discusses the prospects for success against such systems. The report frequently stresses the uncertainties involved in such an evaluation effort. The report recommends: (a) There should be no reduction in the overall U.S. cryptologic effort; (b) some reallocation of cryptologic resources as between the attack on the [redacted systems and other cryptanalytic problems should be considered; (c) a more systematic evaluation, on behalf of the whole Intelligence Community, should be considered for handling raw information which over time might be produced through successful exploitation of some high-grade systems.

7. DATE OF REQUEST: Part II, No. 20, of 12 March 1975 request from Senate Select Committee

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: National Security Agency

9. DATE OF RELEASE:

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Staff

11. PROBLEM AREAS: The paper discusses details of success and failure against [redacted]

The NSA position is that the document can be examined at NSA, and if this indicates the document is needed by the Committee, the matter of necessary paraphrasing can be discussed.
MATERIAL FOR THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: "The Long Range Plan of the
Central Intelligence Agency," 31 August 1965, signed by
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: Central Intelligence
Agency

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: 186-page report with covering
memo to DCI

4. CLASSIFICATION: Varies from section to section.
Lowest is SECRET CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY; highest is TOP SECRET,
with a variety of codewords

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP:

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

Part I gives an overview of the plan.
Part II states the long range planning assumptions.
Part III gives the long range outlook for the
clandestine services, the production of intelligence, the overt
collection and reference services, and support.
Part IV delineates special problem areas: the CIA
image, CIA's role in intelligence coordination, requirements,
early warning, ADP, systems analysis, scientific research,
overhead reconnaissance, national photographic interpretation,
personnel and training, medical views, communications and
security.
Part V lists recommendations.
Part VI is the Index and Part VII the annexes (not
attached).

7. DATE OF REQUEST: Part II, No. 9 of 12 March 1975
request from Senate Select Committee

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: Central Intelligence Agency

9. DATE OF RELEASE:

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Staff

SECRET
11. **PROBLEM AREAS:**

a. The paper, particularly in the subsection dealing with the Clandestine Services, outlines the Executive Branch authorities and controls over intelligence.

b. Several parts of Section III deal with relations with State Department, particularly stressing problems associated with cover.

c. The entire paper reveals both sources and methods. Human source collection and technical collection are discussed in considerable detail, although precise capabilities of technical systems are not spelled out, nor are any source names mentioned. The paper also identifies gaps in intelligence and the CIA's plans to remedy these situations.
MATERIAL FOR THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: "A Review of the Intelligence Community," 10 March 1971, prepared under direction of Dr. James Schlesinger, OMB

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: Office of Management and Budget

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: 47-page report

4. CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET, Handle via "Codeword" Channels Only

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: Should have

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

The report analyzes the causes for the rise in the cost and size of intelligence operations coupled with an apparent inability to achieve like improvement in the scope and quality of its products, and concludes that what is needed is a fundamental reform of the Community's decision making bodies and procedures. It finds that Community activities have become dominated by collection competition, growth has been unplanned and unguided, production has remained the stepchild of the Community, and there has been a great lack of forward planning. It cites the failure of the National Security Act of 1947 to anticipate the problems arising from the complexities of the present technological world, analyzes a number of organizational problems and presents a range of options for reform. Areas which are singled out for consideration are leadership of the Community, direction and control of Defense intelligence activities, and functional reorganization. It recommends a stronger DCI with responsibility for resource as well as substantive matters for the Community, urges stronger central management of Defense intelligence resources, and suggests steps to improve the intelligence product.

This report formed the basis for President Nixon's memorandum of 5 November 1971 on "Organization and Management of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community."
7. **DATE OF REQUEST:** Part II, No. 17 of 12 March 1975 request from Senate Select Committee

8. **RELEASING AUTHORITY:** Office of Management and Budget

9. **DATE OF RELEASE:**

10. **LOCATION OF FILE COPY:** USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Staff

11. **PROBLEM AREAS:** It has been suggested the copy provided CIA is not the final version of the paper, but there is no stamp to indicate it is a draft.

    The report contains some specific examples of technical collection systems with their project names, and on page 7 has a table which breaks out the FY-72 intelligence budget by function. These could be paraphrased or deleted with little substantive loss. Such would ease handling of the document.

    On page 42, the report lists possible savings from some of the proposed reforms, which could provide basis for subsequent inquiries.