THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 18, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Rumsfeld/Mr. Cheney
Mr. Buchen/Mr. Hills
Mr. Marsh/Dr. Wothuis
General Scowcroft/Colonel McFarlane

FROM: James A. Wilderotter

SUBJECT: Additional CIA Studies Requested by the Church Committee

Please reference my April 16 memorandum transmitting abstracts of six studies of the CIA or specific intelligence activities requested by the Church Committee. Attached are abstracts of two additional studies in this category:

7. "Reports on Strategic Warning," February, 1967 (the Shute Report);


These reports are available for your inspection from the Duty Officer in the Situation Room in a folder marked "Additional Studies." In reviewing these reports, you can assume that appropriate measures will be taken with respect to the national security sensitivity of any materials or parts of materials provided to the Church Committee.

Please review these studies promptly. I will circulate on Tuesday, April 22, a memorandum asking for your comments and clearance for review of these materials by the Committee.
MATERIAL FOR THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: "Report on Strategic Warning,"
   February 1967 (See Report)

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: Director of Central Intelligence

   (Report was prepared in response to a request from the Deputy to the DCI
   for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation)

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Covering letter with a 23-page report and ten annexes

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Top Secret, Compartmented

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: Should have

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

   The report is an in-depth study of the performance, planning, and present and foreseeable future problems of the
   Intelligence Community in the execution of its early warning mission. Sections of the report are titled: Background and
   Conclusions, Indications Intelligence, Warning Sources and Warning Processes, Warning Costs and Warning Customers, and
   Recommendations (of which there are 27). Annexes A through E are detailed studies of what the various intelligence
   collection sources do or could contribute to warning. Annexes F through J examine the various processes for extracting
   warning intelligence from those sources.

   The central conclusion is that "so long as the USSR possesses the means to launch a damaging assault on the
   U.S., it is essential to maintain continuous surveillance over all the elements of Soviet power which could be involved
   directly or in a supporting role in that assault."

7. DATE OF REQUEST: Part II, No. 20 of 12 March 1975
   request from the Senate Select Committee

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: Director of Central Intelligence

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION:
10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: DCI/IC Select Committee Coordinating Staff

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS:

The report discusses in detail the Community warning mechanism and as such discusses the warning inter-relationships among the State Department, Defense Department, NSA and CIA. Assets of the Clandestine Services are discussed in some detail, but no sources are mentioned by name. The 1967 capabilities of overhead satellites are described.

The detailed description of capabilities, particularly in the case of highly compartmented systems, can still be considered highly sensitive information.
MATERIAL FOR THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES 

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: "Intelligence Activities and Foreign Policy," 6 November 1968. (The Dillon Report) 

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: A discussion group sponsored by the John F. Kennedy Institute of Politics at Harvard University, chaired by Douglas Dillon. (Meetings of the group were held in Washington, D.C.) 

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: A 17-page report and attached list of 21 participants 

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: "CONFIDENTIAL, Not for publication. Not to be quoted or cited" 

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: No 

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: The report is a distillation of a series of discussions by the group of problem areas of future concern in the field of intelligence, including the relation of intelligence and policymaking, the organization of the Intelligence Community, clandestine and covert actions, Congress and the Intelligence Community, and intelligence and the press. Of note is the discussion concerning the value of covert political action, how and when it should be used, and the problem of inadequate secrecy. 

7. DATE OF REQUEST: Part II, No. 20 of the 12 March 1975 request from the Senate Select Committee referred to the "Lindsay Report," and since Frank Lindsay, President of ITEK Corporation, has a member of the Dillon group it was mistakenly considered this was what was referred to as the "Lindsay Report." It has since been determined the Lindsay Report is a separate document on "Covert Operations of the U.S. Government," dated 1 December 1968, which is in Mr. Lindsay's possession. 

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: Mr. Douglas Dillon 

9. DATE OF RELEASE: 

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: DCI/IC Select Committee Coordinating Staff
11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS:

This paper reflects the views of a distinguished group from academia, business and the professions, including several with extensive former intelligence and diplomatic experience who met to prepare recommendations for the incoming President, whoever he might be, on the future role of intelligence.

So far as can be determined, the minutes were distributed to members of the group, but no further action was taken on this particular paper.

The same group was reconstituted after the 1968 election as a non-public task force of the President-elect, with Frank Lindsay as chairman, and completed a report on covert operations, the so-called Lindsay report.

Any release of this report would have to be cleared with Mr. Dillon.