MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Rumsfeld / Mr. Cheney
Mr. Bush / Mr. Hills
Mr. Marsh / Dr. Wolhuis
General Scowcroft / Major McFarlane

FROM: James A. Wilderottet

SUBJECT: CIA internal histories requested by the Senate Select Committee

The CIA has sent over for our review a total of 52 volumes of internal CIA "histories" requested by the Senate Select Committee. Those materials were compiled under CIA's internal history program, which represents in part an ongoing attempt to chronicle the activities of the Agency, and in part a program to provide an organizational location for individual employees in special circumstances. Many of the histories transmitted to us have not been formally approved by the CIA itself; nevertheless, with appropriate caveats, they represent a reasonably accurate record of events.

Attached are abstracts of the various studies provided by the CIA. Although I have not read all the histories myself, it would appear -- on the basis of the abstracts and a quick overview -- that they can be broken down into two categories; first, those histories which are relatively straightforward and do not present particular problems, and which accordingly can be reviewed by the Committee Staff at the CIA and, if necessary, provided to the Committee with appropriate paraphrasing; and second, those materials which should be reviewed in detail here before any decision is made with respect to their review by the Select Committee. The items in the first category are available for review at your convenience in my office. The other items are in the Situation Room in envelopes marked "Histories."
1. "The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government, to 1952." This is a 12 volume history, classified Secret. As indicated in the abstract, this history does not deal with specific sensitive operations in detail. However, it does describe the NSC decision, in the late 1940's, to assign covert activities to the CIA. The history has not been formally approved by the CIA.

2. "Organizational History of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1950-1953." This is a ten volume series.

3. "CIA Support Functions: Organization and Accomplishments of the DDA-DDS Group, 1953-1956." This is a four volume limited sequel to the previous item, and deals exclusively with internal support activities of the CIA.

4. "General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence, 1950-1953." This is a five volume history of General Smith's tenure as DCI. It includes one volume on "External Relations" dealing with Smith's relations with the President, the NSC, other intelligence agencies, Congress and foreign intelligence services.

5. "Allen Welsh Dulles as Director of Central Intelligence, 26 February 1953-29 November 1961." This is a five volume history of Dulles' tenure as DCI. One volume discusses covert action undertaken under Dulles (including the Bay of Pigs) and another volume discusses in detail "Intelligence Support of Policy," including the 1956 Suez crisis and the "missile gap."

6. "The Office of the Inspector General, January 1952-December 1971." This is a one volume history (approved by the CIA's Inspector General) describing the function of the IG staff over a two decade period. As noted in the abstract, it discusses a 1962 USIB study of the performance of intelligence agencies during the Cuban missile crisis.
7. "Office of Reports and Estimates, 1946-1951." This is a five volume history describing the origins of the research and analysis function in the CIA. It is basically a history of bureaucratic jurisdictional disputes.

8. "The Origin and Development of the Contract Division, 11 July 1946-1 July 1965." This is a one volume history (approved by the CIA) describing the history of contracts with nongovernmental sectors.

9. "Internal Audit of the CIA, 1947-1967." This is a five volume history (approved by the CIA) describing the evolution of the internal accounting system used by the CIA in connection with its responsibilities for certifying expenditures.


11. "Development of Economic Intelligence in the Office of Research and Reports, 1950-1972." This is a three volume history describing in detail the growth (up to 1967) of the CIA's capability in economic intelligence. It discusses in detail some sensitive issues, including a generalized analysis of the capability of Soviet economy to support a modern war machine.

II. Histories which should be reviewed internally before decisions are made (Tab D)

1. "The 1967 Crisis in Action Operations: The Ramparts Exposure." This is a one volume history relating to the CIA's contacts with the National Student Association and the Katzenbach Committee Report.

2. 

3. "Intelligence Support for President-Elect Richard M. Nixon, 19 November 1968-17 January 1969." This is a one volume
chronology of the support operation set up by the Intelligence Directorate of CIA for briefing the staff of the President-Elect. It includes many comments in the nature of "sour grapes."
SECRET

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES


2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: Central Intelligence Agency

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Twelve-volume history

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Secret

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: Should have

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: This history describes in great detail (12 volumes) the origins of the US central intelligence organization, beginning with William J. Donovan's first proposals to President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1941 and ending with the early part of DCI Walter B. Smith's tenure of 1950.

   It describes the organization of the Coordination of Information, the Office of Strategic Services, and the Strategic Services Unit through the end of the war. It is not a history of the activities of these units.

   It reviews the decisions by President Harry S. Truman to establish the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) under DCI Sydney Souers. It traces the evolution of various proposals from various departments and agencies on the structure of a central intelligence machinery and the central issue of individual vs. collective responsibility for national intelligence.

   The history traces the development of CIG under DCIs Souers and Hoyt Vandenberg, and it reviews actions by the White House and by the Congress which led to the enactment of the National Security Act of 1947 and the CIA Act of 1949.

   (con't on p. 2)

7. REQUESTOR/DATE OF REQUEST: William Bader, Select Committee Staff, on 10 April 1975 after reviewing list of CIA histories

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: Central Intelligence Agency

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION:

DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exemplied
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.5
NR# 00-024-1111
CIA (Jul 7/97)

By: djd NARA Date: 3/16/90

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10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: CIA Historian

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS:

The arguments over the subordination of the DCI, the functions of the new central intelligence authority, and the issue of collective vs. individual responsibility for national intelligence revealed sharp divisions within the US government. These are the labor pains which seem to accompany the birth of any new organization charged with a chore which appears to impinge on the prerogatives of old, established agencies and functions.

In addition to President Truman, the NSC staff played a major role in shaping the structure and determining the responsibilities and functions of the new agency.

This history does not deal with specific, sensitive operations in detail. It does describe how, more than 25 years ago, the decision was made by the NSC to assign covert activities to CIA.

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS (con't)

This history describes the evolution of the research and analysis function in CIA and the imposition by the National Security Council of responsibility for covert activities in support of overt national security policies. It describes the various studies of the national security machinery, recommendations for change, and actual changes made.

The history ends with an account of how DCI Smith moved to establish firm internal control, to set up an independent national estimating activity, and to clarify the role of the Intelligence Advisory Committee and the DCI.
MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: "Organizational History of the Central
   Intelligence Agency, 1950-1953"

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: Central Intelligence
   Agency

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Ten-volume history

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Secret

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: Should have

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: The title describes this history quite
   accurately. The time period corresponds to DCI Smith's tenure of
   office. It describes in great detail (10 volumes) the internal
   changes in CIA imposed by the DCI in the interests of tighter
   management; in responding to the demands of the Korean war; and to
   deal with the results of numerous surveys of the new central intel-
   ligence organization.

   The history "is concerned only incidentally with the Agency's
   clandestine activities." It also does not deal in detail with any
   major substantive issues on the analytical side.

7. REQUESTOR/DATE OF REQUEST: William Bader, Select
   Committee Staff, on 10 April 1975 after reviewing list of
   CIA histories

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: Central Intelligence Agency

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION:
10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: CIA Historian

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS:

During this period under DCI Smith, the role of CIA and the DCI were consolidated and strengthened, both by the explicit statutory authority in the Acts of 1947 and 1949, and by Smith's firm grasp of his individual responsibility for national intelligence. Departmental views continued to diverge, and wrangling within the intelligence community persisted.

The National Security Council (NSC) continued as the ultimate authority for specifying CIA and intelligence community authorities under the terms of the National Security Act of 1947. The NSC also received and acted on several independent surveys of the national intelligence organization.

The President continued to receive intelligence support, principally in a series of national intelligence estimates and in a daily intelligence summary prepared by CIA. The President was not involved in any major changes in the structure and functions of the national intelligence machinery.
MATERIAL FOR THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES


2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: Central Intelligence Agency

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Four-volume history

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Secret

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: Should have

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: This is a comprehensive review of the structure and activities of the support and management elements of CIA from 1953 to 1956. It is a sequel, with respect to support activities, to a predecessor history: "Organizational History of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1950-1953."

Topics covered include finance, personnel, training, logistics, and communications.

7. REQUESTOR/DATE OF REQUEST: William Bader, Select Committee Staff, on 10 April 1975 after reviewing list of CIA histories

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: Central Intelligence Agency

9. DATE OF RELEASE:

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: CIA Historian

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS:

None are identified. The history deals exclusively with internal activities of the CIA. Relations with other agencies are described only in most general terms. Top level executives outside the Agency were not involved and are not mentioned.
1. TITLE/SUBJECT: "General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence, October 1950 - February 1953

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: Central Intelligence Agency

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Five-volume history

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Secret

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: Should have

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: This history covers the same time period as "Organizational History of the Central Intelligence Agency 1950-1953," but the background of the authors is so different that the histories read as though the writers had visited different countries. This history of DCI Smith concentrates on the central issues of how Smith put the concept of CIA into being and how Smith created the machinery for making national intelligence estimates.

    Thus, the history is concerned primarily with tracing the evolution of the concept of national intelligence and for carrying the recommendations in 1950 of a NSC Survey Group for improving US national intelligence. It details Smith's steps to improve central command and control over CIA and to clarify his role with the Intelligence Advisory Committee. It also deals with his reorganization of the Agency in response to the NSC recommendations and with the evolution of the role of the clandestine services, with particular reference to the Korean war emergency.

    This history has one entire volume (107 pages) on external relations, including the President, the NSC, the members of the intelligence community, Congress, and foreign intelligence services.

7. REQUESTOR/DATE OF REQUEST: William Bader, Select Committee Staff, on 10 April 1975 after reviewing list of CIA histories

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: Central Intelligence Agency

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION:
The volume on external relations, based largely on the author's direct knowledge, set forth in rich detail DCI Smith's personal dealings with top government officials. Other portions of the history set forth explicit details on the Agency authorities for conducting covert actions and describes in rather general terms the nature of these activities,
MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: "Allen Welsh Dulles as Director of Central Intelligence, 26 February 1953 - 29 November 1961"

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: Central Intelligence Agency

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Five-volume history

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Secret, Top Secret

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: Should have

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: This history covers the tenure of DCI Allen W. Dulles. Although it claims to be selective and to deal only with major problems, its detail (5 volumes) provides a close scrutiny of all the Agency's major activities as well as DCI Dulles' dealings with the White House as the NSC's principal foreign intelligence advisor.

   Dulles served the longest term so far as DCI. In addition to consolidating the internal structure begun under DCI Smith, Dulles refined his relations with the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) and his role in the production of national intelligence. His first love was covert action, and his tenure covered support for Cuban exiles, ending in the Bay of Pigs.

   In a TOP SECRET volume, this history details the role of intelligence in the Suez crisis of 1956, in the missile gap, and in the U-2 program, ending in the 1 May 1960 shutdown.

   This history describes Dulles' actions in connection with Senator McCarthy's allegations about the Agency; his dealings with Congress in general; and his handling of recommendations by various survey groups.

7. REQUESTOR/DATE OF REQUEST: William Bader, Select Committee Staff, on 10 April 1975 after reviewing list of CIA histories

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: Central Intelligence Agency

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION:
10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: CIA Historian

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS:

The emphasis of this history is on DCI Dulles as a dominant personality with a keen interest in covert actions and a respected advisor to top government policymakers. Thus, it stresses the personal relations and is quite explicit on the details of certain covert activities undertaken at the direction of the NSC and with the special approval of a senior interdepartmental group.

It is not comprehensive. For example, this history does not touch on the origins of the U-2 program.
MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES


2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: Central Intelligence Agency

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: One-volume history

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: Should have

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: This history describes the functions of the inspection staff over a period of almost 20 years. Although it focuses primarily on the personal leadership of the various inspectors-general, the history also contains descriptions of several major issues subjected to inspection.

7. REQUESTOR/DATE OF REQUEST: William Bader, Select Committee Staff, on 10 April 1975 after reviewing list of CIA histories

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: Central Intelligence Agency

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION:

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[Stamp: Classified by:]

[Stamp: Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of October 19, 1975.]

[Stamp: Controlled Distribution.]

[Stamp: vocals.]
10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: CIA Historian

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS:

This history is concerned largely with internal CIA matters. However, one major project of the inspection staff was the preparation in 1952 of a USIS study on the intelligence community's handling of intelligence during the Cuban missile crisis. This report narrates and evaluates the performance of several departments and agencies in support of national security policy.
1. TITLE/SUBJECT: "Office of Reports and Estimates, 1946-51"

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: Central Intelligence Agency

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Five-volume history

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: Should have

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: This history describes in great detail the origins of the research and analysis function in CIG and CIA. The period in question was marked by internal bickering and a divergence of views throughout the government on the role of CIA and the nature of national intelligence. This history is more concerned with jurisdictional issues than with substance.

7. REQUESTOR/DATE OF REQUEST: William Bader, Select Committee Staff, on 10 April 1975 after reviewing list of CIA histories

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: Central Intelligence Agency

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION:
10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: CIA Historian

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS:

Two primary functions of ORE from the beginning were the publication of a daily intelligence summary for the President and the formulation of the first national intelligence estimates. These functions are described in some detail.
MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: "The Origin and Development of Contact
Division, 11 July 1945 - 1 July 1965"

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: Central Intelligence
Agency

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: One-volume history

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: Should have

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: One of the first functions assigned
to CI and CIA, as a service of common concern, was that of
establishing contact with non-governmental sectors as a source
of foreign intelligence. This history describes some 20 years of
that function.

7. REQUESTOR/DATE OF REQUEST: William Bader, Select
Committee Staff, on 10 April 1975 after reviewing list of
CIA histories

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: Central Intelligence Agency

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION:

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10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: CIA Historian

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS:

Although domestic contacts has become a controversial subject, this history conveys an impression of a relatively smooth-functioning activity, both within the Agency and in its external relations. Direct involvement with the White House has been minimal; relations with the intelligence community generally harmonious.
SECRET

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: "Internal Audit of the Central Intelligence
   Agency, 1947-67"

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: Central Intelligence
   Agency

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: One-volume history

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: Should have

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: This history describes the evolution
   of the accounting system used by the Agency in carrying out its
   responsibilities for certifying its expenditures, especially of

7. REQUESTOR/DATE OF REQUEST: William Badez, Select
   Committee Staff, on 10 April 1975 after reviewing list of
   CIA histories

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: Central Intelligence Agency

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION:

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10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: CIA Historian

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS:

This history is concerned exclusively with internal procedures.
MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES


2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: Central Intelligence Agency

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: One-volume history

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: Should have

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: This history traces the evolution of CIA's daily intelligence publication from the founding of the Office of Current Intelligence in 1951 to 1967. Although it emphasizes organizational changes, it also describes the substance of many current intelligence crises. It details some of the arguments that went on both inside CIA and between CIA and DIA and occasionally the State Department as guidelines for coverage and coordination were worked out.

7. REQUESTOR/DATE OF REQUEST: William Bader, Select Committee Staff, on 10 April 1975 after reviewing list of CIA histories

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: Central Intelligence Agency

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION:

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10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: CIA Historian

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS:

Since the primary recipient of the daily intelligence summary since 1946 has been the President of the United States, this history describes relations with the Executive Office. In 1958, the daily publication was converted to a bulletin produced in coordination with members of the intelligence community. This relationship is described in some detail.
MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: "Development of Economic Intelligence in the Office of Research and Reports, 1950-1972"

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: Central Intelligence Agency

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: three-volume history

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Secret

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: Should have

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: This history describes the origins and growth of CIA's competence in economic intelligence from the beginnings until 1967. It is not merely a description of the organization and its function. It describes in detail the major substantive issues; for example, the analysis of the capability of the Soviet economy to support a modern war machine. The history analyzes carefully the divergent views of the intelligence community members and provides an objective evaluation of their performance.

7. REQUESTOR/DATE OF REQUEST: William Bader, Select Committee Staff, on 10 April 1975 after reviewing list of CIA histories

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: Central Intelligence Agency

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION:

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10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: CIA Historian

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS:

This history deals with intelligence support for national security policy, such as the so-called bomber and missile gaps and economic aspects of foreign relations with the major Communist countries. Thus, it describes relations with the National Security Council and other members of the intelligence community and sets forth judgments and evaluations of these relations.
1. TITLE/SUBJECT: "The 1967 Crisis in Covert Action Operations The Ramparts Exposure"

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: Central Intelligence Agency

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: One-volume history

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: Should have

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: This is a chronology of events which led to the exposure of CIA's contacts with the National Students Association and of the Agency's funding mechanisms. It is basically a compilation of facts and stands as a reference paper to a companion study, "The 1967 Reappraisal and Readjustment in Covert Action Operations; the Katzenbach Committee Report." This latter study includes an evaluation of a water-shed in the Agency's covert actions role.

7. REQUESTOR/DATE OF REQUEST: William Bader, Select Committee Staff, on 10 April 1975 after reviewing list of CIA histories

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: Central Intelligence Agency

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION:
10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: CIA Historian

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS:

This history is more of a reference guide than anything else. It lists events as they happened without analysis. It does not list the involvement of top-level executives during the period covered.

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: Central Intelligence Agency

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Two-volume history

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: Should have

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: This history describes the Agency's activities and cites specific high-level approvals for all phases of the operation. It is an accurate account of a major covert action in support of overt national security policy, as authorized by top government officials.

7. REQUESTOR/DATE OF REQUEST: William Bader, Select Committee Staff, on 10 April 1975 after reviewing list of CIA histories

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: Central Intelligence Agency

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION:
10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: CIA Historian

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS:

This history describes the role of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson as well as the role of their close advisors in the White House and elsewhere in the executive branch. It also describes in rich detail actions taken by the Agency in carrying out its assigned mission.

Much of this information has since been leaked to the public.

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: OCI/DDI/CIA


4. CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET SENSITIVE, No Foreign Dissem, Handle via "Codeword" Channels Only

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: Should have

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

This is basically a straightforward chronology of the DDI support operation in New York for President-elect Richard M. Nixon. It details the origin of the operation, the information that was provided to the President-elect's staff, the office set-up and communications with Headquarters, and the relations between DDI/NY and key members of the President-elect's staff. Dr. Kissinger is the central figure.

7. DATE OF REQUEST:

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: DDI/DCI

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION:

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: OCI/DDI Historical Board

11. PROBLEM AREAS:

This is a very candid account of DDI/NY's successes and failures in dealing with the President-elect's staff. Names are named, and Dr. Kissinger might regard some of this material as "sensitive." It also notes, somewhat critically, a briefing provided by the JCS for the President-elect's staff.
SECRET

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT:

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: Central Intelligence Agency

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: One-volume history

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: Should have

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

7. REQUESTOR/DATE OF REQUEST: William Bader, Select Committee Staff, on 10 April 1975 after reviewing list of CIA histories

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: Central Intelligence Agency

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION:

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10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: CIA Historian

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROGRAMS:

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MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: [Blank]

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: Central Intelligence Agency

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: One-volume history

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: Should have

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: This history is not accurate nor comprehensive. The author played a limited, special role, and his account of events reflects his limited perspective. A new version is in draft which does provide a more authoritative account.

7. REQUESTOR/DATE OF REQUEST: William Bader, Select Committee Staff, on 10 April 1975 after reviewing list of CIA histories

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: Central Intelligence Agency

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION:

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library
10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: CIA Historian

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS:

Since the author's viewpoint was limited, his account of the involvement of top-level US officials in this operation is superficial. This history is not a valid description of events.