TELCON
Joe Sisco/HAK
6/11/75 - 11:24 p.m.

K: Joe, where do you think all this leads us now, nowhere.

S: Oh, I think absolutely nowhere. I see low gears and I doubt we're going to get anything tomorrow morning. I really don't Henry. I hope I'm wrong.

K: And they just put on this big act for what?

S: Well, largely because they think they have to go through it and he keeps saying the same thing. We're for peace but he can't cough up anything and he can't even answer the question straight. I thought that was a horrible performance tonight.

K: You do.

S: I really honestly do on that.

K: I tell you, I was almost blind with rage. To have to sit there. You were in Moscow with me weren't you when they were sending us the misleading information.

S: Of course, and I'm glad you straightened out the record in that regard. And you happen to know what the situation was and they mislead us while we were in Moscow.

K: And to send out.... And also to give us that -- the way he talked about the Egyptian disengagement with me sitting there is an outrage.

S: I thought it was an insult frankly to make the point that there would be no steps toward peace up to now. Well, I just thought it was a very bad performance. I came home with and maybe we're all prejudice, but I came home with Roy Atherton and Bob Oakley and they felt it was just a bad show. I'll tell you what did come through, I think we've achieved the right kind of atmosphere. We've achieved a certain cordiality but it isn't like it used to be and I thought the President's toast was very restrained.

K: I warmed it up a little bit. You should have seen the first...
S: It was more restrained than that?

K: Yes.

S: Good Lord Henry, it was restrained enough as it was. And therefore, they cannot be in any kind of a great mood. Except if they'd made up their minds that impasse is inevitable.

K: I called Dinitz a few minutes ago. I said look, we've got two hours tomorrow morning to get this thing worked out. We've now had enough rhetoric. We've got to get down to cases.

S: Yes. And what did he say.

K: "OHHHHHHHHHHH, I thought it went very well." I said, I didn't.

S: Well, Henry, I wouldn't myself press them because I don't think if they're going to do something they're going to have to come to it. But you see, what I don't honestly know is whether they've basically made up their minds to really ride out the next 18 months. It's that crucial question that you and I have been anguishing over.

K: Look, I had gotten to the view that we are better off going for an overall one. You can see the nature of the attack but you also have a lot of pluses. Then I was willing to go for an interim but if the interim is going to turn into a nightmare.

S: Well, even though they may very well determine this by not giving you anything in particular and secondly, they can determine it by making the price prohibitive. Those are the two things that we need to see tomorrow morning. And I'm not at all saying it. The only little nibble that I've gotten that sounds like there is a line is as follows: The General on my left said, well what would be wrong with the Egyptians in one end of the pass and the Israelis in another end of the pass with the UN in the middle. Now, you know you raised that question this morning. You got a most inconclusive answer to say the least. But I have now had that raised twice. Once by Gazit and once by this fellow which leads me to believe that somebody in the Israeli Government may be talking along these lines. Now that is still a possibility.

K: I swear to you if that's what they'll do I think they've really gone crazy.

S: Well, it will be interesting to see whether he comes up with that.
K: I think the Egyptians would love it.

S: I think they would too. Because that would bring them right into the passes.

K: That would give them some real bulge of territory.

S: You're darn right. But if they should come up with that it's something I can see we could play with.

K: You wait. How they'll define the entrance and exists to the passes.

S: You wait. How they'll define the entrance and exists to the passes.

K: You wait. How they'll define the entrance and exists to the passes.

S: God help us.

K: They'll probably start the entrance at the pass in Mersa Matruh. All -- that's the first elevation out of the Canal.

S: All I can say is you'd better get a very specific line on both ends. Oh dear. I must say the President did very well for him to throw out that question. It was such a good point it crested at the beginning.

K: What on the defensive line?

S: Right, the defensive borders. You know you talk about defensive borders.

K: He was pretty good at the end too. I've forgotten -- they don't like Geneva. And of course they did so great in kilometer 101 when they were in direct talks without anyone present.

S: Well, I thought that was a pretty good point too and I must say I think he's handled it admirably.

K: You know he doesn't like them anymore.

S: I tell you, they're very difficult to like at this point.

K: But was Golda ever that obnoxious?

S: You know, when they get dug in it's typical. You know the atmosphere gets pretty stiff and they get irritated and so on, but they couldn't have come away happy with that point. They couldn't have come away happy. And I think tomorrow morning it will be the proof of the pudding and I think we've got to be extremely careful that whatever they give us if they give us anything that it's precisely understand.
and I think that it will be left -- what will come out is he'll go back
and talk to the Cabinet. But I doubt that he is going to leave saying
he's going to talk to the Cabinet about anything very precise. And
I think myself that we've going to be left in a rather ambiguous
situation.

K: Then, the president has to tell them. What is this tomorrow the
12th?

S: We need an answer in two weeks.

K: That we must have an answer by the 26th.

S: And ...

K: It must be precise.

S: It must be precise. I would add, if you agree, that....

K: We will have to tell him. I will tell him in the morning. I have
to fix a date for Gromyko. I will fix it July 7th or 8th. By that
time I have to know whether we're going for an interim agreement
or whether we're going for an overall. When I say I have to know
we're going for an interim agreement I must be 98 percent sure
because I'm not going to play an interim line with Gromyko again.

S: It isn't enough for them to say okay.

K: No, no, that's what he tried out for me at dinner. He said my
assessment is wrong. He said why don't you take a trip through
the area. Stop at Heath place once and after that assess it and
then come back a month later.

S: Oh boy. That was the first trip that we took last February.

K: Look, it's out of the question.

S: Completely out of the question. And He can't be serious about it.

K: He was serious. I turned it down. But don't you think at breakfast
I ought to tell him exactly where we stand?

S: Yes. And you're the only one that really can tell him in precise
terms. And then I think we need a straight answer but Henry don't
be too disappointed. I don't think you're going to get a straight
answer tomorrow morning.
K: No, so far I have managed to keep the President out.

S: That's right. I noticed that today and I think you want to keep it that way because Henry, if the result is going to be inconclusive, and in my judgment, it is, it ought to remain inconclusive between he and the President. And I think you should do what the President has asked that you would try to do with him in the aftermath of today's meeting and if it doesn't work you report this to the President. And that little line that we suggested in this page and a half memorandum we sent to you tonight for the President, that's the line we ought to lay out.

K: I'm not going to give it to him until I've checked.

S: No, I think you'll hold it. Henry, you ought to use it as a talking paper as you may or may not need it.

K: You know another infuriating thing to me Joe is how they've handled the Golan book.

S: Yes.

K: They have yet to tell me what's in it.

S: They haven't said a word to you?

K: Well, I asked them on the way in from the airport and he said well, we'll discuss it with you tomorrow. We'll give you some references. You know. Supposing the French government had had a leak like this. I'm not talking about the British.

S: But Henry, let me give you some personal advice. Don't show too much interest in it because they'll begin to get the idea that you're really worried about it.

K: No, I'm not going to talk to them about it.

S: Because you know that's all that they need to get, that kind of a feeling. What's there is there and if there is anything there that they want to try to play blackmail with it's there and I doubt that they're in a position really to use it in that way.

K: I'm positive they can't but I want to use it as a slight counter-blackmail.

S: Yes. Well, I must say. Maybe the girls had a better time on the boat.
K: Are they back?
S: She just walked in and I haven't even had a chance.
K: Okay. Well, I'd better go home. I'll see you at 7:45 at Blair House.
S: Thank you very much for calling.