TELECON
The President/The Secretary
June 15, 1975
Time: 3:20 p.m.

K: How are you Mr. President?

F: Well, it has been fine up here, but I am worried.

K: I had a two hour talk with Rabin and he said he was very shaken by your call and message. He talked in conciliatory terms. He had no authority to go beyond what he gave us, he said. He said he would present it to the Cabinet and maybe have an answer on Saturday. There is no question they will do something. I was polite but he said what can we do? I said that we would try to work on a common strategy, but that we couldn't give any assurances.

F: I was offended by his attitude.

K: I have felt the same way.

F: He gave the impression of saying we gave something and you can take it or not.

K: First of all, he didn't give very much. One unusable coastal road and two outposts. They might help Sadat if he wants to fake an achievement. I would rather take the 450 million in all.

F: As the visceral reaction, we ought to be very tough and not only do it substantively but let it be known through unauthorized sources that we are going for a comprehensive program.

K: Let's give them until Saturday evening.

F: If we had been stronger, we might have gotten results.

K: The mistake is mine, Mr. President. I misled you on Thursday. When I told you I thought we had a chance, you stopped and that made them tough again. But, you know, he can't do anything until he meets with his Cabinet.
F: Aren't we better off to say we are disappointed and go for the comprehensive?

K: Not yet. Let's attempt to keep both options open. Let's be prepared for both.

F: You handle that aspect but between you and me the orders are we have got to prepare for the overall.

K: I think that is right but it may be the best all around. I had a good meeting with the Jewish leaders. I said if it gets into a position where you must choose to fight the Jews or the Americans the President will be a tough man to fight. I think the Israelis or the Jewish community can't survive the struggle. They were still meeting when I left them at 2:30. They had cancelled their plane reservations to see what they could do. I told them we may go for an overall. I gave them a detailed account of the negotiations and said they can't play games with the President and survive.

F: The odds are, I think if you are realistic, 60/40 that we have to go for the overall.

K: That is right. The only thing is how to get into it. We should play out the interim approach until Sadat turns it down. We should also tell him that we are ready to go for an overall. I think he would prefer one more move before we go for the overall.

F: Do you think the Israelis would turn down something that I proposed.

K: That I don't think. But you shouldn't put yourself on the line yet. You have requested that they change their position -- they have to turn it down or come up with something else. If you force them into an interim and then an overall, it will be domestically harder for you. If you put us behind anything you must make them do it.

F: Right.
K: I really think the integrity of our foreign policy is getting involved.

F: That burns the hell out of me. They can't win the confrontation between the Congress and the President.

K: The Congress may start pulling away from it.

F: Let's say that I am very disappointed.

K: We shouldn't say it yet.

F: You handle it but if it comes to me that is what I will say.

K: We ought to get into it coolly and wait two or three days to see what they come back with. If we propose it now Sadat won't accept it.

F: You handle that diplomatic maneuvering but there is no question how I feel.

K: The way in which they treated us I find outrageous.

F: The only way to handle it is to be mad about it. If you and Sisco want to moderate my feelings ....

K: We don't want to. I would recommend, however, moderating your expressions for a couple of days.

F: I am telling you how I feel about it.

K: I feel the same way. I realized on Thursday night, and that ripped it with me. I will tell you later how I found out that they were talking about the eastern end of the passes.

F: My impression was the eastern end of the passes.

K: I said we have made progress, but I was wrong. Basically their proposal was the same as the one in March,
F: We can't do anything in the eastern end of the passes.

K: Now that they pretend that it was the eastern end there is no change at all.

F: I think we were misled.

K: I think that we were set up. They had a nice meeting.

F: And then we would have been called collaborators.

K: We would have been in deep trouble. The honorable way would have been to set a rigid line and then said no.

F: Any contacts that you or anybody else has say that I am disappointed.

K: I don't mind telling it to Dinitz.

F: We are on the right side.

K: This sequence of events puts you in a stronger position. The stations are good.

F: It is a plus.

K: If all else fails, we can always go to the overall. I told that to the Jewish leaders today.

F: To say that I had agreed to put military personnel in there shows we were serious. I think we should be firm on it.

K: I think there is nothing so good as a confrontation that you win.

F: Yes to be on the right side and win.

K: I was at dinner with John Chancellor the other evening and they have been surveying around the country. He says you are very strong. You have honesty and decency and these attributes have increased your strength.
F: I haven't seen his survey yet. We had a good day at Fort Benning and a good meeting with the Republican Party people afterwards. Even two weeks ago Reagen was down there, but despite that the leaders came out 80/20 on our behalf. It was the right time.

K: I think so. It will break one way or the other in the next two weeks.

F: I think we ought to say that we wanted a different result.

K: Even if they accept it.

F: Yes. We were hopeful that they would agree to an interim.

K: They will not be able to say we went for an overall out of vanity.

F: I think for us to throw in the UN warning station proves our credibility.

K: That is on the record now. One other matter -- the ILO is voting to censure Chile and some Latin Americans are voting against it. I recommend we abstain. The ILO has admitted the PLO and I just think it is a political vote.

F: I was mad the way they admitted the PLO. I don't like it. I don't see why we should be pummeled by the ILO in this case. Our position of strength comes from abstainion

K: There will not be many countries with us.

F: I am not worried.

K: I think the more we can push into the left position the better off we are.

F: Dick Bowling is going to take the lead and try to end the House Investigating Committee.
K: That is excellent.

F: I haven't talked to him yet. That Committee is such a mess. Nedze on one side and Harrington on the other.

K: We can't stand any more investigations.

F: Church isn't making any headway.

K: Now he is saying no Presidential involvement. That is like saying none in Watergate.

F: I remember reading things that challenge his credibility. He is not good enough to handle it.

K: He may be saying these things so he can get more television time. He is on the wrong issue.

F: I think he is factually wrong.

K: Right. Harriman said that what is happening is an outrage. He is making speeches about it.

F: And his prestige is still good. I will see you in the morning.

K: Right.

F: Thank you for calling. You handle the diplomatic side.

K: They didn't treat us decently. If they had there would be something we could do. But to say that the eastern part isn't anything west of the ridge.

F: Make them feel that I am an SOB.

K: That will be hard to do.

F: O.K. Henry, see you in the morning.

K: O.K.