DoD Information Review Task Force-2:
Initial Assessment

G-NE: Impacts Resulting from the Compromise of Classified Material
by a Former NSA Contractor

18 December 2013

Information Review Task Force-2
Defense Intelligence Agency
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(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

This report presents the Information Review Task Force-2's (IRTF-2's) initial assessment of impact to the Department of Defense (DoD) from the compromise of classified files by a former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor. The IRTF-2 and Defense component partners continue triaging and reviewing the compromised information for Defense equities and will update this report as additional assessments are completed. Combatant Commands (CCMDs) and Services have produced separate reports that provide greater details concerning the potential impact of the compromise on their respective equities. We have included those available in the Annex. It should be noted that SIGINT-specific equities are not addressed in this report; NSA is reviewing those separately.
(U) BACKGROUND:

A former NSA contractor compromised information from NSA Net and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence
Communications System (JWICS). On 6 June 2013, media groups published the first stories
based on this material, and on 9 June 2013 they identified the source as an NSA contractor who
had worked in Hawaii.

- (U//FOUO) On 11 July 2013, LTG Flynn directed establishment of the Information
  Review Task Force 2 (IRTF-2) to acquire, triage, analyze, and assess all DIA and DoD
  compromised information.

- (U//FOUO) Since 11 July 2013, IRTF-2 has led a coordinated DoD effort to discover,
  triage, and assess the impact of non-NSA Defense material from NSA holdings of
  compromised data.

(U//FOUO) As of 18 December 2013, the federated IRTF-2 assessment community includes:
U.S. Intelligence Capability

The scope of the compromised knowledge related to U.S. intelligence capabilities is staggering.
Annex A: Terms of Reference
Chart Classified: For Official Use Only

Compromised: Out of Government Control

Disclosed: Made available to the public via the media, or to a foreign adversary

Person of Interest (POI): Term used to refer to former NSA contractor associated with leak of classified material, separation of impact assessment and investigation; use of term in briefings and correspondence limits legally discoverable information

Levels of Impact: Derived from Executive Order 12958 and

(U) By Classification Guidance

(U) The United States Classification system is currently established under Executive Order (EO) 12958, as amended, and has three levels of classification — Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret.
(U) As specified in EO 12958, as amended, information may be classified at one of the following three levels:

- Top Secret shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to national security.
- Secret shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to national security.
- Confidential shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to national security.

(U) By CI Damage Definitions

(U) Responsibility for national assessments was assigned to by the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 and reaffirmed by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004

(U) Four Major Categories

3 Per ONCIX:
Annex D

(b)(3): 10 USC 424, (b)
(3): 50 USC 3024(i)
Annex E

(b)(3): 10 USC 424, (b)
(3): 50 USC 3024(l)
Annex F

(b)(3): 10 USC 424, (b) (3): 50 USC 3024(i)
Annex G: Distribution
Chart Classified: For Official Use Only

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security
Director for Intelligence, J2, Joint Staff

Department of the Army
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
Department of the Navy
Headquarters, U.S. Air Force
Department of the Navy
U.S. Coast Guard
Headquarters, U.S. Air Force
U.S. Africa Command

U.S. Central Command
U.S. Cyber Command
U.S. European Command
U.S. Northern Command
U.S. Pacific Command
U.S. Strategic Command
U.S. Transportation Command
U.S. Southern Command
U.S. Special Operations Command

Office of Director of National Intelligence