I. Objective:

The Director of Central Intelligence stated at his confirmation hearings on 26 April 1995 that he intends "to consolidate the management" of all Community imagery activities to improve "both effectiveness and economy by managing imagery in a manner similar to the National Security Agency." To achieve this objective, the DCI is establishing a task force to determine the most effective way to manage imagery collection, processing, exploitation, analysis, and distribution.

II. Key Assumptions:

The Task Force will begin its work with the following key assumptions:

- That the National Imagery Agency (NIA) will supersede the Central Imagery Office and will have strengthened authorities in the area of imagery policy, planning, and the development of a US Imagery System (USIS); it will also have a greater role in imagery program execution, including collection, tasking, processing, exploitation, analysis, and distribution.

- That the NIA will have increased authority for program management and budget execution of all imagery-related activities contained in the NTIP, JNIP, and TIARA programs which will allow for more effective and efficient allocation of resources and more responsiveness to customer needs across the national and tactical spectrum.

- That all organizations in the imagery community will be examined in relation to their role within the NIA. At a minimum, the NIA will be formed from the Central Imagery Office, Defense Mapping Agency, the National Photographic Interpretation Center, and portions of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Services.

- That there will be no erosion of the quality or quantity of either national or tactical imagery support provided to the policymakers or military commanders.
III. Specific Task Force Tasks

- Develop the functional objectives for the NIA and the criteria for evaluating different options for its formulation.

- Evaluate the authority NIA should have for policies, standards, and architecture for development and acquisition of imagery-related, end-to-end, airborne and space-borne capabilities compared to that which is currently vested in both national and tactical imagery organizations.

- Review the Imagery Blue Ribbon Task Force (the Burnett Panel) report, the CIO's US Imagery System Architectural Migration Plan (UAMP), and other relevant studies; assess initiatives undertaken as a result of these reports; identify continuing shortfalls and enduring strengths.

- Compare the management of imagery at the national and tactical levels with the NSA model for managing signals intelligence and the US SIGINT System (USSS).

IV. Development of Options/Key Issues

- The Task Force will develop a range of options, with pros and cons for each option, ranging from a CIO with strengthened authorities to a highly centralized NIA with programming and budget execution authority for all aspects of the USIS. In developing the options, the following key issues should be addressed:

  -- The balance between the strategic national needs of the policymaker and the warfighting needs of the military commander, down to and below the Joint Task Force component commander level; support required to both in peacetime, crisis, and wartime.

  -- The relationship of the NIA to other collection disciplines (SIGINT, MASINT, HUMINT, and Open Source), and all-source production centers in order to develop optimal processes for the utilization of imagery and imagery products.

  -- Imagery's role as a primary source for supporting multiple applications and missions, ranging from production of national-level analytic intelligence and MC&G (including global geospatial mapping information and Services production functions) to
combat mission planning, weapons system targeting, and damage assessment.

-- NIA's responsibilities as the central focal point for developing and designing imagery products for its multiple missions.

In looking at a range of options, the Task Force will review the management of imagery exploitation to include:

-- Distribution of imagery analytical resources to support both policymakers and warfighters in peacetime, crisis, and wartime.

-- Maintenance of a relationship between imagery analysis and the all-source analysis process, including the production of competitive imagery analysis.

Investigate the extent of NIA's authority and responsibility for conducting research and development and systems acquisition, including:

-- Acquisition authorities of the NIA and the need for an acquisition infrastructure.

-- Integration of MC&G-related R&D and system acquisition.

-- Relationship of NIA to system developers.

-- Exploitation analysis tools, dissemination, and archives.

Consider the requirements of, and interaction between, the NIA and national and tactical users including:

-- Assurance of effective dissemination of imagery and imagery product to the national and tactical customers.

-- Contributions and interactions of military commanders' organic imagery assets with the NIA.

-- Consider the NIA's interaction with non-Defense agencies/departments.

-- Optimal organizational structure to support the commanders (e.g., NSA's Cryptologic Support Group model) and national users.
Review the support structure, facilities, and personnel required by the NIA, including:

-- Optimal organization of all imagery resources to support the customer.

-- Alternative strategies for career service affiliations of the various personnel who would be transferred to the NIA upon its formation.

-- Determine the extent that the staffing of the NIA reflects a balance among those organizations currently comprising the US imagery community.

-- Responsibilities for the policy, planning, and programmatic regarding the training and development of DoD and Agency imagery professionals.

-- Cost/benefit of consolidating imagery facilities and support services, including security, logistics, communications, training, etc.

Consider the delineation of the authorities of the Secretary of Defense and the DCI in the subordination, management, and budgetary oversight of NIA, including:

-- The DCI's role in providing national-level guidance and tasking as well as his authority over the NIA's budget.

-- The overall resources controlled by the NIA at the national and tactical levels.

-- The relationship of the NIA to the NIP, JMIP, and TIARA programs.

Examine the NIA's role as manager of the USIS in coordinating the policies as appropriate for the sharing of imagery data and products with foreign countries as well as sales of US commercial imagery abroad.

Review NIA's role in establishing imagery security policy, to include classification of imagery and imagery products.

V. Organization/Management of Review

A Steering Group shall be established and chaired by the Executive Director for Intelligence Community Affairs; its membership will include principals or
designated representatives of the following organizations:

Executive Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Director, National Security Agency
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I
UnderSecretary of Defense for Acquisition
Director, National Reconnaissance Office
Director, Central Imagery Office
Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
Director, Office of Non-Proliferation,
Department of Energy
Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research
Director, Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office
Director, Defense Mapping Agency
Department of Army
Department of the Navy
Department of the Air Force
Headquarters, Marine Corps

The Central Imagery Office will provide an Executive Secretary for the Steering Group. The Community Management Staff will provide administrative and other support as required to the Group.

A Task Force will be established to support the work of the Steering Group. A Task Force Chair will be selected by the Chairman of the Steering Group in consultation with Group members. Each member of the Steering Group will appoint representatives to the Task Force as required. The Central Imagery Office will provide administrative support to the Task Force, and the Task Force Chair will report periodically to the Steering Group on its progress.

The Task Force, in developing a range of options for the formation of the NIA, will identify a recommended option for Steering Group review and the DCI and Secretary of Defense decision by 1 September 1995. The NIA will become operational no-later-than 1 October 1996.

To meet these goals, the Steering Group and Task Force will adhere to the following schedule:

-- Initial Steering Group Meeting -- 6 June 1995
-- Task Force Inititates Work -- 12 June 1995
-- Down Select Options -- 14 July 1995
-- Alternative Architecture's Developed - 14 August 1995
-- DCI/SecDef Decision - 1 September 1995