The Moscow Helsinki Watch Group

On May 12, 1976 at a press conference called by Sakharov, Yury Orlov announced the creation of a group to promote compliance with the Helsinki accords in the USSR. It became known as the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group. Its appearance and the wave of support it generated in the Soviet Union and in the West marked the entry of the human rights movement into a new period, the Helsinki period. This sudden strength was the result of ten years of work by human rights activists, in a time of repression when open statements by activists had been rare and had drawn little attention.

In the late sixties it had seemed, and the KGB leadership supposed, that the human rights movement was finished. It is otherwise impossible to explain why the government took the unusual step in August
1975, of publishing in newspapers the complete text of the Final Act of the Helsinki Accords, including the humanitarian articles. Up until then almost total silence had prevailed within the country on the international obligations of the Soviet Union with regard to human rights. The relevant documents had been published only in special editions with very limited circulation. It is possible that the Soviet leadership was in this instance overcome by a desire to boast to its own people of its success in Helsinki; for many years they had worked toward such an agreement. By the terms of the Final Act the Soviet Union received some substantial benefits; most important of these was recognition of the post–World War II boundaries in Europe in exchange for the promise to observe human rights. Neither the Soviet leaders nor their Western counterparts had counted on substantial changes in Soviet internal politics. The commonly held opinion was that the humanitarian articles of the Final Act were nothing more than a joint gesture by the signing governments in deference to public opinion in democratic countries.

But Soviet citizens, reading the text of the Final Act in the papers, were stunned by the humanitarian articles; it was the first they had heard of any kind of international obligations in the human rights field of their government. A spontaneous reaction was to refer to the Helsinki accords when appealing to Soviet officials in cases where they had refused to satisfy a vital need of the petitioner. In evaluating the Final Act, most human rights workers leaned more toward Western commentators than toward their own compatriots, who lacked experience in the issues involved. Human rights activists thought the Final Act was regressive in comparison with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenants on Human Rights. But there were some, above all Yury Orlov, who saw in this document a new idea.

Orlov had devoted years to searching for ways to create a dialogue between the government and the society. He considered such a dialogue the only means of liberalizing the regime and resolving the economic, political, and moral crisis confronting the Soviet Union. He twice attempted to appeal directly to the government, once in 1956, when he lost his job for it, and was forced to move out of Moscow to Armenia, and again in 1973. After working in Armenia for fifteen years, during which time he became a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences, he returned to Moscow and, soon after, sent a letter to Brezhnev. Orlov received no direct response, although he once again found himself without work. Similar unsuccessful appeals by Sakharov, Turchin, Medvedev, Chalidze, Solzhenitsyn, and others during 1970–74, convinced him of the necessity of finding intermedi-
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The natural allies of the human rights movement were the publics of the countries of the free world, since their moral values coincided with the traditional values of Western democracies, and the organic pluralism and political neutrality of the human rights movement in the USSR placed it outside the struggle of political forces in the West, making it possible for the movement to be supported by both the left and right.

An attempt was made in 1968 to appeal directly to the public opinion of the West with the petition by Larisa Bogoraz and Pavel Litvinov in connection with the “trial of the four.” The first public association founded by human rights activists—the Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the USSR—appealed to the West, to the UN, in its very first document. The members explained this measure by the absence of answers to direct appeals to Soviet authorities and the evident intention of the authorities to prosecute for such appeals. After this experience there were constant individual and collective letters to various public organizations and public figures in the West. All of these appeals contained information about the harassment of Soviet citizens for the independent public positions, and called on Westerners to help those persecuted.

The West was not indifferent to the fate of dissenters in the USSR. Starting with the trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel, and perhaps even earlier (the cases of Pasternak and Brodsky) the Soviet leaders experienced pressure from the Western public and made concessions at the time, since they were striving to preserve in the West the impression that the USSR was a democratic state. Sometimes there were obvious concessions by the authorities, for example the release of Brodsky and Sinyavsky before they had served their sentences, and the repeal of the death penalty for the hijackers. Less visible, but still a significant result of this pressure was a certain restraint in the harassment of dissenters. I believe that without the consideration of public opinion in the West, the harassment of both human rights activists and members of other movements would have been far more “efficient” and would have encompassed far wider circles and possibly would have been much harsher.

The help of citizens of the West was from the very beginning based chiefly on professional solidarity—writers helped writers, scientists aided scientists, nationalist organizations abroad helped people of their nationality, religious organizations supported their fellow believers; Amnesty International was concerned about all prisoners of conscience. But even this support was limited to protests about the fate of people who were suffering from persecution. No one in the
West appealed to the Soviet leaders with a demand that they observe human rights and the law, although the West was vitally interested in this for the sake of its own security. A firm guarantee of such security can only be expected from an open society where the authorities are under the constant, active control of the public. This is possible only under a real observation of civil rights by the authorities. But the governments of democratic countries did not demonstrate interest in the status of human rights in the USSR. The Soviet Union had ratified the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the UN, the international covenants on political and economic rights. But not once did the appropriate international organizations try to verify if the Soviet Union was fulfilling its obligations and urge them to fulfill them. The Initiative Group in particular constantly appealed to the UN, but did not receive a single answer.

Orlov saw an opportunity to use the Final Act, with its unwieldy formulations and purposely convoluted language, to spur the West on to a mediating role. The Final Act pointed out to the signatory countries the legitimacy of mediatory functions in the area of human rights by declaring them to be an indissoluble part of the major goal of the Helsinki accords: the preservation of peace. In this light the question of the degree of freedom given to citizens and the freedom of information available under different governments ceased to be a simple matter of internal affairs and became a general concern. In the case of violations of the humanitarian articles, just as of any other articles, it would be normal for the other partners to apply appropriate pressure. In Orlov’s view, the rights of citizens enumerated in the humanitarian articles were to be treated as minimal international standards for countries who had signed the Helsinki accords. Orlov took the spontaneous response of his fellow citizens to the Helsinki accords as a guide to action, especially since the Final Act contains a direct appeal to the citizens of signatory countries to assist their governments in observing the Helsinki accords, because mere governmental efforts for the preservation of peace might well prove inadequate.

The original declaration of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group read that the group would limit its activities to the humanitarian articles of the Final Act. The group announced that it would accept information on violations of these articles from citizens, compile documents, and familiarize the public and signatory governments of the Helsinki accords with their contents. The eleven persons who signed the constituent document of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group were: Ludmilla Alexeyeva (myself), Mikhail Bernshtam, Yelena Bonner, Aleksandr Ginzburg, Pyotr Grigorenko, Aleksandr Korchak, Malva Landa,
Anatoly Marchenko, Yury Orlov, Vitaly Rubin, and Anatoly Shcharansky. Most of the founders had been long-time participants in the human rights movement. Rubin and Shcharansky had been active in the Jewish Movement for Emigration to Israel. (The Moscow Helsinki Watch Group was the first independent public group to be joined by Jewish refuseniks.)

The Moscow Helsinki Group called on other countries to create similar groups, but the first response was from the Soviet non-Russian republics. On November 9, 1976 the Ukrainian Helsinki Group was announced; on December 1, the Lithuanian Helsinki Group; on January 14, 1977, the Georgian Helsinki Group; and on April 1, the Armenian Helsinki Group. All of these groups were composed primarily of members of the corresponding national movements. In the Ukraine, Lithuania, and Armenia the Helsinki groups were the first open social-action associations. Similar groups appeared outside of the Soviet Union. In September 1976, the Committee for the Defense of Workers, which became the Committee for Social Defense in the summer of 1977, was formed in Poland, and on January 1 the Charter 77 group appeared in Czechoslovakia. Although these associations did not call themselves Helsinki groups, they took positions on civil rights based on the constitutions of their own countries and on international agreements on human rights signed by their governments. In Hungary, Romania, and East Germany the same demands were made. In the United States the Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or the Helsinki Commission, was formed, of six congressmen, six senators, and one representative each, with consultative authority, from the U.S. State Department, the Defense Department, and the Department of Commerce.50

After the Helsinki meeting at which the Final Act was signed, a delegation of American congressmen visited Moscow. Congresswoman Millicent Fenwick met with Yury Orlov, Valentin Turchin, and refusenik Veniamin Levich to hear their views on the Final Act. She was impressed by what they told her, and later introduced a measure for the creation of the Helsinki Commission, making direct use of the opinions of Moscow activists. The commission was to facilitate the fulfillment of the obligations of the signatory countries to the Helsinki accords.51 Later, public Helsinki groups were formed in the United States and in Western European countries.

Thus, the Moscow Helsinki Group was the seed from which the international Helsinki movement grew. Its purpose was to bring the civil rights situation up to the standards defined in the Final Act in those countries where they fell short. The Moscow Helsinki Group not only initiated a whole era of similar associations, but it stimulated the
appearance of several “specialized” human rights associations in the
Soviet Union.

On January 5, 1977 the Working Commission to Investigate the Use
of Psychiatry for Political Purposes, connected to the Moscow Helsinki
Group, was announced. On December 27, 1976 the first document of
the Christian Committee for the Defense of the Rights of Religious Be-
lievers in the USSR was released. The Christian Committee in turn
served as a model for the Catholic Committee for the Defense of the
Rights of Religious Believers.

The appearance of these groups coincided with the initial operations
of the Russian Fund to Aid Political Prisoners, founded by Solzheni-
tsyn in Switzerland in 1974, and with the organizational channels to
transmit that aid. Funds came from abroad and were distributed in
the USSR by Aleksandr Ginzburg, who was helped by those who pre-
viously collected funds within the USSR. They remained anonymous
but their function changed: they received funds from the distributor
and were accountable to him.

Thus, within a short period of time the human rights movement
created a network of open associations. At the time, of course, they
were few, and there were no more than a few dozen participants, but
the human rights movement nevertheless now became visible, stimu-
lat ing others to join. Western sources, primarily those stations broad-
casting to the USSR, revealed the existence of the movement to Soviet
citizens.

The contacts of the Moscow human rights activists noticeably broad-
ened. Long-standing relations with Ukrainians, Crimean Tartars, and
Lithuanians had, by 1974, been supplemented by contacts with
Georgia, Armenia, and the German Movement for Emigration to
West Germany (news of which was regularly published from 1974
on).

The Helsinki groups in the non-Russian republics were not in any
way branches of the Moscow Group, even though they had the same
general goal: compliance with the humanitarian articles of the Final
Act. This brought the national movements closer in ideology and orga-
nization to the human rights movement.

From 1974 the Chronicle of Current Events’ section on the persecu-
tion of believers became a regular feature. It contained reports on
the Russian Orthodox, Catholic, Baptist, Pentecostal, and Adventist
churches. All such contacts went through the Moscow Helsinki Group
and were strengthened due to efforts on its part. Baptists had their
own long-standing human rights organization: the Council of Relatives
of Evangelical Christian Baptist Prisoners, which regularly gave its
informational Bulletin of the Council of Relatives of ECB Prisoners to the Moscow Group and the Chronicle. The Moscow Group made use of these materials in one of its first documents (no. 5), thus conferring international publicity on the practice of taking children from Baptist and Seventh-Day Adventist families who gave them religious instruction. Millions of Soviet citizens learned of this practice through radio broadcasts. Believers of all faiths began bringing their problems to the Moscow Helsinki Group.

Representatives of the Pentecostalists regularly went to Moscow to meet with Moscow Helsinki Group members, and Moscow Group envoys visited Pentecostal communities on several occasions. Formerly rare and superficial, contacts between Moscow human rights activists and the independent Adventist Church groups became constant and friendly. In time both the Pentecostalists and the Adventists arranged for the systematic collection of information on human rights violations within their communities and created their own human rights groups in 1978 and in 1980. Moscow Helsinki Group members helped publish and send to the West the first collection of Pentecostal documents, My People, Let us Leave This Country. Through the Moscow Group, human rights groups of Baptists, Pentecostalists, and Adventists were put in touch with the Christian Committee for the Defense of the Rights of Religious Believers in the USSR. For the first time joint human rights statements by Russian Orthodox and Catholics were made, as a result of contacts facilitated through the Moscow Helsinki Group.

Many “messengers” made their individual way to the Moscow Group, often from isolated areas a long distance from Moscow, from which there had previously been no news of independent civic activities and no means of contact. They came asking that illegal actions taken against themselves or those close to them be publicized. In this way, kolkhoznik Ivan Kareyska from the village of Vysokoe in the Vitebsk oblast came to the Moscow Helsinki Group. He had been expelled from his kolkhoz because of complaints he made about the local authorities and was seeking to be reinstated. Taking upon itself the function of collecting and producing information on human rights violations, the Moscow Group became the voice for civil demands from all strata of Soviet society, from citizens of various ethnic and religious groups, and members of different faiths. The group provided the connecting link between different dissident movements previously isolated from each other; they adopted the tactics of the Moscow Group to stimulate the mediation of the West between the Soviet government and its citizens. Participants in the national and religious movements also began to address appeals to the Belgrade Conference, to the gov-
ernments that had signed the Helsinki accords, the Congress and President of the United States, world opinion, and “people of good will.”

By 1976 the annual Constitution Day (December 5) demonstrations in Pushkin Square, begun in 1965, showed the effects of increased interest and sympathy toward the human rights movement. Formerly several dozen people, usually the same every year, participated. Volunteer police would circle the demonstrators and without a word observe the silent ceremony. At six in the evening the demonstrators would bare their heads for a few minutes as a sign of mourning for constitutional freedoms and the victims of lawlessness. But in 1976 the crowd filled the public garden on Pushkin Square. Volunteer police tried to prevent Sakharov and those with him from reaching the Pushkin statue by encircling and forcing them to one side. But about fifteen regular participants reached the statue. I was among them. At six o’clock the people who had gathered around joined in removing their hats. Those who bared their heads far outnumbered those who did not. For the first time the demonstration was not conducted in silence. Pyotr Grigorenko gave a short speech: a few words mentioning the participation of Vladimir Bukovsky, then languishing in the Vladimir Prison, in the preparations for the first demonstration. He concluded, “I thank you all for coming here to pay your respects to the millions who perished. Thank you for your sympathy for prisoners of conscience!” In response the crowd cried, “We thank you.” Bukovsky was released two weeks later: he was sent directly out of the country in exchange for Secretary of the Chilean Communist Party Luis Korvalan. Similar demonstrations occurred in 1976 for the first time in Leningrad and Odessa, also near Pushkin monuments in both cities.

These events, although on a small scale, were an indication of social cohesion firm enough for coordinated statements on general themes. The almost simultaneous formation of Helsinki groups in four non-Russian republics and their joint work with Moscow human rights activists demonstrated the positive prospects for the resolution of the sensitive problem of mutual relations between Russian and non-Russian nationalities on a legal basis. The alliance with Protestant religious movements convinced those in the lower social strata (Baptists, Adventists, Pentecostalists—almost all blue-collar workers) of the feasibility of the human rights position.

The authorities reacted immediately to the creation of the Moscow Helsinki Group. Three days after the formation of the group was announced, leader Yury Orlov was warned that if it became active, he and those associated with him would feel “the full force of the law.” But there were no arrests until February 1977. The government doubt-
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It was clearly understood that to persecute such a group would be a gross violation of the Helsinki accords, in which they placed a great deal of hope. The risk of open retaliation against the Helsinki groups was great.

On January 8, 1977 an explosion rocked the Moscow subway. Several persons were killed. Official Soviet informational sources usually observe a strict silence when natural disasters or plane accidents occur, but the subway explosion was reported by the government to foreign correspondents. An immediate search for the terrorists was begun among the Moscow human rights activists. At meetings held in institutions and industries, as well as through intermediaries in the West, it was reported that the explosion was the work of dissidents.

The Moscow Helsinki Group called a press conference and distributed an announcement to foreign correspondents, "On the Explosion in the Moscow Subway,"

In the Soviet Union, the word "dissident" has become firmly associated with participation in the human rights movement. Dissidents hold a variety of political, religious, and philosophic views; they are united by their efforts to realize fundamental human rights; they absolutely reject violence or calls for violence as a means to their goals. Dissidents are repulsed and disgusted by terrorist methods.⁵⁸

This statement was signed by the Moscow and Ukrainian Helsinki Groups, the Working Commission on Psychiatry, the Christian Committee, the Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the USSR, the Georgian Initiative Group, and Jewish movement activists.

In a letter Sakharov listed instances of the KGB's criminal activities known to him: "I cannot rid myself of the notion that the Moscow subway explosion and the tragic loss of life it caused are the latest and most dangerous in a series of provocations perpetrated in recent years by the organs of repression." He speculated that whoever committed this crime did so in order to create a pretext for massive persecutions of dissidents and to influence the political climate in the country.⁵⁹ On January 25 the deputy general procurator of the USSR, S. I. Gusev, officially warned Sakharov that his statement on the subway explosion was considered "slanderous" and any repetition of this nature would lead to his arrest. On January 27 the U.S. State Department reacted with an expression of admiration for and full confidence in Sakharov,⁶⁰ which was greeted with joy by the Helsinki groups. Was this not the first step toward the long-awaited mediation by Western governments?

President Carter almost immediately said that the State Department had acted without conferring with him. Nonetheless, it was clear that this step made an impression on the Soviet government: they stopped
referring to the subway explosion as having been instigated by human rights activists.

Open support by the West did not, however, stop repression against the Helsinki groups. During February 1977 the leaders of the Moscow and Ukrainian Helsinki groups, Yury Orlov and Mykola Rudenko, were arrested, as well as members Aleksandr Ginzburg and Oleksa Tykhyy, and in March, Anatoly Shcharansky. In Moscow many explained these arrests as a consequence of a lack of firmness on the part of President Carter. In the West certain people began to say that open sympathy for human rights activists created dangers for them. President Carter compensated in January with a personal letter to Sakharov; it was delivered on February 14, soon after the arrest of Orlov and the others. In April Carter made a no less sensational gesture when he received the hero of the human rights movement, Vladimir Bukovsky.

In no. 44 (March 1977), the Chronicle reported that a special group in the APN publishing house (the Soviet news agency) was at work on a brochure entitled “The Exile of Sakharov,” to be published primarily in foreign languages. The first proofs were ready. It was also reported that in a February–March 1977 meeting of newspaper and journal editors in the agitation and propaganda section of the Central Committee, an unnamed speaker (not from the Central Committee) said that “in order to show our strength without regard for the West it has been decided that fifty of the most active dissidents are to be jailed and all hangarians to be dealt with harshly.”

This plan waited until 1980, when Sakharov was, in fact, exiled and when mass arrests of dissidents had replaced earlier selective arrests. In 1977 repression was still concentrated on the Helsinki groups, whose members were arrested one after the other from 1977 until 1979.

On October 4, 1977 the Belgrade conference on verification of the Helsinki accords, to which the Helsinki groups most often addressed their appeals, opened. The democratic countries did not take a strong position; the European countries could not agree to support the American delegation, which accused the Soviet Union of violating the humanitarian articles, and so weakened its efforts. Nonetheless, this was the first international meeting on a governmental level in which the Soviet Union was accused of human rights violations. The form in which this question was raised was also unprecedented: materials from independent social-action associations (such as the Helsinki groups), containing complaints by Soviet citizens about their government were used. It was a great victory for human rights activists and the first step by Western democratic governments toward meeting halfway the forces for liberalization within the Soviet Union.

It appeared that the goal of the Helsinki groups had been reached:
the free world learned about demands that Soviet citizens had made of their government and openly supported those demands, but the anticipated result—a lessening of repression within the USSR—was not forthcoming. The arrests and harsh sentences of members of the Helsinki groups, during and after the Belgrade Conference, confirmed this bitter lesson.64

Even before the Belgrade Conference the dilemma facing the Soviet government had become quite obvious: either it lost prestige in the West or lost control over its own citizens. The government preferred to sacrifice its prestige. It would have been possible to attribute the continuing repression to weakness of opposition in the USSR and to insufficient support from the West, but the Polish experiment in 1980–81, despite a unified national movement and more decisive support from the West, had the same outcome.

The Helsinki groups have not, at least until the present, achieved the goal of moderating the repressiveness of government power with the help of Western mediation. For his “miscalculation” Yury Orlov received a sentence of seven years in a strict-regimen camp with five years of internal exile. His fate was shared by the majority of his comrades in the Helsinki group.65

But there was another result no one had anticipated: unification of the human rights movement with religious and national movements working toward the goal of the Moscow Helsinki Group—civil liberties enumerated in the humanitarian articles of the Final Act. The national and religious movements that seemed to be based on a common ground, while not united among themselves, were united, in many respects, in the human rights movement. A kind of coalition was formed under the flag of Helsinki.

Beginning in 1977 the arrests of Moscow Helsinki Group members gave rise to protests comparable in size to the petition campaign of 1968.66 But in 1968, 70 percent of the petition signers were Muscovites, and the overwhelming majority were liberal intellectuals for whom signing a protest was their first expression of independent civic-mindedness. Unambiguous threats to deprive them of their livelihood had been sufficient to put an end to their civic activities. Only a small number of pioneers refused to retreat in 1968. In 1977–78, on the other hand, only 27 percent of those who signed protests against the Moscow Helsinki Group arrests were Muscovites; most were human rights activists with a long record of service who were inured to adversities resulting from publicly advocating human rights. There were more than a few newcomers taking their first public stand, but, with rare exceptions, they were aware of the risks. The Muscovites who joined the human rights activists themselves became activists, and
from then on their signatures regularly appeared under human rights documents.

But the majority of the signers (73 percent) were from outside Moscow, where it is much more dangerous to make public statements. Most of these had long been activists in the human rights, national, or religious movements; the repression against the Moscow Helsinki Group did not diminish their support. Most likely, the signers from outside Moscow were people who directly put others in touch with Moscow activists. But those who sympathized with or even helped the Moscow Helsinki Group were not limited to protest signers.

During 1976–78 the organizational structure of opposition forces that had appeared earlier assumed its final form. Open civic associations became the backbone of the human rights movement and of the national and religious movements working in cooperation with it. This general scheme continued to function until 1980–82, when almost all of the participants of open social-action associations and many of their supporters had been arrested.

From 1977 until 1978 arrests in the Helsinki groups were: three from the Moscow Group (Shcharansky’s arrest in March and the earlier arrests of Orlov and Ginzburg); six from the Ukrainian Helsinki Group; one from the Lithuanian Helsinki Group; three from the Georgian Helsinki Group; and two from the Armenian Group; two Moscow Group members, forced into emigration. One other Lithuanian Helsinki Group member left the USSR. The loss was significant even though it did not paralyze the movement. The Georgian Group was the only one effectively liquidated after the arrest of its leading participants; others found fresh members and continued to function.

In 1976 Vladimir Slepak joined the Moscow Helsinki Group, taking the place of Vitaly Rubin, who had received permission to emigrate; in 1977, Naum Meyman, Yury Mnyukh, Sofya Kallistratova, Tatyana Osipova, and Viktor Nekipelov joined; in 1978, Leonard Ternovsky, Feliks Serebrov, and Yury Yarym-Agayev; in 1979, Ivan Kovalyov.

The Moscow Helsinki Group prepared 26 documents for the Belgrade conference; for the Madrid conference in November 1980, 138 documents were prepared. These documents can be divided by theme, corresponding to the provisions of the humanitarian articles of the Final Act:

1. Equal rights and the rights of ethnic groups to determine their own destinies
2. Freedom to choose one’s place of residence
3. Freedom to leave and reenter one’s country
4. Freedom of conscience
5. The right to know one's rights and to act in accordance with them
6. Inadmissibility of cruelty and degradation of the human dignity of political prisoners
7. Freedom of information and contacts between people
8. The right to a just trial
9. Socioeconomic rights affirmed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and by internal pacts on civic and political rights
10. The proposal of the Moscow Helsinki Group to the Belgrade and Madrid conferences on improving controls over compliance with the humanitarian articles

In addition to the Moscow Helsinki Group, also active and effective from 1977 to 1980 were the Christian Committee for the Defense of the Rights of Religious Believers and the Working Commission to Investigate the Use of Psychiatry for Political Purposes, the latter founded by Vyacheslav Bakhmin, Irina Kaplun, Feliks Serebrov, and Dzhemma Kvachevskaya. Pyotr Grigorenko from the Moscow Helsinki Group joined also. The lawyer Sofya Kallistratova acted as legal consultant; a psychiatrist of the Moscow region public hospital system, Aleksandr Voloshanovich, whose name was not revealed until later, served as psychiatric consultant.

The Working Commission operated for four years, until February 1981, when its last participant was arrested. Before that time this tiny group prepared twenty-four voluminous informational bulletins, issued at least once every two months. Even from a cursory glance at these bulletins it is hard to understand how so few people managed to carry out such an enormous task, while carrying on their everyday jobs. With no access to official sources they compiled an index of political prisoners detained in psychiatric hospitals; collected information on dozens of previously unknown victims of psychiatric repression; and collected detailed data on those already known to have been so detained.

Its basic thesis was this: we do not assert that all who are confined to psychiatric hospitals for political reasons are healthy; there are some mentally unsound minds among them; yet it is also necessary to observe the law in the treatment of those who are mentally ill. They kept tabs on all cases of psychiatric prisoners and reported in their bulletin who was ill and what the nature of the illness was; who needed what; who was transferred where, and so forth. The Working Commission assisted in providing material aid to individuals and needy families. They compiled a list of psychiatrists, heads of special psychiatric hospitals, and psychiatric wards in regular hospitals where there were political prisoners. They wrote hundreds of letters to doctors and administrators in an attempt to abolish harmful methods of
cure and cruel treatment. On numerous occasions members applied to appropriate Soviet institutions demanding the release of healthy persons and appealed to Western public opinion in hopes that people in the West would work toward the same end. Members often spent their short vacations traveling to remote areas to visit those most in need of help.

On more than one occasion participants in the Working Commission experienced a pleasure rare enough in the human rights movement: the chance to embrace those they had snatched from incarceration. The creation of the Working Commission was a direct response to an increase in the use of psychiatric repression at the end of 1976. Several former psychiatric-hospital inmates had been re-hospitalized simultaneously: Vladimir Borisov in Leningrad, Pyotr Starchik in Moscow, Eduard Fedotov and Aleksandr Argentov in the greater Moscow region. The newly formed Working Commission worked on those cases and within a short period of time obtained the release of all. They also freed Mikhail Kopysov from a psychiatric hospital in the small town of Bobrov, Voronezh region, when the commission publicized the information they received on Kopysov, he thereupon obtained his freedom. For the release of Yury Belov, who had spent seven years in a psychiatric hospital, they fought for two years.

The unusual success of the Working Commission on Psychiatry can be explained above all by the fact that its activities were the continuation of efforts made by many people over a period of twenty years; it began with loners like Sergey Pisarev, but later it grew to include the entire human rights movement.

The self-sacrifice and accomplishment of Vladimir Bukovsky, who had smuggled out the histories of six dissidents confined in psychiatric hospitals, was not in vain. Even though the International Congress of Psychiatrists meeting in Mexico refused to examine these documents, others in the West did and were convinced that psychiatry was indeed used for political purposes in the USSR. Several dissidents who had been confined to psychiatric hospitals emigrated to the West, where they were examined by specialists and found to be mentally sound. In this way the West had learned of the abuse of psychiatry in the USSR by 1977, when the commission began its work, and when a few organizations were trying to stop the practice. The International Congress of Psychiatrists, meeting in Honolulu in 1977, examined the evidence sent by the Working Commission with full confidence in its veracity and passed a resolution condemning the USSR. The continued and active support of Western public opinion was instrumental in the success of the Working Commission on Psychiatry.

In May 1978 Aleksandr Podrabin was arrested and tried for writ-
ing a book, *Punitive Medicine*, on abuses in Soviet psychiatric practice. Shortly after his arrest, Leonard Ternovsky and Irina Grivnina joined the commission. In August 1978 the name of psychiatric consultant Aleksandr Voloshanovich was revealed at a press conference for foreign correspondents. Voloshanovich stated that he had conducted twenty-seven examinations of people who had been placed in psychiatric hospitals for political reasons and had not found a single case for which there was any medical basis for hospitalization and treatment.

In an obvious attempt to avoid an international scandal, in October 1978 the plenum of the All-Union Society of Neurologists and Psychiatrists created a commission to investigate the cases Voloshanovich presented. A few of the patients were released, but Voloshanovich himself began to be persecuted and was forced to emigrate. (He settled in London, where he practices psychiatry.) After Voloshanovich's emigration in February 1980, psychiatrist Anatoly Koryagin took his place as consultant to the commission. In February 1980, V. Bakhmin was arrested, and in April, L. Ternovsky; in September, I. Grivnina; and in January 1981, F. Serebrov. All of them were tried for "slandering" under article 190-1 of the RSFSR criminal code, except for Serebrov who was tried under article 70. In February 1981 Koryagin was arrested after examining Aleksey Nikitin, who fought for workers' rights in the Donbass, finding him to be of sound mind, and then reporting his findings to foreign correspondents. Koryagin was sentenced to seven years in a strict-regimen camp and five years of internal exile. He had been the last member of the Working Commission at liberty.