ЦК КПСС

К событиям в Афганистане
27-28 декабря 1979 г.

После государственного переворота и убийства Генерального секретаря ЦК НДПА, председателя Революционного совета Афганистана Н.М.Тараки, совершенных Амином в сентябре этого года, ситуация в Афганистане резко обострилась, приобрела кризисный характер.

Х.Амин установил в стране режим личной диктатуры, низведя положение ЦК НДПА и Революционного совета фактически до положения чисто номинальных органов. На руководящие посты в партии и государстве были назначены лица, связанные с Х.Амином родственными отношениями, либо узами личной преданности. Из рядов партии были изгнаны и арестованы многие члены ЦК НДПА, Ревсовета и афганского правительства. Репрессиям и физическому уничтожению в основном подверглись активные участники Апрельской революции, лица, не скрывавшие своих симпатий к СССР, те, кто защищал ленинские нормы внутрипартийной жизни. Х.Амин обманул партию и народ своими заявлениями о том, что Советский Союз якобы одобрил меры по устранению из партии и правительства Тараки.

По прямому указанию Х.Амина в ДРА стали распространяться заведомо сфабрикованные слухи, порочащие Советский Союз и бросающие тень на деятельность советских работников в Афганистане, для которых были установлены ограничения в поддержании контактов с афганскими представителями.

Top Secret

CC CPSU

Regarding events in Afghanistan during 27-28 December 1979

After a coup d'etat and the murder of the CC PDPA General Secretary and Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of Afghanistan N.M. Taraki, committed by Amin in September of this year, the situation in Afghanistan has been sharply exacerbated and taken on crisis proportions.

H. Amin has established a regime of personal dictatorship in the country, effect
tively reducing the CC PDPA and the Rev
erutionary Council to the status of entirely
nominal organs. The top leadership posi
tions within the party and the state were
filled with appointees bearing family ties or
maintaining personal loyalties to H. Amin.
Many members from the ranks of the CC
PDPA, the Revolutionary Council and the
Afghan government were expelled and ar
rested. Repression and physical annihilation
were for the most part directed towards
active participants in the April revolution,
persons openly sympathetic to the USSR,
those defending the Leninist norms of in
tera-party life. H. Amin deceived the party
and the people with his announcements that
the Soviet Union had supposedly approved
of Taraki's expulsion from party and gov
ernment.

By direct order of H. Amin, fabricated
rumors were deliberately spread throughout
the DRA, smearing the Soviet Union and
casting a shadow over the activities of Soviet
personnel in Afghanistan, who had been re
stricted in their efforts to maintain contact
with Afghan representatives.

At the same time, efforts were made to
mend relations with America as a part of
the "more balanced foreign policy strategy"
adopted by H. Amin. H. Amin held a series
of confidential meetings with the American
charge d'affaires in Kabul. The DRA gov
ernment began to create favorable condi
tions for the operation of the American cul
tural center; under H. Amin's directive, the
DRA special services have ceased operations
against the American embassy.

H. Amin attempted to buttress his posi
tion by reaching a compromise with lead
ers of internal counter-revolution. Through
trusted persons he engaged in contact with
leaders of the Moslem fundamentalist op
position.

The scale of political repression was
taking on increasingly mass proportions.
Just during the period following the events
of September, more than 600 members of
the PDPA, military personnel and other per
sons suspected of anti-Amin sentiments
were executed without trial or investigation.
In effect, the objective was to liquidate the
party.

All this, in conjunction with objective
difficulties and conditions specific to Af
ghanistan, put the progress of the revolu
tionary process in extremely difficult cir
cumstances and energized the counter-revo
lutionary forces which have effectively es
tablished their control in many of the
country's provinces. Using external support,
which has taken on increasingly far-reaching
proportions under Amin, they strove to
bring about radical change in the country's
military-political situation and liquidate the
revolutionary gains.

Dictatorial methods of running the
country, repressions, mass executions, and
disregard for legal norms have produced
widespread discontent in the country. In the
capital numerous leaflets began to appear,
exposing the anti-people nature of the cur
rent regime and containing calls for unity
in the struggle with "H. Amin's clique." Dis
content also spread to the army. A signif
icant number of officers have expressed dis
may at the domination of H. Amin's incom
petent henchmen. In essence, a broad anti
Amin front was formed in the country.

Expressing alarm over the fate of the
revolution and the independence of the
country, and reacting keenly to the rise of
anti-Amin sentiments in Afghanistan,
Karmal Babrak and Asadulla Sarwari, both
living abroad as emigres, have undertaken
to unite all anti-Amin groups in the country
and abroad, in order to save the motherland
and the revolution. In addition, the currently
underground group "Parcham," under the
leadership of an illegal CC, has carried out
significant work to rally all progressive
forces, including Taraki supporters from the
former "Khalq" group.

All earlier disagreements were elimi
nated and the previously existing schism in
the PDPA has been liquidated. Khalqists
(represented by Sarwari) and Parchamists
(represented by Babrak) have announced
the final unification of the party. Babrak
was elected leader of the new party center, and
Sarwari - his deputy.

In this extremely difficult situation,
which has threatened the gains of the April
revolution and the interests of maintaining
our national security, it has become neces
sary to render additional military assistance
to Afghanistan, especially since such re
quests had been made by the previous ad
ministration in DRA. In accordance with
the provisions of the Soviet-Afghan treaty
of 1978, a decision has been made to send
the necessary contingent of the Soviet Army
to Afghanistan.

Riding the wave of patriotic sentiments
that have engaged fairly large numbers of
the Afghan population in connection with
the deployment of Soviet forces which was
carried out in strict accordance with the pro
visions of the Soviet-Afghan treaty of 1978,
the forces opposing H. Amin organized an
armed operation which resulted in the over
throw of H. Amin's regime. This operation
has received broad support from the work
ing masses, the intelligentsia, significant
sections of the Afghan army, and the state
apparatus, all of which welcomed the for
mation of a new administration of the DRA
and the PDPA.

The new government and Revolution
ary Council have been formed on a broad
and representative basis, with the inclusion
of representatives from former "Parcham"
and "Khalq" factions, military representa
tives, and non-party members.

In its program agenda announcements,
the new leadership vowed to fight for the
complete victory of the national-democratic,
anti-feudalistic, anti-imperialistic revolu
tion, and to defend Afghan independence
and sovereignty. In matters of foreign
policy, they pledged to strengthen in every
possible way the friendship and cooperation
with the USSR. Taking into account the
mistakes of the previous regime, the new
leadership, in the practical application of its
policies, is intent on giving serious consid
eration to broad democratization of social
life and ensuring a law-abiding society, wid-
ening the social base and strengthening the state throughout the country, and maintaining a flexible policy with regards to religion, tribes and ethnic minorities.

One of the first steps that has captured the attention of Afghan society was the release of a large number of political prisoners, which include prominent political and military activists. Many of them (Kadyr, Keshtmand, Rafi, and others) have actively and enthusiastically joined in the work of the new Revolutionary Council and the government.

Broad masses of people met the announcement of the overthrow of H. Amin's regime with unceiled joy and express their eagerness to support the new administration's program. The commanders of all key formations and units of the Afghan army have already announced their support of the new leadership of the party and the government. Relations with Soviet soldiers and specialists continue to remain friendly overall. The situation in the country is normalizing.

In Kabul's political circles it is noted that the Babrak government, evidently, must overcome significant difficulties, inherited by him from the previous regime, in establishing order in domestic politics and economy; however, they express hope that PDPA, with USSR's help, will be able to solve these problems. Babrak can be described as one of the more theoretically equipped leaders of PDPA, who soberly and objectively evaluates the situation in Afghanistan; he was always distinguished by his sincere sympathies for the Soviet Union, and commanded respect within party masses and the country at large. In this regard, the conviction can be expressed that the new leadership of DRA will find effective ways to stabilize completely the country's situation.

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[Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 42, dok. 10; provided by M. Kramer; trans. by D. Rozar.]