Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: June 23, 1967

SUBJECT: Non-Proliferation Treaty; Assurances to Non-Nuclear Powers; Latin American Nuclear Free Zone

PARTICIPANTS:
- Secretary Dean Rusk
- Foreign Minister Gromyko

GROMYKO INTERPOSED THAT IF YOU ACCEPT GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT, THAT WOULD SETTLE IT; OR WE MIGHT HAVE A GENERAL PROVISION

Gromyko asked: How soon could the obstacles be overcome and a non-proliferation treaty completed, including the achievement of an agreement among the eighteen nations at Geneva?

Secretary Rusk replied that once we tabled a draft, with or without an agreed paragraph on controls, the problem would lie with governments who have not yet seen the text; for example, India and Japan. He made clear that the U.S. does not have pledges from other governments. The U.S. and the Soviet Union may present the draft but then these principal problems would arise:

-- assurances for India;

-- the question of the length of the treaty, where the Italians and others seek a length that is something short of eternity, perhaps 25 or 30 years.

-- finally, both U.S. and Soviet Union will be pressed on the question of reducing and controlling nuclear arms as between themselves

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in the preamble of the treaty indicating we would do our best to move towards disarmament.

Gromyko then asked if we had seen the draft given by Soviet Union to India.

Secretary Rusk said we have an important constitutional problem in giving nuclear assurances from the Executive Branch. This would require putting the matter as treaty to Senate, where a 2/3 majority vote is required. If we worked via a resolution in the Security Council, we could avoid this difficult constitutional and procedural matter.

Gromyko said the Soviet draft was based on and rooted in the Charter of the UN.

Secretary Rusk asked Gromyko if he had also gotten the impression the Indians had separated the non-proliferation treaty from the matter of assurances.

Gromyko replied that he had always thought the statements of assurances would be made in connection with the treaty. They were flexible as to whether they would be attached in some way or be made as an accompaniment to the act of concluding the treaty.

Secretary Rusk repeated the point that if we made a unilateral statement of assurance we would have to be careful because of the constitutional problem involved for the Executive Branch. Operating through the Security Council would be easier. Secretary Rusk then said: What would our position be if the Indians did not insist on assurances, and asked if Gromyko had any more information. Gromyko said Indians had raised the matter in connection with the NPT.

Secretary Rusk said one problem might arise: If the Indians asked for assurances, the other non-nuclear powers might ask for them.

Gromyko replied that the statement made would not be adapted specifically to India but to non-nuclear powers in general.

Secretary Rusk said there might be differences of views as among non-nuclear powers as to what kind of assurances are required:

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Some might want stronger language than in the draft the Soviet Union gave to India.

Secretary Rusk then asked if the U.S. and USSR tabled an incomplete draft soon, could the treaty be completed - perhaps by October?

Gromyko said that seemed reasonable if the main obstacles were removed.

Secretary McNamara agreed: Let us try for October.

Gromyko repeated: That is reasonable, very reasonable.

Secretary Rusk said we must wrestle with problems of control.

Gromyko said that except for Western Europe, there is no problem.

Secretary Rusk said we can't command Western Europe. The three communities of Western Europe have a new chairman, Mr. Rey, a Belgian. He had urged him to go deeply into the matter of the EURATOM-Geneva control question. The ultimate problem is with General de Gaulle.

Gromyko said he had gotten the impression in Paris that the French favor the treaty. They probably do not plan to sign it, but they are not definite even on this point.

Secretary Rusk said they also take the view that EURATOM must exercise its own controls.

Gromyko replied; Let EURATOM also use IAEA safeguards.

Secretary Rusk said U.S. is not member of EURATOM. We engage in technical cooperation with it but we have no direct interest.

Gromyko said: Try to explain to them that their position makes trouble for the NPT: The question poses great difficulties. It is impossible to combine bloc and international principles of control. The three year transitional period doesn't help. They must have an international system.
Secretary Rusk said if the French were to discover its attitude were an obstacle to the treaty, it is possible they would change their mind.

Gromyko said it is better you explain this to the French.

Secretary Rusk said our ability to persuade General de Gaulle is somewhat limited. He then went on to ask Gromyko if he anticipated that the Soviet Union would be willing to have its peaceful atomic installations inspected by IAEA.

Gromyko said that is a U.S. privilege; the USSR shall not do so.

Secretary Rusk asked: what are the difficulties?

Gromyko said there is no need for it. If you wish to, that's all right. But not for the Soviet Union.

Secretary Rusk pointed out that acceptance by the Soviet Union, as well as by the U.S., would have good effect on Japan and India which were concerned with discrimination. In cases where discrimination is not required for non-proliferation, it would be wise to avoid it. It would be helpful if Soviet Union and U.S. would demonstrate that fact themselves. It would make a deep impression on countries which might make trouble in accepting the treaty.

Gromyko concluded that when the text is sent to the Committee of eighteen, four months ought to be enough to complete work. The target date of October was good. If possible, the treaty ought to be concluded sooner.

Secretary Rusk asked when we would have a common text.

Gromyko said that depends on when we overcome our differences on controls. On other matters, we are closer than before.

Perhaps the Chairman and the President are now talking about it. I urged U.S. to pay attention to the question of controls, which must be international.

Secretary Rusk said we find ourselves in a difficult situation. We could give ourselves three years beginning now, we could gain me.
Gromyko said what happens if the three years run out and there is no solution? But, he said: We do not exclude the possibility of submitting the treaty with a blank Article III.

Secretary Rusk said we would work hard on this question.

Gromyko urged Secretary Rusk to look into it again and try to find common ground and try to convince our allies.

Secretary Rusk asked if the Soviet Union had again talked to the French.

Gromyko said: Just in passing. He thought that Debrec had mentioned EURATOM.

Secretary Rusk pointed out that the problem was not EURATOM installations in France. France, as nuclear power, takes the view that the Geneva safeguards cannot be applied on its territory.

Gromyko said: Why not have both EURATOM and IAEA safeguards.

Secretary Rusk said Soviet Union may underestimate the strong interest within the EURATOM group against further nuclear powers in Europe; for example in Belgium and Netherlands. The Soviet Union would have more confidence in the EURATOM safeguards system.

Gromyko said he was not against the system but there was no organic connection between an international system and regional system. The two systems are different in scope and membership, although presumably many tasks would be similar.

Secretary Rusk asked if the Soviets had a non-proliferation expert on their delegation?

Gromyko said: Yes, Vorontsov.

Secretary Rusk said perhaps Mr. Adrian Fisher could get together with him later.

Secretary Rusk noted that the Latin Americans had concluded agreement on a nuclear free region.

Gromyko asked: Was the agreement formalized?
Secretary Rusk replied, not yet. They have to clear up the alleged distinction between a nuclear explosion and nuclear weapons. But the missing piece of the puzzle is Cuba. Did Gromyko have any idea what the Cuban position was.

Gromyko said he didn't know but thought they had stated their position two years ago. So far as he knew, their position had not changed.

Secretary Rusk said he had the impression the issue had been raised by some Latin American countries with Cuba and they had gotten negative reaction. He expressed the hope Gromyko would use Soviet influence to get them to join the Latin American agreement.

Gromyko said he didn't know much about it. The Soviet Union had not been consulted. The question does not relate to the Soviet Union; but he thought Cuba had stated its position before at General Assembly in 1965.

Secretary Rusk said he thought the Latin American agreement a good idea as an example for other regions -- the Middle East, for one. But these agreements don't work if there is one country outside.

Gromyko said: But if the Middle East nations sign a non-proliferation agreement, the problem would be solved, although he recognized that a treaty on a nuclear free zone went beyond a non-proliferation agreement.

Secretary Rusk asked: Do you expect all Warsaw Pact countries would say yes?

Gromyko said that each will have finally to state its own position.

Secretary Rusk asked whether the non-proliferation question came up in conversation with Prime Minister Moro and the Chairman. Gromyko said virtually not at all.

Secretary Rusk said Italy is against a treaty for eternity.

Gromyko said it is still a Catholic country. He had talked, however, at great length with Fanfani, perhaps two hours. He had explained in great detail the non-proliferation treaty and carried

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The impression some points had been misunderstood: For instance, that the Soviet Union was against peaceful uses of atomic energy. He pointed out the Soviet Union was for unlimited uses of atomic energy for science and industry. He had the impression that his explanation to Fanfani had been helpful.

Secretary Rusk said some countries misunderstood this question of the industrial uses, but those misunderstandings had now been overcome.

Gromyko stated also on question of nuclear explosions, Fanfani understood better than before that there was no difference between explosive devices and weapons.

Secretary Rusk said there were two points he would like to make. First, he would greatly regret if the tabling of the draft were delayed because of differences over control, and second, the US was ready to work on the question of control with the Soviet Union, but there could not be substantial delay.

Gromyko replied, it would be better if we could agree. It would take time in the future. But he didn't exclude tabling the draft with blank Article III. The Soviet Union was against "family control." There could be several layers of control, if people wished. The Soviet Union is interested in only one layer.

Secretary Rusk said it could all be done very quickly if the USSR would say yes to our draft.

Gromyko said this was also true, if the US said yes to the Soviet draft.

Secretary Rusk asked: As you interpret your draft on the question of assurances to the Indians and others, would that instrument be put inside or outside the Security Council?

Gromyko said that the UN Charter was the basis for their draft. Indians wanted something more definite.

Secretary Rusk said he was not being negative, but we have problems unless the Security Council has passed a resolution. We can't for a Security Council resolution.

Gromyko said the Soviet formulation would be all right for given problems in the United States.
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