Attached SALT MemCon is to be reproduced and distributed in accordance with the STATE/ACDA agreement contained in ACDA/EX/RIC memorandum dated September 25, 1970.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SALT DELEGATION
VIENNA, AUSTRIA

DATE: March 26, 1971
TIME: 1200-1230 hours
PLACE: American Embassy, Vienna

SUBJECT: US Safeguard ABM Alternative

PARTICIPANTS:

US
Amb. J. Graham Parsons
Mr. Curtis W. Kamman
Interpreter

USSR
Deputy Minister Pleshakov
Mr. P. A. Skoptsov

Minister Pleshakov dominated the conversation with sharp but
good-natured questions criticizing the U.S. third alternative on ABM
limitation, i.e., NCA defense of Moscow on their side and four mis-
sile site complexes on our side.

Minister Pleshakov asked with some incredulity why we proposed
a four-to-one deal. I replied that numbers were not everything, in
fact equality of numbers was not so important when purposes were
different. Under this alternative existing realities were reflected,
defense of NCA on their side and of four missile sites on our side.
For each of us our objectives were important. To obtain different
objectives, why would the numbers be just the same?

Minister Pleshakov then asked whether we would envision
under our proposal an equal number of interceptors and launchers
for each country, despite the fact that the U.S. would maintain these
missiles in four sites while the Soviet Union would have only the
Moscow site. I said I could not tell him the exact numbers of ABM
missiles involved. I also declined to reply to a question as to
whether and how many missiles on our side would be long-range
(Spartan) and how many short-range (Sprint). (Neither Spartan or
Sprint were mentioned by name.)
Pleshakov next asked if any of the four sites would be in the Washington area. Referring him to Ambassador Smith's statement of today, I replied in the negative.

Minister Pleshakov said while we were at it, why did we not propose 12 to one, which would be our full Safeguard proposal. I replied by asking, jokingly, if he thought 12 to one martinis were best or four to one. The latter reflected realities and would enhance stability.

Minister Pleshakov remarked that my answer with the martini analogy really showed the absurdity of our proposal. Was it really a serious proposal, not just quixotic? I said that it was indeed serious and equal in status to our two other ABM proposals. Furthermore, I did not understand the reference to absurdity unless he meant that on the offensive side it was absurd not to have exact numbers too. Here there were many asymmetries. Long ago we had agreed that our weapons systems had developed differently in accordance with the geography and circumstances of each side. Why should it seem absurd that a proposal should reflect what had happened on the defensive side?

Mr. Pleshakov digressed to point out that on the offensive side we had proposed equal aggregates of 1900, not unequal ones. I pointed out that we were free to differ on the composition within those aggregates and for that matter his side had so far even refused to discuss MBLMs which we had freely acknowledged to be important to us. Mr. Pleshakov reported that we, not their side, declined to take account of FBS which I briefly disputed.

I remarked that I had heard Mr. Pleshakov's objection to four-to-one loud and clear. Was his objection to the ratio four-to-one or to the principle of unequal numbers for different proposals? He replied what ratio then would I suggest, to which my answer was that I would suggest what was in our proposal, four-to-one. Surely he would not expect something different from me but I still wondered as to the question of principle. Mr. Pleshakov refused to make a distinction between specific numbers and the principle, but he clearly avoided claiming that no difference in numbers was admissible.
A bit plaintively Mr. Pleshakov referred to our earlier discussion and substantial agreement on NCA ABM. Why did we keep on making more proposals? We were making things too complicated. My answer to this was that all along the Soviet side had maintained agreement on ABM was relatively simple as compared with the offensive side. Perhaps we had now shown it was not as simple as even today Minister Semenov's statement had claimed. In any event we needed to discuss details further.

Mr. Pleshakov emphasized that he personally was in full agreement with the view of his Delegation, i.e., that the U.S. proposal was "obviously unacceptable." Mr. Skoptsov said he shared this opinion, and believed that the new proposal, as I had suggested, was indeed evidence that the defensive question was not so simple. He felt that the new proposal represented a detour leading away from the apparent convergence of positions on ABM limitations which Minister Semenov had cited in the plenary session.

When Minister Semenov took his leave, Minister Pleshakov and I had embarked on a discussion over Titans which he had referred to as an MLBM despite its age. While I hesitate to ascribe significance to the remark, I thought that he was hinting that their MLBMs were not so young either, even if they had not shriveled up like grandfather Titan.