TOP SECRET

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ACTION SS-45
INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSD-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DOD-00 SALT 00842

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1119

TOP SECRET SECTION 1 OF 3 USDEL SALT 00842

EXDIS/SALT

SUBJECT: U.S. PROPOSED AGREEMENTS

1. TEXTS OF U.S. PROPOSED OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE AGREEMENTS GIVEN HEREWITH. DELEGATION HAS PREPARED THEM PURSUANT TO GUIDANCE; THEY INCORPORATE THE CHANGES INDICATED IN USDEL SALT 838 AND 839 AND NO NEW POINTS.

2. DELEGATION PLANS TO TABLE THESE TEXTS AT PLENARY SCHEDULED AT 1100 HOURS TUESDAY, JULY 27, AND WOULD APPRECIATE TIMELY AUTHORIZATION TO DO SO. (TEXT OF PLENARY REMARKS: INTRODUCING TEXTS SENT SEPT 1; DELEGATION NOTES SOVIETS EXPECT SUCH TABLING TO OCCUR TOMORROW, AND IT WOULD BE PSYCHOLOGICALLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO BE UNABLE TO DO SO.

3. TEXTS FOLLOW BELOW:

INTERIM AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
ON CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO LIMITATION
OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

IN CONNECTION WITH THE AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
1. Each party shall not, after July 31, 1971, start construction of new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers, and shall limit ICBM launchers to those operational and under active construction as of that date. There shall be no increase in the depth or interior diameter of ICBM launchers.

2. Each party shall limit launchers for modern large ballistic missiles (MLBMS) to those externally completed by December 31, 1971.

3. Each party shall not, after July 31, 1971, start construction of new submarines for submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers, or construct additional SLBM launchers on submarines operational as of that date. Each party shall limit SLBM launchers to those launchers on those SLBM submarines operational and under active construction as of that date.

4. For purposes of this interim agreement, the following definitions apply:

(A) ICBM launchers—launchers for land-based ballistic missiles which are capable of ranges in excess of 5,000 kilometers, including those deployed for possible use at lesser ranges.

(B) MLBMS launchers—launchers for ballistic missiles which have a volume exceeding 70 cubic meters and are of a type which first became operational in 1964 or later.

(C) SLBM launchers—launchers for ballistic missiles on submarines (including launchers on submarines undergoing overhaul or conversion).

5. Notwithstanding paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of this interim agreement, each party shall limit strategic offensive missile launchers for research, development, testing, evaluation, and training, and launchers for space missions.
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TO NO MORE THAN ONE-HUNDRED AND SIXTY (160). THIS LIMIT SHALL INCLUDE ALL LAUNCHERS AT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TEST RANGES AND FACILITIES, LAUNCHERS ON TEST-BED SUBMARINES AND SURFACE SHIPS; AND TRAINING LAUNCHERS AT OPERATIONAL SITES.

6. EACH PARTY SHALL NOT USE COVERED FACILITIES FOR FITTING OUT OR BERTHING SUBMARINES. THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE AGREEMENT SHALL APPLY TO THIS INTERIM AGREEMENT.

7. THE STANDING COMMISSION TO BE ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 11 OF THE AGREEMENT SHALL ALSO PERFORM RELEVANT FUNCTIONS OF THE TYPES PRESCRIBED IN THAT ARTICLE IN CONNECTION WITH THE OBLIGATIONS OF THIS INTERIM AGREEMENT.

8. THE PARTIES SHALL CONTINUE ACTIVE NEGOTIATIONS FOR MORE COMPLETE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THE PARTIES AGREE THAT THE OBLIGATIONS IN THIS INTERIM AGREEMENT ARE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE SCOPE AND TERMS OF THE MORE COMPLETE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO BE NEGOTIATED.

9. EITHER PARTY SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO WITHDRAW FROM THIS INTERIM AGREEMENT UNDER THE CONDITIONS AND IN THE MANNER SPECIFIED IN ARTICLE 13 OF THE AGREEMENT.
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T O P I S E C R E T S E C T I O N 2 OF 3 USDEL SALT 942

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10 THIS AGREEMENT SHALL ENTER INTO FORCE ON THE DATE
ON WHICH EACH PARTY SHALL HAVE INFORMED THE OTHER PARTY BY
WRITTEN NOTICE OF ITS ACCEPTANCE.

DONE IN DUPLICATE IN THE ENGLISH AND RUSSIAN LANGUAGES,
BOTH TEXTS BEING EQUIVALENT AUTHENTIC AT
THIS DAY OF , 19.

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

UNNOTE:

NOTE:

AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS.

PREAMBLE:

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, HENCEAFTER REFERED TO AS THE PARTIES,

PRECEDED FROM THE FACT THAT NUCLEAR WAR WOULD HAVE
DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES FOR ALL MANKIND,

CONVINCED THAT LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC ARMS WOULD

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

The Secret
RESULT IN A REDUCTION IN THE COMPETITION IN STRATEGIC ARMS
AND A DECREASE IN THE RISK OF WAR.

RECOGNIZING THE DIRECT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STRATEGIC
DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE ARMS AND THE NECESSITY TO LIMIT BOTH,

AGREEING UPON CERTAIN MEASURES CONSTRaining STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE ARMS PROGRAMS, PENDING CONCLUSION OF A MORE COMPLETE
AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WHICH WILL BE
THE SUBJECT OF SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES,

MINDFUL OF THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE VI OF THE
TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS,

DECLARING THEIR INTENTION TO ACHIEVE, AT THE EARLIEST
POSSIBLE DATE: THE CESSATION OF THE NON-NUCLEAR ARMS COMPETITION
AND TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES TOWARD REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC
ARMS,

DESIRING TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE RELAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TENSIONS AND THE STRENGTHENING OF TRUST BETWEEN STATES,

HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

ARTICLE 1

THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE TO LIMIT ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE
(ABM) SYSTEMS AND TO ADOPT SUCH OTHER MEASURES RELATING TO
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS AS PROVIDED IN THIS AGREEMENT.

ARTICLE 2

I. FOR PURPOSES OF THIS AGREEMENT, THE FOLLOWING
DEFINITIONS APPLY:

(A) AN ABM SYSTEM IS A SYSTEM FOR RENDERING INEFFECTIVE
STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES OR THEIR COMPONENTS IN FLIGHT
TRAJECTORY.

(B) ABM INTERCEPTOR MISSILES ARE INTERCEPTOR MISSILES
CONSTRUCTED OR DEPLOYED FOR AN ABM ROLE OR OF A TYPE
INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM MISSILES TESTED IN AN ABM MODE.

IT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
TOP SECRET

RESULT IN A REDUCTION IN THE COMPETITION IN STRATEGIC ARMS AND A DECREASE IN THE RISK OF WAR,

RECOGNIZING THE DIRECT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE ARMS AND THE NECESSITY TO LIMIT BOTH,

AGREEING UPON CERTAIN MEASURES CONSTRAINING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS PROGRAMS, PENDING CONCLUSION OF A MORE COMPLETE AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WHICH WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES,

MINDFUL OF THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE VI OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS,

DECLARING THEIR INTENTION TO ACHIEVE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE THE CESSION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS COMPETITION AND TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES TOWARD REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC ARMS,

DESIRING TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE RELAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS AND THE STRENGTHENING OF TRUST BETWEEN STATES,

HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

ARTICLE 1

THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE TO LIMIT ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE (ABM) SYSTEMS AND TO ADOPT SUCH OTHER MEASURES RELATING TO STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS AS PROVIDED IN THIS AGREEMENT.

ARTICLE 2

1. FOR PURPOSES OF THIS AGREEMENT, THE FOLLOWING DEFINITIONS APPLY:

(A) AN ABM SYSTEM IS A SYSTEM FOR RENDERING INEFFECTIVE: STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES OR THEIR COMPONENTS IN FLIGHT TRAJECTORY.

(B) ABM INTERCEPTOR MISSILES ARE INTERCEPTOR MISSILES CONSTRUCTED OR DEPLOYED FOR AN ABM ROLE OR OF A TYPE INDISSINGUISHABLE FROM MISSILES TESTED IN AN ABM MODE.
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(C) ABM LAUNCHERS ARE LAUNCHERS CONSTRUCTED OR DEPLOYED.
FOR ABM INTERCEPTOR MISSILES.

(D) AMB RADARS ARE RADARS CONSTRUCTED OR DEPLOYED
FOR AN ABM ROLE OR OF A TYPE INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM RADARS
TESTED IN AN ABM MODE.

(E) OTHER LARGE PHASED-ARRAY RADARS ARE THOSE PHASED-
ARRAY RADARS OUTSIDE OF MODERN ABM RADAR COMPLEXES, HAVING
A PRODUCT OF POWER (IN WATTS) AND APERTURE (IN SQUARE METERS)
GREATER THAN ONE MILLION.

(F) A MODERN ABM RADAR COMPLEX IS A CIRCULAR AREA OF
NO MORE THAN THREE (3) KILOMETERS IN DIAMETER WITHIN WHICH ARE
DEPLOYED ANY ABM RADAR OR COMPONENTS THEREOF, WHICH FIRST
BECAME OPERATIONAL AFTER JULY 1, 1971, OR ANY PHASED-ARRAY
AMB RADAR OR COMPONENTS THEREOF.

2. THE ABM SYSTEMS OR THEIR COMPONENTS LIMITED BY THIS
AGREEMENT SHALL INCLUDE THOSE:

(A) OPERATIONAL;

(B) UNDER CONSTRUCTION;

(C) UNDERGOING OVERHAUL, REPAIR, OR CONVERSION;

(D) UNDERGOING DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING.

ARTICLE 3

1. EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES NOT TO DEPLOY ABM INTERCEPTOR
MISSILES, ABM LAUNCHERS, OR ABM RADARS EXCEPT IN ITS OWN
TERRITORY AND ONLY AT ONE OF THE FOLLOWING:

(A) ONE CIRCULAR AREA HAVING A RADIUS OF ONE HUNDRED
100) KILOMETERS, CENTERED ON THE PARTY'S NATIONAL CAPITAL;

(B) THREE (3) CIRCULAR AREAS EACH HAVING A RADIUS OF
SIXTY (60) KILOMETERS AND EACH CENTERED ON A POINT IN ICBM:
FIELDS WEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER FOR THE U.S. AND EAST OF

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
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THE URAL MOUNTAINS FOR THE USSR.

2. WITHIN THE AREA REFERRED TO IN SUBPARAGRAPH (A) OF PARAGRAPH 1 OF THIS ARTICLE, A PARTY MAY DEPLOY NO MORE THAN ONE HUNDRED (100) FIXED ABM LAUNCHERS AND ONE HUNDRED (100) ABM INTERCEPTOR MISSILES LOCATED ON OR IN THE VICINITY OF ABM LAUNCHERS; MAY DEPLOY ABM RADARS AT NO MORE THAN FOUR (4) MODERN ABM RADAR COMPLEXES; AND MAY RETAIN THOSE MECHANICAL-SCAN, DISH-TYPE ABM RADARS WHICH WERE OPERATIONAL AS OF JULY 1, 1971.

3. WITHIN THE TOTAL OF THE AREAS REFERRED TO IN SUBPARAGRAPH (B) OF PARAGRAPH 1 OF THIS ARTICLE, A PARTY MAY DEPLOY NO MORE THAN THREE HUNDRED (300) FIXED ABM LAUNCHERS, AND THREE HUNDRED (300) ABM INTERCEPTOR MISSILES LOCATED ON OR IN THE VICINITY OF ABM LAUNCHERS, AND MAY DEPLOY ABM RADARS AT NO MORE THAN FIVE (5) MODERN ABM RADAR COMPLEXES.

ARTICLE 4

1. EXCEPT AS PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF THIS ARTICLE OR AS MUTUALLY AGREED, THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE NOT TO DEPLOY OTHER LARGE PHASED-ARRAY RADARS AS DEFINED IN SUBPARAGRAPH (E) OF PARAGRAPH 1 OF ARTICLE 2, IN ADDITION TO THOSE OPERATIONAL OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION ON JULY 1, 1971.

2. THE SOVIET UNION SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO RETAIN THE OTHER LARGE PHASED-ARRAY RADARS OPERATIONAL OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION AS OF JULY 1, 1971. THE UNITED STATES SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO DEPLOY IN ADDITION TO THOSE OPERATIONAL OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION AS OF JULY 1, 1971, AN AGREED NUMBER OF EARLY WARNING OTHER LARGE PHASED-ARRAY RADARS TO PROVIDE A CAPABILITY EQUIVALENT TO THOSE SOVIET OTHER LARGE PHASED-ARRAY RADARS WHICH PROVIDE EARLY WARNING AND WHICH WERE OPERATIONAL OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION ON JULY 1, 1971.

ARTICLE 5

THE LIMITATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE 3 SHALL NOT APPLY TO ABM INTERCEPTOR MISSILES, ABM LAUNCHERS, AND ABM RADARS USED FOR DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING LOCATED WITHIN CURRENT TEST RANGES OR AGREED ADDITIONAL TEST RANGES. EACH PARTY AGREES TO HAVE NO MORE THAN FIFTEEN (15) FIXED ABM LAUNCHERS AT THESE RANGES.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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ARTICLE 6:

1. EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES NOT TO DEVELOP, PRODUCE, TEST, OR DEPLOY SEA-BASED, AIR-BASED, SPACE-BASED, OR MOBILE LAND-BASED ABM SYSTEMS, OR COMPONENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS.

2. EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES NOT TO DEVELOP, PRODUCE, TEST, OR DEPLOY ABM LAUNCHERS CAPABLE OF LAUNCHING MORE THAN ONE ABM INTERCEPTOR/MISSILE AT A TIME FROM EACH LAUNCHER, NOR TO DEVELOP, PRODUCE, TEST, OR DEPLOY AUTOMATIC OR SEMI-AUTOMATIC OR OTHER SIMILAR SYSTEMS WITH RAPID RELOAD CAPABILITY FOR ABM LAUNCHERS.

ARTICLE 7:

1. THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE NOT TO MODIFY ANY TYPES OF MISSILE SYSTEMS OR THEIR COMPONENTS OTHER THAN ABM SYSTEMS OR THEIR COMPONENTS, WHATSOEVER THEIR ORIGINAL DESIGN MISSION, WITH THE RESULT OF CONVERTING THEM FOR ABM USE OR GIVE THEM A DUAL: ANTI-AIRCRAFT AND ABM ROLE, AND NOT TO DEVELOP OR DEPLOY NEW MISSILE SYSTEMS OR THEIR COMPONENTS OTHER THAN ABM SYSTEMS OR THEIR COMPONENTS FOR SUCH A ROLE.

2. THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE NOT TO TEST MISSILES OTHER THAN ABM INTERCEPTOR/MISSILES IN ANY ABM MODE.

ARTICLE 8:

EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES NOT TO REDUCE THE VIABILITY OR CIRCUMVENT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS AGREEMENT THROUGH TRANSFERS.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY.
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TO THIRD COUNTRIES OF ABM SYSTEMS OR THEIR COMPONENTS LIMITED UNDER THIS AGREEMENT.

ARTICLE 9

IN ADDITION TO AGREING UPON A SEPARATE INTERIM AGREEMENT ON CERTAIN MEASURES TO LIMIT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE TO CONTINUE ACTIVE NEGOTIATIONS FOR MORE COMPLETE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

ARTICLE 10

1. FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROVIDING ASSURANCES OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT, EACH PARTY SHALL USE NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION AT ITS DISPOSAL, OPERATING OUTSIDE THE NATIONAL TERRITORY OF THE OTHER PARTY, TOGETHER WITH THE COROLLARY LIMITATIONS AND COOPERATIVE MEASURES PROVIDED FOR IN THIS AGREEMENT DESIGNED TO SUPPLEMENT NATIONAL VERIFICATION CAPABILITIES.

2. EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES NOT TO INTERFERE WITH THE NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION OF THE OTHER PARTY OPERATING IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 1 OF THIS ARTICLE.

3. EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES NOT TO USE CONCEALMENT MEASURES WHICH IMPEDE VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. THIS OBLIGATION SHALL NOT REQUIRE CHANGES IN CURRENT CONSTRUCTION, ASSEMBLY, CONVERSION, OR OVERHAUL PRACTICES.

ARTICLE 11

TO PROMOTE THE OBJECTIVES AND ASSIST IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT, THE PARTIES SHALL ESTABLISH PROMPTLY A STANDING COMMISSION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF WHICH THEY WILL:

(A) CONSIDER QUESTIONS CONCERNING COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED AND RELATED SITUATIONS WHICH MAY BE CONSIDERED AMBIGUOUS;

(B) PROVIDE, ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS, SUCH INFORMATION AS EITHER PARTY CONSIDERS NECESSARY TO ASSURE CONFIDENCE IN
Department of State

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COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED, INCLUDING THE OFFERING OF SELECTIVE DIRECT OBSERVATION IN ORDER TO CLARIFY AMBIGUOUS SITUATIONS:

(C) CONSIDER QUESTIONS INVOLVING UNINTENDED INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION:

(D) CONSIDER POSSIBLE CHANGES IN THE STRATEGIC SITUATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES WHICH HAVE A BEARING ON THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT:

(E) CONSIDER AS APPROPRIATE POSSIBLE PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER INCREASING THE VIABILITY OF THIS AGREEMENT, INCLUDING PROPOSALS FOR AMENDMENTS; AND,

(F) CONSIDER AS APPROPRIATE PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER MEASURES AIMED AT LIMITING STRATEGIC ARMS.

ARTICLE 12

1. THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE OF UNLIMITED DURATION.

2. --- YEARS AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THIS AGREEMENT, AND AT --- YEAR INTERVALS THEREAFTER, THE PARTIES SHALL TOGETHER CONDUCT A REVIEW OF THIS AGREEMENT.

ARTICLE 13

1. EACH PARTY SHALL IN EXERCISING ITS NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY HAVE THE RIGHT TO WITHDRAW FROM THIS AGREEMENT IF IT DECIDES THAT EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS RELATED TO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS AGREEMENT HAVE JEOPARDIZED ITS SUPREME INTERESTS. IT SHALL GIVE NOTICE OF ITS DECISION TO WITHDRAW TO THE OTHER PARTY, WHICH WITHDRAWAL SHALL BE EFFECTIVE SIX (6) MONTHS AFTER THE DATE SUCH NOTICE IS GIVEN. SUCH NOTICE SHALL INCLUDE A STATEMENT OF THE EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS THE NOTIFYING PARTY REGARDS AS HAVING JEOPARDIZED ITS SUPREME INTERESTS.

2. AFTER --- YEARS HAVE ELAPSED FROM THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGREEMENT AND IF THE PARTIES HAVE NOT REACHED AGREEMENT ON MORE COMPLETE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ARMY AS A RESULT OF NEGOTIATIONS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 9, EITHER PARTY SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO WITHDRAW PROVIDED IT SHALL HAVE GIVEN NOTICE OF ITS INTENTION TO WITHDRAW SIX (6) MONTHS IN ADVANCE. SUCH NOTICE MAY NOT BE GIVEN UNTIL 10 YEARS HAVE ELAPSED AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THIS AGREEMENT.

ARTICLE 14

1. THIS AGREEMENT SHALL ENTER INTO FORCE ON THE DATE ON WHICH EACH PARTY SHALL HAVE INFORMED THE OTHER PARTY BY WRITTEN NOTICE OF ITS ACCEPTANCE.

2. THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE REGISTERED PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 102 OF THE ChARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

DONE IN DUPLICATE, IN THE ENGLISH AND RUSSIAN LANGUAGES, BOTH TEXTS BEING EQUALLY AUTHENTIC, AT , 19 .

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

GP-ISMITH

8/20/1880