MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET

ACTION
September 1, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM: PETER W. RODMAN
SUBJECT: Memcon of Your Talk with Harold Brown

Attached for your approval is my memcon of your talk with Harold Brown on Monday, August 30, 1971. Your talking points and Brown's talking points are attached to the memcon.

Approve See changes

I plan no distribution.

As changed.

Attachments.

TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 1, 1971

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Harold Brown
               Henry A. Kissinger

PLACE: Dr. Kissinger's Office
       San Clemente

DATE & TIME: Monday, August 30, 1971
             11:30 a.m.

Dr. Brown: Do you have any interest in a 2-population-sites deal?

Dr. Kissinger: No. Should I have?

Dr. Brown: No.

Dr. Kissinger: The sons of bitches know damn well that our position
is 3:1. They have no reason to suppose we would agree to 2 missile
sites or 2 population centers.

Dr. Brown: Except thru Bill Beecher!

Dr. Kissinger: They have no reason to take that as our position. I
told Dobrynin last week that if we were interested in population centers,
we would have taken Moscow-Washington. My reason is this: It will
be impossible for us to tell Congress we are scrapping what we have
asked for, in order to build what we have never asked for, with the
Russians staying with what they have.

Dr. Brown: Senators I talked to who came through would be more
willing to go along with NCA if it was part of an actual SALT deal.
This includes Scott, Cooper, Holifield, Hosmer. But you may have
a commitment to Stennis and Jackson that I don't know about.

Both from a strategic point of view, and from the viewpoint of
subsequent trading, in my opinion, Washington is better than Grand
Forks, and we should think about it seriously.

TOP SECRET
Dr. Kissinger: It would amount to zero for us.

Dr. Brown: There may be a way around this: One-for-one-anywhere, with an option to change.

Dr. Kissinger: One-for-one is out of the question. We've given them too much this last year.

Dr. Brown: Do we need 2 missile sites for strategic reasons?

Dr. Kissinger: The Arms control community keeps shifting from one position to the next. First, Doty and his colleagues were waxing eloquent about 2 sites; then they shifted to one site. Next they'll go to zero. It seems impossible for us to stick to an intellectually respectable position.

Dr. Brown: It's important to restrain radars, and also SAM upgrade. I think they'll give on that -- because they can't object to prohibiting what they have been claiming is impossible anyway. How do we get those concessions? I'd be willing to go to one-anywhere-one-anywhere, to get those concessions. I also think an NCA in Washington is more useful than 2 ICBM sites.

Dr. Kissinger: -- if we could get it.

Dr. Brown: The JCS were for 4 missile sites, then maybe 3. If we go down to 2, they too would probably rather have Washington. We could consult Congress, to let them help us make the choice.

Dr. Kissinger: Who do we consult? Percy is mush. Cooper is nice but weak.

Dr. Brown: Mansfield.

Dr. Kissinger: He'll go for zero, or for some gimmick (like putting it in escrow) that amounts to zero.

Dr. Brown: What about Stennis and Jackson.

Dr. Kissinger: Jackson is against NCA -- because all those who went out on a limb on Minuteman will look awful.
Dr. Brown: Maybe not if it's part of arms control agreement.

Dr. Kissinger: The Arms-Control fraternity might object to NCA as the beginning of an area defense; they'll go along with 2 ICBM sites because they know it's militarily useless.

It would be a lousy educational exercise if in the first arms control agreement, the President -- who came in pushing superiority, and whose first major military program was ABM -- is so eager for an agreement that he agrees to stop something unilaterally, and ends up with zero, in exchange for the Russians keeping what they had.

The key question is, What puts the most pressure on the Russians? Hardware and operational experience, in my view. The Arms-Control fraternity is always against what's being proposed -- either on the ground that something better is coming along or on the ground that the old system is adequate.

My mistake was not to sort out the ABM issue completely before we talked to the Russians. I can't understand how it happened that we accepted NCA. I can't reconstruct it.

Dr. Brown: The Soviets would have suggested it if we didn't.

Dr. Kissinger: But how did it become the U.S. position for 6 months? I often make mistakes, but usually I know why afterward.

I think we need an ongoing ABM to keep pressure on the Russians in later negotiations. If we switch to NCA, can we guarantee that Congress will keep it going? It's psychologically important with the Russians, too. I think the Russians are a bunch of thuggish bureaucrats, with a collective leadership problem. We can't keep letting them push us, or they'll draw the wrong conclusions.

By the way, I think Gerry has done a superb job. I've nothing but respect for him. Make sure you tell him the President has complete confidence in him. Garthoff I don't know about.

Dr. Brown: I understand the psychological problem of switching our rationale.
TOP SECRET

Dr. Kissinger: One-for-one is absurd. Two-for-one is a slightly bigger base, and it gives more leverage, though it's not militarily any more significant.

Dr. Brown: Shaw and Garthoff -- the delegation members who understand the Russians best -- think a 2-site-100-interceptors-for-Moscow deal might be possible. It may take a while to get it. What is the time schedule? In the 2-3 more weeks in Helsinki, what do you want us to try for?

Dr. Kissinger: Stick to the present position. Gerry had suggested one-for-one. I don't think he should do that.

Dr. Brown: Maybe one-anywhere . . .

Dr. Kissinger: Congress is mush. In 1969 we had Dirksen and Russell. Where do you go today? We can't go to Congress. They'll put it in escrow, or come up with 20 other variations. No leadership. I can tell you we've been sorely tempted on Vietnam on numerous occasions to go to Congress and engage them. McGeorge Bundy wanted us to make Congress a partner with us in setting a deadline -- but you can't, given the lack of coherent leadership.

Dr. Brown: But some Senators have told me it's a different situation if we get an actual agreement on one-site-anywhere.

Dr. Kissinger: I can just see the cartoons when we go to Congress to ask for something we had never asked for before.

If the President is re-elected and if I stay on, I would want to try to find some better basis for the making of national security policy. It can't be done with Congress the way it is.

Dr. Brown: What should we try to settle by the end of September? The three areas are: offensive freeze, ABM limit and Composition, and radar controls?

Dr. Kissinger: All three.

Dr. Brown: Now, the Soviets know what the pressures are . . .

TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET

Dr. Kissinger: Maybe, but we've done enough -- We made a major move in May, we gave on Berlin. We should have linked Berlin to SALT, I think now. They needed the agreement. If the White House hadn't gotten involved, they'd still be talking about the preamble. They've shown me on Berlin what they can do when they want something.

The Chinese are tough, but meticulous when you reach agreement in principle. The Soviets, once you have an agreement, they fight you over the translation.

Of the three areas, I'd prefer an offensive limit, then an ABM-composition deal.

Dr. Brown: But you won't get radar controls at all if you leave it to last.

Dr. Kissinger: So we don't get it. Let the opposition run against us on that platform!

Dr. Brown: My impression is that the Soviets are behaving as if they expect a political decision by the end of the year. It may be that they think we'll be pushed --

Dr. Kissinger: No.

Dr. Brown: Then maybe it means they want it.

Dr. Kissinger: I think Gerry should stick to our position a bit.

Dr. Brown: It's easy to do. It may help the negotiations.

Now, on offensive limits, the Russians don't want to include subs. This freezes where they are ahead and leaves open where we are ahead. A deal like that doesn't look too good. On ABM, there was an alternative that Gerry for a minute was tempted by but Nitze and I talked him out of: one NCA and one ICBM site each. The Soviets would have Moscow and Sverdlovsk. I'm against it because our targeters would complain.

Dr. Kissinger: It's a helluva agreement that expands what they have. I think it really depends on whether they're emotionally capable of making a deal except when they have us over a barrel.

Dr. Brown: On Offensive limits: They won't be willing to start seriously moving until there is an agreement in principle on ABM composition. Then, when they do, they'll resist the inclusion of SLBM's. What's in

TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET

it for them? To foreclose ULMS? But that's 5 years away anyway. I wouldn't stick on that, though I'd prefer an SLBM freeze.

On large radars, I'd be willing to see a Henhouse freeze without a U.S. equivalent, simply because OTH and satellites would be better for us anyway.

**Dr. Kissinger:** I have no problem, though the JCS might scream.

**Dr. Brown:** Do you see any particular virtue in settling for only a tacit agreement if we run into trouble -- with 2 sites for us and Moscow for them?

**Dr. Kissinger:** I think they'll yield.

We are having fantastic troubles from the right on SALT, and Gerry should know this. SALT has given them more of a blow than China. I just talked with Reagan, who asked me: What are you doing that the Democrats wouldn't have done -- except that you're doing it more efficiently? The President can't ignore this; they are the ones who provide the enthusiasm for him. If he adopted Ted Kennedy's program, our friends would still vote against him. Rockefeller is a Republican who might have been able to hold the Democratic center, but the President never will.

**Dr. Brown:** Do you want to cash in our chips on the accidents agreement?

**Dr. Kissinger:** OK.

**Dr. Brown:** What did the Stennis Committee's action on Safeguard really mean? Denial of Washington?

**Dr. Kissinger:** Yes, denial of Washington plus Jackson's fear that he'll have egg on his face.

**Dr. Brown:** We keep coming back to this question: I'm more optimistic that Congress would buy an NCA as part of an agreement -- but I admit I have no basis for that optimism.

**Dr. Kissinger:** I wish I'd done it better to start with.

**Dr. Brown:** How about an option whereby we finished Grand Forks and then moved it to Washington?

TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET

Dr. Kissinger: I'm worried about the severe impact on the Russians of scrapping our major program in exchange for their just talking about it. The Russians would talk Percy and Cooper into saying we have to scrap Grand Forks first, before building Washington.

We've done a number of uncharacteristically generous things toward the Russians lately. The only times they've ever been flexible have been after the Jordan crisis and after China, and just after we came in. Then we let them up for air -- and they subside.

They've gotten tougher on SALT since the Berlin agreement. I'm not complaining about the Berlin pact -- I engineered it, and it's a good agreement -- but maybe we should have held it up a bit.

Dr. Brown: Maybe we should fix on a 2-missile-sites-for-Moscow deal, with a 100-interceptor limit. It's militarily senseless, but maybe it's a better bargaining position for later.

Dr. Kissinger: It's better than zero.

Dr. Brown: I'd hate to give up radar controls, though, for a second site.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree. I've never heard the proposition that we should have a SALT agreement that has no radar controls.

Dr. Brown: State, the Chiefs, and the Soviet Union support that proposition!

Dr. Kissinger: Why the Chiefs?

Dr. Brown: They figure the Soviets will behave the same way with or without constraints, and they would rather have no constraints on us. This is nonsense. They don't worry enough about not constraining the Soviets, and they worry too much about the difficulties from constraining us.

You've shaken me on NCA. How straight can you play with Jackson?

Dr. Kissinger: I'll talk to Jackson when we get back.

Dr. Brown: What we're doing can't help but look suspicious to Soviets, even given their irrationality. They've built a bedroom, and will stick with it. We've built nothing, and we want to build a strong box.

Dr. Kissinger: I admit I have no military rationale for the missile sites -- but I'm worried about the long-term impact on the Soviets. The Chinese are more formidable: In the Jordan crisis, the Soviets panicked. Chinese never would. They'd take us to and over the line. But the Chinese have

TOP SECRET
the larger picture in mind. The Soviets could have made a generous move at no cost on many occasions, and won enormous good will. But their tendency is to do the opposite.

Dr. Brown: The Soviets are less secure.

Dr. Kissinger: They're highly insecure, and basically second-raters. And they don't understand the U.S. or foreign policy. I was amazed at Chou's understanding --he'd argue on the merits, and we'd have a sensible debate, not these ridiculous arguments about equality and reciprocity.

Dobrynin doesn't always talk that way. In fact, he mentioned that idea that intrigued Gerry. But I told him we had just made a concession, and don't ask for another.