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SEP 29 1971

RS/AN ANALYSIS BRANCH


SUBJECT: SALT MemCon

REF:

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SMITH

Attachment:


GP-1

MICROFILMED BY S/S-1

Reviewed by: 日本語
Date: 29 Sept 1971
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SALT DELEGATION
HELSEINKI, FINLAND

DATE: September 17, 1971
TIME: 12:30 - 12:50 p.m.
PLACE: Soviet Embassy, Helsinki

SUBJECT: Smith-Semenov Post-Mini-Plenary Conversation,
September 17

PARTICIPANTS: US
Ambassador Gerard C. Smith
Mr. William D. Kramer,
Interpreter

USSR
Deputy Foreign Minister V. S. Semenov
Mr. V. Ya. Faekov,
Interpreter

Minister Semenov said he understood that Ambassador Smith had
proposed to hold the concluding Plenary meeting next Thursday.
Ambassador Smith confirmed this and thought it would be useful to
have a general windup of the situation. Semenov further said that
it was his understanding our Executive Secretaries would start work
on the final Communiqué today. Smith confirmed that he had instructed
Garthoff to start this process with Kishilov as soon as possible.

Semenov said it had been reported to him that the meeting of the
new troika yesterday had been very useful. He wondered whether it
would not be advisable next week to have a private meeting with
Smith, possibly with the Executive Secretaries, or in any other
composition that Smith might have in mind, for the purpose of
going over the entire text and in the hope that the two Heads of
Delegations might succeed in removing some of the brackets in that
text.

Smith tentatively agreed. He said that he was not sure
that he would be able to remove any brackets, but if there were
a possibility to do that he would be anxious to explore it.
Semenov said he hoped that Smith had noticed that in today's Soviet statement Semenov had paid special attention to Article 2. It seemed to him that there was an opportunity here to try and remove some differences on language for this Article. In his view Article 2 and Article 3 formed the main basis for the ABM agreement. He quite understood that in regard to Article 3 we faced some serious problems that would require additional reflection with a view to narrowing differences. On the other hand, looking at Article 2, he came to the conclusion that there were possibilities for reaching mutually agreed language. At one time it had appeared to him that such agreed language would be easily achieved, but then somehow the two sides had started moving away from each other. It was the Soviet view that inclusion of the word "indistinguishable" cast doubt on the effectiveness of national technical means of verification. In this connection he would recall that when he had reported on the state of our negotiations at a meeting of his Government in Moscow, one of the fundamental questions asked of him related to national means of verification. He was asked how this matter would be settled between the two Delegations. He had replied that it was his general impression that the US Delegation had a very good understanding of this general situation. At that same meeting some views had been expressed to the effect that this issue of national technical means might prove to be a stumbling block. He would say that inclusion of any provision that would enlarge the shadow of doubt about verification would make consideration of what had been discussed here in Helsinki very much more difficult and might also create additional difficulties at the next phase in Vienna. He would therefore ask the US side to take this fact into consideration. It was quite possible that he was himself at fault in this respect, perhaps not having been convincing enough in expressing the views of the Soviet side on this issue. His argumentation on the efficiency and adequacy of national means and the complete unacceptability of on-site inspection would perhaps require some further presentation. He had a voluminous dossier on this question and apparently he would have to make use of it at the next Vienna phase, presenting his considerations and reasons in support of the Soviet position in greater detail. However, he wanted to express the hope that perhaps we could work the problem out while we were still here and remove the unnecessary difficulties caused by inclusion of the word "indistinguishable."
Smith said that in regard to the Article 2 problem, as he understood it, the Soviet side had not wanted to say anything in Article 2 that might prejudice the Soviet position on SAM upgrade. He had thought that this concern had been resolved between Garthoff and Kishilov when they discussed Articles 4 and 7 of the draft text. But lately he had the feeling that the Soviet position on Article 2 reflected a desire that nothing be done to prejudice the Soviet position on the issue treated in paragraph 1 of Article 6. It seemed to him that we should be ingenious enough to draft Article 2 in such a way as not to prejudice the position of either side in regard to paragraph 1 of Article 6. Smith wanted to emphasize to Semenov the great importance that the US Government attached to this issue. It was his belief that without such a provision, which was similar to analogous provisions included in other treaties, an agreement between us might prove to be simply an illusion. We might think that we had concluded an agreement on limiting ABM systems, only to find that in fact we had only limited launchers, interceptors and radars. He hoped that he had been able to convey to Semenov the great importance we attached to that issue.

On the question of national means, Smith did not believe that there were any significant differences between the positions of the two sides. We accepted the idea that this agreement would be monitored by national technical means of verification, even though in this respect there was an asymmetry which did not favor his side. It was much harder for us to rely on national means only than for the Soviet side. However, we were willing to do this. Still, Smith did not understand why it would be inappropriate for one side to offer direct observation to the other when circumstances indicated that this was called for. For example, what would be wrong with the United States offering direct observation to the Soviet side if the latter believed that certain installations were ABM’s when in fact they were not? In such an event we could invite the Soviets to come and take a look for themselves. Why would it be wrong to include such a provision in an ABM agreement between us? Regarding Semenov's additional arguments that he had mentioned, the dossier, Smith would always be glad to listen to Semenov's presentation and would perhaps be persuaded, although he was not sure.
Semenov said that in regard to Article 2 he would have no objection to a further search by our Executive Secretaries for possible language that would not prejudice our respective positions on paragraph 1, Article 6. However, Article 2 spoke for itself. He did not really know in what sense Article 6 had a bearing on Article 2, since the latter dealt with definitions and in his view this was quite enough for that particular Article. With reference to the US position on Article 6, which had been advanced here in Helsinki for the first time, naturally the Soviet side had carefully listened to the considerations expressed in support of the US position. At this moment he would not care to say any more than had already been said on this issue. Obviously this problem would be kept in his field of vision during the preparation in Moscow for the next Vienna phase.

Frankly, it was his Delegation's impression that inclusion of the word "indistinguishable" in Article 2 would make the entire agreement quite uncertain. What was indistinguishable from launchers, missiles, and radars? This concept in his view was too ill-defined and arbitrary for inclusion in an agreement on ABM's that we have been working on. Furthermore, when we spoke of reaching an agreement to limit ABM's in our two countries, it was his impression that we intended such limitation to be at a minimum level and this in his view was an essential consideration in seeking mutually acceptable positions. In his goal he saw the main basis and the soul of our discussions. Smith was right in his belief that the Soviet side was seriously interested in reaching an ABM agreement. For his part, he proceeded from the same premise regarding the intentions of the US side. Therefore he believed that in this matter we should each take a broader view of the matter, bearing in mind that inclusion of uncertainties in an agreement would surely lead to all sorts of misunderstandings in the future. He emphasized that after concluding an ABM agreement we would be faced with the necessity of solving a number of other questions that were no less difficult than this one. Therefore he believed we should give a green light to the work that lies ahead of us and that that work should be based on the growing mutual trust between our two sides. He asked Smith to note that he had not spoken in these terms in the past, but in the context of recent events and of our work here he was doing so now.

Smith replied that he would like to think over Semenov's suggestion that our Executive Secretaries take over Article 2. This might be acceptable, but before saying any more on the subject he would like to consult with his colleagues.
Semenov said he would be very reluctant to leave Article 2 in brackets. This would create an undesirable impression when he reported to his leadership upon coming home.

Semenov said that he wanted to raise two aspects of Article 3 that could be considered in their interrelationship. For the defense of capitals option the US side had proposed a circular area of ABM deployment with a radius of 100 kilometers. Further, it had also proposed additional limitations on the geographic location of ABM radars in smaller circular complexes. The Soviet side had already explained why it considered that such limitations were not viewed as appropriate for its radar deployment. The question then arose whether or not we could possibly find a compromise solution for this difference between the two positions. He had been instructed to say that if the US side agreed to the Soviet approach to geographic ABM radar limitation, in other words if it gave up its concept of modern ABM radar complexes, the Soviet side could consider the question of reducing the area of ABM limitation from an area defined by a radius of 200 kilometers to an area limited by a 150 kilometer radius. Naturally, Smith would see that this was a compromise solution. He would like to hope that the US side would give due attention to this new and constructive Soviet step toward accommodation. Smith asked for confirmation on whether he had understood the proposal correctly: was it true to say that if the US would abandon its concept of MARCs, the Soviet side would reduce the area of limitation from an area delimited by a circle with a 200 kilometer radius to a circle with a 150 kilometer radius? Semenov confirmed that this was true. Smith said that he would report this compromise proposal to Washington promptly. He would, however, also give Semenov his initial reaction to this idea. These two kinds of circles seemed to him to be on two different planes and offhand he could not see how movement on the larger circle could be viewed as adequate compensation for movement on what we considered to be an essential part of this agreement. It seemed to us important that ABM radars be confined to relatively few locations in relatively small areas. However, as he had said, he would report this proposal to Washington promptly. Semenov said that his proposal applied to the defense of capitals alternative and he wanted to assure Smith that this question had nothing to do with the possibility of creating a dense local ABM system. The Soviet side had no such intention and he trusted neither did the US side. Smith would undoubtedly appreciate that when deploying an ABM defense for defense of their capitals against accidental and unauthorized launches, the two sides should be free to adopt
whatever technical solution appeared to them advisable and necessary for this purpose. He asked Smith to bear in mind that the Soviet side viewed the defense of its capital very seriously and not only in the framework of SALT. Perhaps the US did not believe this purpose to be too important, but for the Soviet side it was of essential significance and not only from the point of view of SALT, but also in view of well-known circumstances which he would not care to discuss here.

Smith said that he would limit himself to saying that the diameter of the large circle for ABM deployment, in his view, was not related to the existence of smaller circles within that larger area. On the other hand, the existence of these smaller circles in our opinion bore a very sensitive relationship to the entire problem of ABM limitation. Thus a reduction of the radius of the larger circle from 200 to 150 kilometers would not be viewed as appropriate compensation for absence of the other restraints. Semenov said that this proposal, which he had been instructed to suggest to Smith, did represent a very substantial reduction of the large areas, as Smith could easily understand it if he looked at the geometry involved. Smith said he was a poor geometer.
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