TO: Department of State

INFO: DEPT PASS:

FROM: U.S. Delegation SALT, VIENNA

DATE: December 10, 1971

SUBJECT: SALT MemCon

REF:

Attached SALT MemCon is to be reproduced and distributed in accordance with the memorandum to Mr. Rich, Deputy Director, S/S-0, dated February 25, 1971 from Mr. Furnas, Special Assistant to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

SMITH

Attachment:

Parsons, Garthoff-Grinevsky, Kishilov Memcon
December 9, 1971

GP-3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPC/CDR

Date: 11/18/94

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Drafted by:

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Clearances:

SALDEL: William T. Shinn
SECRET/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
U.S. SALT DELEGATION
VIENNA, AUSTRIA

DATE: December 9, 1971
TIME: 12:30 - 12:50 p.m.
PLACE: American Embassy Vienna

SUBJECT: Resolving Differences on ABM Joint Draft Text

PARTICIPANTS: US

Ambassador J. Graham Parsons
Dr. Raymond L. Garthoff

USSR

Mr. O. A. Grinevsky
Mr. N. S. Kishilov

The discussion on reciprocal modifications to narrow differences on the ABM JDT (see A-619 and A-626) continued.

Because of a conflicting engagement, Grinevsky and Kishilov had to leave after only a brief discussion. It was agreed that the same group would meet again on December 10, following the mini-plenary.

Garthoff inquired about the Soviet reaction to his personal suggestion on December 7 for a small change in the preamble. Grinevsky replied that he did not have an official response to convey, but both he and Kishilov said that they thought the suggestion would be acceptable. Garthoff recalled that he had advanced the suggestion as a personal one, but could now report that his Delegation would be prepared to support it.

Most of the discussion resolved around Article II. Grinevsky began by delivering a short speech to the effect that the Soviet side did not regard the article as necessary, that it had been found troublesome, and that it was something of a concession by his side even to be making the effort to resolve differences. Moreover, it was related to the differences contained in Article V. His remarks implied that members of his Delegation believed there should be a "tradeoff" involving the US dropping Para 3 of Article V in exchange for Soviet acceptance of a definitional Article II as proposed by the US side. Garthoff stated again that the US side considered Article II to be important, that the definitional approach was non-prejudicial to Soviet as well as American
positions on other articles such as Article V, and that the US position on Article V involved a matter of important substance which could not be "traded". He also said that while we were not proposing any particular "package", Grinevsky and Kishilov of course recognized that we were working simultaneously on possible resolution of differences on a number of articles, and had to find some combination of such articles which would represent in the eyes of both Delegations an equitable balance of movement on various points by both sides; we considered that Article II should be included in such a group of articles. Articles V and VI, on the other hand, like Article III, evidently were not ripe for resolution at this time. Grinevsky nodded understanding, and remarked that his side would need to address Articles II and V on some early occasion, but that their informal work on resolving differences should continue and would be the best way to reach agreement. (In these remarks, Grinevsky seemed to imply that it would be necessary for his Delegation to go through a ritual of trying to get concessions from our side on Article V before he would be authorized to reach an agreement accepting the basic US position on Article II.)

Garthoff asked if there were further reactions from Grinevsky and Kishilov to the oral remarks he had made in response to the Soviet text passed over to us on December 8. Grinevsky said there were not. Garthoff said that for convenience he had prepared a typewritten copy reflecting approximately what he had said the day before, which he would give Grinevsky and Kishilov (see attachment). Grinevsky and Kishilov both seemed disappointed on hastily reading it, but raised no new considerations (except for Grinevsky's dissatisfaction with the word "counter", which Garthoff—and Kishilov—confirmed had been used throughout in our exchanges without objection from the Soviet side.

Grinevsky asked about our reaction to the new Soviet proposal on Article IX. Garthoff replied that we acknowledged that the new proposed language was more precise than had been the earlier bracketed clause. Nonetheless, we continued to believe it was not necessary, and it would cause difficulties. Accordingly, we remained firmly on the position that Article IX should consist only of the unbracketed text of the September 23 JDT. Grinevsky and Kishilov both seemed disappointed. Grinevsky asked if it would help to use the word "technology" in the English text, rather than a literal translation "technical documentation" which, they understood, was not a usual American term; the expression in Russian would not, however, be changed. Garthoff remarked that "technology" sometimes had the connotation of "hardware", whereas the day before they had suggested that the term in Russian also meant to cover blueprints and
technical calculations. Grinevsky merely repeated that if it would be easier for the US side, his side had no objection to the use of the term "technology" in English. He indicated that his Delegation would probably propose their new formulation for Article IX, and present supporting arguments, in the near future.

In response to a question, Grinevsky stated that he had no additional comments to make concerning other articles.

Attachment:

Article II

SALDEL/EXO:RLGarthoff/res
12/10/71
ARTICLE II

1. For purposes of this Agreement:

(a) an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory;

(b) ABM interceptor missiles are interceptor missiles constructed for an ABM role, those deployed for an ABM role, and those of a type tested in an ABM mode;

(c) ABM launchers are launchers constructed for launching ABM interceptor missiles, and those deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles; and

(d) ABM radars are radars constructed for an ABM role, those deployed for an ABM role, and those of a type tested in an ABM mode.

2. The ABM components listed in subparagraphs (b), (c), and (d) of paragraph 1 of this Article shall include those which are:

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(a) operational;
(b) under construction;
(c) undergoing testing;
(d) undergoing overhaul, repair, or conversion;
or
(e) mothballed.