TO: Department of State

COPY NO. 2

INFO:

FROM: U.S. Delegation SALT, VIENNA

DATE: December 23, 1971

SUBJECT: SALT MemCon

REF:

Attached SALT MemCon is to be reproduced and distributed in accordance with the memorandum to Mr. Rich, Deputy Director, S/S-O, dated February 25, 1971 from Mr. Furnas, Special Assistant to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

SMITH

Attachment:

Parsons, Garthoff-Grinevsky, Kishilov Memcon
December 20, 1971
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
U.S. SALT DELEGATION
VIENNA, AUSTRIA

DATE: December 20, 1971
TIME: 1:40 – 3:50 p.m.
PLACE: Franziskaner Restaurant
Vienna

SUBJECT: SALT

PARTICIPANTS:

US

Ambassador J. Graham Parsons
Dr. Raymond L. Garthoff

USSR

Mr. O. A. Grinevsky
Mr. N. S. Kishilov

The chief purpose of the working luncheon reported below was to further explore possibilities for narrowing differences on the two joint draft texts. Some points relating to other aspects of SALT also arose.

Relationship between ABM and Offensive Freeze JDTs

Grinevsky made clear that his Delegation is reluctant to move very rapidly on the offensive JDT in the absence of any continuing movement on the ABM JDT. The American participants made clear that it was the wish of the US side to move forward on both texts, but that we continued to seek resolution of Article II, along with Articles XI through XIV of the ABM JDT at the same time. But the US side was not holding back on the ABM JDT, and would do its part to help reach agreement that very day on Article II, if the Soviet side was also prepared to do so.

Offensive Freeze JDT

Grinevsky noted some minor uncertainty in his Delegation over the American proposed change in wording of the modernization article, but he and Kishilov agreed with a suggestion by Garthoff on two alternative ways that this could be handled, in terms of slight differences in translation.

Grinevsky twice raised the suggestion of solving differences over the preamble of the offensive text, but after determining that the US side was not prepared to accept the Soviet preferred solution, he did not have an authorized alternative to propose. There was some discussion of a suggestion advanced earlier at the working level, the essence of which
would be to retain the American proposed reference to "recognizing the relationship between offensive and defensive arms", but dropping the additional phrase "and the need to limit both", which the US side had earlier included in its proposal. Participants on both sides again stated that they were not in a position to determine positions of their Delegations on this point, even in an ad referendum way, but both agreed to consider with their Delegations the possibility of a compromise along the lines indicated.

Verification and "Special" Concealment

Grinevsky reported that his Delegation had not yet had sufficient opportunity to consider the last US proposal for language of an interpretative statement on the meaning of "special" concealment measures. He again repeated, however, that his Delegation continues to have difficulty with the expression "any actions" which does not correspond with usual established practice. Garthoff urged that he seek approval by his Delegation of the most recent US proposal, but agreed to consider deletion of the single word "any" modifying "actions". Grinevsky expressed appreciation, and said that his Delegation would continue to examine this question.

Article I of the ABM JDT

Grinevsky offered a Soviet counterproposal to our most recent suggestion for the second paragraph of Article I. The Soviet counterproposal would read as follows: "The Parties undertake not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of the country, and also not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region in excess of the limitations provided for in Article III of this treaty." Garthoff noted that the suggested reformulation substituted the limits established under Article III for our term "thick defense" of a region. He was not sure that this suggestion was an improvement over the term "thick", but he did not see any objection in substance to the alternative way of wording the point. The Soviet suggestion also omitted the US proposed phrase "and not to provide a base for such defenses." Both American participants questioned whether a formulation omitting this phrase would be acceptable to the American side. Grinevsky agreed to consult further with his Delegation on whether they could accept the addition of such a phrase, and the American participants agreed to pass along the Soviet suggestion for omitting it. It was agreed that, in any event, it would be necessary to establish more precise limitations in appropriate subsequent articles.
Article II of the ABM JDT

Following the mini-plenary meeting earlier that day, Garthoff had given Grinevsky a revised draft Article II (see attachment). Grinevsky noted that there were three problems remaining. First, sub-paragraph (a) used the simple expression "to counter" strategic ballistic missiles. He said that he was not sure if this formulation would be acceptable to his Delegation; he did not exclude the possibility, but he did suggest—as he had done in his dinner conversation with Garthoff on December 17—use of the expression "serving to counter...". Garthoff in turn said that inclusion of the word "serving" might be acceptable to his side, but this was uncertain—that the simple expression "to counter" seemed clear enough and was acceptable to the US side. He therefore urged Grinevsky to see if it was acceptable to the Soviet side, and meanwhile both could continue to think about "serving" as a possible addition.

Grinevsky stated that the second problem was the absence of a connective between the sub-paragraph defining ABM systems, and the three sub-paragraphs following which defined components. His Delegation strongly believed that there should be some connective such as "namely" or "consisting of". Garthoff stated that the American side did not consider that a connective of this kind was either necessary or desirable. If, however, there were to be one, it should be precise. Therefore, he suggested, we might consider use of the phrase "currently consisting of" as a connective. This was clearly a new thought to Grinevsky and Kishilov and they appeared uncertain of the reaction of their side. Garthoff noted that the Soviet side, as well as the American, recognized that their could be future systems, and while the question of constraints on future systems would be settled elsewhere than in Article II, the correct way of indicating a valid connection between components and systems in Article II would be to include the word "currently". Grinevsky agreed to take up this possibility with his Delegation.

The third point which Grinevsky raised was the handling of "testing" in the three sub-paragraphs dealing with ABM components. Grinevsky noted that in his conversation with Garthoff on December 17, the expression "tested and deployed" had been included in the first half of each of the three sub-paragraphs; it was absent in the draft they had been given earlier that day. Garthoff acknowledged that fact, and said that we considered it unnecessary to include the words "tested and", but he believed that if the Soviet side strongly wanted them included, we could probably agree. We could not, however, regard that reference to "tested" as a substitute for the phrase "or of a type tested in an ABM mode". Grinevsky indicated that was precisely what he was about to
suggest. The American participants vigorously argued for the need to include this additional phrase, and with no promise of success the Soviet participants agreed to try this approach with their Delegation.

Article V of the ABM JDT

Grinevsky raised the question of dealing with future ABM systems through statements on the record concerning consultation prior to deployment in the Standing Commission. Garthoff noted that the suggestion which he had advanced in this respect was for an agreed minute; formal plenary statements might be used, but in any case there must be a clear agreed mutual understanding that, prior to any deployment of future systems and components, there would be consultation and agreement in the Standing Consultative Commission. Grinevsky acknowledged this, and said that perhaps an agreed minute could be used. He did remark that there might be some question about the precise action to be taken through the Standing Commission. Garthoff again noted that his suggestion was for consultation and agreement prior to any such deployment. Grinevsky said that it was necessary to think further about this matter, but that the approach suggested was of interest.

Article IX of the ABM JDT

Grinevsky asked if there were a draft of the kind of statement or minute that could be made to express the understanding that the non-transfer provision would include technical documentation and blueprints. Garthoff then gave Grinevsky the following illustrative draft statement:

The Soviet Delegation understands the proposed Article IX of the ABM Treaty to mean that neither the US nor the USSR will provide ABM systems or their components, as identified in Article II, to other countries, and that this obligation includes not providing technical specifications and blueprints specially worked out for the creation of such ABM systems and components. If the US side agrees with this understanding, the Soviet Delegation is prepared on that basis to agree to the proposed formulation of Article IX.

Grinevsky said his Delegation would consider the matter further, but they continued strongly to prefer inclusion of such an understanding in the text of the treaty. Garthoff repeated that the US side did not see the need for such a statement in the agreement, but was prepared to consider a side understanding of the kind represented by the text he had just provided.
ABM Levels

Grinevsky asked if the US side would provide a reaction to the latest Soviet proposal on ABM levels before the holiday. Garthoff replied in the negative, but hoped we would have more to say on the subject in January.
ARTICLE II

1. For purposes of this Agreement:

(a) an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory;

(b) ABM interceptor missiles are interceptor missiles deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode;

(c) ABM launchers are launchers deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles; and

(d) ABM radars are radars deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode.

2. The ABM components listed in paragraph 1 of this Article shall include those which are:

(a) operational;

(b) under construction;

(c) undergoing testing;

(d) undergoing overhaul, repair, or conversion; or

(e) mothballed.