The attached SALT MemCon is to be reproduced and distributed in accordance with the memorandum to Mr. Miller, Deputy Executive Secretary, S/S, dated December 6, 1971 from Mr. Christopher, Special Assistant to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

SMITH

Attachment:

US/USSR Mini-Plenary Meeting No. 13
January 7, 1972
SECRET/EXDIS

SALT VI
US/USSR Mini-Plenary Meeting No. 13
U.S. Embassy
1100 Hours, January 7, 1972

Persons Present:

Ambassador Smith  Minister Semenov
Ambassador Farley  Academician Shchukin
Ambassador Parsons  General Trusov
Mr. Nitze  Mr. Kishilov
General Allison  Admiral Sinetsky
Dr. Garthoff  Colonel Baranovsky
Colonel Fitzgerald  Mr. Artemiev (Interpreter)
Mr. Krimmer (Interpreter)

Discussion:

Ambassador Smith welcomed the Soviet Delegation to the
U.S. Embassy for the first time this year and gave the floor
to Minister Semenov.

Minister Semenov said that the Soviet Delegation had carefully
studied Ambassador Smith's statement of January 5 and paid
attention to several of its aspects. They had especially noted the
comment that the review of the pre-holiday Vienna phase and the
Soviet ABM proposal of December 15 was continuing. The Soviet
Delegation had also noted Ambassador Smith's words which apparently
pointed to the possibility of forward movement in the talks in the
near future. At the same time, the brevity of the statement and their
understanding of the specific content did not permit seeing with
sufficient clarity the possibility of progress in the development of the
negotiations. Therefore, the Soviet Delegation would like to express
the hope for further development of these points. Clarification
would open the way to more complete mutual understanding and to
advances in working out the joint draft texts of both a treaty on
limiting ABM systems and an interim agreement for a freeze on
certain offensive arms. The Soviet Delegation noted that the January
5 statement had referred to U.S. readiness to consider questions in
both areas and to work on both draft texts in parallel. The Soviet
side holds a similar position on parallel discussions.

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Minister Semenov concluded that evidently the two sides share a common opinion on the usefulness of working in this parallel direction with the maximum possible intensity. Delays in the development of the sides' respective positions could hardly be useful. In view of this fact, the January 5 statement concerning the desirability of achieving success early this year corresponds to the Soviet Delegation's understanding and the Soviet side is prepared to make a constructive and business-like effort in this direction.

Minister Semenov then gave the floor to General Trusov.

General Trusov said that at the last Mini-Plenary the U.S. Delegation had raised the question whether the Soviet December 15 proposal for limiting ABMs provides that ABM components deployed for protection of ICBM silo launchers would be limited to the area within one ICBM base. The USSR Delegation had already clarified its position concerning the December 15 proposal, and, in this connection, he wanted to refer particularly to the Soviet statements made on December 17 and 22.

General Trusov, in answering the U.S. question, wanted once again to stress in regard to the December 15 proposal that the Soviet side proceeds from the premise the deployment of all ABM components for defense of ICBM silo launchers in both the U.S. and the USSR would be limited to one immediate area -- base -- of actual deployment of ICBM silo launchers. The Soviet side also deems it necessary that the sides undertake obligations not to deploy for defense of ICBM silo launchers such ABM components as could be used in the interest of providing an ABM defense of the territory of the country.

Ambassador Smith asked if the Soviet Delegation had any additional statements to make at that time.

Minister Semenov said they had none at the moment.

Ambassador Smith then gave a statement on an ABM agreement as a treaty (see Attachment 1).

Minister Semenov noted with satisfaction that the U.S. side had enunciated its official position that limitations on ABM systems could be formalized by concluding a treaty. In evaluating the significance of this question, the Soviet side had from the very
beginning proceeded from the premise that it would be appropriate to formalize agreement on ABM limitations by concluding a treaty which would emphasize the importance of the agreement both in regard to relations between the two Governments and in regard to strengthening peace. Therefore, it could be noted that the positions of both sides coincide in regard to this question. This made it possible to reach agreement on the appropriate provisions of the Joint Draft Text of the Treaty for limiting ABM systems. It also would have a good effect on the work of the Special Working Group.

Ambassador Smith asked if the Soviet side would like to proceed.

Minister Semenov replied that perhaps the U.S. side should make some observations so as to maintain a balance.

Ambassador Smith said that, in that case, he would like to ask General Allison to offer certain considerations.

General Allison gave a statement on SLBMs (see Attachment 2).

Minister Semenov asked General Trusov to speak.

General Trusov said that at the last Mini-Plenary the U.S. Delegation had once again addressed the question of the U.S. position on including SLBMs in an interim freeze on strategic offensive arms, and General Allison had devoted his statement to this question today. The Soviet Delegation was authorized to state that the Soviet side cannot agree with the U.S. proposal that SLBM launchers be included in the systems to be frozen. As it has repeatedly stated, the Soviet side proceeds from the assumption that limits on SLBM launchers can be subsequently considered as a component element in limiting strategic offensive arms as a whole. The Soviet Delegation has given convincing arguments in favor of this proposal. Further active negotiations on strategic offensive arms, during the course of which solutions to this entire problem will be reached, will be conducted after solutions have been reached on the questions envisaged by the May 20 Understanding.
General Trusov said that the desire of one side to expand the scope of the freeze would not facilitate mutually-acceptable agreement within the framework of the instructions to the two Delegations. It would complicate the work of the two sides by including those problems which the May 20 Understanding was designed to overcome. The Soviet Delegation had taken note of the U.S. Delegation's January 5 statement which said that the joint working document on a freeze agreement provides a useful starting point for developing a mutually-acceptable interim agreement for certain measures with respect to strategic offensive arms. The USSR Delegation is deeply convinced that its proposal provides a realistic basis for working out such an agreement.

Ambassador Smith said the U.S. side had no more statements to make today.

Minister Semenov said that the Soviet Delegation was richer than the U.S. side in this respect and gave the floor to Academician Shchukin.

Academician Shchukin said that in regard to Mr. Nitze's statement at the previous Mini-Plenary on January 5, he wanted to offer a few considerations on the question of limiting ABM systems and individual components thereof for defense of ICBM silo launchers. As had been stated before, particularly on December 14 and 20, the Soviet side believes that, in limiting ABM systems, the provisions contained in the agreed Article I of the Joint Draft Text for a treaty limiting ABMs and in the clarifications given on December 22 to the Soviet draft Article III should be observed in such a way that ABM components for defense of ICBM silo launchers must be envisaged with constraints such that they could not form the basis of an ABM defense of the territory of the country. In this regard the Soviet Delegation had tabled a proposal that the sides assume obligations not to use for defense of ICBM silo launchers ABM components which could be used for an ABM defense of the territory of the country.

Academician Shchukin said that at the November 30 meeting the Soviet Delegation had referred to a number of specific constraints on ABM components for defense of silo launchers and proposed that the deployment of ABM components for defense of silo launchers should be immediately within the limited areas of deployment for such launchers. The Soviet side considers that, inasmuch as ABM components deployed in the area of actual deployment of ICBM silos should not have the capability of protecting targets other than the silo launchers,
the limitations for these ABM means should be different from those deployed for defense of the national capital against unauthorized and accidental launchers. In particular, it is intended that the ABM means deployed for protection of ICBM silo launchers could not include, for example, interceptors of the SPARTAN type or ABM radars of the PAR type, inasmuch as such components of ABM systems have the capability of protecting targets other than silo launchers. In this connection, Academician Shchukin wanted to ask about the U.S. side's view as to whether, in its opinion, the so-called Modern ABM Radar Complex corresponds to those limitations under which use of Modern ABM Radars in an ABM system for defense of ICBM silo launchers would not provide capabilities for defending objects other than silo launchers. He would like to hear any considerations the U.S. side has on this question.

Ambassador Smith said the U.S. Delegation would like to study Academician Shchukin's statement and question and return to them at a subsequent meeting. He then asked if the Soviet Delegation had any further statements to make.

Minister Semenov replied in the negative.

Ambassador Smith said that in that case there was no additional business other than to set the date of the next meeting.

Minister Semenov suggested that, "as an exception," the sides could agree to meet on Tuesday, January 11, at the Soviet Embassy. The composition of the meeting could be agreed subsequently.

Ambassador Smith agreed, and declared the meeting closed.

Drafted by: CG Fitz Gerald: jm
January 8, 1972

Approved by: Ambassador Gerard Smith

Attachments.
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STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SMITH
(January 7, 1972)

When the U.S. Delegation tabled a draft text for an ABM agreement on July 27 of last year, a reservation was placed on the question of whether it would eventuate in a treaty or a less formal agreement. The draft text used the neutral word "Agreement" instead of "Treaty", and contained an entry-into-force provision which would, under our Constitution and practice, permit an ABM agreement to be either a treaty or an executive agreement.

The Soviet Delegation has repeatedly stressed that an ABM agreement should be in treaty form. The U.S. side continued to reserve its position pending completion of the thorough review which a matter of this significance warrants.

Under the United States Constitution, major international agreements are made in the form of treaties and require the advice and consent of the Senate. In the arms control field, this has generally been the form adopted. The process of seeking the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification of a treaty broadens the public awareness and impact of an agreement. Senate consent establishes

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broad political consensus supporting both the objectives and the terms of the treaty in question. Once ratified, the treaty becomes the supreme law of the United States.

The agreement that we are trying to reach to limit antiballistic missile systems—when taken together with an interim freeze on offensive weapons—would be a very important step in the field of arms control. Not only would it be significant in terms of our security and the overall relationship between our two countries, but it would also be important for international peace and security in general.

Washington having reviewed this subject, I am now instructed to state that the U.S. position is that an ABM agreement should be in the form of a Treaty.

It has been agreed that the Certain Measures with respect to strategic offensive arms should be specified in an interim agreement. Under American terminology, this would be an "executive agreement." This form of instrument would reflect the interim nature of an offensive freeze, and the fact that it would deal only with certain strategic offensive systems.

As you know, we view restraints on offensive systems as being of no less importance than restraints on defensive
systems. Initial measures freezing certain strategic offensive arms are, pursuant to the May 20 understanding, to be followed by further negotiations looking toward more comprehensive limitations which should also be the subject of a treaty.

Although there would be a difference in form in the initial instruments, it is our position that constraints in both the offensive and defensive areas should come into effect simultaneously, and that while constraints persist in one area constraints should also continue to obtain in the other. I shall return to this matter at a subsequent meeting.
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STATEMENT BY GENERAL ALLISON
(January 7, 1972)

I

The U.S. Delegation has emphasized on a number of occasions the importance of including SLEM launchers in any interim agreement freezing strategic offensive arms.

II

Our common task, in addition to limiting ABMs, is to reach an interim agreement on certain offensive arms, and in the process to create more favorable conditions for further negotiations. We do not see how such favorable conditions would be created by omitting one of the two major elements of strategic offensive missile forces from an interim freeze.

III

It may be helpful to take a brief look at the prospective dynamics of the levels of strategic arms possessed by the two sides. First, we note that the number of strategic aircraft is not increasing. Second, the two sides are agreed that
launchers for land-based strategic offensive missiles should be frozen. Third, of the strategic offensive systems which one side or the other is suggesting be limited, SLBM launchers comprise that element which is increasing most rapidly. It seems fair to say that were SLBM launchers not included in the restraints of an interim freeze agreement fore-shadowed by the May 20 understanding, this would leave open, unnecessarily, we believe, a major avenue for further strategic arms competition.

IV

During SALT, both sides have recognized that in many respects their objectives and principles coincide. A key item in the framework for our negotiations has been that arms control agreements should not encourage the proliferation of weaponry. This is the obligation which both our countries assumed under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. From this perspective, one can say that should SLBMs not be frozen, we will have departed from a basic tenet on which our talks are established. What is more, we will have done so by omitting the fastest-growing strategic force.
IV

The USSR Delegation has stated that proposing a freeze on SLBM submarines, to effect a freeze on SLBM launchers, introduces a new element into our negotiations. We believe that the U.S. July 27 proposal is consistent with the application to SLBMs of the concept of a freeze on strategic offensive missile launchers. The U.S. Delegation believes, however, that the primary requirement is to constrain ICBM and SLBM launchers.

One of our major efforts in the next few weeks should be to seek a mutually acceptable solution to this SLBM issue. This matter has been reviewed in Washington, and it remains the conviction of my Government that SLBM launchers should be included in an interim freeze.

We are ready to try to work out with you ways in which this may be done.