MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
U. S. SALT DELEGATION
HELSINKI, FINLAND

DATE: April 16, 1972
TIME: 7:00 to 8:30 p.m.
PLACE: Finnair
Lapland to Helsinki

SUBJECT: SALT Problems and Prospects

PARTICIPANTS:

US
Dr. Raymond L. Garthoff

USSR
Mr. O. A. Grinevsky
Mr. N. S. Kishilov

(Note: There had been virtually no substantive discussion between the USSR and US Delegations during the weekend excursion to Lapland. During the visit to the cross-country ski camp on the tundra, Kishilov suggested to me that we ride a snowmobile to have privacy for some discussion; however, Mrs. Semenov joined us on the snowmobile, precluding substantive discussions. On the flight back, Kishilov indicated that he wished to talk, and an extensive discussion followed, the major part also including Grinevsky.)

Semenov in Moscow

Kishilov said that Semenov had returned to Moscow as a result of his own decision that it was timely to report personally to his authorities to request new instructions. He and certain colleagues had flown to Moscow Saturday morning, and would probably return Wednesday. Kishilov emphasized that Semenov would be meeting with the "highest authorities", and that it was very important that they get "the right decisions" at this time. Kishilov also said that he might go to Moscow himself on Monday to join them.

SLBMs

At this point in the conversation, and on two later occasions, I stressed the paramount importance of Soviet agreement to include SLBM launchers in the freeze. I said Soviet agreement to include SLBMs would help in resolving other problems. At a later point in the conversation, with Grinevsky also present, the latter asked what would happen if they did not agree to include SLBMs. I said I did not know, but if the SALT talks were not to succeed, I thought the consequences would be much worse than merely fail to reach an...
agreed outcome. I stressed that SLEM inclusion was the key to agreement in general, and would facilitate resolution of other problems—though it would still be necessary to reach mutually acceptable solutions to other problems.

**ABM Levels**

Kishilov turned to the central problems of ABM limitation. He said all our present problems were compounded by the idea of the US defending a second ICBM base, and it seemed to him that the outcome would need to be agreement for two sites on each side with the second American site at the national capital. Otherwise, he explained, the US would be defending 350 ICBM silos and the Soviets would need many more than two ICBM defense sites. (As Kishilov referred to defending 350 silos, I interrupted to say not really more than 200, with a limit of 200 ABM interceptors.) Grinevsky remarked that Malmstrom as a second site for the US was "not acceptable."

I emphasized that I could not of course speak on this matter officially, but personally I thought the possibility of the second site being Washington was not excluded in the context of agreeing to include SLEMs.

Kishilov and Grinevsky then said that if we were to agree on a 2 for 2 level, it was still necessary somehow to meet their position on defense of an equal number of ICBM silos. I said that I thought it should be possible to meet both the US position on an equal number of sites, which we regard as essential, and the Soviet position on defense coverage of a comparable number of silos. Kishilov suggested an increase in the area of coverage of Soviet ICBM silos. I said we could consider that. Kishilov then suggested an increase from 70 to 150 kilometers radius in the ABM deployment circle. I again said that we could consider that possibility, and that it probably could be possible to agree. I noted that in such a case it would be possible for the Soviets to have an approximately equal number of silos covered, say, ten more or less than the US, in the non-European part of the USSR. Kishilov remarked that a 150 kilometer circle for the US would make no real difference—it would still mean the Grand Forks ICBM base. (Comment: I did not comment on this point, since his interpretation is the one we would wish them to have.) Kishilov and Grinevsky said they were still not sure of some things with respect to Soviet ICBM deployments. They thought this was a possible solution, but did the Soviet side really only need one area? Also, why did the US want the Soviet ABM deployment for ICBM defense limited to the non-European area? Would this not constrain Soviet choice of ICBMs it wished to defend? I replied that it would be possible to combine the Soviet insistence on overall protection of an equal number of silos with holding the Soviet side to one enlarged deployment circle. In fact, there was more than one place in the non-European part of USSR where
that could be done, and would involve the possibility for the Soviet side to
defend two ICBM fields within one such circle. The Soviet side would also
have an option of deploying ABM defense for "heavy" ICBMs. At one point,
Kishilov asked whether we should consider some area (apparently, an equal
area for the two sides) other than a circle with 150 kilometer radius, but I
replied that I thought such a circle would be easier to agree on.

Both Kishilov and Grinevsky spoke in terms assuming a three or five
year deferral of the second site. The only possible exception was a remark
by Grinevsky that the Soviet side thought it should have some silo protection
from the outset since the US would have, but Kishilov seemed to brush this
aside. (Comment: It was not clear whether Grinevsky had in mind meeting
this point through modification or abandonment of the deferral idea, and
whether Kishilov was disagreeing or simply did not want to get into that
question further at this time.)

Kishilov asked about the matter of referring explicitly to national
capitals in the Treaty text. I said that we wanted to do so. Grinevsky
asked why it was necessary and said the Soviet side had reasons for preferring
not to do so. When I asked what these reasons were, I was not given any clari-
fication, and Kishilov rather abruptly moved on to another subject, simply
remarking that they understood the US did want explicit reference to national
capitals, which I again confirmed.

Kishilov then turned to the question of interceptor/launcher levels.
I said there must be equal numbers, and on that the two sides seemed in agree-
ment. I noted that the US had proposed 100 for each ABM deployment area, and
I assumed this would remain the case if we were to withdraw the option of
Malmstrom as our second site. Grinevsky and Kishilov noted that the Soviet
side had proposed 75 for defense of capitals, but 150 for defense of ICBMs.
I said that 150 for defense of ICBMs seemed too high, and it seemed preferable
to have equal numbers for each type of ABM defense, as well as for each side.
Grinevsky remarked that 100 might be more than they felt was necessary for
capital defense; what about 75 for defense of the capital and 125 for defense
of ICBM silos? I repeated that I thought the numbers should be equal, but that
we seemed to be thinking in the same general range of numbers of interceptors,
and I assumed we could work out something along the lines of proposals of the
two sides. I noted that the lower number of interceptors which the US was
proposing for ICBM defense helped to mitigate any difference in numbers of
ICBM silos "defended" on the two sides, and that while the matter might be
dealt with simply through enlargement of the deployment area for defense of
ICBMs, it could also be served by the smaller number of interceptors. Kishilov
said he was sure something could be worked out.
ABM Radars

Kishilov turned next to this subject, noting radar constraints for defense of ICBMs looked like the toughest problem, if the US continued to stick with the idea of applying MARCs. The Soviet side had indicated that it could agree to MARCs for defense of capitals, and we could talk further about that, but MARCs would be too restrictive for meeting ICBM defenses, which on the Soviet side had not yet even been designed.

I suggested we turn first to numbers of MARCs for defense of the capital. I said there should be an equal number of MARCs, as we had proposed. Kishilov and Grinevsky confirmed that the Soviet proposal involves X number of MARCs plus the existing radars near Chekhov and Naro-Fominsk (referring to these locations specifically, but noting that the location designations had been mentioned earlier by the US side). The US would have simply X number of MARCs. I objected vigorously to the inequality. Kishilov and Grinevsky explained that there was no inequality, their proposal merely took account of what was existing on each side as exceptions, and was an equal trade-off with the US being allowed the one MSR and one PAR at Grand Forks as exceptions to applying equal constraints on ABM radars for ICBM defense, and Chekhov and Naro-Fominsk as existing exceptions to equal constraints for other ABM radars for capital defense. I said I did not agree with that approach, but wanted to know what number the Soviet side had in mind as "X". Was it four? Both Grinevsky and Kishilov replied in the negative. Grinevsky recalled that at Vienna the Soviet side had mentioned the number ten. I recalled that the numbers six and eight had also been mentioned, and nothing had been said about an "additional + 2". I again asked what number they had in mind if not four, for X. Grinevsky replied: "Twice that number". I asked: "Plus two?" Grinevsky replied in the affirmative. I then noted that we had proposed four MARCs for defense of the capital, and could perhaps consider six, but including the radars at Chekhov and Naro-Fominsk. Kishilov suggested that if we could work out the more difficult problem of ABM radar constraints for ICBM defense, he thought it should be possible to compromise between those levels the two sides presently had in mind. (Comment: From this discussion, I assume the Soviets will stand fast on a trade-off between the two large Soviet phased-array ABM radars already at Moscow, and our two at Grand Forks. They will probably propose, in addition to them, eight MARCs for each capital, and be prepared to fall back to six--plus the two existing radars.)

Kishilov said that, in addition to the exception of the one PAR and one MSR for the US, each side should have an unlimited number of ABM radars designed to support only defense of ICBM silos. I disagreed, saying the number of radars for ICBM defense need not and should not be unlimited or even a high number. Both Kishilov and Grinevsky again argued that...
different systems of ABM defense were called for for defense of ICBM silos, as compared to defense of the capital. I asked how many they thought might be needed for such ICBM defense. At first they were evasive, then Grinevsky said perhaps one radar for each interceptor. I said it would be possible to design a system using that many radars, but it was not necessary to do so, and we did not agree that it should be allowed. Kishilov and Grinevsky had argued that their defense had not even been designed yet, and they needed freedom of action, but the purpose of SALT is to find agreed limitations on freedom of action. Kishilov said that MARCs would be too limiting—even six or eight MARCs, he said, would be too few. (Comment: This was the first time anyone on either Delegation had mentioned a number of MARCs other than two per ICBM deployment area.) I questioned Kishilov’s statement, and taking his own example, remarked that six MARCs, each with two site defense radars would allow twelve radars, representing one for each eight interceptors, assuming a 100 interceptor level. Grinevsky seemed to show some interest in that example, but the differing views on ABM radar constraints for ICBM defense remained without further suggestions for resolution.

I remarked that, as Ambassador Smith had said, at the ABM levels we were discussing overall strategic stability would not really be affected by differences in number of silos protected, or differences in ABM components. Grinevsky and Kishilov both agreed.

OLPARs

Remaining time on the flight was drawing short, and Kishilov went on to say "So much for Article III—what else really remains /at issue/ on the ABM side?" Kishilov continued by saying that Article XV on withdrawal can’t really be a sticking point, particularly since they had indicated a way in which that question could be resolved while meeting the essential points on both sides. Grinevsky immediately spoke up to note the Article VI (OLPAR) issue, asking whether the Soviet proposal did not provide a basis for resolution. I said the Soviet proposal was a step forward, but there still remained problems. In the first instance, it applied an unequal standard. Grinevsky replied that, assuming agreement on an equal standard, could we not agree on the smallest Soviet ABM radar as the standard. I asked whether he meant the smallest ABM radar any place, that is, including those at the ABM test range. Both Grinevsky and Kishilov replied in the negative, saying they meant "deployed" ABM radars. I asked whether that meant completed or under construction; I also asked what the smallest Soviet ABM radar is. Grinevsky said I knew. I replied I was not sure if I did, but if they meant the radar near Chekhov, it was too
big. Grinevsky said we could make a distinction between the largest operational radar and the largest under construction. I replied that I was not sure what he had in mind, but the two we had talked about earlier, near Chekhov and Naro-Fominsk, were both very large; I thought too large. Grinevsky said he was only advancing a personal idea, and if it was not a good one, please say so and he could drop it. I replied that from the US standpoint the first essential is an equal standard, and the second essential is that it not be at too high a level to be meaningful. Beyond that, as long as we were clear on the standard, I thought we could discuss various possibilities. I then asked why, if the Soviet side could accept some radar as representing the level of standard, could they not accept the MSR. Grinevsky said the MSR was too low a level. I said we needed to discuss the whole OLPAR question further, and the discussion ended at that unsettled point.

Offensive Limitations

Time was now short, and Kishilov hurriedly asked what the main issues were on the offensive side. For the third time, I emphasized the importance of including SLBM launchers. Kishilov and Grinevsky both indicated that they understood our position. Grinevsky said that a favorable outcome would help in resolving other problems. Kishilov said no, he understood it was more basic than that, that it was necessary for success in the negotiation. I said they were both right. Kishilov said they had nothing more they could say on the subject at that time.

Kishilov said that in the final analysis he assumed we could let mobile land-based ICBMs go /unfrozen/. I objected, and said they should be included in the freeze. The Soviet participants did not, however, want to discuss the matter further, and despite my reaffirmation of our position, I had the impression they did not regard it as our last word.

Kishilov and Grinevsky said there was difficulty in referring to date of signature as a time for something to come into effect, if the date of entry into force was a different date and a much later time. I stressed that the most important thing was the actual effective beginning of the freeze at the date of signature. Kishilov said that was clearly understood. Grinevsky agreed, and said that in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties the sides could act in accordance with an agreement before it entered into force, but it was a different matter to write into the agreement a date of signature as effective date of a provision. He said that he thought, however, that something could be worked out, if we could show flexibility on the formulation of the provisions. He also remarked that there was no real distinction of substance between the date of signature and July 1, 1972--assuming of course that agreement was reached at or around the time of the Summit.
Kishilov asked what else remained. I mentioned the need not to convert older to new ICBMs. Grinevsky interjected that he could not understand why we objected to inclusion of the phrase "in the process of modernization and replacement". I moved on to note the importance of a definition of "heavy" ICBMs, and mentioned that I thought the question of definition of an ICBM seemed near agreement. Grinevsky replied in the negative, saying there was some "trouble" over the last proposed ICBM definition. Some of their people had been measuring across the Pole and came up with a different measurement. I replied that that was a different thing altogether, since we had clearly said "nearest point". Grinevsky said that came to essentially the same thing we had proposed before. I said it was supposed to. We have sought to meet the Soviet objection to a precise quantitative definition, but we were not changing the substance of the matter. On the definition of "heavy", both Kishilov and Grinevsky said that both sides now agree on which are light ICBMs and which are heavy. I said that this did not deal with the question of future ICBMs, and suggested perhaps we could define "heavy" as any missile larger than the current class of light ICBMs, without specific reference to a number of cubic meters or the designation SS-11. The Soviet participants seemed unsure on this point, but thought it could be considered.

I mentioned, but there was not time to discuss, the difference over duration of the Interim Agreement.

Closing Soviet Comments

Kishilov said we should refer to the discussion we had had as "the Tundra discussion" since that had been the idea. Grinevsky said it had been very useful. He expressed the hope things would work out well. He doubted if they would know more about what was happening in the Moscow discussions until the Minister returned.

SALDEL/EXO:RLGarthoff/res
April 17, 1972